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i) Abstract  
Mega-events greatly impact up on their host cities. This is particularly so when we look at the socio-
economic, trade, tourism and commercial opportunities, and the recognised intense challenges such 
interventions pose for existing small business communities situated at the heart of regeneration efforts and 
Games execution. Although studies around ‘community impact’ feature across the literature, these specific 
spaces, and the complex effects upon adjoining small business communities, have been somewhat 
neglected. Arguably, whilst host communities often form hoped-for beneficiaries of project intervention - 
particularly during bidding and prior to hosting Games discourse and policy rhetoric - as the project draws 
closer to the Opening Ceremony, large flagship urban projects, like the Olympics, can often lose sight of 
their initial, virtuous aims. Host communities can be conceived as becoming invisible, somewhat 
depoliticised, and ignored in the melee of the neoliberal city. How best to re-distribute Games-related 
benefits, conceptually and practically speaking is thus a critical and strategic position across this thesis. 
The thesis presents four core research objectives: 1. an in-depth analysis of how host community small 
firms were impacted by the London 2012 Games - specifically those directly affected by project delivery 
across ‘Last Mile’ spaces. This is complemented by a critical examination of how and why tourism and trade 
was affected across host communities, and the specific effects this had on local consumption practices 
during the live Games phases. 2. Critical analysis of how and why host spaces became subject to intense 
territorialisation, being converted into a major project tool, resource and commodity to the detriment of 
existing small firms. 3. Potential small business legacies in light of concerns around on-going gentrification 
and risks of the clone town effect. And finally objective 4. draws on the main findings of the first three 
objectives to identify key lessons learnt and recommends a series of practical ways project actors, business 
support organisations and small firms themselves can better re-distribute Games-related benefits.  
The thesis presents a case study of the London 2012 Games, specifically focused on bounded spaces of the 
‘Last Mile’ and HEZs’, inductive and exploratory in nature. It provides an in-depth, stakeholder informed, 
empirically driven qualitative analysis of the retrospective experiences of four key stakeholder groups. These 
include forty-three in-depth interviews conducted between 2013 – 2015 including: i) small firms impacted 
across the Last Mile of Central Greenwich, ii) official Olympic Borough local authorities and business 
engagement officers, iii) regional and national business support organisations (e.g. Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB), London Chamber of Commerce), to iv) key project actors and governmental bodies at 
city and national level (e.g. Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS), House of Lords). 
Comprehensive analyses of over 30 major policy documents released from 2005 – 2015 and a series of 
documentary, archival and media reports supplement evidence used across the findings and analysis of this 
thesis. The research sits within the sociology of radical change, invoking a radical humanist and critical 
theorist position. 
Findings illuminate the systematic negative impacts, major challenges and exclusionary environments small 
businesses can face throughout all phases of project delivery, specifically immediately before and during 
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Games delivery. Analysis presented across the thesis, including the ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping, illustrates 
how the Games can disrupt existing host business environments and thus reduce the competitiveness of 
small firm performance and survival. Although small firms were promised lucrative opportunities to seize 
Olympic trade, event visitation and tourism, access to these event-related benefits was limited. During what 
should have been a thriving summer period for the heritage and artisan Last Mile topology of Central 
Greenwich and beyond, a range of negative tourism impacts emerge amongst some of the many factors 
contributing to what this thesis terms the ‘anti-tourism perfect storm’. This new contributory 
conceptualisation illuminates the intense accumulation of negative tourism factors that led to the extreme 
absence of Olympic tourism trade in the visitor economy. Findings reveal a series of major dichotomies 
between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ and amplifies the plight, disappointment and local narratives of feeling lied 
to and deceived by the practices of London’s grand project. Given these challenges, the research found 
small firms making deterritorialisation attempts to emancipate themselves in order to negate the established 
negative challenges. This illuminates, in significant detail, the reasons why and the specific methods with 
which the community fought back, demanding consideration of a plurality of interests and alternative 
narratives. It is in light of this, and the learning of this study, that the thesis constructs a ‘Manifesto for 
Resistance and Effective Leverage’ to illustrate ways small firms can mobilise, amplify and better access the 
very benefits initially hoped-for, and projected onto, host communities in order to re-distribute Games-
related opportunities more effectively. With respect to local legacies, the findings reveal potential 
gentrification effects, shifting business demographics away from independent artisan high streets toward 
corporate chains. This illustrates pervasive concern over the clone town effect and the continued 
homogenisation and corporatisation of central urban areas, which present a dangerous future for the 
survival and competitiveness of local traders as we move further into the enigmatic legacy phase. 
 
As an antidote to the ‘fast’ form of Olympic tourism, the thesis considers how future mega-events can 
foster a deeper connectivity between event ‘visitor’ and host ‘place’. A major part of achieving this is to 
consider ways to de-securitise host spaces to allow greater flows of event visitors into host communities, 
whilst still maintaining a safe, secure event experience. The thesis provides a set of practical 
recommendations to empower local communities and help re-distribute benefits. A key issue is how small 
businesses themselves can develop consortiums and forums to help restore power imbalances and 
collaboratively enhance their political positions and business propositions to access event-opportunities. 
The thesis also calls for future mega-event policy to be developed with ‘social justice’ as a core narrative.  
 
Key words: small business, mega-events, event impact, tourism, shocks, legacy, critical theory, case study.  
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Chapter 1 - Thesis Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Thesis Structure 
The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (hereafter referred to as simply the ‘Olympics’ and/or 
the ‘Games’) offered not just unparalleled opportunities to stimulate a once in a lifetime cataclysmic 
economic boost to UK PLC following difficult global financial times (alongside a raft of other 
simultaneously hoped-for ambitions, e.g. fostering civic pride, regenerating socio-economically deprived 
post-industrial neighbourhoods). It also sought, through a series of immediate and longer-term ‘legacies’, 
to transform and enhance the lives of individuals and those host communities at the epicentre of the Games 
project, Olympic planning and live Games-time activities. This was expected given the varying ways mega-
events traditionally impact upon host communities in both positive and negative senses, and the stridency 
of the positive Olympic rhetoric emitted from policy makers across the highest echelons of government, 
right through to local authorities. It is important to note that the newly developed Olympic 2020 agenda 
(IOC, 2016) continues to put social and economic development at the heart of Games bidding. This thesis, 
however, provides an in-depth qualitative analysis to amplify a cautionary tale of both a vulnerable 
stakeholder group (small firms) and host community spaces. It illustrates the complex ways small business 
communities situated across the ‘Last Mile’ stretches of the HEZ, and their adjoining public spaces, are 
greatly (negatively) impacted by the coming of such projects. Exploring these qualitative local idiosyncrasies 
is vital as [mega] event impact analyses often remain decontextualized (Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). It 
can be argued that this leads to a somewhat superficial understanding – in a qualitative sense – of how small 
business communities operating within mega-event environments experience ‘impact’ and local ‘legacies’. 
Whilst host communities generally, and specifically in the case of London, emerge as hoped-for 
beneficiaries of positive Olympic effects, this thesis highlights the major challenges small business 
communities face in light of hosting. From negative impacts on tourism, trade and commercial potentiality 
to the direct risks of small business exclusion and unsustainable longer-term economic legacies found across 
the Territorialisation, Deterritorialisation and Reterritorialisation (TDR) cycle, this thesis critically examines 
what, how and why these vulnerable stakeholders became invisible and marginalised during the staging of 
London’s grand project. 
The thesis structure is broken down into six main chapters, as shown in Table 1. It is important here to 
highlight to the reader that the author has intentionally formatted the Literature Review, Findings and 
Discussions in a particular way. For ease of reading and greater clarity, these chapters - for the most part - 
are written in a logical-chronological order - often starting with, for example, contextual overview and/or 
background, with immediate, present matters in the main body, and then concluding with reflections on 
longer-term, future dimensions of – in the case of this thesis - ‘legacy’. This structural coherence affords a 
greater story-telling approach to argument construction. 
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Chapter Detail 
Chapter 1 – Thesis Introduction Details nature, scope and objectives of the thesis and presents the conceptual overview. 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review Critically reviews and synthesises key literature required to achieve the research 
objectives of this study, and respond to emergent data themes. Draws on i) underpinning 
theory and concepts, ii) London-centric case study issues, and iii) synthesising prior case 
study analysis from relevant cultural and sporting events and festivals. Constructing the 
review helps to identify gaps in knowledge, illuminating spaces where this study can 
contribute to knowledge. 
Chapter 3 – Philosophical 
Positionality and Methodology 
Provides a detailed overview of the philosophical positionality adopted and an explicit 
overview of the methodological decisions taken across the construction of this thesis.  
Chapter 4 – Findings Synthesises interview, policy document, archival material and media evidence to provide 
an eclectic evidence base that underpins the ‘Discussions’ and ‘Conclusions and 
‘Recommendations’ of this thesis.  
Chapter 5 – Discussions Draws a priori and a posteriori findings together with strong empirical evidence, 
develops new and links to existing micro, meso and grander theorisations whilst 
reflecting on the spaces where this thesis can contribute to new knowledge.  
Chapter 6 – Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
Wraps up all prior key findings, discussions and concluding remarks from both 
theoretical and practical standpoints, and reflects on the extent to which the research 
objectives of this study have been met. Presents the final recommendations for project 
actors, small businesses and the academic community going forward. Closes with a 
detailed outline of the author’s research agenda from 2016 – 2020 with respect to i) 
actioning recommendations, ii) executing future areas of academic study, and iii) 
continuing the theoretical and practical outcomes of this research, based on empirical 
groundwork conducted for this thesis - starting with empirical observations for Rio 2016 
between 31 July and 9 August 2016. 
 
Table 1: Thesis Structure 
The following section outlines the five key ‘Research Objectives’ (RO) of this thesis, followed by the 
overarching Conceptual Framework illustrated in section 1.3. A top level outline of this thesis’s 
‘Contribution to Knowledge’ can be found in the Discussions (Table 31). 
1.2 Research Objectives  
The research objective(s) guiding this study, whilst thematically similar to initial versions, have changed 
throughout the process of this PhD in response to research findings and identified problems. The agreed 
four final objectives of this study were to: 
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Research 
Objective 1 
Critically analyse and fully unpack how small firms were impacted throughout the Olympic delivery 
cycle [before, during and after], specifically those in host borough HEZs and across Central 
Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ – an exploration of short vs. long, positive vs. negative effects. 
Research 
Objective 2 
Examine how and why local space was impacted by the occurrence of the London 2012 Games, and 
the impact this had on tourism dynamics, trade and commercial opportunity for small businesses. 
Research 
Objective 3 
Reflect up on the elusive concept of ‘Olympic Legacy’ in the context of host small business 
communities; can we identify the emergence of a ‘legacy’ for London’s East End, and specifically Central 
Greenwich’s small businesses? 
Research 
Objective 4 
Identify lessons learnt and recommend practical ways to better re-distribute Games-related benefits 
to vulnerable small business communities. 
  
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 1 below provides a conceptual overview, in the form of a connected graphical interface, of the main 
ideas and concepts used and found across the study and the presumed relationship between them. By no 
means does this constitute reality and truth but merely attempts to provide a bounded theoretical and 
empirical focus and study narrative to provide a sense of the scope and scale of the work undertaken. The 
formation of the framework is the creative product of the Literature Review, Findings, Discussions and 
Conclusions of this thesis and links closely to the research objectives. Similarly to the study’s research 
objectives, the framework was developed iteratively throughout the production of the thesis. The 
framework helps to illustrate the key theories, concepts and ideas used and found across the PhD, and the 
story of host community and small business impact.   
The time bar at the bottom illustrates the three key phases of project delivery. From left to right, it starts 
with the period before the Games, formally known in the TDR cycle as the ‘territorialisation’ phase. This 
phase symbolises and materialises as the period of time when the Olympic project captures existing local 
and host community spaces to prepare for the hosting of the Games. The middle point constitutes the time 
during the Games and immediately after the Closing Ceremony, formally known as the ‘deterritorialisation’ 
phase. This phase indicates the period of time when the project begins to move away from the context. 
Finally, the ‘reterritorialisation’ stage is the period of time when the context fully recaptures local spaces, 
longer-term effects following the Games begin to emerge, and the official ‘legacy’ phase commences. All 
three phases, and the temporally bound impacts and legacies that emerge from this study, form a pertinent 
part of the structure of this thesis. The framework is best read left to right, based on the chronological 
order of events, in order to better navigate the complexities of and interconnectedness between concepts.  
 Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Chapter 2 – Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review  
As detailed in Table 1, the review is vital of the construction of this thesis, commencing with a theoretical 
and contextual overview around the theory and impacts of events and the Olympic philosophy. It 
scrutinises the power of mega-events as both a positive catalyst for socio-economic change and regional 
development, whilst illuminating the criticisms and darker side of event-led urban flag projects. Specific 
emphasis is placed up on the complex and multi-faceted ways host cities and their chosen host communities 
and their small business communities can be impacted during all phases of the TDR cycle, particularly the 
immediate and legacy periods. The concept of legacy is thus critically deconstructed and examined, and 
toward the end of the chapter, the idea of mega-events are placed under the theoretical lens of neoliberalism 
to help explain why host communities often emerge excluded across the TDR cycle. Issues of spatio-
political conflict, territorialisation, appropriation and commodification of public spaces, and challenges 
posed by prioritising more spectacular forms of cultural expression, consumption, and corporate desires 
provide a necessary prelude to the in-depth qualitative empirical findings across Chapter 4. 
2.2 Event Policy and Impacts 
2.2.1 An Introduction to Events, Mega-Events, and the Olympic Philosophy 
Without doubt, the world has seen propelled growth in human success: be it of an artistic, scientific, cultural 
or sporting nature (e.g. Hall, 1992). Progress has been notably seen across the past two centuries; epochs 
of time and accomplishments celebrated through, and piggybacked on to, the familiar concept of an ‘event’. 
Events come in all shapes and sizes, from a local tombola to the ‘hallmark’ event. Hallmark events are 
considered the most popular and pervasive of the event genre (Gold and Gold, 2008), often repeatedly 
celebrated in the same place and time, playing a major role in the developmental processes of regional and 
national economies, societies and their cultural identities (e.g. Roche, 2000). Tennis ‘Grand Slams’ (e.g. 
Wimbledon) and the Edinburgh Comedy Festival are examples of such cultural and sporting occasions. 
Mega-events are, however, a rather different animal, often characterised – for example - by two global 
sporting interventions: the ‘FIFA World Cup’ and the ‘Olympic and Paralympic Games’. The Olympics is 
often recognised as the ‘archetypal and most prized event of this genre’ (Essex and Chalkley, 2002; MacRury 
and Poynter, 2009) and the world’s ‘leading festival of sport’ (Rustin, 2009). Roche (2000) broadly defines 
mega-events as ‘large scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic 
character, mass-popular appeal and international significance’ (2000: 1), often described as ‘one off’ events 
that significantly affect economic, social and cultural dimensions at an international, national and host city 
level, whilst simultaneously impacting on local host communities (Kidd, 1992; Swart and Bob, 2004). Sola 
(1998) provides a more functional definition, useful in the context of this research, stating that mega-events 
are defined by their ability to ‘increase tourist volumes directly and indirectly relating to the event (…) 
visitor expenditures boost local trade (…) additional publicity for host leading to further knowledge of the 
culture by visitors and promote a positive image (…) infrastructure improvements to stadia and surrounding 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
19 | P a g e  
 
areas that lead to further prosperity both during and following the event’ (1998: 14). Sola’s (1998) definition 
serves to illustrate the types of positive [and localised] impacts host cities hope to achieve by executing a 
series of strategic ‘event leverage’ tactics; to optimise opportunities afforded by such cataclysmic event-led 
policy. A detailed review of event ‘impacts’, ‘leveraging’, and ‘legacy’ is explored later on in the chapter.  
The Olympics was revived by Pierre de Coubertin in 1894, and described by MacRury and Poynter (2009) 
as a ‘popular celebration of science, reason, progress, and the striving for perfection, where the Olympic 
Movement symbolised a universal spirit that rose above the specific interests of nations’ (2009: 2). The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) (2013) Olympic Charter heralded visions of ‘respect for universal 
fundamental ethical principles (…) banishing any form of discrimination with regard to a country or person 
on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender, or other-wise which is incompatible with belonging to the 
Olympic movement’ (IOC, 2013: 54). Zimblist (2015) highlights that early notions of the Olympic 
movement sought to bring nations together to resolve antagonism, and promote peace and understanding. 
However, Zimblist (2015) later argues that there is little evidence to suggest that the Games has either 
ended existing hostilities or prevented new ones. In fact, on the contrary, over the past half-decade political 
unrest, terrorism threats and action, through to on-going resistance efforts, have been witnessed, and have 
become synonymous with cataclysmic Olympic planning in past and recent mega-event host cities (e.g. 
Beijing, London, and now Rio). Community resistance has been seen against Favela and local displacement 
(e.g. Talbot, 2016), through to broader issues around the diversion of public funds away from vital public 
services and welfare programmes (e.g. BBC, 2015), toward the ‘mega’ pot of central event funds.  
Conflict of both ideological and religious natures typifies the ‘extraordinary’ conditions that personify this 
mode of development, alongside social and economic tension across host populations. This highlights one 
of several paradoxical mega-event characteristics found across this thesis. Several authors illustrate that 
whilst mega-events have the power to ‘orientate’ and ‘integrate’ single states in to one connected, global 
society (e.g. Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006), they simultaneously serve to exacerbate conflict, socio-cultural, 
and, economic divisions (e.g. Raco and Tunney, 2010). Critical reflections around event-led development 
is detailed further in section 2.3.3 and preludes the empirical findings of this thesis.  
Although serving to provide cataclysmic event-led urban and policy development and regeneration, and a 
vision of ethical principle, it has become popular in academic commentary to question the morality of mega-
events, from exposing corruption (McGillivray and Frew, 2015), to revealing an underlying capitalist 
hegemony contributing to the unequal developmental processes that coincide with Games planning. Vigor 
et al (2004) for example claims that the Games has seen a progressively ‘fundamental change in philosophy’ 
(2004: 5). Zimblist (2015) notes that whilst the Games offers an illusion and rhetoric of ‘inclusivity’, only 
the wealthy really have the time and money to engage in sport, especially in industrialised Western countries. 
As such, Zimblist (2015) characterises the Olympics as an ‘economic gamble’; a project without a 
guaranteed favourable end for the host city and its host communities, and an intervention that favours 
those with the influence and power, money and ultimately ‘capital’ to participate (also see McGuigan, 2005; 
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Horne, 2007). Questions of ethics, access to capital, power and influence, and the extent to which 
communities are included and excluded in mega-event planning for major concerns addressed throughout. 
Technology, as with most other global industries, has played a major part in the cataclysmic growth of 
mega-events. They have the capacity to globally diffuse promotional messages through multi-channelled 
communities, from live TV to catch-up TV, which can be viewed through a range of devices by billions of 
‘Olympic TV’ viewers (Roberts, 2004)1. The IOC (2005) claims that the Beijing 2008 Games was broadcast 
across 220 territories, with an estimated audience of approximately 4.3 billion viewers, explicitly stating that 
‘television, the internet, and mobile phones offered fans unprecedented choice of what, when and where 
to watch the Games (…) these were the first truly ‘digital’ Games harnessing the power and potential of 
digital technology’ (2005: 2). Furthermore, six years before, the Japan and South Korea World Cup in 2002 
broadcast across 213 territories, producing a cumulative audience of 28.8 billion viewers, as reported by 
Madrigal et al (2005: 182). It is therefore unsurprising that the global consumption of mega-event-related 
communication continues to draw in unprecedented audiences across both the FIFA World Cup and the 
Olympic Games (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006).  
Interestingly, in parallel to the exponential global mediatised growth of the Games, research by Malfas et al 
(2004) highlights their continued growth in scope and size. Table 2 below, through a comparison between 
the Los Angeles (LA) Games of 1984 and Athens 2004, illustrates this growth. Such growth not only has 
economic implications but also signifies and symbolises social and sociological importance (Roche, 1992, 
2000; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). For example, Roche (2000) argues that mega-events offer modernity 
an allure of ‘predictability’ and ‘control’ over the pace of time and direction of change in a complex, 
globalised and fast-moving world where ‘technological, ecological, and other changes can appear ‘out of 
control’’ (2000: 568).  
1984 LA Games 2004 Athens  
Representing countries: 140 Representing countries: 201 
Number of athletes: 6797  Number of athletes: 11.099  
Number of sports: 23 Number of sports: 28 
 
Table 2: Olympics Size Comparison (LA 1984 and Athens 2004) – Extracted from Malfas et al (2004: 
210) 
World Expos, starting with the ‘Great Exhibition of Crystal Palace’ of 1851, illustrates this duel economic 
and social purpose. According to Benedict (1983) these events were not just about trading commodities: 
‘they were selling ideas; ideas about the relations between nations, spread of education, advancement of 
science, the form of cities, the nature of domestic life, and the place of art in society’ (1983: 2). Rather 
ironically, the focus up on technological advancements has become so that World Expos, due to the growth 
                                                          
1 For example, Tomlinson (1996) notes ‘it is through television that the world experiences the Olympics’ (1996: 21). 
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and accessibility of international travel, now fail to have the global significance they once had in terms of 
economic trade, global communication and integration (Dungan, 1984; Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-
Roura, 1995).  
2.2.2 The Host City – Event Policy, Power, and ‘Leverage’ 
The comparative decline of World Expos contrasts with the rising international importance of both the 
FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games. As these events continue to grow in terms of global image, 
physical size, investment, expenditures, spectator numbers and commodities (Rustin, 2009), several authors 
(e.g. Cashman, 2002; Smith, 2012) claim that the Olympics have grown into the world’s most complex 
mega-event projects. Projects that have, perhaps, become too large, and impose too great a financial burden 
upon the host city. This has opened mega-events up to the criticism that only wealthier nations and cities 
can afford to host them.  
It is, however, impossible to ignore the unique and extraordinary conditions and political impetus mega-
events create, which can, in turn, stimulate economic and social development (e.g. Vigor et al, 2004). Mega-
events, and events in general, thus often form a core feature of urban, regional and national event-led urban 
development strategies (Raco, 2004); a strategic approach to urban and event planning formally referred to 
as ‘event leveraging’ (Chalip, 2004). The FIFA World Cup and the Olympics have thus become the two 
archetypal interventions for host cities wishing to achieve a wide range of ‘urban renewal’ and/or ‘urban 
regeneration’ initiatives. Burbank et al (2002) claims that cities wishing to spearhead boosts to their 
regeneration focus on the catalytic role of mega-sports events. Here, the link between professional sports, 
urban development and the technological revolution that affords exponential mediatised growth and access 
to global audiences (e.g. Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006) without doubt greatly contributes to the 
attractiveness of hosting sports mega-events (also see Hiller, 2006; Short, 2004). 
Owing to their global presence mega-events provide an internationally recognised single-focal point, time-
stringent and immovable deadlines for complex project completion (Burbank et al, 2002; Smith, 2012; Gold 
and Gold, 2008). Host nations are thus placed under significant political and economic pressure to deliver 
on-time and to strict quality standards. It instantaneously creates an impetus, and thus an agenda, widely 
thought to enable powerful mechanisms for effectively mobilising development policies (Cochrane et al, 
1996; Smith, 2008; MacRury and Poynter, 2009). Due to their ‘chameleon-like’ (Rustin, 2009: 19) and 
‘ambulatory’ character (Gold and Gold, 2008) mega-events lend themselves to the absorption of dynamic 
city agendas (Rustin, 2009) whilst simultaneously pooling together eclectic [private and public] sources of 
funding, including considerable governmental financial aid, alongside corporate and official sponsor fees. 
Furthermore, Smith (2012) claims that they unify disparate groups of stakeholders, be it policy makers, 
investors, and host communities together toward a unified will and vision, and provide local authorities 
with an impetus to invest in ‘physical regeneration, transport and heritage restoration’ (2011: 4). It is 
therefore of no surprise to find that mega-events manifest as important political tools as  ‘hosting a premier 
event is desirable as a growth strategy because city leaders can claim credit for generating revenue from 
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tourism, enhancing the city’s image, and perhaps even re-shape the city’s physical structure’ (Essex and 
Chalkley, 1998; Hall, 1997). Mega-events in this sense continue to be placed at the forefront of the IOC’s 
strategic ‘Olympic 2020 agenda’ (IOC, 2016). Whilst such initiatives are known to boost the confidence of 
local communities (Roche, 1994), critical scholars (e.g. Foley et al, 2011; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; 
Raco and Tunney, 2010) claim that centralising excessive public funds toward speculative projects in this 
way diverts attention and money away from fundamental social problems and economically excludes less 
visible stakeholders in the melee of the neoliberal city2. 
It is however important to take a balanced view at this stage. Mega-events have and continue to serve as a 
major economic injection for tackling both social and economic challenges in the post-modern city. This 
was certainly the case for London, and now Rio – to tackle, for example, urban areas blighted by socio-
economic decline, poverty and criminality. We must also recognise that local ‘community’ impacts are just 
some of the all-encompassing legacy agendas that underpin reasons for the Games to exist and host cities 
to bid for (e.g. environmental, technological, sporting, education et cetera). Furthermore, they also serve as 
a basis for building internal capacity and expertise around delivering ‘successful events’, which often serve 
as a fundamental pillar for bidding for future events3. Building both ‘social and human capital’ formed the 
overarching ambition of the 2012 Games, bringing ‘people, businesses, other institutions and the city 
together to focus on long-term development of the city’ according to the Work Foundation (2010: 45).The 
idea that the Games would ‘fast track’ (Faulkner et al, 2001) and ‘accelerate’ the rate of socio-economic 
develop was at the heart of the Olympic strategy and major pillar in the Olympic ‘legacy’ vision. This is 
discussed in further empirical depth, supported with secondary evidence across section 2.4, 4.2, and 4.7.  
2.3 Host City and Community Impacts 
2.3.1 Wider Impacts 
So far, the review has broadly established that mega-events have both positive and negative consequences 
up on the communities that host them. Although Cashman (2002) claims ‘ideally the Games should leave 
a host community and the city environment better, rather than worse off’ (2002: 12), Matheson and Baade 
(2004) and Coates and Humphreys (2002) argue that they have at best neutral but largely negative economic 
effects for the host city and subsequent communities. Despite the inherent positive rhetoric that is often 
transmitted during early phases of bidding, right through to Games delivery. Several authors, including 
Raco and Tunney (2010), Smith (2012), MacRury and Poynter (2009), and Zimblist (2015) in their historical 
cost-benefit analyses, claim that host cities have by and large had mixed-negative experiences of hosting. 
As illustrated earlier, Olympic cities have been subject to major political contestation, financial over-runs 
and economic pressures, civil unrest (e.g. Mexico 1972), and terrorism (e.g. Munich 1968). Rio 2016 also 
                                                          
2 Zimblist (2015) refers to mega-events as ‘economic gambles’. 
3 Gold and Gold (2008) illustrates for the London 2012 bid ‘upskilling’ and improving ‘export’ capability and capacity was identified as a major 
hoped-for ‘legacy’. 
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threatens to be ‘Hell on Earth’ due to public sector cut backs in fire and policing services according to 
several media accounts affecting visitor safety (e.g. The Guardian, 2016).  
Alongside complex localised impacts, Preuss’s (2006) ‘Legacy Categorisation’ captures the essence of 
regional and host city and community impacts. This has been more recently update by Pappalepore and 
Duignan’s (2016) mapping of impacts, specifically in the context of small organisations, similar to those 
who form the immediate empirical focus of this thesis’s investigation. The in-depth descriptive breakdown 
of short vs. long term, positive vs. negative impacts and legacies, driven by qualitative empiricism, literature 
and secondary evidence, provides the first comprehensive synthesis here in the context of the chosen 
stakeholder group. It is, in itself, a necessary and key contribution to the body of literature on event impacts 
and serves as the initial framework used in the development of the author’s ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping – 
see section 5.6. This builds on Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) earlier work, using further empirical, 
literature, and secondary evidence gathered across this study to extend not only the internal validity, but the 
external validity and wider generalisability of the framework in the context of host community impact. 
 
Table 3: Preuss’ (2006) ‘Legacy Categorisation’ 
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Table 4: Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) ‘Potential impacts of major events on small organisations and 
businesses’ 
Events clearly present a multitude of lucrative opportunities for the host city, its communities and small 
businesses to cultivate and maximise; a concept often referred to as ‘event leveraging’ (see Chalip and Leyns, 
2002; Chalip, 2004; Weed, 2008; O’Brien, 2006; Osmond, 2002). The first and most noted framework for 
assessing event leverage was developed by Chalip (2004), aptly referred to as the ‘Event Leveraging Model’ 
(or sometimes the ‘Economic Leverage Model’). The model was developed from research arising from the 
Sydney 2000 Games (e.g. Faulkner et al, 2001; Chalip, 2002) aggregated with study findings from Chalip 
and Leyns’ (2002) analysis of the Gold Coast Honda Indy car race in Australia. The model focuses on the 
immediate and longer-term benefits of events, characterising the ‘event’ (e.g. London 2012) as a series of 
events constituting the intervention. For example, in the context of the Olympics this could include: i) the 
Opening and Closing Ceremonies, ii) the Cultural Olympiad, iii) event visitor trade for small businesses et 
cetera. These ‘events’ can be considered ‘leveragable resources’; specific individual opportunities that 
require targeted strategies and tactics to foster tourism and economic developmental benefits (Chalip, 2002). 
Alongside the specific delivery of the Games, the combined ‘leveragable resources’ constitute the ‘event 
portfolio’, which host cities, host communities and their small businesses can attempt to capitalise on. This 
is particularly so in light of the context and empirical focus of this research and the chosen case study area 
of Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ and ‘HEZ’ as detailed across Chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
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Figure 2: Chalip’s (2004) ‘Event Leverage Model’ 
As illustrated by the research objectives of this study, whilst the study reflects on longer-term ‘legacy’ 
(Research Objective 3) the major focus is on ‘short-term’ and ‘immediate’ impact (Research Objective 1 
and 2). Chalip (2004) illustrates that this notion of ‘immediate leverage’ constitutes a major opportunity to 
‘optimise total trade and revenue’ in the host community, stimulated by four key factors: (1) ‘enticing visitor 
spend’, (2) ‘lengthen visitors’ stays’, (3) ‘retain event expenditures, and (4) enhance business relationships’ 
(Chalip, 2004). Points 1 and 2 can optimise ‘total revenue’, whilst 3 and 4 can optimise ‘total trade’. In order 
to maximise event opportunity, leakage of event expenditure and local economic benefit can be optimised 
by sourcing local products and services from local supply and labour. Furthermore, business relationships 
can be enhanced by providing platforms for local and visiting business people attending the event, as well 
as those who are ‘associated with event participating, or whose business provide supplies or services to the 
event’ (Chalip, 2004: 237). Stimulating business to business (B2B) relationships may thus increase and 
optimise trade in the host community. Building on the ELM, Weed (2008) assesses the strategic leverage 
of maximising tourism opportunities by isolating just one single event – the Olympic Games – as the 
leveragable resource (compared to a whole portfolio). Similarly to Chalip (2004), Weed (2008) focuses on 
two specific leverage points (aka ‘Opportunity’ in ELM): ‘Olympic tourism’ (to maximise trade and revenue 
in the host community), and ‘Olympic media’ (to enhance city marketing ambitions). This adds ‘during’ the 
Games as well as the ‘pre and post’ event periods of Chalip’s (2004) model, as pre-event periods tend to be 
‘overlooked in discussions of long-term impacts because the focus is on legacy of an event, which by 
definition occurs post-event period’ (Solberg and Preuss, 2007: 214-215). Later on in Chapter 5, the ELM 
is reflected on in light of the findings of this thesis, and ideas are presented for how host small business 
communities can better seize event-related tourism and trade – see section 5.6.  
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2.3.2 Regeneration and London 2012 
Regeneration formed one of the key expected legacies and reasons why London hosted the 2012 Games, 
as detailed shortly on in section 2.4. 4.2 and 4.7. The concept has however existed in various guises 
throughout the post-WW1 and WW2 periods (Roberts, 2000; Tallon, 2010), broadly defined as a 
‘comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which 
seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition 
of an area that has been subject to change’ (Roberts, 2000: 17). In the context of Olympic legacy, Tallon 
(2010) claims that regeneration ‘brings together many of the individual outcomes of legacy discussed in the 
wider literature in to a framework of longer urban (re)development, revival or renewal’ (2010: 21).  
Smith (2012) and Davies (2012) argue that regeneration has become a prominent feature in mega-event 
strategy since the highly praised 1992 Barcelona Games. Meanwhile, Essex and Chalkley (1998), Davis and 
Thornley (2010), and Gold and Gold (2008) claim that mega-events have harnessed the power of mega-
events since the mid-20th century. Rome 1960 and Tokyo 1964 are often used as cases in point across the 
literature. However, the ‘Barcelona model’ serves as ‘best-practice’ for achieving ‘successful’ event-led 
regeneration (Vigor et al, 2004; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006); a case study many Olympic cities have 
since attempted to replicate but with lesser success according to MacRury and Poynter (2009). The 
Barcelona milestone illustrated the power of event-led regeneration policy in development strategy at the 
local, city and national levels (Garcia, 2004; Smith, 2012; Gold and Gold, 2008). Key infrastructural projects 
(e.g. the regeneration of Barcelona’s Dockland area and the East Spain coastline rail systems), spatial 
strategies generating new commercial districts, global tourism development strategies and cultural 
programmes (Gold and Gold, 2008) - all adorned the holistic strategy of 1992, injecting substantial levels 
of public investment (approximately US$ 6.2 billion, representing 83% of Barcelona’s total Olympic 
expenditure according to Malfas et al, 2004: 218). Essex and Chalkley (2002) claim the Olympics has a 
number of poignant milestones, for example: i) the financial success of LA 1984, ii) the spectacle of Sydney 
2000, iii) Barcelona’s urban transformations, and iv) the human cost and ethical contestations from Beijing’s 
2008 Games.   
Similarly to Barcelona’s regeneration objectives, London’s ambition for East London was strident. 
According to Davies (2012), in recent years regeneration strategies have geared closer toward the renewal 
and physical re (development) of largely derelict, socio-economically deprived, post-industrial urban zones 
(Raco and Tunney, 2010; Smith, 2012). Tactics are used to clean up and remobilise brownfield sites for 
commercial development and/or to house Olympic infrastructure (see Gold and Gold, 2008; Geraint, 
2002), whereby Olympic Park developments sit on core nucleated sites in order to optimise and maximise 
potential regenerative benefits (Smith, 2008). Looking back at previous Games, this formed a major strategy 
for Barcelona (1992), Sydney (2000), Rio (2016), and was certainly the case and backdrop for London’s 
regeneration efforts.  
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Historically, London’s East End (sometimes referred to as ‘East London’), as well as other major UK cities 
(including Bristol, Manchester, Sheffield) have, since the 1960s and throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s, suffered 
economically and socially due to de-industrialisation. For example, some areas of East London contain 
some of the worst poverty in Britain (Hammett, 2003). Economic slump, a poor international image, 
abandoned industrial infrastructure (e.g. warehouses, train lines etc.) and toxic brownfield land have all 
contributed to the area’s economic decline (e.g. Smith, 2012). Even during the early industrial years, the 
growth of London during the early-late nineteenth century displaced traditional slum communities4 during 
the intense phase of infrastructural developments occurring in Central London (e.g. St Katherine’s Docks 
(1827) and Railway Terminal (1840-1875)), leading to a significant influx of poor, low-skilled workers and 
thus overcrowding, dense concentrations of poor people and immigration. This caused East London to 
become synonymous with poverty, overcrowding, disease and criminality (Palmer, 1989). East London has 
thus been subject to processes of decline and renewal, subject to fluid and significant inward and outward 
immigration, which has created a diverse, multi-ethnic and unique population (MacRury and Poynter, 2009). 
In a bid to revive the deprived spaces of East London, London’s bid was firmly based on rejuvenation. The 
claim was that the 2012 Games would ‘develop on of the largest new urban parks constructed in Europe 
in the past 150 years’ (Coalter, 2004), and provide a ‘once in a lifetime’ opportunity to transform these 
deprived areas (DCMS, 2012b). Intervention was legitimised through effective project rhetoric that flooded 
the place image of East London with dystopic images. For example, one of many major policy report 
described East London as a space with ‘discarded shopping trolleys, dirty canals, polluted soil and broken 
buildings’ (DCMS, 2012b: 3).  
Historically, the cataclysmic event-led policies of London 2012 have been preceded by decades (post 1970s 
– early 21st century) of progressive urban development initiatives spearheaded by the London Docklands 
Development Corporation (LDDC). This was a strategy established in the late 1970s - early ‘80s to 
implement and manage regeneration efforts, the most popular being that of ‘Canary Wharf’, along with a 
number of developments along the ‘Thames Gateway’. Although progressive, several authors argue that 
the fast tracking of urban policy and (often post-industrial) development has characterised East London’s 
growth since the 1960s - gaining traction in the 1990s through the introduction of Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs), with centralised government departments seeing local space as blank space for urban 
reengineering programmes and projects (see Dixon et al, 2007). According to Cochrane (2007), such 
programmes directly appear to stunt both local opposition and involvement, a major finding of this study 
research too. London 2012 identified six major boroughs (Newham, Greenwich, Waltham Forest, Tower 
Hamlets, Hackney, and Barking and Dagenham) across East London to play host to the carnival, formally 
referred to as the ‘Growth Boroughs’ (UK Government, 2013). The idea of growth referred to the ‘ex-ante’ 
and ‘ex-post’ benchmarking deprivation statistics that Games-led regeneration was to tackle – six 
geographical proximities targeted for growth under the overarching strategy of ‘Convergence’. The strategy 
                                                          
4 Think of Charles Dicken’s Oliver Twist… 
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initiated through the ‘Strategic Regeneration Framework’ (SRF) aimed to take these ‘under-performing’ 
boroughs, sitting below average in terms of economy, employment, health, skills et cetera, and bring them 
up to the ‘London average’ (UK Government, 2013).  
Figure 3 below outlines how the growth boroughs chosen represented some of the top 10% deprived areas 
in the country, serving to justify Games’-intervention. Extracted from HC Hansard (2012):  
‘…the ‘Strategic Regeneration Framework’ (SRF) sets out an ambitious legacy vision that is 
unrivalled anywhere in local government: within 20 years, the communities who host the London 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will enjoy the same social and economic changes as their 
neighbours (…) let’s make sure the Olympic legacy lifts East London from being one of the poorest 
parts of the country, to one that shares fully in the capital’s growth and prosperity’ (2012: 2). 
 
Figure 3: Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 for London (Government Office for London, 2007) 
London’s 2005 ‘technically polished’ bid for the 2012 Games crystallised a major vision for East London 
regeneration (MacRury and Poynter, 2009) featuring heavily in the public eye. Several authors agree, the 
focus on community benefit and regeneration legacy played a key part in the bid’s success, beating off close-
contender: the city of Paris (e.g. Gold and Gold, 2008; Vigor et al, 2004). And it was the emphasis up on 
the ‘non-sporting’ outcomes of the London bid ‘struck a chord’ with the IOC in their ‘post-commercial 
phase’ according to MacRury and Poynter (2009). The thesis examines London’s legacy promises and 
potential futurities in detail across Chapter 4.  
In order to link mega-event context-specific regenerative development with official conceptualisations 
around the theory of regeneration and regional development, Tallon (2010) presents the following typology 
(Table 5). Here, we can see distinct similarities between wider theory of regeneration, and Olympic-led 
flagship development and ‘official’ legacy conceptualisations detailed later on in section 2.4.   
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Dimension Concerns 
Economic Job creation; income; employment; skills and workforce development; employability; business 
growth; inward investment, house prices and affordability; gross value added (GVA), and land 
value 
Social/Cultural Quality of life; health; education; crime; housing; provision and quality of public and 
community services (including sport, leisure, culture etc); social inclusion and cohesion. 
Physical/ 
Environmental 
Infrastructure, quality and development of built and natural environment; transport and 
communications; remediation of land. 
Governance Nature of local decision-making; engagement of local community; involvement of other 
groups; style of leadership; partnerships. 
 
Table 5: Tallon’s (2010) ‘Key Dimensions of Regeneration’ 
As Games’ organisers look beyond traditional economic impact studies in order to justify the considerable 
public investment required to stage them (Gold and Gold, 2008; Davies, 2012), urban regeneration 
ambitions continue to intertwine with delivering a ‘successful event’ – so much so that ‘Olympic planning 
must now be viewed as almost synonymous with urban planning’ (2002: 102). According to Hiller (2002) 
and Coaffee (2011), mega-events can thus no longer just be concerned with planning for the event itself 
but must also consider urban contexts and effects, not only residual and unplanned ones but as a 
simultaneous objective. Whereas the rhetoric of legacy is at the forefront of Olympic discourse [particularly 
during bidding and early project phases], achieving positive urban regeneration plays a major role in the 
legacy ambition of host cities5. The power of events and their intertwining objectives with regional 
development constitute a major political and economic tool for city growth and transformation in the 
modern urban realm (e.g. Hall, 2006; Munoz, 2005). Urban developers and academic commentators thus 
argue that mega-events form an increasingly central, rather than peripheral, element of urban modernity 
(Vigor et al, 2004; Tomlinson and Young, 2005; Tomlinson, 2005; Young and Warmsley, 2005). This is 
particularly so given that predictions see the majority of the world’s population living in urban environments 
by 2020 (UITP, 2014), and ironic given that, for most of the 20th century, the role of mega-events in societal 
development and discourse was seen somewhat as a joke by mainstream sociology (Horne and 
Manzenreiter, 2006). Such concerns thus highlight why prominent authors in the field of urban studies, 
regional development and event impacts claim there is significant neglect toward the complex-localised and 
often idiosyncratic urban effects bestowed up on the communities that host (Raco and Tunney, 2010; 
Smith, 2008; McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2015; Short, 2001, 2004). This is a 
clear gap in the literature – one which, through extensive empirical, qualitative and in-depth descriptive 
                                                          
5 For example, MacRury and Poynter, 2009; Burbank et al, 2002; Cashman, 2002; OECD LEED, 2010; Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Smith, 2012; 
Gold and Gold, 2008; Vigor et al, 2004. 
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analysis, the author wishes to explore, whilst simultaneously amplifying the local narratives of host 
communities, invisible, lost and perhaps depoliticised in the melee of the neoliberal city.  
Chapter 2 now turns to the specific criticisms of event-led policy, serving to illustrate why critically 
examining host community impact is, and should continue to be, a strategic priority of academic production, 
discourse and the on-going ‘Research Impact’ agenda of the UK Research Excellence Framework (REF) 
submission for research units and individual academics in adjoining fields of study.  
2.3.3 Criticisms of Event-Led Policy and Development: Displacement, Gentrification, Host Community 
Exclusion and Manufacturing Consent 
Although mega-events have the propensity for positive impacts and legacies nationwide and across the host 
city, for example helping to stimulate jobs and investment, and giving hope back to areas suffering from 
post-industrial slump and de-industrialisation processes (Raco, 2004), their real impacts continue to spark 
heated debates across academic, practitioner and political arenas (Raco and Tunney, 2010). For example, in 
the context of Rio’s 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympics, the city has and continues to receive 
notable media attention and critical commentary around the controversial diversion of funding away from 
much needed public resources (e.g. Strange, 2013; O’Neill, 2014). This is coupled with current economic 
and political instabilities, and the perceived – and actual - social exclusion and inequalities emerging around 
host areas preparing to stage the Games (Euromonitor, 2013 - also see Vox, 2016) – apt in light of Rio de 
Janiero’s Governmental policy discourse that claims:  
‘…the Olympic Games should serve the city, rather than the city serving the Games’ (Rio 
Government, 2016: 9)  
In light of the long vs. short term, positive vs. negative impacts and legacies mapping as illustrated earlier 
(e.g. Preuss, 2006; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016), mega-events can pose significant-negative effects up 
on host communities. It is important to examine these in light of the research objectives and as a prelude 
to the empirical-case study findings of this thesis. The first issue illustrates concerns around  ‘displacement’6 
and the removal of economically [and politically] vulnerable local stakeholder groups to make way for 
necessary Olympic-related developments (MacRury and Poynter, 2009; Smith, 2012; Pappalepore et al, 
2011; Vigor et al, 2004; Raco and Tunney, 2010). Secondly, concerns over host community ex-ante and ex-
post gentrification and rising rents (commercial and residential) through, for example, increased desirability, 
marketing of place and infrastructural developments (e.g. Vigor et al, 2004; OECD LEED, 2010; Raco and 
Tunney, 2010; Gold and Gold, 2008; Hiller, 1998, 2002; Smith, 2012). Thirdly, issues of mega-events 
representing elitist ‘top-down’ modes of planning, ‘exclusionary tendencies’ and limited community 
consultation with local-host communities (e.g. Cashman, 2002; Miles, 2010). In light of these three main 
negative effects, the question of who really benefits from Games’ intervention is a pertinent issue raised for 
this study, as Fardon (2013) claims such development ‘mostly hits the deprived’. He continues to note that 
                                                          
6 Referred to by Preuss (2006) as ‘socially unjust displacement’. 
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mega-events breed and unearth ‘dominant [political, economic] elites’ of whom attempt to ‘unify 
consumption’ and silence voices of dissent – indicating how individual elites, with power and influence 
over Games-related planning, stimulate imbalances between who’s voices are heard [and listened to] and 
thus constitute states of hegemony (e.g. McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Rojek, 2013, 2014). These concerns 
prelude and dominate the headlines of empirical investigation conducted for this thesis. 
As explored earlier, through the process of ‘fast-tracking’, mega-events offer host cities unparalleled 
mechanisms to catalyse new and existing urban policy at a much more rapid rate compared to normal ‘day 
to day’ – more progressive – forms of development (House of Lords, 2013; Preuss, 2006). The benefits are 
clear. Such forms of development can allow targeted areas and the host city to quickly benefit from 
associated developments, for example infrastructure or place marketing, helping it to better position itself 
in the global market (Preuss, 2007). This is particularly essential given the significant competition between 
global cities in order to remain competitive.  
As identified earlier, host cities establish discourses around ‘legacies’ in order to maximise urban 
opportunities from hosting, promoting particular discourses around the overarching objectives of the 
intervention. However, some of the major critiques of such mega-event led development concern the 
somewhat marginalising and exclusionary tendencies in relation to engaging and partaking in two-way 
dialogue with host communities, signifying ‘limited community consultation’ (Cashman, 2002). As opposed 
to more ‘progressive’ means, cataclysmic fast-tracked forms of urban development, often associated with 
planning and delivery of mega-events, tend to transcend two-way dialogue and regular bureaucratic forms 
of consultation (e.g. Hiller, 2002), take a narrow view, promote ‘single’ project discourses (guided by the 
overarching legacy objectives of the Games), and ‘fail to be responsive to wider interests and long-term 
community needs’ (Mean et al, 2004: 130-131), often ‘in the interests of global flows rather than local 
communities’ (see Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 18). In this sense, Miles (2010) notes that mega-events 
tend to favour the appeasement of global consumerism, as opposed to locale and host community - 
illustrating the overarching concern that public event expenditure often favours the more spectacular 
elements of modern day society, namely corporate-private interests. This is pertinent in the context of this 
study as although events often seek support from small businesses and other local communities prior to 
delivery in order to legitimise policy objectives (Foley et al, 2011), Mitchell et al (1997) claim that such 
stakeholders are often unable to obtain action in response to their concerns, following the ‘principle of who 
or what really counts’ (1997: 853). Therefore, whilst perspectives are encouraged and sought, local narratives 
are quickly marginalised as the project becomes ‘real’ (Gilmore, 2014).  
As alluded to earlier, the ‘over-riding’ of local concerns is widely attributed and justified based on the 
aforementioned pressures placed on project actors to deliver global projects on time and to budget, often 
justified as a project ‘in the city and national interest’ (Cashman, 2002; Smith, 2012; Raco and Tunney, 2010; 
Hiller, 2002). In the context of London 2012, this position stands in stark contrast to the early rhetoric 
projected before the Games claiming the event would be an ‘opportunity for everyone (…) where legacy 
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plans will reflect this aim by ensuring they are open to as diverse range of people and communities as 
possible (…) where local people, businesses and third sector organisations will have a real input in to the 
plans at every step (…) as we [DCMS] recognise that local people could feel excluded as the regeneration 
and construction work changes the environment around them’ (DCMS, 2008b: 37). Later on, the study 
reveals the multifarious ways London’s vision of positive host community impact, virtuous aims of 
inclusivity throughout all stages of the TDR cycle emerge dichotomous against the realities.  
Hiller (2002) claims that instead of consulting local residents and businesses, project actors often conceive 
their task as ‘merely informing people about plans rather than truly seeking input about these plans from 
the ground up’ (2002: 104). Bid critics Booth and Tatz (1994), state that a common tactic of organisers is 
to superficially seek representation, incorporating key gatekeepers and minority views from communities 
who could potentially oppose delivery in order to neutralise threats and demonstrate ‘wide community 
consent’ (Cashman, 2002). Coined as ‘manufactured consent’, Cashman (2002) claims that this process does 
not signify ‘real consultation’ but is a political move to avoid dissent, leading to a continued lack of 
understanding of local issues and localism. It is therefore unsurprising that commentators (e.g. Raco, 2004) 
argue that flagship regeneration programmes like London 2012 always promise change but seldom deliver 
the type of change earmarked for London’s East End (House of Lords, 2013).  Becker’s (2008) analysis 
claims that Beijing 2008 epitomised such regressive, top-down approaches to Olympic policy, planning and 
delivery, creating severely disadvantaged communities through the need to, for example, create space for 
Olympic infrastructure. Unfortunately for local people, concerns about the welfare of these low-order 
stakeholders are a common picture across the majority of mega-event settings, including: Barcelona, Sydney, 
Beijing, London, and currently for Rio too as illustrated earlier.  
Vigor et al (2004) and Ziakas (2014) thus claim that, in order to promote local inclusivity and sustainable 
futures, mega-events should impartially redistribute benefits to local stakeholders and simultaneously meet 
the needs of the host community through inclusive ‘bottom-up’ (Vigor et al, 2004: 9) leveraging strategies 
(Ziakas, 2014).  Such leveraging – or planned creation of – positive legacies for host communities (as 
opposed to mere post-event impacts) should be viewed as a tool with which to ‘enable positive social 
change, rectify power imbalances and decrease inequalities’ (Ziakas, 2014: 9).  Although for London 2012 
the London Development Agency (LDA) placed considerable emphasis in their literature on obligations 
around community negotiation, the major challenge in the context of this and future research is the 
dominating extent to which major aspects of local delivery are presented as ‘non-negotiable’ often even 
locking local authorities out of the decision-making process (Cashman, 2002). Cashman and Hughes (1999: 
32) notes that this was the case in Sydney 2000 stating that local authorities received ‘very little information 
on key issues like anticipated transport flows that are often vital for the formulation of local transport plans’ 
(1999: 32). These findings provide a suitable prelude to the findings of this case study. It is therefore no 
wonder why Flyvbjerg and Bruzelius (2002) subsequently claim that there is little evidence that local actors 
- particularly small enterprises - have ever significantly influenced the objectives of high-profile mega-event 
projects. 
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Raco and Tunney (2010) and Davies (2013), in light of the above criticisms, claim that event-led 
development often reflects and reproduces dominant imaginations and skewed visualisations around how 
‘good cities and good neighbourhoods’ and affected areas should function and look (Raco and Tunney, 
2010). Spaces earmarked for mega-event led development are thus subject to political moves and power 
struggles. One of the major issues is that spaces required for Olympic development are often conceptualised 
as ‘blank slates’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010), ready for ‘wholesale demolition’ (Shin, 2013: 7) and subject to 
acts of ‘tabula rasa’ (Davies and Thornley, 2010) with ‘little consideration needed for existing activities and 
practices’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2087). As alluded to earlier, soon-to-be Olympic spaces primed for 
event intervention, afforded by the projection of dystopic images of socio-economic decline (e.g. Smith, 
2012 – also found across the policy document analysis of this study), then juxtaposed against utopian 
visualisations. The mega-event, creating the necessary catalyst for regional development: new infrastructure, 
housing, stadia, all of which create a vision often difficult to resist and argue against the creation of paradise, 
an ‘urban quarter, and a place of community and national pride’ (ODA, 2007: 7). Smith (2012) and Raco 
and Tunney (2010) claim this is a common tactic for uniting a country toward a common utopian vision, 
against a common enemy, in this case, the historically blighted past of East London’s dirty canals and 
abandoned post-industrial warehouses. Raco (2014) and Raco and Tunney (2010) however suggest that 
such intervention reflects little understanding of the pre-existing socio-economic practices that permeate 
across these blackened and invisible spaces, and the interconnected networks such communities rely on. 
As identified from the post-Games rhetoric, policy makers have already proclaimed victory against the evils 
of socio-economic decline, shouting from the rooftops: ‘gone are the towering electricity pylons that 
dominated a landscape of polluted land and waterways, much of it a dumping ground for industrial and 
domestic waste’ (DCMS, 2012b: 6). Mission accomplished. But what next for the future of East London? 
What about the local legacy? What else will be erased from the socio-economic surface and depths of East 
London, and in the case of this thesis, Central Greenwich and the intensely impacted HEZs and Last Miles? 
This will be reflected up on across Chapter 4 and 5, and forms Research Objective 3. 
Gentrification, sometimes referred to as the ‘Olympic Effect’ (see House of Lords, 2012), becomes one of 
the major challenges for local communities before and after hosting mega-events. One of the key risks, 
according to McKay and Plumb (2001), Kavetsos (2012), OECD LEED (2010) and the Work Foundation 
(2010) is that structural economic changes to residential and commercial lettings can often force lower 
income communities out of an area;. This is a major concern for London 2012 (e.g. House of Lords, 2013) 
in light of systematic challenges across previous and future (e.g. Rio 2016) mega-event delivery. For 
example, Brazil’s property tycoon Carolas Carvalho intends to create a community of ‘“noble” elite, cleared 
of poor communities, described as the “beautiful new Rio de Janiero” (…) “a city of the elite, of good 
taste” (…) claiming that “the gardens that are planned for the inside will be at the level that only kings have 
previously had” (…) according to The Guardian (2015). Furthermore, the Centre for Cities (2012) report 
states that, in the case of 1992 Games, ‘gentrification changed the social mix’ of local communities (2012: 
5), and the Work Foundation (2010: 46) reported that house prices ‘jumped by 250% between 1986 and 
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the start of the Games’. Furthermore, with the 2000 Games, ‘housing prices in Sydney were growing at 7% 
above inflation in the years prior to the Games’ according to the Centre for Cities (2012) and House of 
Lords, 2012: 70). This was a concern for London 2012 given increasing evidence of ‘increased house prices 
in the run up to the Olympic Games, potentially pricing out the local population’ (Work Foundation, 2010: 
46). It is therefore of major concern that ‘regeneration’ is merely a synonym for ‘gentrification’ - a double-
edged sword – and a series of contradictions whereby ‘one measure of increasing house prices could be 
seen as a successful outcome of regeneration’ (House of Lords, 2013: 68). The challenge for London’s 
strategy of Convergence was thus complex, and at threat.  
Although initial ambitions were to enhance the socio-economic environment for current deprived 
communities and spaces for Growth Boroughs, the House of Lords (2013) legacy inquiry claimed: ‘we 
heard concerns that the ‘Olympic Effect’ would increase prices still further in surrounding areas, leading to 
convergence being achieved through gentrification, rather than improved outcomes for current residents’ 
(2013: 68). Other witnesses invited to share their perspective on the report further claimed: 
‘Elected representatives of these [Olympic host] boroughs told us that the situation had already 
started to change, and that house prices were increasing, heightening issues of affordability (…) 
the prices are ridiculous (…) The cost of properties is still, in my view, exorbitant, and I think this 
is a major problem. I have no idea how the country is going to deal with that, but we are pricing a 
whole generation of people out of London (...) Obviously the improvements that we have seen as 
a consequence of the Olympics will only make that situation worse’ (Cllr Robbins cited in House 
of Lords, 2013: 68). 
The risks of these aforementioned economic pressures are among the major concerns highlighted for this 
study. Although mega-events promote visions of futurity, promises and hope for deprived areas, scenarios 
of doubt, uncertainty and risk emerge concurrently for local actors and their uses. This was particularly 
illuminated in the context of Raco and Tunney’s (2010) case study concerning the eviction of over 300 
small firms: to make way for the ‘necessary Games infrastructure’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2070). In light 
of the evidence, it is pertinent to ask: why do host communities, and specifically small business communities, 
appear to be of relatively low importance to such developmental agendas? Berry et al (1968) and Imrie et 
al (1995) claim the lack of consideration for small firms may occur due to them often being in ‘unappealing, 
low-cost neighbourhoods’ and thus ‘easily written off as collections of old fashioned firms whose decline 
is inevitable’ (in Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2070), alongside a lack of understanding around the close-knit 
community networks small local firms come to rely on and that characterise local business clusters. Davies 
(2010: 15-18), for example, highlights the existence of local connections of 1) a ‘historical’ nature (e.g. client 
relationships between firm and consumer formed over tradition and years of operations), 2) a ‘practical’ 
nature (e.g. costs, supply chain and business location in a given area), and 3) of a ‘physical’ nature (e.g. 
integration with local sports clubs, societies, churches etc.). Empirical analysis from Raco and Tunney 
(2010) illuminates, one displaced business claiming ‘80% of our business customers are within a 2-mile 
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radius. A lot are moving or have already moved. Two of our main customers used to live next door – now 
we’ve lost them’ (2010: 2010). These insights, however, only touch on the surface of the challenges small 
firms’ face – as illustrated by the empirical findings of this thesis. 
What we can see here is that event-led regeneration projects can therefore ‘dismantle’ and ‘destroy’ both 
qualitative and quantitative local firm dependencies across tangible and intangible close-knit networks 
(Amin and Thrift, 2002; Porter, 2000). Connections easily lost through the structural economic pressures 
placed on host communities. This can subsequently ‘destroy pre-existing socio-economic practices (…) 
where traded dependencies have a severe impact on the short-term competitiveness and survival of firms’ 
(Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2070) - and are easily lost through forced relocation and economic pressures. In 
addition, Raco (2014) and Raco and Tunney (2010) claim that local small firms are constrained by their lack 
of perceived, and difficulty in proving their, contribution to the economic and social vitality of modern 
cities – often representing visual symbols of earlier epochs of economic activity whose presence may be 
seen as a physical block to the overarching regenerative objectives of mega-events. Furthermore, 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) claim that small firms have relatively low power, influence and ‘political 
clout’. Concern over the welfare of such low-priority stakeholders are thus often reduced due to the 
presumption that spaces occupied by local small firms can be used ‘in favour of more marketable purposes 
and profitable land uses’ (Thomas and Imrie, 1989: 19). Paradoxically, Osmond (2002) claims small local 
businesses are a ‘critical much overlooked foundation for a successful Games’ (…) where the visitor 
experience and perception of the Games efficiency and effective delivery is impacted on by the capacity of 
local business to continue to deliver a proactive and seamless service’ (2002: 237).  
It is, however, worth noting that London is not the first mega-event to see small business community 
marginalisation. According to the House of Lords (2012), negative impacts were seen in the Seoul 1988 
Games, where over 200,000 street stalls were relocated prior to the Olympics, subsequently reducing local 
spend. Risks to local businesses around Newham’s new ‘Westfield’ shopping centre catalysed by the delivery 
of London 2012 were also raised as a concern by the House of Lords (2012) report, claiming that the 
‘Olympics for residents could prove negative, rather than just minor: retailers worry that the new shopping 
mall [Westfield] will eat in to their business. Tenants fear a permanent increase in rents (…) and may ‘push 
out shops’ (New York Times, 2012). One major critic of the Games, Iain Sinclair, speaking in the context 
of London 2012, claims that mega-events ‘degenerate not regenerate (…) reinventing five hundred years of 
British history, and brush it aside for a corporate sports day (…) it boils down to 1000s upon 1000s of 
individual lives, that are now forever changed for three weeks of a brand fest’ (Sinclair, 2012). These issues 
all provide preluding evidence in light of the empirical findings of this thesis.  
One of the main contributing factors here described by Cashman (2006) is the somewhat flawed assumption 
that, by virtue of hosting the Games, benefits naturally ‘flow back in to the community at the end of the 
Games’ (2006: 15). The problem is that current academic, and critical research, currently shows that those 
who need the changes rarely benefit from them (Smith, 2008). One of the major issues identified - 
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theoretically and empirically - is that mega-events often focus on ‘project’ ambitions, prioritising more 
‘macro’ and ‘city and nation’ objectives in search of a ‘utilitarian’ vision, without placing significant 
importance on critical analysis of local challenges bestowed on what appear to be somewhat embattled, 
rather vulnerable, stakeholders. As alluded to earlier, stakeholders often perceived as existing in low-order 
suburbs, offering little to the economic vitality of the city, and further illustrates how such interventions 
ignore the day-to-day socio-economic practices that local communities often to rely on (Raco and Tunney, 
2010). This reflects an ironic situation whereby the very communities who formed the intended 
beneficiaries of London 2012’s initial bid, and recipients of a virtuous legacy vision, become marginalised.  
It is in light of these factors that the moral ground and objectives of this study are established, and the 
subsequent need to expose the systemic challenges bequeathed on local small firms around HEZs, and 
amplify local narratives of impact against the contrasting legacy rhetoric of a ‘sustainable, mixed use 
regeneration’ promise (LDA, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). This is key as Calvo (2014) argues that events should 
always lead to sustainable regional development as an on-going legacy of mega-events. 
2.3.4 Host City Tourism Impacts 
As identified earlier, for example by Preuss (2006) and Pappalepore and Duignan (2016): ‘increased tourism’ 
(in both the short and long term), ‘local business opportunities’, ‘city marketing’ and ‘international 
reputation’ are some of the major, hoped-for benefits for host cities (also see ETOA, 2005; 2010). Mega-
events are widely believed to intensify local leisure consumption, and provide trade opportunities for local 
retail, cultural, leisure and hospitality industries (Hiller, 2006; Chalip and Leyns, 2002). Several previous 
mega-event cities have noted this, including the Economic and Social Council of Greece (ESCG) of whom 
considered the Athens (2004) Olympics one of the most important tourism contributions to the economy, 
and the Australian Tourist Commission (ATC) of whom described the Sydney 2000 Games as ‘the most 
significant beneficial event in the history of Australia’s inbound tourism’ (ETOA, 2005: 4). 
Mega-events have thus, in recent years, taken on major importance in local, city and national tourism 
strategies (e.g. Gold and Gold, 2008). They have predominantly centred on promoting ‘favourable domestic 
images’ in the international migration and business marketplaces (e.g. Malecki, 2004), consciously using 
marketing to communicate selective images of towns and cities to a target audience (e.g. Roche, 2003). This 
process is formally known as ‘place marketing’, ‘place promotion’ (e.g. Van Den Burg and Braun, 2002), 
‘re-branding’, ‘city marketing’ and/or ‘showcasing’ (Faulkner et al, 2001: 139). It forms a strategy whereby 
host cities elaborately position themselves within the globe’s world class – and elite – cities in the eyes of 
the international community, with the key objective of attracting and retaining high calibre mobile capital, 
businesses, people and visitors (Smith, 2012; Hall, 2005, 2006; Bramwell, 1997, 1998). Often, cities bid for 
the Olympics as a way of enhancing their global image and status, leading to increased ‘visibility, business 
opportunities, tourism, and global publicity’. For example, in the context of Sydney 2000: ‘the main impulse 
behind the Games is [was] to promote Sydney as a ‘global city’ (Cashman and Hughes, 1999:70). Gratton 
et al (2005) state that economic gains through post-Games tourism expenditure is often sought, alongside 
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re-establishing or  redefining host spaces as key tourism destinations. Furthermore, Silk and Amis (2006) 
claims that the increasing commercialisation of sport illustrates how cities, mega-events and global 
economies converge as an antidote response to economic slump and social challenges brought about by 
post-industrial cities, where regeneration is sought through the construction of ‘tourist bubbles’.  
Several authors (e.g. Smith, 2012) also widely acknowledge that just bidding for the Games, in itself, is a 
statement to the world stage about the identity, ambitions and futures that bidding city hosts and 
governments aspire to, perhaps to secure new status as a ‘global city’. Or perhaps an opportunity for already 
established global cities to ‘re-affirm’ their position amongst the elites (MacRury and Poynter, 2009). Mega-
events can thus be understood as providing legitimation and platform for international economic success. 
This is particularly crucial given the need for historically developed and prosperous cities, that have been at 
the top of the ‘urban hierarchy’ and often referred to as ‘global’ or ‘world’ cities’ (e.g. London, New York, 
Tokyo etc.), to compete with new rising stars and emerging nations with respect to ‘investment capital, 
businesses and tourists’ (Burbank et al, 2002). Like Rio, and the likes. Toward the late 20th – early 21st 
century, due to political, economic and technological advancements, the ‘global economy’ has become an 
environment whereby such cities vie and compete for economic growth. Del Cerro (2013) refers to this as 
an increased competitive global system, resulting in the need to carve out particular niches (Burbank et al, 
2002).  
Regarding tourism development, Chalip and Leyns (2002) describes event tourism as one of the fastest 
growing elements of the leisure tourism market, and Getz (2012) suggests that sports events are perhaps 
the largest component of the event tourism market. The importance of mega-events for stimulating tourism 
policy and development is illustrated, for example, by Barcelona’s exponential global growth. Tourism 
legacies also formed a major ambition for London 2012, illustrated in the broader five government ‘policy 
promises’, which hoped to showcase that the ‘UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, 
visit, and for business’ (DCMS, 2008b: 1) and ‘attract new visitors to the UK and boost tourism in the long-
term’ (DCMS, 2012a: ). More specifically, the ‘This is GREAT’ campaign set out an ambitious international 
and domestic marketing campaign, and the UK’s biggest ever inbound tourism push, to ‘enhance Britain’s 
global image’ and revive ‘mature markets (e.g. US, France) along with getting on the wish list of first time 
visitors from growth markets such as Brazil, China, India and Russia (…) help the world discover why 
Britain is a great place to visit, study, work, invest and do business in 2012 and beyond’ according to 
VisitBritain (DCMS, 2012a: 42). In addition to a global poster campaign, VisitBritain spearheaded a series 
of campaigns: from exhibitions to flash dance mobs in Vancouver airport (complete with Britain’s favourite 
characters, e.g. Potter and Poppins). With predicted tourism bounties to the visitor economy amounting to 
approximately £2 billion in terms of both the short-term tourism boost and longer-term image 
enhancement (ETOA, 2005: 4), thanks to ‘enhance[d] image exposure’ (PWC, 2004: 18), the aim was to 
‘radically improve London’s image (…) and establish the East End as a key destination in the tourism 
economy of London’ (HC Hansard, 2012). This has, and continues to be, a major strategic agenda of 
London’s growth strategy, and of transnational importance for the Olympic 2020 agenda (IOC, 2016). It is 
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however worth noting that whilst significant public expenditure can be ploughed in to funding domestic 
and international mega-event tourism strategies, criticisms exist around the immediate and short-term 
consequence up on the tourism systems (e.g. Mill and Morrison, 2012) of host cities.  
2.3.5 The Business of Olympic Tourism: a Critical Perspective 
Although the review and later findings identify a range of opportunities and hoped-for tourism benefits for 
host cities, a number of authors (e.g. Hall, 1997; Getz, 2012; Ritchie, 2000) claim that impacts and legacies 
arising from mega-events are not always positive. In fact, frequently exhibit significant challenges and 
negative consequences. One of the overarching criticisms of Olympic-induced tourism is that considerable 
evidence suggests that the predicted, and aforementioned, bounties of tourism are often inflated (e.g. Fourie 
and Santana-Gallego, 2011; ETOA, 2010; City Majors’ Archive, 2008). This is echoed by the European 
Tour Operators Association (ETOA) (2005) who claim ‘audiences regularly cited for such events as the 
Olympics are exaggerated’, based on ‘hopes and illusions’, a problematic which ultimately concludes that 
‘there is no strong link between hosting sporting events and increased tourism’ (2005: 2). Despite strident 
pre-Games rhetoric around tourism benefits, even at the national level, doubt over the true benefits 
emerged in the immediate Games phase from then Culture Secretary, Jeremy Hunt MP claiming: ‘it is very 
difficult to predict what will actually happen to consumer spending in one part of London during something 
like the Olympic Games because the upheaval is so huge. We are hoping to come away net positive in terms 
of the overall period of the Games but we don’t know’ (The Independent, 2012). This is somewhat ironic 
in light of the projected hoped-for benefits for London 2012, as addressed in the Findings and Discussions 
of this thesis.  
Two major reasons are cited for challenging initial tourism effects. These are i) ‘tourism displacement’ (e.g. 
Fourie and Gallego, 2011, ETOA, 2005; 2010), and ii) the formation of ‘aversion markets’ (e.g. Spilling, 
1996; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). With respect to displacement, the Work Foundation (2010) claim 
that usual tourist activity is often replaced by a type of ‘Olympic-focused’ tourism due to images conjuring 
up chaotic event scenes across host cities, further exacerbated by hikes in both travel and accommodation 
costs (ETOA, 2005). The ETOA (2005) details this point, claiming that ‘attendees at the Games displace 
normal visitors and scare tourists away for some time (…) both Sydney and Barcelona had ‘excellent’ 
Olympic Games, but their tourism industries have not significantly benefitted (…) thus there appears to be 
little evidence of any benefit to tourism of hosting an Olympic Games, and considerable evidence of 
damage’ (ETOA, 2005: 2).  
Although specific impact on businesses and trade has been documented in places, analysis remains 
fragmented. One of the major concerns in the context of this research is the possible effects on both local 
and city-wide business trade. Findings from previous Olympics found that ‘many hotels and restaurants 
reported significantly lower than normal sales volume (…) even shops and resorts in areas up to 150 miles 
away reported slower than normal business during the Summer of 1996’ (French and Disher, 1997). 
Furthermore, the ETOA (2005) reports that ‘during the Olympics a destination effectively closes for normal 
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business. The repercussions are felt before and after, both tourists and the tour operators that supply them 
are scared off immediately before and during the events (…) this absence then creates its own effect, as the 
normal conveyor belt of contented customers begetting new arrivals has been broken’ (ETOA, 2005: 10). 
Illustrated by the figure below by Deloitte (2004), the ETOA (2005) claim, in the contexts of Games 
between 1988 and 2000, that international tourism often peaks in the year before the event, ‘year -1’, and 
systematically dips during and after the Games. The UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) indicated that 
during the Games in August 2012, overseas tourism to the UK decreased by 7% compared to 2011 (ONS, 
2012). It is therefore not surprising that the FSB (2013) reported concerns around ‘ghost town’ effects 
emerging across London. These concerns echoed throughout the comprehensive evidence and empirical 
findings gathered across this thesis. Smith and Stevenson (2009) however claims that tourism legacies are 
still often used as a primary justification for staging mega-events, despite the criticism of over-inflated 
benefits, and a disappointing body of evidence.  
 
Figure 4: Deloitte's (2004) 'Tourism Impact Analysis' 
As established throughout this thesis, Games rhetoric and conjecture emerges as a symptom of the 
pressurised and politicised nature of wider ‘inflation’ of Games benefits and legacies – as detailed further 
in the next section. Whilst criticism over tourism benefits exists, policy makers and project actors continue 
to save face and present the squeaky clean image of long-term tourism enhancement for London, claiming 
that ‘although the outcome is not yet fully reflected in the data, the UK has leveraged the preparation of 
these events in terms of tourism campaigns, [and] generating interest in the country’, according to the World 
Economic Forum (UK Government, 2013: 50). In light of the aforementioned concerns, given that current 
evidence on local tourism impacts is inconsistent, ambiguous, and lacking in empirical detail – particularly 
with respect to qualitative analysis of host community experiences – it is through a combination of factors 
that serve to justify the objectives and approach taken across this thesis.  
 
2.4 Beyond ‘Impact’: Event ‘Legacy’ 
2.4.1 Introduction to Olympic Legacy  
It is clear that the promises of a positive host city and community legacy formed the overarching 
justification and goal for the delivery of the London 2012 Games. Lord Coe, alongside a plethora of policy 
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documents, claimed that ‘legacy is absolutely epicentral to the plans for 2012. Legacy is probably nine-
tenths of what this process is about, not just 16 days of sport’ (The Guardian, 2006). Since the birth of 
modern-era Olympics (1896 – present day), the ambition and scale of the Games has grown significantly, 
and with that, the notion of legacy has been born. Now, as we move further into the 21st century, given its 
extraordinary capability to drive economic and social change, it is of significant importance that cities create 
long-lasting positive benefits for affected communities (OECD LEED, 2010). Such opportunities are often 
encapsulated, conceptualised and packaged by project actors through the notion of ‘legacies’ – a key feature 
of Olympic rhetoric and discourse (e.g. MacRury and Poynter, 2009) – often centred around ‘positive’ and 
‘longer-term’ effects (IOC, 2013: 4). It is therefore unsurprising that (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001) claims 
that legacy ‘seems to have sprung out of nowhere [but] is now on everyone’s lips’ (2001:2). MacRury and 
Poynter (2009) thus state that ‘the scale and cost of the contemporary Games demands its organisers to 
deliver a variety of non-sporting outcomes and legacies for host city and nation’ (MacRury and Poynter, 
2009: 1). Legacy rhetoric in the context of London 2012 is explicitly mapped out in the empirical findings 
(section 4.7). 
Given the considerable importance of ‘legacy’, it is pertinent to examine and evaluate what this means in 
reality. Furthermore, detailed immediate analysis and longer-term longitudinal review may also reveal 
important insights into the truer costs and/or benefits of hosting, thus allowing host communities, 
governments and society at large to question the efficacy of legacy. This is particularly important as policy 
makers should be able to evidence the effectiveness of event-related policy stimulation – importantly, what 
works, what does not and why – in order to create feedback loops and justify the considerable public 
expenditure of hosting (e.g. Gold and Gold, 2008). Such a feat is, however, complicated by concerns that 
research and policy makers face in measuring the relationships between the event and associated policies, 
and the overarching output of legacy – owing to the difficulty of defining, counting and attributing to the 
specific event (OECD LEED, 2008). The review now turns to a detailed critique of legacy as the driving 
force behind Olympic rhetoric, followed by an analysis of various attempts made by policy makers and 
academics to advance understanding of the dynamic, nature and characteristics of legacy.  
2.4.2 Legacy Critique 
We can identify that the above is particularly important given criticisms that the notion of longer-term, 
intangible ‘legacies’ (particularly the growing importance of ‘social legacies’ and ‘social capital), sometimes 
referred to as ‘soft legacies’ (see Smith and Fox, 2007)) may manifest as a way to cover up excessive spending 
and ‘divert’ attention away from more important issues (e.g. Smith, 2012). Zizek (2008), in this sense, may 
conceptualise the hosting of the Olympics, and the attributed juxtapositions formed between East London’s 
dystopic past and ‘legacy-as-a-tool-to-fix’ the evils of socio-economic deprivation, and the promised 
utopian futures forecast as an output from the Games - as an ‘ideological fetish’.  
By fetish, Zizek (2008) simply refers to an object which been given a greater value and/or quality. It is 
through scapegoating and isolating these factors that Zizek (2008) believes fetishes help cover up real 
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conflict, acting as a conduit for individuals and organisations (in this case London 2012 project actors) to 
vent frustrations, whilst diverting attention away from more significant social and economic problems. An 
issue previously established earlier in the review. For example, he frequently uses the concept of fetishes to 
highlight distractions from the ‘subjective violence’ and ‘unknown knowns’ of naturalised capitalist order and the 
underlying socio-cultural and economic conflicts that underpin the ravages of the capitalist system and 
Marx’s early notion of the ‘ruling class’. This reflects Christopher Bollas’s (2009) concern that legacy is 
something that can help us to forget about present, as anxiety about the ‘future’ often invades the ‘present’. 
However, Zizek (2008) notes that when the fetish is removed, for example the Olympic carnival moves on, 
the harsh reality of the post-Games so-called legacy is uncovered. It is because of the positive aurora that 
enshrouds the Games that, for example, we need to ‘rid East London of the evils of socio-economic deprivation’, or 
that ‘sport is inherently good for you’ - to the average layperson, it is fundamentally impossible to argue against 
the wider perceived good of hosting an Olympic Games. As such, the ‘harsh realities’ of host, and local, 
impact and legacy seldom i) emerge politicised, ii) amplify themselves, and iii) rise to the surface of mega-event 
analyses. Senior London Urban Planner, Martin Crookson stated at a London Legacy Development 
Corporation (LLDC) (2013) seminar talk: 
‘Even though legacy is promised, it does not mean it will happen (…) a two week mega-event will 
not itself create legacy (…) in fact it will be difficult for potential areas outside of the ‘commercial 
areas’ to benefit’ (LLDC, 2013). 
Legacy is clearly an enigmatic and widely contested phenomenon. It is largely down to its ‘indirect’ and 
‘subtle’ nature (see Getz, 2007, 2008) that several authors (e.g. Davies, 2012; Cashman, 2002; Preuss, 2007; 
Gold and Gold, 2008) claim its definition is little understood, ‘making it hard to measure accurately or with 
any confidence’ (Preuss, 2007: 207). Bollas’ (2009) view above is supported by several concerns over the 
efficacy – and in fact reality – of what legacy is and how to achieve it. This includes the view of two London-
centric critical commentators, Iain Sinclair and the ex-Creative Director of the Millennium Dome, as 
discussed in the Vice (2012) documentary: ‘The Dark Side of the Olympics’. Both claim that ‘this whole business 
[London 2012] has been positive on the idea of creating a heritage or legacy, and that’s getting it the wrong 
way round. Nobody can say what the future will be. The thing you have to work on is the present’ (Sinclair, 
2012), and the idea that ‘you can’t set out to create legacy; legacy is what happens. You can’t just say, ‘right 
I want to just make some legacy’’ according to the ex-Creative Director of the Millennium (Vice, 2012). 
Furthermore, aforementioned concerns that such mega-event projects tend to override the interests of local 
people, communities and specifically businesses, raise scepticism over the nature of ‘legacy’ benefits (e.g. 
Hiller, 2002).  
In light of such symptomatic issues, it is therefore unsurprising that academics continue to criticise the 
notion of host cities bidding to host such unpredictable, unevidenced focuses of extraordinary policy; 
basing many of their justifications on so-called ‘event strategies’ with only a vague idea of the complexity 
and ambulatory nature of achieving event-led forms of legacy (Preuss, 2007). The idea of mega-events as 
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‘gambles’ goes back to aforementioned concerns over the ‘entrepreneurial strategies’ cities look to in order 
to stimulate growth - at whatever cost. Entrepreneurial policies partly replace more progressive and 
‘managerial’ modes of urban governance and political economic strategy. Cashman (2002) claims that 
inadequate attention has been paid to the long term planning of legacy, often subsumed by bidding, winning, 
planning and staging the Games, a state of affairs where ‘nobody has been prepared to commit the research 
resources required to carry out scientific study of the net legacy benefits’ (Mangan, 2008: 1871). Thus it is 
unsurprising that Cashman (2002) calls for excavating beneath the immediacy of the event, drawing on 
empirical and interdisciplinary approaches to post-Games studies of mega-events. Whilst the Olympic 
Games Global Impact (OGGI) study fulfils, in part, the evaluative method after the Games, with indicators 
and monitoring of legacy achievement (Furrer, 2002) from economic to environmental impacts (e.g. 
Gratton and Preuss, 2008), one major issue exists. This is the concern that the OGGI study dissolves shortly 
after the delivery of the Games. This highlights the concern that legacy is seldom measured and politicised 
enough after this period, despite theoretically being a ‘long-term’, perhaps ‘10 year project’ (e.g. House of 
Lords, 2013; UK Government, 2013), especially in the context of London 2012. In light of these issues, 
and criticisms - emphasis up on analysing and reflecting up on host community legacy is vitally important. 
London’s legacy ambition is thus under major scrutiny post-Games, with concerns that the overarching 
rhetoric and utopian promises are being neglected without responsible oversight (House of Lords, 2013). 
As alluded to above, this serves to illustrate the need for Research Objective 3 – to reflect on small business 
legacies. Such concerns are indicative of what Harvey (1989) refers to as ‘bread and circuses’; a scenario 
where the longer-term vision of legacy is often forgotten after the spectacle has vanished from our screens. 
In other words, ‘de-politicised’, resulting in a scenario whereby ‘the circus succeeds even if the bread is 
lacking. The triumph of image over substance is complete’ (Harvey, 1989b: 14). In the context of London, 
these concerns were echoed by the House of Lords (2013) claiming that there was a ‘perception of 
insufficient long-term benefits, or even-adverse long-term consequences, for cities and countries having 
hosted the Games’ (2013: 21). If this is the case, which it looks to be in light of the evidence, critical 
commentators need to consider both practical and conceptual ways to support subjugated stakeholders to 
rid themselves of potential burden. And to find ways to negate damaging effects, and/or consider ways to 
effectively leverage on aforementioned leveragable opportunities, and redistribute Games-related benefits.  
Studies of the socio-cultural and economic geographies of hallmark, major and mega-events have produced 
such insights, often critically conceptualize mega-events as ‘marketing beacons’ (Stevenson, 2003), 
‘cosmetic exercises’ (Garcia, 2004), ‘carnival masks’ (Harvey, 1989) and ‘spectacles of diversion’ (Kellner, 
2013) that produce ‘class politic’ and ‘displacement’ effects (Getz, 2007). In addition, due to their 
international significance and ‘dramatic character’, mega-events have long served to mobilise political and 
economic elites to leverage cultural and material resources to showcase cities to the world and attract new 
sources of capital investment (Ley and Olds, 1988). Mega-events often catalyse urban transformation in 
which political and economic elites attempt to unify disparate groups and interests, mitigate or co-opt 
opposition and otherwise weaken and neutralize resistance by arguing that hosting a mega-event will 
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contribute to business vitality and economic development (Gotham, 2011). This illustrates earlier arguments 
as to why, due to their invisible and limited perceived contribution to the economic vitality of modern day 
cities, small firms emerge powerless and vulnerable across all phases of the TDR cycle – an apriori and 
aposteriori and major concern following the empirical findings of this thesis.  
Mega-event planning thus depoliticizes spectacles using rhetoric around ‘growth’, ‘progress’ and 
‘development’, juxtaposed against ‘dystopic’ images as discussed earlier, with the present intervention 
portrayed as beneficial for all social groups, in an attempt to conceal the parochial interests of powerful 
actors (e.g. McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Raco and Tunney, 2010). It is therefore unsurprising to see a call 
for ‘deeper analyses of the spatio-political relations between mega-sports events and their strategic 
extension into civic spaces that support modern consumer capitalism (Gotham, 2005; McGillivray and 
Frew, 2015). According to McGillivray and Frew (2015), the dynamics of these new spaces have received 
surprisingly little critical attention, although research into mega-events is extensive and continues to grow 
exponentially (Rojek, 2013). As continually alluded to, academics and critical commentators must continue 
to question the ethics of mega-event projects, and interrogate the evolving nature of ‘who wins’ in such 
cataclysmic modes of urban intervention and development – in a deeper, more qualitative and empirically 
driven way, as approached by this study,  
On the flip side, however, we must consider Mangan’s (2008) concern that premature assessments of legacy 
effects can often overlook eventual success, producing errors due to incomplete evidence. Some academics 
argue that measuring ‘true legacy’ can often take 15-20 years as ‘legacies have a lasting effect on the host 
city; requiring studies to be conducted 15-20 years after the event has occurred’ (Mangan, 2008: 1871). We 
must therefore consider developing rational and logical arguments in the light of limited information on 
actual legacy, invoking what Ha-Joon Chang (2012) refers to as ‘bounded rationality’ – a theory from 
behavioural economics suggesting that ‘rational analysis’ is bounded by the knowledge we have at a given 
time. This is opposed to an analysis based on ‘all the facts’, which requires the researcher to reflect on the 
limitations of any form of ‘impact’ and ‘legacy’ analysis arising from the London 2012 Games. Furthermore, 
research must consider the extent to which legacy constitutes a social construction – verhesten – and 
‘depending on one’s perspective, rather than to be offered as singularity successful for all’ (Hiller, 1998: 50) 
- which is complicated by context sensitive dependencies. 
 Vigor et al (2004) illuminates the nature of assessing legacy perfectly below, claiming: 
‘Business, government (local, regional or national), community groups, residents, environmental 
organisations and the Olympic Movement itself all have a view, and many are actively telling their 
story about what a London Games in 2012 could mean for them. All of these potentially entail 
long lasting legacies, but each has a different impact on the ground’ (Vigor et al, 2004: 8).  
This serves to justify why a qualitative, social constructivist position situated within a ‘case study’ approach 
that incorporates perspectives across a multi-levelled stakeholder sample (e.g. senior project officials, local 
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councils, and local small firms) was executed. Coherence between research objectives, philosophical and 
methodological positions is thus explicitly reconciled – as evidenced throughout the thesis.  
2.4.3 Definition, Conceptualisation and Contextualisation 
Hiller (1998) claims that impacts and legacies are often ‘cross-cutting’ (1998: 50) and highly complex. This 
section explores two key theoretical models to help deconstruct the concept of legacy and capture its key 
‘dynamics’ and ‘structures’ – the ‘Legacy Cube’ and ‘Linkage Model’. It is important to do so in light of the 
lack of agreed definition and understanding of legacy’s nature, a concept that plays such a significant role 
in policy legitimisation. Although attempts have been made to define it, in light of changing Olympic 
contexts and the overarching contextual nature of impacts and legacies, criticisms also exist with respect to 
the development of ‘gold star’ definitions of legacy (Cashman, 2002). This is particularly emphasised given 
that the Games continue to be delivered across unique scenarios (Gold and Gold, 2008) with different bid 
emphases shaped around  pre-existing economic, social, cultural conditions and heritages (Smith, 2008). 
One further concern is can be formally referred to as ‘conceptual schemes’, i.e. varying definitions and 
semantics associated with the word ‘legacy’. Moragas et al (2002: 491), speaking at the IOC symposium on 
‘legacies’, claimed ‘when asked to define legacy, participants found there are several meanings of the 
concept, and some of the contributions have highlighted the convenience of using other expressions that 
can mean different things in different languages’ (2002: 491). The variability of definition and context, not 
to mention the socially-constructed nature of ‘impact’ and ‘legacy’ as a broader ontological point, was indeed 
found to be an issue for this research. Interestingly, variables potentially emerge so dynamic that a DCMS 
(2007b) commission legacy report argues that little can be gained from examining past experiences as hosts 
face such different circumstantial - macro-environmental – conditions that determine policy, practice and 
event outcomes. Although, Smith (2008) claims, ‘this is a misleading statement to make’, one cannot ignore 
the fact that London faced significant economic (e.g. global turmoil and the recession of 2008), 
technological (e.g. era and apex of web 2.0 developments and shifts to online e-commerce) and political 
(e.g. 7/7 bombings in the wake of periods of ‘Arab Uprising’ and the growth of Islamic State) 
circumstances, to name just a few, as indicated in the latter sections of the Findings chapter. 
In terms of finding a definition of legacy, broadly speaking, and in its elementary form, this concept can be 
recognised as a ‘tangible or intangible thing handed down by a predecessor; a long-lasting effect of an event 
or process, and the act of bequeathing’ (Mangan, 2008; 1869). More specifically, legacy is centred on the 
more ‘positive’, ‘longer-term’ effects of mega-events according to the IOC (2013), often associated with, 
but not exhaustive to, the dominant themes of ‘economic’ and ‘social’ impact. Several typologies and 
conceptualisations are offered by academic literature. As discussed earlier, Preuss’ (2006) ‘Legacy 
Categorisation’ provides a detailed list which has considerable thematic overlap between several other 
analyses, as briefly alluded to in Table 6. 
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Author Legacy dimensions 
Cashman (2002b)  ‘Economic’; ‘built and physical environment’; ‘information and education’; ‘public life, politics 
and culture’; ‘sport’; symbols, memory and history’  
 
Chappalet (2006)  ‘Sporting’, ‘economic’, ‘infrastructural’, ‘urban’ and ‘social legacy’  
IOC (2013) ‘Cultural, social and political’, ‘economic’, ‘environmental’, ‘sporting’ and ‘urban’ legacies  
 
Table 6: ‘Typologies of Olympic Legacies’ 
Conceptualisations have largely been split in to either i) themes/subject or ii) structure/nature – as legacy 
constitutes, and manifests as, a multi-dimensional construct (e.g. Agha et al, 2012; MacRury and Poynter, 
2009). Thematic analysis helps to deconstruct the day-to-day practical effects of ‘legacy’, and structure 
affords a better understanding of its character and functioning. Two theoretical models have attempted to 
examine the complex character of ‘legacy’: Preuss’ (2007) ‘Legacy Cube’ (later updated in Gratton and 
Preuss (2008)) and Hiller’s (1998) ‘Linkage Model’. 
Firstly, the ‘Legacy Cube’ conceptualises legacy as five inter-related dimensions (see Figure 5), required to 
provide the ‘holistic evaluation’ of event legacies ‘necessary to identify all legacies’ (Hiller, 1998). The cube 
consists of the following structures: (1) ‘planned vs. unplanned’, (2) ‘positive vs. negatives’, (3) ‘tangible vs. 
intangible’, (4) ‘short vs. long term’, and (5) the ‘spaces’ affected by these structures (e.g. physical, and 
mental (e.g. brand enhancement). Preuss (2007) states that ‘irrespective of time of production and space, 
legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and 
by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself’ (Preuss, 2007:211). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Preuss’ (2007) and Gratton and Preuss’ (2007) ‘Legacy Cube’ 
Such a comprehensive analysis is of major importance in light of criticisms that Games organisers tend to 
overly focus on the more ‘planned, positive, tangible’ (Cashman, 2006: 15) sub-cubes of impact and legacies, 
especially during pre-event bid construction and bidding phases. Preuss (2007) emphasises Cashman’s 
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point, highlighting that ‘many of the pre-event feasibility and economic impact studies that consider legacies 
are potentially biased, because of the ambition of those commissioning the studies is to favour the hosting 
of the event and therefore only emphasise this particular sub cube’ (Preuss, 2007:211). This particular issue 
has been widely discussed by authors in relation to hallmark and mega-event sports events (Preuss, 2000; 
Baade and Matheson, 2002; Cashman, 2005). Amongst today’s global and elite cities, in order to win a 
competitive host bid, on one hand voters must be convinced by the scope and ambition of the proposed 
project, whilst on the other hand, promises made, should idealistically be met: ‘constructing messages that 
resonate with both audiences, and also distinguish it from the other bidding cities’ (Vigor et al, 2004: 13). 
It is therefore concerning that mega-event bid teams tend to overpromise, and propose unrealistic, 
somewhat overly ambitious plans – including wildly inaccurate costings (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006), 
claiming a ‘fantasy world of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, underestimated environmental 
impacts, and over-valued economic development effects’ (2006: 10). This is true with respect to the broader 
hope-for legacy benefits, and the rhetoric around the bounties of Olympic tourism – as illustrated across 
prior sections.  
In light of the over-estimated effects, it is no surprise to find Flyvbjerg (2012) claim in his analysis that 
mega-events, over the history of Summer and Winter Games (all pre-2012, including London), have initial 
budget overruns averaging 179%. This was also the case for London 2012, where the initial budget in May 
2003 was £4bn but in 2007 an overrun of approximately £9.325bn was announced (HC Hansard, 2007), 
despite Olympics Minister Tessa Jowell claiming ‘we can, and we will avoid cost overruns which Athens 
experienced and the long-term debt which other host cities have had to deal with’ (BBC, 2007). An 
interesting criticism to note is that if the figure were to include more indirect costings (e.g. additional 
policing and administration, transport projects and counter terrorism efforts), Olympic spend might have 
increased to somewhere between £12bn and £24bn according to reports by Sky Sports (2012). It is 
therefore unsurprising that Flyvbjerg et al (2003) claim that ‘mega-projects including sports stadia and other 
infrastructure, may often consistently, systematically and self-servingly mislead governments and the public 
in order to get projects approved’ (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003:  11-21). Themes of lies, deceit and the overarching 
dichotomies between Olympic rhetoric vs. reality emerge as dominant empirical and theoretical themes 
found across the empirical findings of this thesis, and detailed further in Chapter 5 and 6.    
Hiller’s (1998) ‘Linkage Model’ is similar to the ‘Legacy Cube’ in that it attempts to map out alternative 
dimensions of legacy, borrowing the concept of ‘linkages’ from political economy literature (Watkins, 1989). 
The model assumes that legacies are part of chains of relationships expressed through: 
‘Forward’ 
linkage 
The planned, tangible, often positively perceived effects caused by the event (Hiller, 1998), for 
example, infrastructural, tourism and local business benefits 
‘Backward’ 
linkages 
Justifications for the intervention, having a ‘causal’ relationship to the event, powerful effects 
helping to rationalise the whole purpose of the event (e.g. Roche, 1992; Hiller, 1998) 
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‘Parallel’ 
linkages 
The unplanned, sometimes unrecognised, positive and negative effects, often residual to the event 
(Hiller, 1998), for example, the unpredictable impacts of spatial striation, and longer-term 
structural economic pressures on host communities. 
Table 7: Hiller's (1998) 'Linkage Model' 
According to Hiller (1998), such linkages are often a ‘largely neglected aspect of mega-event analysis’ (Hiller, 
1998: 50), important to assess in order to provide more enhanced ‘contextual and longitudinal’ analyses. 
This aligns closely with earlier calls for a more joined-up, contextual legacy analysis of local dynamics and 
idiosyncrasies as argued by Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) in agreement with Hiller (1998). Although 
both models provide a useful heuristic, both require further empirical analysis to improve their ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ validity. This study provides an opportunity to ground, where feasible, these 
conceptualisations with the somewhat messy and empirically rich detail emerging from host communities. 
From an epistemological perspective, it is important to note that whilst these frameworks are often used in 
positivist research, in the context of this study they do not present any form of ‘truth’ but rather a pragmatic 
way to organise socially-constructed empirical material.  
To conclude, legacy clearly offers cities an unparalleled rhetoric and discourse to package comprehensive 
and cataclysmic utopian visions of urban regeneration and regional development. Legacy thus serves to 
legitimise the intervention, illustrating visions of a greater tomorrow, and without these London would 
simply never have won the bid to host the 2012 Games.  
Although using events in this way appears on the surface to provide obvious solutions, the arguments so 
far illuminate the darker, more sinister side of what this thesis refers to as ‘dark policy’. In the strive for 
global competitiveness and all out growth, the enigmatic – and utopian - legacies of host cities fuel economic 
and political will towards this grand (elitist) project, regardless of the social cost to host populations. 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) indicate the extent to which legacy’s vagueness and positive connotations 
make it particularly suitable for legitimisation rhetoric, the same characteristics make it unsuitable for 
detailed, in-depth analysis. This thesis calls for a new era of detailed empirical excavation beneath the surface 
of the local dynamics and idiosyncrasies of not only ‘immediate’ impact but ‘longer-term’ legacies, as 
established in the Conclusions and Recommendations (Chapter 6).  
The thesis now turns to the determining effects of post-1960s commercial turn, and the pervading free-
market principles that characterise neoliberal development, on the governance, development and delivery 
of mega-event projects. In light of the research objectives, and the emergent findings of this research, the 
following section further explores the ways in which mega-events exhibit territorialising tendencies across 
host cities, examining how they can seize and control, commodify and re-commercialise urban and event 
spaces posing exclusionary effects up on existing communities and small businesses. 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
48 | P a g e  
 
2.5 Neoliberalism: the Commercial Turn and Commodification of Mega-Events 
Mega-events, particularly the Olympic Games, have been subject to exponential growth over the past forty 
years. Technology and developments in global communications have, of course, played a major part. New 
technologies now afford global citizens easy access to places, and enhancements in global communities 
(especially social media) have expanded the gaze on Olympic spectacles. As established earlier, mega-events 
now drive mass global interest and are intensely mediatised, drawing in major television audiences, with 
global attention matching ‘physical’ growth in the size of the project (see Malfas et al, 2004: 210). It is 
therefore unsurprising that such holistic project growth clearly coincides with not only the desire and 
attractiveness to host but also increased parallel commercial and economic interests and desires that 
underpin mega-event funding strategies (Hall, 2006). Hall (2006) claims that, through technological 
developments, mega-events have extended the ‘market reach’ of the Games given intense time-space 
compressions (e.g. earlier Games would require weeks/months to experience, now, it is almost 
instantaneous). The eyes of the world focus on one ‘event’ and thus extend the market reach for associated 
products and services - the commercial potentiality is clear.  
As such, Hall (2006) notes that we can see a growing corporate interest in affiliation with global sporting 
brands. It is therefore unsurprising that a host of authors claim that the interests of corporate, 
governmental, project and supranational actors intertwine closely (e.g. Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Hall, 
2006). Kellner (2013) notes that the reproduction of dominant societal values initiated between sports 
[mega-events], commercial desires, and the media represents an ‘unholy alliance’ with challenging 
consequences. The resulting effects illustrate that, from a material and symbolic perspective, the Games are 
subject to intense commercialisation  commoditisation  corporatisation effects - from the sale of 
broadcasting rights, Olympic commodities e.g. the torch relay, right through to the corporate-only nature 
of Games host space protected by intense advertising and trading regulations. The subsequent effect has 
been a significant rise in corporate interest in sponsoring sporting events and competition with the ambition 
of placing products in physical Olympic space – as well as on television and media – a phenomenon that 
has intensified over the past 40 years (Smith, 2012; Hall, 1992, 2006; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). 
Furthermore, it has been noted by various authors (e.g. Smith, 2012) that positive transfer association 
between the ‘event’ and ‘brand’ has led to such corporate interest and involvement – the idea of sponsorship 
packaging via a ‘tri-partite’ model of ‘sponsorship rights’, ‘exclusive broadcasting rights’ and ‘merchandising’ 
in particular appears to be a lucrative proposition for corporate involvement within event agendas (Horne 
and Manzenreiter, 2006).  
The justification for corporate involvement appears to be self-evident; however, in the last thirty years the 
pressure to identify and secure alternate non-public sources of capital to fund mega-event projects has also 
been imperative for cities (Smith, 2012; Gold and Gold, 2008; Channel 4, 2009). Given that commercial 
sports events are often described as the lead sector in city economic regeneration strategies (e.g. Gratton, 
1999), paralleling the importance of securing sponsorship funding and stimulating private investment in 
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cities – it is unsurprising that with the expansion of mega-sporting events comes a greater formation of 
alliances between sport, media and  business, and strong links between transnational capital and global 
sports events (Hall, 2006; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). This, given these close intertwining relationships, 
has a significant transformative effect on the way mega-sporting events have been delivered from the late 
20th century onwards (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006).  
The exponential growth of corporate alignment with mega-event projects runs in parallel with the wider 
adoption of ‘neoliberal’ free-market ideology around late 1970s and 1980s – particularly across the UK and 
US – transforming urban governance practices in the world’s more advanced western nations (Harvey, 
2007). As alluded to earlier, the shifting effects seen from ‘managerialism’ to ‘entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 
1989, 2010) indicate the significant effect on urban policy paradigms, dramatically changing the way 
governments and their associated actors ‘think’ and ‘act’ in the neoliberal city. As indicated, the key shift 
here is the closer intertwining relationships between public and the private sector – specifically: industrial - 
corporate - governmental bodies that emerge and converge at the point of bidding and hosting mega-events 
(Vigor et al, 2004). This new age way of thinking is thus transforming how mega-events are planned and 
delivered, and may give rise to theorisations about ‘who benefits’ from such interventions. For example, 
Harvey (1989) specifically highlights how ‘neoliberal’ governance is strongly linked with capitalist 
bourgeoisie control – the problem is the common ‘misconception’ that free-market thought produces 
‘growing’ and ‘dynamic’ economies and thus there is no immediate reason to ‘abandon such political 
thought’ (1989: 8). Neoliberalism, thus, forms the dominant political-economic paradigm of the current 
age.  
According to the IOC (2005: 2), over the past three decades the commercialisation of TV rights has become 
the greatest source of revenue for Olympic funding strategies. Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) draw on key 
IOC statistics in their analysis, claiming that between 2001 and 2004 TV broadcasting rights amounted to 
‘53%’ (US $2.229bn), with corporate sponsorship at ‘34%’ (US $1.459bn), ticket sales at ‘11%’ (US $441m) 
and merchandising at a miniscule ‘2%’ (US $86.5m) of total revenue (see Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 
5). The graph below provides a snapshot of the growth trajectory of TV broadcasting deals from 1960 – 
2012, highlighting a specific poignant commercialisation turning-point in the wake of the LA 1984 Summer 
Games and the subsequent Calgary 1988 Winter Games. Table 8 below presents evidence of significant 
growth in corporate sponsorship across FIFA World Cups and Olympic Games.   
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Table 8: ‘US Broadcasters and Olympics Television Rights (US$m) 1960-2012’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 
2006) 
 
Table 9: ‘Mega-Events and Sponsorship Programmes’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006) 
The notion that the Games must protect sponsor interests is overtly outlined in the Host City Contract 
(HCC) supplied to the host city by the IOC - justified based on the need to combat excessive public 
spending (Whitson, 1998; Barney et al, 2002; Hall, 2006) on mega-event project ‘gambles’ with little 
evidence of economic return on investment (ROI) (see Harvey, 1989). Corporate interests in sponsoring 
sporting events in order to ‘place’ still dominates in exclusive spaces of Olympic Games-led consumption.  
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The commercialisation of the Games product and corporate involvement in the sponsoring of global event 
brands (Hall, 2006) is, however, not a recent introduction. Drawing on the works of Barney et al (2002) it 
would be inaccurate to suggest that commercial interests have emerged solely since the LA Games of 1984. 
Barney et al’s (2002) historical analysis illustrates the emergence of (albeit smaller scale) ‘commercial creep’ 
in earlier versions of the Olympic Games which, they argue, contributed to the development of the 
commercial rationale and paradigm for the Olympics to be bought and sold as a commodity. For example, 
the October 1902 issue of the Olympic programme promoted the French brandy maker ‘Benedictine’, and 
the mass commoditisation of advertisement billboards seen in the 1924 Paris stadium with brands 
Ovalmaltine, Cinzano et cetera. and a 320-page Olympic guide containing 256 pages of adverts (Barney et 
al, 2002). It is, however, the 1980s that numerous authors (Tomlinson, 2004; 2006; Hall, 2006, Barney et al, 
2002; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006 etc.) claim  the milestone decade in which what was once a harmless 
peripheral Olympic commercial activity ambition became core, central, overt economic strategy for 
Olympic funding (Tomlinson, 2004; 2006). It was this overt, dominant economic logic and justification to 
alleviate the pressures of spiralling costs (due to increases in the Olympics’ size) in event-project funding 
that descended upon both the FIFA World Cup and Olympics. 
2.5.1 Paradigm Shift: The New Commercial Logic of Mega-Event Economics 
The commercial potential of mega-sporting events has continued to become increasingly realised, and 
operationalised, through parallel developments in official forms of ‘corporate sponsorship packages’. 
FIFA’s commercial sponsorship programme, spearheaded by FIFA President Joao Havelange, and the IOC 
followed parallel tracks, creating TOP (The Olympic Programme’) sponsorship and marketing initiatives 
(Tomlinson, 2006). This commercial turn came at a critical turning point for the global survival of mega-
sporting events, catalysed by the financial difficulties of Montreal’s 1976 Games. It is widely acknowledged 
in this short epoch of time, no city wanted to host the 1984 Games. Mexico (1968) was marred by violence 
and political protest; Munich (1972) ended in the terrorist tragedy of eleven Israeli athletes being killed, 
followed by the aforementioned debt of Montreal (1976): ‘costing 9.2 times more than initially budgeted 
and yielded a debt that took the city thirty years to pay down’ (Zimblist, 2015). The case of Montreal’s 
economic troubles spearheaded the commercialisation of the Games, an urban intervention known for 
leaving a negative legacy of abandoned structures (white elephants), cost-overruns and excessive public 
spending, leading to significant public debt being left in 1976 (see Gold and Gold, 2008). With the federal 
government reluctant to provide the city of Montreal with a financial guarantee, according to Preuss (2003) 
the organising committee relied solely on financial support from the city. In turn, and coinciding with an 
economic downturn and global inflation in the macroeconomic environment, alongside considerable local 
opposition and construction/technical problems, the result was economically disastrous, resulting in 
considerable cost overruns and significant debt for the city (Chalkley and Essex, 1999). Preuss (2003: 24) 
explores how, even at the turn of the century, city taxpayers were left paying off the debt through a special 
tobacco tax, aimed to be paid off by 2005-2006, illustrated by a news piece by the Urban Toronto (2006) 
claiming: ‘you can say it was Quebec smokers who paid for that, but we can say that this is good for the 
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health of all Quebecers’. With only a couple of entries to host 1980, as the 1984 Games drew closer, the 
IOC emerged desperate to find a host. Los Angeles (LA) stepped up, unopposed –with a guarantee from 
the IOC that they would foot the bill for any losses (Zimblist, 2015). Utilising existing venues, together 
with clever and aggressive marketing of corporations (led by Peter Ueberroth of the LAOCOG) allowed 
LA to realise moderate profits of $215m. A new economic model for staging the Olympics was born, a 
model heavily dictated by corporate creep (Tomlinson, 2004: 160); alluring path to profits (Zimblist, 2015) 
– ‘cities and countries now lined up for the honour of hosting the Games (…) ‘the competition to host the 
Games became almost as intense as the athletic competition itself. Would-be hosts lavished more and more 
money on their bids, today, spending upward of $100m on the bidding processes alone is not unusual’ 
(Zimblist, 2015: 1).  
It is however notable that, from this point on, mega-events, specifically the Olympic Games, saw major 
change to its event funding strategies. For example, the IOC were forced to waive the role that the city 
itself must assume financial liability (Burbank et al, 2001) – costs were therefore recovered through 
commercial involvement, namely corporate sponsorship, and thus from this point forward the Games 
placed significant emphasis on and were more closely aligned to and influenced by commercial agendas 
(e.g. Hall, 2006; Smith, 2012; McGuigan, 2003, 2005). This panacea to combat the excessive cost and 
exponential growth of staging the Games was a critical milestone in mega-event funding strategy at a time 
cities were increasingly conspicuous and risk-averse following Montreal’s experience (Preuss, 2007). 
Aversion to hosting was to only last a short while, until the LA Games of 1984. With minimal public 
expenditure and clamping down on excessive costs, and very little in the way of costly urban infrastructural 
development (e.g. road, transport, venues), the 1984 Games had a very small impact on LA’s physical urban 
landscape. Instead the Games focused on attempting to market, brand and promote the city as a new 
destination to do business, visit and live in. This approach provided an economic ROI, and the Games 
were reported to have generated a profit of $222 million US dollars, as shown in Perelman’s (1985) audit 
below:  
 
Los Angeles (1984) Income and Costs Figure 
Broadcasting rights generated 
 
$286,794,000  
Ticket sales $139,929,000 
Sponsorship and licensing $126,733,000 
The coin programme $35,985,000 
Interest income $76,319,000 
Non-monetary contributions; revenue from ticket-handling 
charges and accommodations 
$102,884,000 
Operating costs $398,394,000 
Payments for venue and facility use $97,389,000 
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IOC expenses $50,145,000 
Los Angeles (1984) Surplus  $222,716,000 
 
Table 10: ‘LA 1984 Post-Games Financial Audits’ (Perelman, 1985) 
Such commercial success is seen as playing a crucial role in renewing interest amongst future bidding cities 
in hosting the Olympics, with Burbank et al (2001) arguing that 1984 created a ‘new paradigm for hosting 
mega-events’ (Burbank, 2001: 53). The private sector played a major part in this transition away from public 
liability to one of corporate investment, as Perelman (1985) notes: 
‘It was noted for past Games, the top sources of funds had been direct government subsidies, 
receipts from lotteries and Olympic commemorative coin programs, and then television rights 
sales, ticket sales and the sales of the sponsorships. Direct government subsidies were unavailable 
to the LAOOC, and lotteries were then illegal in the state of California (…) the planning focused 
sources in the private sector: television revenues, sponsorships and ticket sales’ (1985: 116). 
Pejoratively dubbed by various authors as the ‘Capitalist Games’ (Gold and Gold, 2007) and the 
‘Hamburger Olympics’ (Gruneau, 1984), LA 1984 symbolized a major commercial transition and the 
emergent commercial ‘stain’ corporations were imposing on the Olympic landscape (Tomlinson, 2006). 
Wishing to prevent a re-run of Montreal, everything was on sale for the LA Games - from sponsorship 
packages to the commoditisation of Olympic rituals (e.g. a run with the Olympic torch at a fee of $3000 
per km), epitomizing Roche (2000) and Ritzer’s (2008) view that mega-events can be conceptualized as 
cathedrals of consumption. This marked a key milestone and explicit demonstration of the unrestrained 
commercialisation of the Olympics’ future – justified through the need to continue its existence, to save an 
exponentially growing and costly project from financial risks. LA 1984, according to many, certainly wrote 
a new script for the economics of the Games – a script entitled ‘Commercial Logic’. This has subsequently 
led to the intense commodification and corporatisation of mega-events, as illustrated in the proceeding final 
sections of this chapter. 
2.5.2 Deep Sponsorship and Corporate Desires 
As we move into the 21st century, a continuing commercial Games epoch, there is an emergent criticism 
that corporates do not just dominate the sponsorship and scheduling of events, but also elements of 
decision making too (e.g. McGuigan, 2005; Hall, 2006; Smith, 2012; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; 
Whitson, 1998; Law et al, 2002). Whitson (1998) and Law et al (2002) explore how sponsors may not just 
use the event for notable benefits, for example: image enhancement and potential increased revenues (e.g. 
Gold and Gold, 2008), but as also as an opportunity to dominate how mega-events are run, how they are 
developed, planned and regulated. McGuigan (2003, 2005) and McGuigan and Gilmore (2002) calls this 
‘deep sponsorship’ – the scenario where corporate interests and involvement may direct the nature of the 
event itself, potentially becoming heavily involved in decision-making processes. This shift is identified by 
McGuigan (2003, 2005) as a shift from ‘associative sponsorship’ (kudos-enhancing association) to ‘deep 
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sponsorship’ which is essentially a constitution of the cultural object itself in pursuit of corporate goals. 
Something seen in significant detail in the empirical findings of this study. Critical commentators suggest 
that this state may give rise to publicly subsidizing schemes (e.g. schemes like the Olympics) that benefit 
corporations (e.g. Smith, 2012). McGuigan’s (2003) case study of the construction of the Millennium Dome 
fully illustrates the extent to which corporate interests can dominantly influence the delivery of public 
projects. His study found that despite providing only a small amount of sponsorship money of approx. 
£150m, sponsors were provided with a significant say in decision making – mimicking the findings of this 
thesis. 
The issue of global cities seeking to use mega-events as part of place competition strategies (see Hall, 2006) 
may, according to Hall (2006), lead to private-public growth coalitions which may seek to coerce and/or 
co-opt interests in an ‘attempt to control the mega-event agenda’ (Hall, 2006: 64 - also see Smith and Fox, 
2007). For example, the idea that Sydney 2000 created a strong ‘community of interest’ is rather apt, as such 
phrases indicate a rather narrow community in the form of ‘elite interests’ directly and indirectly influencing 
event proposals (Hall, 1992). In light of this, critical commentators should reflect on the extent to which 
mega-event projects reflect neoliberal agendas, and afford the embedding and permeation of private 
corporations into (albeit temporarily, but in many ways permanent) the life and urban fabric of host cities. 
Neoliberalism in this sense involves promoting market-led economic and social restructuring orientated 
around incorporating ‘private sector needs’ into mega-event and wider city economic and social policies 
(e.g. Jessop and Sum, 2000). Prioritising ‘development’ issues and ‘growth’ desires over ‘welfare’ (Hall, 2006: 
63). Private-public coalitions created in the name of economic interests create a scenario reflective of 
Molotch’s (1976 in Hall, 2006) theorization of the city as a ‘growth machine’ in which the ‘desire for growth 
provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized elites, 
however split they might be on other issues’ (1976: 310). This emerged particularly so in the context of 
London, as regional stakeholders, entrepreneurs and business investors, alongside policy organisations 
appeared to be somewhat fragmented in their developmental ambitions before the politicisation of East 
London’s regeneration and development objectives to be spearheaded by the 2012 Games. Harvey (1989) 
argues that mega-event development in this sense epitomise the entrepreneurial tendencies of cities to 
engage in projects that pose a ‘risk’ and ‘gamble’ (see Harvey, 1989b, Zimblist, 2015) with little evidence of 
ROI. Interventions that, by and large, favour cataclysmic development, intensify corporate involvement, 
and overshadow the interests of local, vulnerable community stakeholders. 
Stories of being superseded by corporate desires emerge across London’s host landscape, for example the 
BBC (2012b) media case study of the Games’ Earls Court venue explored how existing vendors within the 
venue were forced to sign a contract ceding rights to trade and to temporarily move out. The conclusion 
was that ‘they [existing businesses] may just have to sit out these Games on the side lines’, despite reports 
claiming that London 2012 bosses wanted to keep these companies in operation: ‘when you look at the 
detail, you wonder how this could possibly be (…) for example a company selling orange juice in the same 
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venue as McDonalds, you know who will win that fight don’t you’ (BBC, 2009). The idea that corporations 
form a major powerful influence on the planning of mega-events, enough so that local traders are at risk of 
being ‘side-lined’, is a key point for this research (and evidenced throughout the literature, secondary and 
primary findings gathered for this study). This was indicated by Nigel Currie, well-renowned event 
sponsorship expert talking in a BBC (2012b) media article: 
‘Whatever venues come in to use for the London Olympics will be completely clear from any 
sponsors, other than the ‘official sponsors and sponsors’ of the Olympics (…) major governing 
bodies know how vital sponsorship income is to them, and therefore they have got to go out of 
their way to make every protection possible for their sponsors’ (BBC, 2012b). 
2.5.3 The Commodification of Mega-Events 
The review outlines that cities generally have been opened up to commodification processes (see I love NY 
example by Harvey (1989)). The widely cited definition from the Oxford English Reference Dictionary 
(OERD) describes commodities as an ‘article or raw material that can be bought and sold, especially a 
product as opposed to a service’ (1996: 291). As Tomlinson (2006) postulates, if we use the above OERD 
definition, the modern Olympics has always been a commodity, with ticket sales for admission, products 
on sale at the event (e.g. food, drink, merchandise) and advertising space, as identified earlier by Barney et 
al (2002). However, Tomlinson (2006) claims that these commodities were founded on a more ‘break-even 
paradigm’; humble levels of consumption, and perhaps in a different league to the commoditisation seen 
in the late 20th, early 21st century Games. Broadly speaking, so far, and in light of the arguments below, the 
review indicates that with their escalating scale mega-events have become commoditised, with the practical 
(and theoretical) implications for host communities and their spaces. Smith (2014) further notes that many 
commentators suggest that access to public space is threatened by privatisation and commercialisation 
(Smith, 2014). Project and context space-as-a-commodity thus emerges as a key battleground where 
conflicting interests and demands win and lose – as illustrated in detail across the Findings and Discussions 
of this thesis. 
Mega-events are one of the world’s leading modes of cultural consumption; a major component of the 
socio-cultural, economic and political fabric of modern life (Anderson and Getz, 2007). McGuigan (2005) 
postulates that such events signify intense forms of ‘commoditisation of culture’ and wider concerns over 
the ‘neoliberalisation of cultural production’, referred to by Rifkin (2000) as the emergence of ‘cultural 
capitalism’. Mega-events encompass both sporting (Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup) and cultural 
elements (Cultural Olympiad, City of Culture etc.). Conceptualizing mega-events as a ‘cultural object’ and 
major commodity with the capacity to be ‘mined’, split up and sold to the highest bidder (see Lefebvre, 
2005; Miles, 2010) thus typifies how hosts seek to commoditise major aspects of Games’ material and 
symbolic resources in order to claw back excessive public spending. Debord’s (1995) view of the spectacle 
(mega-events being one of many) suggests that the ‘world we see is the world of the commodity (…) where 
social space is continually being blanketed by stratum after stratum of commodities’ (1995: 29). And Miles 
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(2010) further notes that global entertainment seduces and pacifies consumers, even perhaps determining 
the nature of our existence, with social life becoming about ‘owning’ and ‘having’ as opposed to ‘living’. He 
goes on to suggest that ‘the images around us are a constant reminder of how to live and the only legitimate 
way to live is through consumption’ (Miles, 2010: 78). The review and empirical findings from this research 
clearly illustrate and bring these issues in the case study context. 
Just as ecotourism ‘neoliberalises’ natural visits, experiences, wildlife (e.g.  National Trust memberships) 
etc. by providing them with an exploitable (see McAfee, 1999 in Duffy, 2002) ‘economic market value’ eco-
tourists are willing to pay to see (Duffy, 2002), Smith (2012) argues the same can be said for mega-events. 
They have the potential to turn elements of cultural phenomena into commercial assets. Just as wildlife and 
landscapes can be sold as images, products and destinations (Duffy, 2002), events can be used as a key tool 
for marketing and branding urban places and spaces to see and visit. Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) 
draws up on such analogies illustrating the overtly corporate nature, commercial scope, and ‘Disneyland’-
esque branding exercise is invoked at the expense of less visible smaller organisers and local producers of 
cultural artefacts. The authors found, in the context of East London, how international renowned and 
corporate entities dictated the choice of ‘cultural’ projects to be associated with the London 2012 cultural 
programme, with one interviewee claiming: ‘it’s not even through democratic or public call process, it’s 
through a privileged network process (…) cultural content ‘tied up and handcuffed’ dictated by official 
sponsors’ (2016: 351).  
Theoretically speaking, in this sense, Rifkin (2000) suggests that ‘culture, like nature, can be mined to 
exhaustion’ (2000: 247), further illustrated by Cowen and Tabbarock’s (2000) argument that some of the 
more recent forms of cultural production, like art, media and music is sold as a commodity. Furthermore, 
Braverman (1974) claims that the growth of western capitalist cities is underpinned by such commoditising 
tendencies, exploring ‘how capitalism transformed all of society in to a gigantic marketplace (…) a process 
that has little been investigated, although one of the keys to all recent ‘social history’ (Braverman, 1974: 
271). Pine and Gilmore (1998) claim that mega-events and their contribution to the experience economy 
have been subject to intense levels of commercial creep, a clear indicator that ‘mega-sporting events can be 
best understood as a more fully developed expression of the incorporation of sporting practice in to the 
ever-expanding market place of international capitalism’ (Gruneau, 2000 in Roche, 2000). As such, Kellner 
(2013) notes that the ‘entertainmentisation’ of economy, society, politics, and everyday life intensifies and 
continues to promote the ‘culture of the spectacle’.  
Blinded by the positive connotations of the spectacle, McGillivray and Frew (2015), however, claim that 
due to their cultural universality and longevity there is a tendency to dismiss such forms of urban 
intervention as intense one-off spectacles and fantasy to be awed by rather than seeing their underlying 
political and economic significance. In fact, and in light of this, critical commentators, specifically over the 
past three decades, have begun to intensely illuminate the paradoxical qualities of mega-events: their ability 
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to mask hidden power struggles, modes of elitist domination and hegemony, mediums of manipulation, 
social control and symbolic power (e.g. Rojek, 2014). 
Mega-events, indeed, have the power to decide who is invited to the party and who is not. As Lefebvre 
(2000) argues, the contested and decisive decision-making processes that shape final policy outcomes 
rapidly become masked or hidden as cities become commoditised spaces to be marketed and sold. Such 
interventions thus manifest as a juggernaut for mobilising social and economic processes, given their 
‘spectacular’ and ‘fleeting’ nature (e.g. Cochrane et al, 1996). But arguments reveal so far that it may only 
be those with the privilege, economic, and political power and influence that can access the rhetorically 
spoken leveragable event opportunities projected by project rhetoric, media and key policy makers and 
project actors. This emerges to be a dominant conclusion for this research detailed across Chapter 5 and 6. 
2.5.4 The Territorialisation of Mega-Events 
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries mega-events served significant political and cultural functions; 
however, the deindustrialization of western cities, alongside other aforementioned factors, catalysed an 
important commercial shift in the funding strategies of mega-events. Since the 1970s mega-events have 
placed greater emphasis on the urban transformative power of deindustrialized spaces; dilapidated urban 
landscapes are used to reinvigorate the economic activity of tarnished space and showcase entire cities (and 
nations) on the global stage (formally known as ‘showcasing’ and ‘place marketing’ – see Faulkner et al, 
2001). Furthermore, writings on increased pro-growth public private partnerships through the era of early 
neoliberalism (see Harvey, 1989) show the growth of intertwining relationships between the state and 
corporate entities. Although tourism and events have become increasingly shaped by neoliberal policies, 
Mosedale (2016) argues that the consequences of such ‘neoliberalisation’ are relatively under-explored. In 
relation to prior arguments, the increasing corporate creep and commercial exploitation of host city’s 
cultural and civic capital by associated corporate sponsors is unsurprising (Eick, 2010; Foley et al, 2011; 
Hiller, 2012).  
McGillivray and Frew (2015) claim that the stringent regulatory pressures placed on host cities via the HCC 
emphasise the need to surrender legislative sovereignty and offer civic space as a blank canvas to be painted 
with the desires and agendas of mega-events. Civic space and soon-to-be Olympic hosting space is thus 
efficiently captured – the act of ‘territorialisation’ (e.g. Raffestin, 1980), where the ‘project territory’ merges 
with that of the existing ‘context territory’. The commodified and increasingly corporatised nature of mega-
events, with their capacity to be mined and succumb to the increasing desires of ‘capital’, serves as a major 
theoretical and in fact practical pretext for the range of commoditizing (and territorialising) tendencies seen 
in the case study of this research identified across the Findings and Discussions of this study, illuminating 
major tensions between ‘project’ territory and ‘context territory’.  
The corporatisation of public spaces is often linked back to the delivery of the Germany 2006 World Cup, 
where clear ‘machinations of striation were visible, fuelled by the promotional rights of corporate partners 
and sponsors that had, increasingly, become the focus of the IOC and FIFA’ (McGillivray and Frew, 2015). 
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The need to demand ‘exclusivity’ not only inside stadia but across the city (Hall, 2006). Hall (2006) also 
highlights such concern, illuminating how local business felt ‘locked out’ (e.g., for Germany 2006 only 
Anheuser Busch and McDonald sold beer and fast food in stadia), invoking protests around the city largely 
based on the fact that the German FIFA bid was in-part justified by the supposed economic benefits it 
would bring to Germany and host cities. Nicholas Stucke, President of the German Trade Association, 
stated in the context of the 2006 World Cup that ‘there won’t be any German products on sale in the 
marketplaces of the towns where the matches are being held… You can get a Coca-Cola, American Beer 
and McDonalds but that will be it (…) German products will be locked out’ (Hall, 2006). The cases of 
Germany 2006 and London 2012 provide useful case studies for highlighting how Olympic-driven 
regulation, commodification and commercial creep in hosting civic space alienates local business interests.  
Klauser (2007) illustrates that:  
‘In the most powerful way probably, the temporary reign of football over Germany’s city centres 
has been visualised through spectacular images of thousands of peaceful, football-watching fans in 
so-called ‘public viewing sites’ or ‘fan miles’’ (Klauser, 2007).  
McGillivray and Frew (2015) identify similar issues of corporate ‘striation’ and ‘territorialisation’ in their 
analysis of London’s ‘Live Sites’ too. They discuss how key event and hosting sites became brandscaped, 
with the ‘territorialising tentacles’ of the London project illustrating not only the capturing of live sites but 
other city spaces also, claiming that during the summer of 2012 London was a city ‘kneeling at the altar of 
the Olympic brand’ (2015: 2658). Their findings allude to the milieu of corporate landscapes permeating 
throughout host event space, where sponsors remained prominent in key spectator areas and fans and 
spectators were transformed into consumers – these issues are detailed further across the empirical findings 
of this thesis. Championing the sterilization of the Olympic façade from commercialisation may, however, 
serve to drive commercialisation effects outside official venues and into peripheral venue spaces (e.g. the 
Olympic Park and surrounding areas of the Greenwich Park), as explored by McGillivray and Frew (2015), 
protecting local civic spaces as prime real estate for commercial activity, as identified in the empirical 
findings of this research. This was noted by Tomlinson (2006), who claims that ‘Olympic Parks’ and the 
streets around the venues are orgies of consumption, sites of commercial advertising (…) a brilliant 
conjuring, or marketing trick by which the IOC in the post-1984 era of naked professionalism and blatant 
commercialism has preserved a presentational gloss of idealism and universalism’ (Tomlinson, 2006: 15).  
The resulting effects found for London, and prior mega-events, is that host community spaces and the host 
city more broadly, manifests a canvas for commercial exploitation. The city is broken up into little parts 
and commoditised, be it the side of a tower block sporting a Gillette advertisement or the territorialisation 
of Live Sites and host communities. Prahl (2013) illustrated, for example, how the Brandenburg gate became 
commercialised and viewing areas privatised, with host spaces being bought, and sold, restricting access to 
local business communities. Furthermore, regulations enforced across these select urban zones prohibited 
any food and drink items from getting in, to ensure viewers bought the right sorts of commercial products 
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on offer during the event. Sponsorship expert Nigel Currie, speaking to the BBC (2012b) illustrates this 
point: ‘the key issue for corporates is that they do not have any opportunity to promote in venues, so they 
look to maximize mass impact outside the venues, and this includes any venue that comes in to use for the 
Games’ (BBC, 2012b). In this sense, host communities and their public spaces become key commodities 
to be transformed in to assets that satisfy project demands. Chapter 4 Findings provides a detail empirical-
spatial analysis of how Central Greenwich, and beyond, emerge overly territorialised and captured by 
London’s mega[event] project – to the detriment - and supposed beneficiaries of - existing communities 
and their small businesses. 
In this sense, it can be understood that mega-events and their event actors are continuously in a power 
struggle to territorialise (and then deterritorialise) host city space every four years (see McGillivray and 
Frew, 2015). Territorialisation can be considered the ‘production of territory’. In theory, this is space where 
significant human energy and work has been applied (see Raffestin, 1980), produced by the ‘action’ [e.g. 
London 2012], and carried out by syntagmatic actors who implement the action (e.g. project actors (IOC, 
LOGOC, ODA, LLDC)). Olympic territorialisation thus manifests as the capturing of either material 
(physical spaces) or symbolic (image, brand), designated by powerful project actors for staging Games’ 
related activities. Territorialising concepts thus provide insight into the interpretive nature of spatial 
organisation based around the idea of the ‘social production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1992). In general, and 
aptly for this research, territorialisation amounts to the ‘temporary’ hostile takeover of space which, once 
the carnival closes immediately after the Games, ‘de-territorialises’ itself. De-territorialisation is therefore a 
process whereby controlled space is emancipated from project striation (e.g. barriers dismantled, 
extraordinary security measures relaxed, infrastructure and Olympic venues reconfigured etc.). ‘Project 
territory’ dissipates and the process of re-territorialisation begins: the phase of Olympic legacy. Space and 
legacy and re-appropriated: ‘converted in to an asset, in the sense of endowment, a gift of memory for 
future generations, in to territorial capital’ (OECD, 2001; Zonneveld and Waterhout, 2005). We can thus 
conceptualise the Games as existing within three overarching territorial phases: ‘territorialisation’ – ‘de-
territorialisation’ – re-territorialisation’ (TDR cycle) – as identified in Chapter 1 and the Conceptual 
Framework.  
This research study touches on all three phases: 1) project territorialisation and the varying impact this has 
on the existing ‘context territory’ (e.g. local businesses), and 2) the de/re-territorialising phase with respect 
to post-Games legacies and reflections on what these might mean for local business. Project territory, to 
some extent, is the production of territory striking an (uneasy) balance between ‘global’, ‘project’ and 
‘macro’ needs (e.g. the IOC, sponsors, local sanctioning bodies etc.) and ‘local’ needs (e.g. nation, city, 
region, locale, community of residents/traders etc). Olympic territorialisation, inasmuch as it can be 
considered the production of new territory-created ‘striated’ space, interweaves its project requirements 
within the ‘normal’ dynamics of change occurring in what can be referred to as the ‘context territory’. While 
we can say that the project territory in the context of this research is under the direct control of project 
actors (e.g. LOCOG, ODA, LDA, TFL, LLDC etc), the ‘context territory’ is the entire set of resources and 
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actors who did not have a direct hand in spearheading the event but were nevertheless present within the 
HEZs of Greenwich and other hosting Olympic boroughs examined across this research study. 
Interweaving the seam that joins both territories, municipalities have a significant meso-level responsibility, 
particularly with respect to spatial planning and urban imaging. For example, in the context of this research, 
it was a strategic decision to interview local authorities and key support organisations and actors in order 
to allow such ‘meso-level’ perspectives to emerge.  
It is important to note that the ‘project’ and ‘context’ territories are subject to varying temporal dynamics, 
and differ in how they unfold over time. The ‘project’ territory by virtue of its title exists within the time 
structure of the duration of the ‘project’ with the primary objective of planning and delivering a successful 
event under intense time, mediatised and budget conditions. The opening ceremony thus symbolizes the 
project’s definitive form. The closing ceremony initiates the de-territorialisation phase, when the project 
selectively reorganizes itself, embarking on ‘post-Games’ programmes which slowly transition into the 
phases of re-territorialisation and the new dynamics that constitute the ‘context territory’ (Dansero and 
Mela, 2007).  
In light of the aforementioned arguments, the thesis now presents the philosophical positionality and 
methodological decisions taken in the construction of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3 – Philosophical Positionality and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction to Philosophical Positionality and Methodology 
The following chapter examines, details and critiques the philosophical positionality adopted and 
methodological decisions taken in the construction of this thesis. It transparently highlights and justifies 
the intellectual coherence between the overarching research objectives (s re-stated below), and 
philosophical, and methodological dimensions underpinning the research. The ‘paradigmatic standpoint’ is thus 
established and argued based on the ‘research objectives’ and ‘research problems’ to be addressed. 
Systematic evidence and visual detail helps to provide comprehensive guidance about all facets of the study 
‘from accessing the general philosophical ideas behind the inquiry to the detailed collection and analysis 
procedures’ (Creswell, 2003: 3). The thesis begins with a detailed examination of philosophical assumptions 
attributed to what Burrell and Morgan (1979) refer to as ‘subjectivism’ vs. ‘objectivism’ – and the traditional 
research philosophies attributed to each position. These include i) ‘ontology’, ii) ‘epistemology’, iii) ‘human nature’, 
and the natural corollaries conceived for iv) ‘methodological’ approach (e.g. ‘nomothetic’ vs. ‘ideographic’). The 
question of sociological paradigms is supported with a brief debate on the ‘dimensions of sociology’, namely 
‘Sociology of Regulation’ vs. ‘Sociology of Radical Change’. This research follows the method above to negate 
inherent contradiction [e.g. ‘epistemological dilemmas’], and to fix what Burrell and Morgan (1979) refer to as 
the ‘intellectual territory’. In light of the aforementioned debates, the thesis – reflecting the research problems 
and moral dilemmas identified through the course of this research – argues for the theoretical positionality 
of ‘radical humanism’ and ‘critical theorist’. Moving away from both philosophical and theoretical analysis, but 
with positionality fixed, this chapter shifts its focus to the practical execution of methodological strategy 
and tactics. The ‘research strategy’ is examined, detailed and justified by linkage to existing specific research 
methods and subject-specific literature. Debates around i) ‘induction’ vs. ‘deduction’, ii) ‘qualitative’ vs. 
‘quantitative’ approaches, iii) ‘theoretical’ vs. ‘empirical’ analyses, iv) ‘applied, problem-focused’ vs. ‘blue-sky’ research, 
and v) the role of ‘narrative analysis’ all feature in the discussion. Explicit detail and justifications are then 
provided for the ‘case study’ approach taken: the ‘event case study’ of the London 2012 Games, and the 
specific Central Greenwich analysis of ‘Last Mile’ and ‘HEZ’ small business experiences. Questions of 
‘generalisability’, ‘internal’ and ‘external’ validity are also addressed here.  
The latter half of the chapter turns to the execution of the case study, namely how this was done and why 
specific tactics and decisions were made. The ambition of this chapter is not just to provide a rigorous 
overview but to transparently convey – from sample and stakeholders, right through to gaining access to 
data – the process of methodological execution. This i) helps maintain and invoke aspects of the critical 
theorist perspective adopted, ii) aids future scholars to build on the study and its findings, and iii) effectively 
aligns with calls for meta-evaluation of small firm experiences in the context of the ‘Last Mile’, as explicitly 
outlined in the recommendations of this thesis. This has been partly achieved through visualising the 
research process in the ‘Stage 1 – 12 model’, outlining not only the methodological steps taken but the process 
of intellectual development and construction too. Detail on method and qualitative analysis then proceeds, 
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providing an overview of i) primary and secondary data methods and techniques used, ii) the positives and 
challenges faced in implementation, iii) adoption of ‘methodological triangulation’ to enhance reliability/validity, 
and iv) explicit detail on the ‘research sample’. The chapter outlines the aliases of all forty-three respondents, 
and explains in detail all four stakeholder groups (SG 1- 4) selected for empirical examination. Alongside 
clarifying the gatekeepers used to invoke the study’s ‘snowball’ – ‘purposive’ sampling approach, tactics for 
gaining access to data are detailed. These include both traditional and innovative digital methods (e.g. 
Twitter, blogging and LinkedIn) affording access to the highest echelons of regional and national project 
policy and actors, whilst simultaneously also serving to build stakeholder trust across the specific case study.  
The final part of the chapter outlines i) key steps and secondary materials used, and ii) the 30 plus policy 
documents analysed [‘documentary analysis’], legal documents, over 60 media reports, and over 75 video 
documentary reports used as a key source of evidence and support for the findings and discussions of this 
thesis. The comprehensive desk-based research and analysis conducted for this research and significant 
theoretical analyses, alongside the depth and breadth of empirical stakeholder perspectives gathered, 
provide an excellent bank of data with which to conduct systematic qualitative (and ‘narrative’) analysis. An 
explanation of ‘data selectivity’ and the specific qualitative analysis methods used include i) the use of 
QAQDA, i) data crunching via analytical and coding software: NVIVO10, iii) the framework of Attride-
Stirling’s (2001) TNA, and iv) Stephen Toulmin’s (1958) principles of ‘argumentation’ to build theory and 
develop coherent links between evidence and ‘truth’ claims implicitly and explicitly derived throughout this 
thesis. The closing sections of this thesis examine and detail issues pertaining to i) research validity, ii) ethics, 
and iii) a self-reflection on shifting paradigms, perspectives and axiological drivers in the context of this and 
future research. All of the considerations addressed in this introduction form the key pillars of inquiry of 
this thesis.  
3.2 Re-statement of Research Objectives 
 
Research 
Objective 1 
Critically analyse and fully unpack how small firms were impacted throughout the Olympic delivery 
cycle [before, during and after], specifically those in host borough HEZs and across Central 
Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ – an exploration of short vs. long, positive vs. negative effects. 
Research 
Objective 2 
Examine how and why local space was impacted by the occurrence of the London 2012 Games, and 
the impact this had on tourism dynamics, trade and commercial opportunity for small businesses. 
Research 
Objective 3 
Reflect up on the elusive concept of ‘Olympic Legacy’ in the context of host small business 
communities; can we identify the emergence of a ‘legacy’ for London’s East End, and specifically Central 
Greenwich’s small businesses? 
Research 
Objective 4 
Identify lessons learnt and recommend practical ways to better re-distribute Games-related benefits 
to vulnerable small business communities. 
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3.3 Research Philosophy and Positionality 
Before presenting the specific methodological strategy, methods and tactics used for executing the study 
(section 3.4), the following section explores key arguments and debates associated with research philosophy. 
It critiques the purpose of considering and integrating these arguments into the formation of research 
strategy and methodological execution. It discusses the various ‘paradigmatic standpoints’ one may take.  
Remenyi (1998) claims that ‘before researchers undertake any research activity, it is essential that they 
consider carefully an overall research strategy by considering as to which research community they feel they 
belong to; and that researchers know the ‘epistemological’, ‘ethical’ and ‘ontological’ assumptions of their 
research’ (1998:102). Through considering these positions, researchers reflect their ‘worldview’ stance, 
according to Creswell (2003), paradigmatic positions that have ‘implications of a methodological nature 
(…) and consequences for the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain ‘knowledge’ about the 
world’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). ‘Fixing’ such worldviews is of pragmatic importance as it allows the 
necessary coherence and natural corollaries to occur, and prevents inherent contradictions in approach 
between philosophical positions and methodological tactics and strategies used in the overarching design 
and execution of research projects that ‘underwrite the different approaches to social science’ (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1989). 
3.3.1 Subjectivism vs. Objectivism 
Two major intellectual schools of traditional thought dominate social scientific research debates – 
‘objectivism’ (sometimes referred to as ‘sociological positivism’) and ‘subjectivism’ (sometimes referred to 
as ‘German idealism’). Both are polar opposite worldview positions. The ‘objectivist’ invokes ‘hard’, ‘real’ 
and ‘natural’ approaches to the analysis of social (and natural) science, whilst the ‘subjectivist’ believes reality 
lies in the ‘spirit’ or ‘idea’. Positivist positions tended to dominate sociological analysis before the early-mid-
20th century, whilst the 1950s has spawned the emergence of ‘subjective’ approaches. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) claim that this shift has bred new philosophical assumptions, theoretical standpoints, ideas and 
approaches that help researchers negotiate the complexities inherent in executing research. It is important 
to note that such shifts are indicative of wider ‘cultural movements’ seen across European scholarship. For 
example, the ‘cultural turn’, shifts from ‘modernity’ to ‘post-modernity’ and from ‘structuralism’ to ‘post-
structuralism’. These shifts have had a significant effect on the academy. ‘Intermediate positions’ have 
spawned, a good example being Roy Bhaskar’s ‘Critical Realism’ - an analytical fusion in which whilst ‘real 
structures’ exist (e.g. policy documents considered as hard ‘truths’), they are also simultaneously ‘socially 
constructed’. Additionally, the ‘linguistic turn’ (e.g. Locke, 2004) has significantly shifted our view of 
semiotics forever, illuminating how language use not only ‘represents’ reality but simultaneously ‘reinforces’ 
and ‘influences’ reality. Both examples indicate the changing nature of what the world now constitutes as 
‘truth’. In the context of this, and future research, we must be acutely aware of such matters of ontology 
and how comfortable one is making ‘truth claims’.  
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In order to further explain the methodological implications of objectivist (quantitative) and subjectivist 
(qualitative) positions, Table 11 below, adapted from Easterby-Smith et al (1991), outlines associated ‘basic 
beliefs’, ‘researcher’s role’ and ‘preferred methods’. Both positions not only project polar opposite 
worldviews but also have major implications for how one does research.  
Consideration Objectivist (quantitative) Subjectivist (qualitative) 
Basic beliefs and 
‘axiological’ assumptions 
World is external and objective. Observer is 
independent and science is value free. 
World is socially constructed and subjective. 
Observer is part of what is observed, and 
science is driven by human interest. 
Researchers should Focus on facts; look for causality and 
fundamental laws. 
Reduce phenomena to simplest elements 
(reductionism), and often formulates and 
tests hypothesis. 
Focus on meanings, try and understand what is 
happening. 
Look at totality of each situation (holism), and 
tends to develop ideas through induction from 
evidence. 
Preferred methods Operationalise concepts so they can be 
measured, often using large samples, and 
multiple methods to establish different views 
of phenomena. 
Small samples investigated in depth over time 
(meta-evaluative). 
 
Table 11: ‘Key Features of Positivist and Anti-Positivist / Phenomenological Paradigms’ (Adapted from 
Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 27) 
A key difference between both positions is that ‘objectivist’ (and more positivist positions) attempt to strip 
away contextual factors and local complexities to simplify and control a tight set of variables, often 
‘searching for regularities and causal relationships between constituent elements’ (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). This is commonly referred to as a ‘reductionist’ approach. The intended outcome of such 
investigation ‘by its very nature leads to simplifications of the real world environment in which the variables 
naturally or usually exist’ (Remenyi et al, 1998: 36). In contrast, a ‘subjectivist’ approach embraces local 
complexity, totality and variability in order to ‘holistically’ analyse complicated scenarios. This approach 
identifies socially constructed truths through an – epistemologically apt - in-depth examination of human 
meanings and perceptions (Remenyi et al, 1998). It is therefore unsurprising that objectivist (realist – 
positivist) positions tend to dominate the study of the ‘natural’ sciences, and subjectivist (nominalist – anti-
positivist) positions the ‘social’ sciences (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). These debates play a major role in 
justifying methodological design and research execution, as provided throughout this study. 
The ‘interpreted’ nature of subjectivist research thus requires the researcher to become a fundamental part 
of the social construction of the story, often assessing in-depth small samples and investing emotional 
energy in engaging with the individual subjects of the research. This is particularly the case in the context 
of this research, given the critical stance taken. It however contrasts with the ‘independent’ and ‘value free’ 
stance of ‘objective’ research, which is often regarded as more ‘systematic’, ‘rigorous’ and more scientifically 
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valid and credible. However, comparing the ‘usefulness’ of both approaches is akin to debating the sex of 
the angels – there is no answer – as usefulness solely depends on the purpose and overarching objective(s) 
of the research under investigation. Both positions do, however, have major implications for 
methodological execution, generalisability and validity – these arguments underpin methodological 
decisions made across this study, detailed shortly on.  
Derived from Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) seminal paper, ‘Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis’, Figure 6 below explores a series of basic ‘ontological’, ‘epistemological’, ‘human nature’ and 
‘methodological assumptions associated with the positionality of ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ paradigms. 
By understanding the natural methodological corollaries associated with such positions, justification can be 
sought for the strategy and approach taken to execute this study. Additionally, such analysis illuminates why 
there are discernible differences among research strategies, stimulated by the varying permutations of these 
four key positions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: ‘Nature of Social Science Research’ (Adapted from Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 3) 
3.3.2 Ontology – Nominalism vs. Realism  
The philosophy of ‘ontology’, the study of ‘the very essence of the phenomena under investigation’ (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979) and the ‘nature of reality itself’ (Creswell, 1994), looks at whether reality exists 
objectively and independently of one’s mind or whether reality is a product of ‘individual cognition (…) 
and a product of one’s mind’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and the ‘product of consciousness’ (Remenyi et 
al, 1998).  
The key tenet of ‘nominalism’ is the notion that individual cognition is made up of nothing more than 
‘names’, ‘concepts’ and ‘labels’ that structure reality. These solely artificial creations offer utility for 
convenience to enable individuals to describe, make sense of and negotiate the complexities of the external 
world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), with reality being subjective and multiple, as seen by participants in a 
study (Creswell, 1994). A subjectivist view of the world, that sees humans at the epicentre of creating their 
own meaning, falls under the umbrella of ‘existentialism’. On the opposite side of the coin, ‘realism’, as the 
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name aptly suggests, postulates that reality exists ‘really’ and independently of the mind, consisting of ‘hard’, 
‘tangible’ and ‘immutable structures’ found in the ‘natural world’. In this scenario the individual is born into 
reality and ‘experiences’ it – as opposed to creating it themselves (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; also see 
Creswell, 1994 and Remenyi et al, 1998). An objectivist view of the world falls under the umbrella of 
‘materialism’, often associated with the philosophy of ‘monism’. 
Ontology is… ‘Whether the object of the investigation is the product of consciousness 
(nominalism) or whether it exists independently (realism)’ (Remenyi et al, 1998).  
3.3.3 Epistemology – Anti-positivism vs. Positivism 
Sometimes referred to as the ‘theory of knowledge’, the study of epistemology is concerned with what our 
grounds of knowledge are and ‘how one might be able to understand the world and communicate this as 
knowledge to fellow human beings’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Within research, two polar positions exist 
– anti-positivism vs. positivism. Epistemology constructs the world from the position of ‘relativism’, 
making it only to be understood by the individual research participant in the environment under scrutiny – 
calling for researchers to understand reality from ‘the inside (…) to occupy the frame of reference of the 
participant in action’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 5). This reflects Protagoras’ relativist philosophical 
viewpoint through the rejection of absolute truth and absolute definitions and, as such, is ultimately 
interested solely in practical questions rooted in the contexts and minds of the subjects under investigation.  
In the production of anti-positivist knowledge, the researcher thus refrains from generating any form of 
‘objective’ knowledge claim (Douglas, 1970b in Burrell and Morgan, 1979). An anti-positivist, relativist, 
epistemological position was taken for this study, as reflected in the analysis and discussions. 
3.3.4 Human Nature – Voluntarism vs. Determinism 
Two standpoints make up Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) notion of ‘human nature’, an analysis of sociology 
responsible for broadly defining ‘the nature of the relationships between man and the society in which he 
lives’ (1979: 12). These are: ‘voluntarism’ (agency) and ‘determinism’ (structure). Voluntarism is concerned 
with the capacity for man to act ‘autonomously’ and out of ‘free will’, whilst ‘determinism’ explores the 
extent to which man is ‘determined’ and ‘restricted’ by his situational environment. These ideas are 
particularly important in the context of spatial relations, as discussed in the empirical findings of this thesis. 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) metaphor of ‘the master’ and ‘the marionette’ presupposes that powerful actors 
influence the types of determined relations that occur within mega-events and host spaces. This will be 
reflected on in the discussions chapter of this thesis.   
3.3.5 Dimensions of Regulation vs. Radical Change 
Two standpoints make up Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) dimensions of ‘regulation vs. radical change’ (see 
Table 12 below), notions that run parallel with Dahrendorf’s (1967) considerations of ‘order’ vs. ‘conflict’. 
Both allow for different ‘frames’ and ‘viewpoints’ to be created by the researcher with respect to analysing 
‘social processes’ –the researcher must commit to one or the other, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
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The ‘sociology of regulation’ is primarily concerned with explaining society in terms of emphasising ‘unity 
and cohesiveness’ (1979: 17); the need for regulation in human affairs, focusing on understanding why 
society maintains as an entity and holds together, rather than falling apart (Burrell and Morgan, 1979)7. The 
idea of ‘order’. Conversely, ‘sociology of radical change’ theorists emphasise ‘deep-seated structural conflict, 
modes of domination and structural contradiction’, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979: 17). Theorists 
conceptualising the world in this way are thus concerned with man’s emancipation from structures that 
limit development and potential; proposing visionary alternatives and change - often utopian ideals8 (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979: 17). Adopting this position often requires rejecting the ‘status quo’ and ‘conventional 
wisdoms’ that have come to typify current society. This thesis adopts a position of radical change, and takes 
a critical theorist stance in the context of the research case study, which in turn greatly affects its language, 
construction and truth claims, right through to the practical and policy recommendations presented toward 
the end of the study.  
The Sociology of Regulation is concerned with: The Sociology of Radical Change is concerned with: 
 
a) The status quo 
b) Social order 
c) Consensus 
d) Social integration and cohesion 
e) Solidarity 
f) Need satisfaction 
g) Actuality 
 
a) Radical change 
b) Structural conflict 
c) Modes of domination 
d) Contradiction 
e) Emancipation 
f) Deprivation 
g) Potentiality 
 
Table 12: ‘The Regulation – Radical Change Dimension’ (Adapted from Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
In order to develop a theoretical standpoint for research, Burrell and Morgan (1979) neatly combine both 
‘subjectivist vs. objectivist’ and ‘regulation vs. radical change’ paradigms together to create a quadrant where 
one can be situated (see Figure 7). The frame thus acts as a further filter for narrowing down a ‘worldview’ 
and clarifying one’s positionality.  
 
                                                          
7 For example, preventing the Hobbesian vision of ‘war of all against all’ from becoming a reality’. 
8 For example, who would have thought that 100 years later women’s rights would have transformed, and that technology would have played a 
role in major Middle Eastern movements like the Arab Spring.  
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Figure 7: Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Four paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory  
Table 13 below outlines the main assumptions of all four positions, helping researchers to make a decision 
about which paradigm to sit in. Most notably, we can see that each quarter shares a common characteristic 
with the parallel one but all four provide fundamentally different perspectives for analysing social 
phenomena through ‘contrasting standpoints, and generate quite different concepts and analytical tools’ 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979:23). The purpose is to support a ‘commonality of perspective which binds a 
group of theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social theory 
within the bounds of the same problematic’ (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 36)9. Furthermore, the paradigms 
help form a map for negotiating the subject area, offering convenient means of identifying basic similarities 
and differences between worldview, underpinning the frame of reference which they adopt for social 
analysis and helping to create one’s own personal frame of reference. Burrell and Morgan (1979: 26) call 
this the mapping of ‘intellectual territory’. By situating this research in the paradigm of ‘radical humanism’, 
the author was able to limit the theoretical frame of this research – as reflected across all thesis chapters. 
Quadrant paradigm Dimensions 
Functionalist Objectivist-sociology of regulation 
Interpretivist Subjectivist-sociology of regulation 
Radical structuralist Objectivist-sociology of radical change 
Radical humanist Subjectivist-sociology of radical change 
 
Table 13: ‘Dimensions of the Four Paradigms for Analysing Social Theory’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
3.3.6 Methodology - Nomothetic vs. Ideographic  
In order to support the practical, methodological strategies required in any thesis one must consider the 
basic assumptions of two polar positions: nomothetic vs. ideographic theory. Ideographic theory is based 
on the view that ‘one can only understand the world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under 
investigation (…) through analysis of subjective accounts which one generates by getting ‘inside’ situations 
in the everyday ‘flow of life’ (…) and getting close to one’s subject’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 6). 
Furthermore, Sparkes (1992) claims that this approach provides a unique opportunity to explore how 
research participants understand their social worlds and contextual realities, allowing multiple explanations 
                                                          
9 As my supervisors would say, this approach enables one to find a warm stream of water across a startling cold ocean of theory.  
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and realities to emerge through a complex and messy web of stakeholder expectations, as opposed to one 
single truth and definitive answer (Jennings, 2005). According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998): 
‘Qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach (…) qualitative researchers 
attempt to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’ 
(1998: 3). 
Conversely, nomothetic theory is often ‘employed in the natural sciences which focuses up on the process 
of testing hypothesis in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour (…) preoccupied with the 
construction of scientific tests and the use of quantitative techniques for the analysis of data (…) up on 
systematic protocol and technique (…) e.g. surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and standardised 
research instruments of all kinds are prominent among the tools which comprise nomothetic methodology’ 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 6-7). These debates are a by-product of natural corollaries between 
philosophical positions and methodological approaches, helping to justify methodological decisions made 
across this research.      
Combining all previous discussion positions and assumptions concerning research philosophy and 
methodology, before the thesis moves on the specific research strategy of this research it is worth exploring 
Creswell’s (1994) strategic criteria for choosing paradigms. The assumptions in the table further contribute 
to justifying the particular strategy executed for this study.  
Criteria Quantitative Paradigm Qualitative Paradigm 
Researcher’s worldview Researcher’s belief in quantitative 
assumptions of epistemology, 
ontology, axiological and 
methodological considerations 
  
Researcher’s belief in qualitative 
assumptions of epistemology, ontology, 
axiological and methodological 
considerations 
Training and experience of the researcher Technical writing skills, computer 
statistical skills, library skills 
Literary writing skill, computer text 
analysis skills and library skills 
Researcher’s psychological attributes Comfort with rules and guidelines 
for conducting research, low 
tolerance for ambiguity, time for 
only a study of short duration 
Exploratory research, variables 
unknown, context important, may lack 
theory base for study 
Nature of the problem Previously studied by other 
researchers so that body of literature 
exists, known variables and existing 
theories 
Exploratory research, variables 
unknown, context important, may lack 
theory base for study 
Inductive vs. deductive (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998) 
Deductive, hypothesis creation and 
theory testing 
Inductive, research question creation and 
theory building/supporting 
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Audience for the study Individuals accustomed 
to/supportive of quantitative 
studies 
Individuals accustomed to/supportive of 
qualitative studies 
 
Table 14: Creswell’s (1994) ‘Criteria for Choosing Paradigms for Research Strategy’ 
Informed and justified by these philosophical debates, the chapter now turns to the specific methodological 
strategy, tactics and the specific ways - primary and secondary data collection was organised and executed.  
3.4 Methodological Strategy, Tactics and Execution 
In the previous section the thesis discussed the meta-theoretical debates and underpinning for this research, 
and the associated methodological assumptions of a ‘radical humanist’ position. In light of these debates, 
this section establishes the specific strategy used to construct this thesis, for both primary and secondary 
data collection.  
According to Wilson (2010), the research strategy forms a ‘detailed framework or plan that helps guide you 
through the research process, allowing a greater likelihood of achieving your research objectives’ (2010), 
whilst Danermark et al (2002) describe the construction of methodology as being on ‘the borderlines 
between, on the one hand the philosophy of science, and on the other hand, the critical methods or working 
procedures used in specific studies’ (2002: 73). The link between research objectives, philosophical position 
and methodological decisions is summed up by Sayer (1992) claiming that it is imperative that ‘in designing 
concrete research, we have to keep in mind the nature of our object of interest’ (1992: 241). In other words, 
and simply put: 
‘The term ‘method’ denotes a way of doing something. Methodology refers to the coherent groups 
of method that complement one another and that have the ‘goodness of fit’ to deliver data and 
findings that will reflect the research question and suit the research purpose. The group of methods 
of data collection and analysis will also be coherent because the researcher has philosophised in a 
certain way about them and has made sure they are compatible’ (Henning et al, 2004: 36). 
In the context of this research, strong coherence (and natural corollaries) is achieved through effective 
linkage between 1) the overarching justification and research objectives of this study, 2) the meta-theoretical 
approach and critical come radical humanist stance taken, and 3) the overarching ‘qualitativeness’ of the 
analytical framework used. Due to the moral and ethical standpoint of this research, the methodology 
requires an empirically driven approach centred on the ‘nature of the problem’. This has been achieved 
through consistently moulding the research questions to respond effectively to the changing nature of the 
problem found. In light of the critical stance of this research, one of the overarching objectives of this 
research was to amplify and emancipate host community voices and narratives. This is supported by 
MacRury and Poynter (2009), who claim the importance of capturing narratives within host cities in order 
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to fully understand legacy context. The focus on an empirically driven, in-depth qualitative study is justified 
given the established need to explore the complex multifarious idiosyncrasies of host community impacts. 
For methodological clarity, the research can be simply understood as being rooted in a ‘subjectivist’ 
paradigm, ontologically nominalist, epistemologically anti-positivist, and leading to an ‘ideographic’ 
methodological position rooted in the sociology of radical change, invoking a radical humanist and critical 
theorist stance. The strategy executed was ‘exploratory’, ‘qualitative’ and ‘inductive’ in nature, responding 
effectively to research themes developed, empirically driven and building theory from in-depth qualitative 
data (stories, narratives). An exploratory approach was taken given the limited theory base, and inadequate 
empirical depth of host community impact that seldom exists within the context of mega-event analyses. 
This is vital as one of the major criticisms of current impact research is its overt reliance upon quantitative, 
positivist approaches – often solely economically focused and using questionnaire and survey methods to 
collect data (Preuss, 2006; Jones, 1997; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; Kasmati, 2003). This is true with 
respect to academic study but also in much of the policy evaluation from host cities and practitioner 
literature (e.g. Deloitte, 2004, PWC, 2004). Narratives often fail to emerge (for London 2012 and prior case 
study analysis), claim Raco and Tunney (2010) and Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), certainly with respect 
to the empirical depth provided in this thesis. As such previous studies have failed to address issues among 
the community. This approach alone, provides a much needed contribution to the literature, as detailed by 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016). 
Whereas deduction moves from the ‘general to the particular’10, induction moves from the ‘particular to 
the general’. The inductive approach invoked for this study thus allows one to ‘gain an understanding of 
the meanings humans attach to events (…) gain closer understanding of research context (…) need to 
collect qualitative data (…) allow flexibility to respond to emergent ideas and theories (…) less concerned 
with the need to generalise’ (Wilson, 2010: 96). The development of ‘context contingent’ knowledge was a 
vital hoped-for outcome of this study. This reflects Aristotle’s call for empirical analysis and the continued 
strive toward inherent truth in the context under investigation, as the only way of experiencing the world 
is through our very own senses. Given the study’s emphasis on the ‘research problem’, and the policy and 
practical outputs provided later in this thesis, we can state that this study is ‘applied’ to nature, as it is ‘based 
on a decision in relation to a real-life problem, providing value and answers to management problems’ 
(Wilson, 2010: 154). The efficacy of its application is particularly fruitful given the multi-levelled 
stakeholders involved in the empirical-primary data collection, along with extensive engagement with policy, 
practice, academic and media sources to underpin the assertions and ‘truth claims’ of this study. Throughout 
the next sections, the thesis provides a detailed breakdown of both the primary and secondary sources used 
across this study.  
                                                          
10 Using pre-existing knowledge, concepts and theories to guide analytical frames. Think Sherlock Holmes walking in to a room, the particularities 
of the crime scene made easier to ‘make sense of’ given his knowledge of solving previous cases. 
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3.4.1 Case study: London 2012 Games, Central Greenwich and the Last Mile  
Empirically driven, this study is centred on an ‘event case study’ of the London 2012 Games, drawing 
specifically on local small firm experiences across Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ (one of the most affected 
‘HEZs’ designated to host Olympic events) but also reflecting on views across Official Host Boroughs right 
through to the highest echelons of Games project management (e.g. LOCOG) and the UK Government 
(e.g. House of Lords and DCMS). For clarity, the Last Mile is ‘the term given to the last part of a spectator’s 
journey from a transport hub to Games’ venue’ (Commission for Sustainable London, 2012: 41). Such 
spaces form the major spatial and empirical focus for this research in light of severe criticisms emerging 
from the empirical findings of this thesis. See Figure 8 below for the official image and proximity for 
London’s Central Greenwich HEZ – the blue dotted line represents the ‘event zone’ parameters, the solid 
green line outlines the ‘competition venue’ boundaries. 
 
Figure 8: ‘HEZ’ and ‘Last Mile’ of Central Greenwich [Park] (Extracted from DCMS, 2015) 
One of the major challenges for this research was determining which geographical case study area should 
be explored, given that the policy literature claimed that no specific geographical location was more 
impacted than another by the Games. Choosing the site and specific sample of small businesses to assess 
impact was therefore not immediately obvious during the early stages of the thesis. Through sustained 
reading, it emerged that specific ‘HEZs’ housing the main event sites, and specifically the ‘Last Mile’ 
stretches, provided spatial boundaries for exploring small firm experiences. These spaces were identified as 
topologies that were greatly impacted in a multitude of ways by the occurrence of a mega-event throughout 
all stages of the TDR cycle – before, during and after the Games. Smith (2008) further claims that it is those 
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in the immediate vicinity who are often impacted by the occurrence of mega-events, stating: ‘at best the 
Games can allow for collective upsurges in goodwill and festive atmosphere, at worst, they provide the 
vehicle by which group[s] are further marginalised or forced to leave the locale’ (2008: 14).   
From impacts pertaining to advertising, tourism, trade, space and regulation, to disruptions to 
transportation networks and the operational delivery of small firms, the Last Mile emerged as a perfect case 
study environment for empirical analysis. Furthermore, prior literature also alluded to the challenges host 
communities face during re-territorialisation phases, often referred to as ‘legacy phases’ – as well as the 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation phases. These aforementioned factors, alongside the limited prior 
analyses of small firm experiences across Last Mile and HEZs, provided a suitable justification. In addition 
to the above, the Central Greenwich, and case study approach in general, was chosen for a number of other 
reasons: 
i) Initial doctoral readings (e.g. FSB, 2012) illuminating the multiplicity of opportunities and 
challenges bestowed upon small firms before and during the Games; 
ii) Significant total population of retail and food and beverage industries, the chosen sector for 
this research’s empirical focus; 
iii) Case study approach prescribed by North American scholars (e.g. Brenner and Theodore, 
2002) to contextualise ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’; 
iv) Similar studies invoking case study approach with comparable study objectives11. 
It is worth noting that, despite small firms forming the initial make-up of the research sample, in response 
to negative trading impacts found during the initial pilot phase, it was decided to include the perspectives 
of major stakeholders involved in the planning and delivery of the Games (including Government, DCMS, 
House of Lords, London Assembly, LOCOG etc.) in order to provide a balanced perspective on immediate 
and wider Games impact.  
Although the research includes perspectives outside the official case study geographical boundary of Central 
Greenwich, no cross-case study comparative analysis has been made. In hindsight, this was a significantly 
important decision, as it neutralised intensely negative experiences (both supporting and opposing local 
views – providing the ‘other side of the coin’ and informing critical debate), and subsequently developed 
key stakeholder networks for invoking influencing change – a key current and future objective in the 
continuation of this research agenda. These networks form a vital part of enacting change, and as part of 
the author’s current and on-going research agenda between 2016 and 2002 – as detailed in section 6.6  
There are however several other reasons why this chosen case study approach was taken. Eisenhardt (1989) 
claims that case studies focus on ‘understanding the dynamics present within a single setting’ (1989: 534), 
specifically events, processes, people and other phenomena within a context (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The 
                                                          
11 For example, Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; Raco and Tunney, 2010; O’Brien, 2006; Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Vlachos, 2012; Pappalepore, 
2011; FSB, 2013. 
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chosen case study method for this research can be understood as a ‘single case study’ (also referred to as 
‘holistic’ case study) design focusing specifically on a ‘narrow case study design’ and ‘narrow analytical 
scope’, as prescribed by Wilson (2010). Yin (1994) believes that case studies have distinct advantages when 
‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little or no control, and investigating a ‘contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 
1994: 13). Furthermore, Flyvbjerg (2006) claims that case studies provide a useful mechanism for providing 
detailed questioning to test throughout the research. All of the above factors form vital components of the 
research objectives of this thesis as illustrated across all chapters. 
This study follows Yin’s (1994) method of asking ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions closely, providing: i) in-
depth descriptive examination to identify opportunities and challenges, ii) exploring how challenges 
manifested, iii) reflecting on why challenges and dichotomies emerged so dominantly, and iv) consideration 
of the ramifications of unpacked impacts. Lastly, practical ways of going forward are devised (Research 
Objective 4) to ensure potential rectification of identified problems in order to emancipate and prevent 
challenges from re-occurring in similar contexts in the future.  
Another reason why a case study approach was chosen is based on Collis and Hussey’s (2009) claim that 
case studies are often by default ‘set in an interpretivist paradigm’ (2009: 82), thus qualitative in nature. 
Therefore, the worldview taken for this study adheres to Altheide and Johnson’s (1994) notion that social 
worlds should be viewed as independently constructed and interpreted, rather than literal. Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) believe that allowing for the emergence of thick descriptions permits a deeper evaluation, 
allowing conclusions to be drawn and potentially transferred to other settings, situations and people. 
Although such conclusions do not lend themselves to fully generalisable truths, they can support and 
develop emergent ideas and theories, and produce forms of ‘general validity’, as explained shortly. The 
overarching subjectivist approach is thus justified based on the primary need and study objectives to 
emphasise the ‘explanation and understanding of what is unique and particular, rather than of what is 
general and universal’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 3).  
In agreement with Sayer (1992), whilst case study data is a critical component of qualitative (and especially 
critically orientated) study, the empirical production of such detail should not be overlooked. Sayer (1992) 
claims ‘…that studying things in context may seem so common-sensical as to be unworthy of mention… 
dismissive attitude (toward context) frequently belies an assumption that contexts are merely something 
that one refers to in general terms as part of the ‘background’ … contexts are rarely just backgrounds; 
exploration of how the context is structured and how the key agents under study fit in to it – interact with 
it and constitute it – is vital for explanation’ (Sayer, 1992: 248). In light of these challenges, it was therefore 
an explicit imperative of this thesis to keep in mind that examining the messy and complex structural and 
social conditions that typify the existence of the social object is 1) not only crucial for achieving effective 
qualitative analysis but 2) forms a major objective of this research. One may also argue Stake’s (1995) 
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position that case studies offer limited prospects for learning as they are often centred on just one to three 
cases, offering limited generalisability. Yin (1994) somewhat agrees with this thesis, and claims that, whilst 
this may be the case, they are excellent tools for in-depth qualitative analysis, and can be useful for mapping 
territory in preparation for larger scale studies to provide generalised results.  
Whilst these arguments provide a sound critique for the ‘external validity’ of this study, alongside the 
execution of this thesis, the author has been working closely with the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) 
in preparing (2014 – 2015) and executing (2016 - 2018) a major seminal study (see image from study below) 
that attempts to test the rich empirical findings of this study via a cross-London mixed-method survey. 
Whilst the findings are not subsumed into the empirical analysis of this study, executing this study affords 
both greater ‘external validity’ and ‘generalisability’ of findings, provides an exceptional opportunity for 
‘research impact’, and provides a significant opportunity for post-PhD production of journal articles – to 
amplify challenges in both academic and policy realms and help to invoke change. To re-iterate, all of this 
serves to illustrate the coherency of the meta-theoretical, philosophical, critical and methodological 
decisions made in the author’s research. See section 6.6 for further detail on the author’s research agenda 
between 2016 – 2020.  
 
Figure 9: ‘Joint FSB and University Survey Logo’ (Developed by the author) 
Conversely, although both approaches (subjectivism vs. objectivism) appear absolutely contrasted, they do 
share one feature in common – the search for some form of ‘generalisability’. According to Remenyi (1998), 
whilst objectivist research often takes a ‘deductive’ approach to test theoretical ideas, subjectivist research 
assumes an ‘inductive’ position attempting to ‘build’ or ‘support’ theory development. The result is that 
both often produce different forms of generalisability. Whereas objectivist research tests specific ideas, 
isolating particular variables under scrutiny, and models specific methodological design which can be easily 
replicated, subjectivist research, due to its local complexities and variability at play, cannot – thus producing 
a higher ‘degree of error’. The study must therefore consider the ‘validity’ of research results, critique the 
degree of caution with which the research results can be used, and claim to what extent empiricism and 
theory development reflect the general phenomenon under investigation. Sayer (1992), however, claims 
that such ‘intensive’ qualitative-focused work seldom produces ‘representative’, ‘average’ or generalisable’ 
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discoveries (1992: 243). Although this is a limitation it is not the purpose of this study, as the goal is to look 
at causal explanations in a specific context and the ‘substantial relations of connections’ within the case 
study in question (1992: 243). Furthermore, Easton and Harrison (2004) claim that the methods researchers 
employ do not just depend on the research issue and problem under scrutiny but also the values and 
axiological position of the research, affirming that ‘whereas the research problem/question determines the 
‘effectiveness’ of each research approach, the values of the research influences the term of whether the 
research values theory comprising of ‘deep’ explanations of specific context, or ‘shallow’ explanation across 
a wider range of contexts’ (2004: 195). In the context of this research, ‘deeper’ explanations are sought, 
rooted in the causal contextual nature of the case study. This justifies the fact that, whilst cross-Olympic 
contexts were highlighted across the empirical material and secondary data collection (afforded by inviting 
comments from key London-wide perspectives), Central Greenwich’ was the main focus of analysis. Collins 
(1994), however postulates that: 
‘…It is important to note that here is always a judgement to be made. Those scientific discoveries 
are not made at a single point in time and at a single place, with single demonstrations. They are 
made through a process of argument and disagreement. They are made with the scientific 
community coming slowly toward a consensus’ (Collins, 1994).  
In light of this study, it is important to note that the final argument construction combines both a medley 
of critical and credible secondary data sets and existing scholarly arguments, with a fresh primary data set, 
argued well using, e.g. Toulmin’s (1958) framework of argumentation, in order to come to Collins’ (1994) 
idea of ‘consensus’. This is a somewhat Socratic-dialectic between the researcher and research data, 
synthesising knowledge (that has previously constituted a synthesis upon synthesis) in order to create a new 
thesis, which in turn spawns a new antithesis. This is the knowledge creation/production process which all 
scholarly arguments are founded upon (Collins, 1994).  These issues are paramount to the formation of this 
study. Given the critical stance taken, in order to make significant ‘social change’ (a necessary outcome of 
‘critical research’) one must consider pragmatic concerns; increasing the validity of the research and 
reducing the degree of error will be vital in producing the necessary evidence required to influence policy 
and practice with the ambition of invoking change. Issues of driving change and ‘research impact’ are 
addressed across the Conclusions and Recommendations (Chapter 6) of this thesis.   
3.4.2 Research Process 
In order to increase methodological transparency, the following ‘Stage 1-12 model’ illustrates the explicit 
research process taken in the construction and intellectual development of this thesis – see Figure 10 below. 
Starting with the initial research questions and objectives, the study executed a critical review based on 
systematic key word searches to identify gaps in knowledge and research problems. This allowed the author 
to highlight gaps in the literature, helping to construct new research questions to guide the empirical data 
collection of this research. In addition, these processes afforded the expansion of knowledge, allowing for 
greater intellectual dialogue between the author and the stakeholders of this research (Stage 1). In light of 
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the new research questions, the researcher constructed the first methodology draft, ready to execute the 
‘pilot study’ (Stage 2). The pilot study provided a major opportunity to test the first draft of interviewee 
questions, develop the researcher’s data collection skills and competency, and allow initial emergent 
empirical themes to appear that subsequently informed future interview questions and the revision and 
inclusion of new literature (Stage 3) in response to identified small firm challenges. As a result, early findings 
helped to inform the main period of primary data collection (Stage 4).  
Following data collection, the first empirical analysis draft was created (Stage 5) to outline the major a priori  
and a posteriori themes that would subsequently inform the supporting and building of theory used for this 
thesis, as outlined by Attride and Stirling’s (2001) ‘TNA’ – see section: 3.5. As discussed above, following 
the main phases of the data collection and the development of key policy networks, the author sought to 
execute a joint survey study with the FSB to seek greater ‘generalisability’ of the qualitative data findings 
produced so far (Stage 6). Whilst this data is critical for future academic discussion, mixed-method survey 
data was not incorporated into the analysis and discussions of this thesis (during Phase 7).  
In light of well-established empirical themes, a final review and inclusion of all literature was included across 
the thesis in reflection (Stage 8). Stages 9 – 12, the final stages of the research process, thus constituted the 
bulk of the ‘writing up’ phase – occurring from April 2015 – April 2016. Firstly, in light of the established 
empirical themes and up to date review, the discussions chapter aimed to bridge the gap between a priori 
understanding and emergent themes in order to inductively build and support theory development (Stage 
9). Once complete, the methodology chapter was revised in light of the actual, final methodological 
decisions made (Stage 10), followed by a conclusive wrapping-up chapter and recommendations for 
emancipatory social change (Stage 11). The final stage was concerned with reconciling all established 
positions taken to ensure coherence between research objectives, reviewed literature, philosophical 
positions and methodological decisions, empirical analyses and discussion points, and conclusions and 
recommendations were given.  
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Figure 10: ‘Stage 1 – 12 of Thesis Development’ (developed by the author) 
3.4.3 Primary Data Collection Methods  
Yin (1994) identifies six key data collection techniques for gathering qualitative information for case study 
research. These include conducting interviews with key respondents, documentation, archival records, 
direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts. Through analysing multiple sources, the 
thesis gathers evidence and information from different sources to enhance the ‘construct validity’ of case 
study findings (Yin, 1994: 34) – see section 3.6 for further details in the context of this research.  
Centred on a qualitative research design, in-depth interviewing methods have been used for to collect data; 
predominantly face-to-face interviews (41) and telephone interviews (2). These methods were also 
complemented by a range of other key secondary sources for qualitative analysis – see section 3.4.6 - which 
helped inform the methodological triangulation (see Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) underpinning the analysis, 
discussions and conclusions of this thesis. Methodological triangulation is described by Denzin and Lincoln 
(1970) as ‘collecting information from a diverse range of individuals, settings and using a variety of methods’ 
(1970: 23), and Easterby-Smith et al (1991) state that ‘several research designs, approaches and methods are 
used’ (1991: 41). According to Yin (1994), interviews are one of the most important sources of information 
in case studies. In-depth semi-structured interviewing techniques were used, allowing for narrative and 
discussion and giving research participants to opportunity to control the direction of conversation, under 
the guidance of a brief interview structure. This allowed perceptions, experiences and feelings to be 
explored (Oppenheim, 2000) and the recalling of ‘lived experiences’, which adheres to the ‘narrative 
analysis’ used for this thesis. Semi-structured interviewing provided structure around established a priori 
knowledge but allowed free flowing discussion that afforded the emergence of a posteriori themes, 
permitting the research to get ‘inside situations’ and analyse ‘subjective accounts’, thus letting ‘one’s subject 
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unfold its nature and characteristics during the process of investigation’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 6). This 
aligns closely with the philosophical and methodological position of this research, which subsequently 
helped to inductively, and empirically build on existing theory. 
Given the subjectivist nature of this research, it was vital that research participant experiences were allowed 
to emerge, allowing for deeper analysis and the rich data appropriate for the overarching objectives of this 
study (e.g. Chalip and Leyns, 2002; O’Brien, 2006; Jones, 1997), without stunting with too much structure 
– in terms of both questioning and time allocation12. Adopting a more conversational style in the interview 
allowed for greater flexibility with minimum influence on the direction of the discussion, allowing the 
researcher to frequently probe issues that appeared to be more pertinent to the narrative of the individual 
participant. Throughout, descriptive ‘what’ and ‘how’ (descriptive data) were complemented by ‘why’ 
(explanatory data) questions to encompass better analytical understandings (Frazer and Lawley, 2000). 
Furthermore, according to Wilson (2010) interviews provide ‘instant results (…) and access to personal 
beliefs, attitudes, experiences and meanings, whilst providing verbal and non-verbal communication’ 
(Wilson, 2010). Furthermore, they can provide researchers with in-depth information, permitting detailed 
exploration of particular issues in a way which is seldom possible via other forms of data collection 
according to Ram (1996) and Rouse and Deallenbach (1999). For example, semi-structured forms of 
interviewing afford the flexibility to ask follow-up questions to clarify confusion and enhance understanding 
with respect to what has taken place, how, and why things happen (Wilson, 2010; Pettigrew, 1990; Pettus, 
2001). Qualitative methods also allow for a degree of flexibility, allowing emerging data to be iteratively 
incorporated into the methodological and interview design, and the design of research objectives. This was 
certainly the case in the context of this research. Furthermore, qualitative methods during the analysis and 
discussion stage allow for a continuous dialogue to be forged between theory and emerging data 
(Hargreaves, 1986). Given such flexibility, O’Brien (2006) claims that qualitative approaches permit the 
exploration of ‘inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes that define daily life’ (2006: 244), reflecting 
early Socratic thought that sought - through two-way questioning – to reveal ideas, assumptions and 
inherent contradictions within individual viewpoints in order to come to new conclusions. This was 
particularly vital, for example, for unearthing the ‘rhetoric vs. reality’ dichotomies and debates that formed 
the foundation of the findings and conclusions of this thesis.  
Undertaking in-depth interviewing requires a variety of skills (Denscombe, 2007), such as the ability to 
listen, and emotional intelligence - sensitivity to the feelings and body language of the participant – and 
being non-judgemental. It involves knowing when to allow silences to go uninterrupted but also when to 
use prompts and probes to extract empirical data. Whilst there are many similarities between a 
‘conversation’ and an ‘interview’, the latter usually requires the researcher to make sense of and reflect on 
responses in light of the overarching goals of the data collection at hand (e.g. Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
Table 15 below highlights the benefits and limitations of in-depth research. 
                                                          
12 For example, one interview lasted just 25 minutes whilst another lasted 2 ½ hours. 
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Benefits of in-depth interviews Limitations of interviews 
 Detailed rich data  
 Can establish rapport, clarify questions 
and build good future relationships  
 Can contact after interview to seek clarity  
 Respondents can express themselves 
freely  
 Caters for respondents who like to 
answer in their own words  
 Interviewer maintains control of the 
interview through good traffic 
management  
 High ethical standards must be 
maintained at all times  
 Gain permission to tape interview so 
easier to transcribe  
 If interview goes well hardly need 
questions as conversation flows.  
 If questions need to be asked, make sure 
open, and where possible probe  
 Conclude positively and gain further 
leads  
 Need to ensure ‘right’ respondents used (prior 
research)  
 Respondents may speak at length (set time limits 
and stick to them, keep focused)  
 Respondents may reply too briefly (open questions, 
delve deeper, rephrase questions)  
 Need for post interview coding of answers (have a 
good system tried and tested)  
 Can be demanding on respondent (trained and 
prepared, accept part of interviewing process) need 
to be calm and organised  
 More time-consuming to complete (richer data 
compensates for time taken)  
 More difficult to analyse (good tools needed and 
experience and confidence to use them)  
 Choices may ‘lead’ the respondent (art of designing 
a good interview protocol and bias declared)  
 Must ensure all possible responses are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive (good research design)  
 Ensure setting is amenable for a constructive 
interview (preparation)  
 
Table 15: Benefits and Limitations of In-Depth Interviews’ (Adapted from Frazer and Lawley, 2000) 
Throughout the data collection phases, it was imperative that the researcher constructed interview questions 
based on the overarching research objectives and questions to be asked within the study. Other critical 
success factors are the importance of key interview skills - including ‘good planning’, ‘interpersonal skills’ 
and having a clear, interested manner when questions are asked, recording responses and generating a good 
rapport with the interviewee (Oppenheim, 2000). Furthermore, to improve the validity and depth of 
collected data, it was of major importance to place interviewees in a state of ‘cognitive ease’ (Kahneman, 
2012); a relaxed state of mind inducing more creative and intuitive responses. According to Kahneman’s 
(2012) notion of ‘System 1’ thinking, where ‘cognitive ease’ is present individuals are more likely to ‘make 
mistakes’ – in the context of this research the researcher may interpret such a state as an opportunity for 
interviewees to ‘open up’ and perhaps provide more honest responses. To optimise participant ‘ease’ all but 
two interviews took place in the participant’s usual place of work or premises. One issue found in the two 
that took place in an agreed location - one in the café of the British Museum and another in Café Nero – 
was that the audio was difficult to transcribe due to noise levels. Thus, the researcher refrained, for the 
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remainder of the interviews and future interviewing, from conducting interviews in what could be noisy 
locations. Responding to the above issues forms a vital part of the researchers’ skill set and was imperative 
for successful data collection efforts.  
 
Figure 11: ‘Participant Information Pack: Front Cover’ (developed by the author) 
Throughout the interviews, if at any time responses to interview questions were not clear, the researcher 
repeated answers back and sought clarification to ensure the data could be interpreted in the most accurate 
way. It was also important to clearly define any concepts used and clarify the line of questioning throughout 
the study to avoid ambiguity and vagueness, which was key to eliciting valuable data. The pilot study and 
early stages of phase 2 of the data collection provided vital opportunities to iron out such issues. A flexible 
approach to the simplicity or complexity of questioning was also required depending on the stakeholder 
group (1-4) participant in question – some interviewees simply had more prerequisite and technical language 
than others.  
In light of the above issues and acknowledgement of the benefits and limitations of in-depth interviews, 
the researcher produced a ‘Participant Pack’ – see Figure 11 above for the front cover. Electronically 
disseminated before the interview, and presented as a physical copy at the beginning of all interviews, the 
pack gave full details of the study (objectives, purpose and value of study), ethical considerations, and 
researcher’s contact details – see Appendix 4 - 7. This allowed the participant to provide ‘informed consent’ 
(see Oliver, 2008) – see section 3.7 for full details of ethical considerations taken for this study. In addition, 
the researcher clarified and stressed the anonymity and confidentiality agreements of partaking in the 
research, data security, and the option to withdraw any statements, and even themselves, from the study at 
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any time. Following agreement to be recorded, participants also had the opportunity to retain the audio 
copy of their interview (recorded using the iPhone application ‘Recordium’), which was sent instantly to an 
email address of their choosing directly from the app, and to read final transcription if requested. This 
allowed the participant to identify any potential verbatim errors in order to help ‘confirm the findings’ 
(Saldana, 2009) and thus improve the ‘internal validity’ of findings (Yin, 1994). Transcribing audio data is 
key as it allows for a more thorough examination of empirical data (e.g. Bryman, 2001) and holistically 
captures the participant’s full argument. Transcription was conducted through the dictation software 
‘Dragon Naturally Speaking’, which improved both efficiency and verbatim accuracy (once the author had 
trained his voice on the software). Participants were also reminded that, post-interview, they could contact 
me again with respect to anything they would have liked to say but forgot in the interview. It was not 
uncommon for this to happen, and for general dialogue between myself and respondents to occur after the 
interview (e.g. some would send me newspaper articles on subject matter referred to in their earlier 
transcription, additional contact details for other potential participants et cetera).  
In light of these issues, one of the major tools used in this research for structuring the interview process 
was Wilson’s (2010) ‘Stages 1 – 6’, applied to the context of this research, as shown below.   
Stage  Considerations for researcher 
Stage 1 – pre-interview 
planning 
- What data do you want to collect? 
- Is it aligned to the research questions? 
- Place, time and interview conditions? 
- Reviewed by supervisor(s)? Suitable? Avoidance of bias? Non-sensitive? 
- Structured? Semi-structured or unstructured? 
Stage 2 – day of interview 
 
- Printed out questions and rehearsed? 
- Got all contact details, map of location etc. 
- Notepad, pens, (fully charged) dictaphone and download of ‘Audio Boo’ software? 
- Business cards, suitable clothing? 
Stage 3 – arrival 
 
 
- On time, to set-up and test interview equipment 
- Friendly chat to calm researcher and participant nerves 
- Personal disposition, confident handshake 
Stage 4 – interview start 
 
- Explain project (PIS), including objective of research and any outputs they would be 
interested in 
- Dummy run through questions if (structured/unstructured) if required 
- Clarify clear ethical questions (e.g. anonymity, confidentiality of data) 
- Answer any questions before starting   
Stage 5 – during 
interview 
- Clear and professional voicing interview questions 
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- Give participants time to response, don’t interrupt (could prevent rich data results) 
- Keep research questions in mind – has the research participant answered the question? 
Stage 6 – end of interview 
 
- Sign consent form and thank the research participant 
- Offer to send audio file 
- Provide details about how the data will be processed. Publication perhaps? 
 
Table 16: Wilson’s (2010) ‘Stage 1 – 6 of Interview Planning’  
3.4.4 Research Sample  
Identifying a relevant sample is a critical part of collecting empirical data. This is largely based on the lack 
of resources (e.g. time, money, energy, internal expertise) to survey an entire population, and often the need 
to identify the views of a specific group of people – as is the case with this research. Wilson (2010) claims 
that there are three main stages to deriving a suitable sample: ‘identifying overall ‘N’ population’  
narrowing ‘N’ down to a ‘sampling frame’  followed by the decision about which ‘final’ sample 
(sometimes referred to as ‘n’) is chosen for the empirical data collection of ‘individual cases’ – see Figure 
12 below.  
 
Figure 12: 'Narrowing Sample Frames' (Extracted from Wilson, 2010) 
Four different stakeholder groups (SGs) were invited to share their perspectives for this research (see Table 
17 below), supporting a stakeholder-methodological triangulation approach. With respect to sampling 
techniques, a non-probability purposive sampling approach was chosen based on 1) the targeted 
geographical proximity of this research (e.g. small firms across Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’), and 2) the 
need to extract the specific knowledge and experiences of impacted stakeholders (SG1), and stakeholders 
who were specifically involved in the planning and delivery of the Games, as well as the welfare of host 
small business communities (SG2, SG3, SG4). As can be seen from the table below, the multi-levelled 
sample involved perspectives from the highest echelons of the UK Government, senior ministers, planners 
and civil servants, senior business engagement officers (both in the chosen case study and across a number 
of other Olympic host borough councils), organising committee representatives, the co-author of the 
London 2012 bid them self, national regional and local business organisations, and a significant number of 
first hand experiences from retail and F&B small firm owners placed directly on the ‘Last Mile’.  
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Out of 53 (‘Sample Frame’) small firms across the ‘Last Mile’, the perspectives of 21 were gathered to 
inform the empirical views on local impact used for this research, although all 53 were asked on numerous 
occasions - both digitally and face-to-face – to provide their opinion. With respect to all SGs, an 
‘appreciative inquiry’ (AI) approach was used. AI prescribes that, rather than being ‘critical’ and highlighting 
previously identified problems and issues previous, the researcher also includes explicit questions around 
the ‘opportunities’ of the Games, using a ‘positive’ tone of voice to offer a position of neutrality. This 
encouraged participants who might usually be more guarded in their answers and inclined to ‘toe the line’ 
to open up and provide candid responses, allowing for a greater richness of data. This was particularly 
important for SG2 and SG4, who at the time were still in politically pressured positions and might have 
been reluctant to engage with external research bodies like universities.  
Stakeholder group (SG) Description  
Stakeholder group 1 Small local firms centred in Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ ‘HEZ’ 
Stakeholder group 2 Local councillors (key business engagement officers) across all official Olympic 
host boroughs (e.g. Royal Borough of Greenwich Council)  
Stakeholder group 3 Business organisations responsible for the welfare of small local businesses 
around all official Olympic host boroughs (e.g. local chambers, regional support 
organisations like Business in the Community (BITC) and includes all three major 
business organisations: FSB, London Chamber, and CBI) 
Stakeholder group 4 High level project actors, key stakeholders who have direct or indirect 
involvement in the planning, delivering or lobbying of the Games (e.g. House of 
Lords, DCMS, London Assembly etc.) 
 
Table 17: Breakdown of Research Stakeholder Groups (SGs) 
Access to all SGs was sought through initial gatekeepers (sometimes referred to as ‘key informants’), leading 
to a ‘snowballing’ effect. This was particularly effective given the often interconnected relationships 
amongst local networks, and the fact that gatekeepers and key informants often act as ‘well-informed’ 
spokespeople (all having a view of what is going on in their respective ‘communities’) for a larger group of 
stakeholders, which subsequently leads to other information and networks according to Creswell (2007). It 
is thus of major importance that initial gatekeepers are chosen based on their local influence to allow for a 
successful snowball attempt (Cassell and Symon, 2004). Furthermore, in order to sustain and leverage 
gatekeeper networks, and continue to be positively recommended to future contacts, Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998) stress the importance of mutual trust between these key stakeholders and the researcher themselves. 
The respective gatekeepers are indicated below, along with a table that outlines the specific interviewee 
respondents and their aliases for protecting anonymity, and a breakdown of interviewees according to their 
stakeholder groups. It is important to state that choosing gatekeepers introduces bias into the sampling by 
limiting access to certain groups; these introduce the research to their peers, who may share similar mind-
sets/views on the research issues. This was more so for higher echelons of government but a good mix of 
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political spectrum, gender and specific roles was achieved.  The main SG1 sample was well represented as 
specific small firms bounded into the Last Mile were invited to provide their opinions, and thus all small 
firms under investigation had an equal chance to participate in the study.   
Stakeholder group  Chosen key gatekeeper and justification 
Stakeholder group 1 High street restaurateur in Central Greenwich – through secondary research 
identified as significant presence across social mediums, media and business 
networks  
Stakeholder group 2 Greenwich Council, Senior Business Engagement Officer – ability to provide 
significant local perspective on research issue, and linkage with other councils 
Stakeholder group 3 Federation of Small Business (FSB) – author of post-Games small business report 
on London 2012 impacts, and clearly networked organisation with ties to small 
business and policy networks 
Stakeholder group 4 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) ‘Legacy Unit’ – major actor in 
the planning of London 2012, and author of post-Games legacy report, clearly 
networked 
 
Table 18: ‘Key Gatekeepers Chosen Across SGs’ 
Interviewee alias (and SG) Organisation and role 
Interviewee #1 (SG4) House of Lords, Leader of London 2012 Legacy inquiry 
Interviewee #2 (SG4) Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), Head of Olympic Legacy 
Unit  
Interviewee #3 (SG4) London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), Head of Community 
Partnerships and Regeneration  
Interviewee #4 (SG4) UK Government [Shadow Cabinet], Shadow Minister for Employment (MP) 
Interviewee #5 (SG4) London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG), Chair of 
the London Forum 
Interviewee #6 (SG4) British Olympic Association (BOA), Senior Advisor and Co-author of London 
2012 Bid 
Interviewee #7 (SG4) Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), Senior Civil Servant 
Interviewee #8 (SG4) London Assembly, Senior Civil Servant (a) 
Interviewee #9 (SG4) London Assembly, Senior Civil Servant (b) 
Interviewee #10 (SG4) London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), Small Businesses Advisor 
Interviewee #11 (SG3) Confederation for British Industry (CBI), Senior Business Representative  
Interviewee #12 (SG3) Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), Head of London Policy 
Interviewee #13 (SG3) London Chamber of Commerce, Head of Marketing 
Interviewee #14 (SG3) London Business Network, Head of Business Support 
Interviewee #15 (SG3) East Greenwich Business Association (EGBA), Chair  
Interviewee #16 (SG3) East London Chamber of Commerce, Head and Chair 
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Interviewee #17 (SG3) Business in the Community (BITC), Head of Small Business 
Interviewee #18 (SG3) Federation of Small Business (FSB), Regional Representative [East London] 
Interviewee #19 (SG2) Greenwich Council, Senior Business Engagement Officer 
Interviewee #20 (SG2) Newham Council, Senior Business Engagement Officer 
Interviewee #21 (SG2) Tower Hamlets Council, Senior Business Engagement Officer 
Interviewee #22 (SG2) Waltham Forest Council, Senior Business Engagement Officer 
Interviewee #23 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Biscuit Biscuit), Owner  
Interviewee #24 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Greenwich Business Café), Owner 
Interviewee #25 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Red Door Café), Owner 
Interviewee #26 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Mister Greenwich), Owner 
Interviewee #27 (SG1) Local F&B firm (San Miguel Tapas), Owner 
Interviewee #28 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Theatre of Wine), Owner 
Interviewee #29 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Longitude), Owner 
Interviewee #30 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Coach and Horses), Owner 
Interviewee #31 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Goddard’s), Owner 
Interviewee #32 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Village Food and Wine), Owner 
Interviewee #33 (SG1) Local retail (Flood Gallery), Owner 
Interviewee #34 (SG1) Local F&B firm (San Miguel Tapas), Restaurant Manager 
Interviewee #35 (SG1) Local F&B firm (Mevali), Owner 
Interviewee #36 (SG1) Local retail firm (Jeanette), Owner 
Interviewee #37 (SG1) Local retail firm (Johnny Rocket), Owner 
Interviewee #38 (SG1) Local retail firm (Johnny Rocket), Manager 
Interviewee #39 (SG1) Local retail firm (Flyjack), Owner 
Interviewee #40 (SG1) Local retail firm (Historic London), Owner 
Interviewee #41 (SG1) Local retail firm (Pickwick Paper), Owner 
Interviewee #42 (SG1) Local retail firm (Music and Video Exchange), Owner 
Interviewee #43 (SG1) Local retail firm (Arty Globe), Owner 
 
Table 19: Breakdown of All Participants Interviewed 
Stakeholder group (SG) Representation Example organisations 
Stakeholder group 1 21  Retail and food/beverage small firms across ‘Central 
Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ high street. 
Stakeholder group 2 4 Greenwich Council, Newham Council Tower Hamlets 
Council, Waltham Forest Council senior business 
engagement officers. 
Stakeholder group 3 8  FSB, CBI, London Chamber of Commerce, and local East 
London Chamber of Commerce etc.  
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Stakeholder group 4 10 House of Lords, DCMS, LLDC, London Assembly, ODA, 
LOCOG, BOA, UK Government (Senior Government 
Minister) etc. 
 
Table 20: Breakdown of Representation across SGs 
In light of the triangulated methodological approach taken, primary data was collected across three main 
time phases – all with very specific strategic purposes (see table below). Phase 3 data was not used in the 
empirical analysis of this study, and serves to illustrate – as detailed as part of the on-going research impact 
of this thesis as addressed in the final Conclusions and Recommendations, Chapter 6.  
Phase Method Date(s) executed 
Phase 1: Pilot Study In-depth interviewing August – September, 2013 
Phase 2: Main data collection  In-depth interviewing May – September, 2014 
Phase 3: Joint data collection with FSB  Mixed-method online survey (data not used) January – August, 2015 
 
Table 21: Key phases (1-3) of Data Collection 
3.4.5 Gaining Access to Data: Traditional and Digital Techniques 
Gaining access to all four stakeholders groups represented a major challenge for this research, requiring a 
range of traditional and digital techniques. With respect to SG1, access was sought through developing and 
exploiting social networks; namely, through Twitter (@michaelbduignan) and blogging networks 
(www.OlympicResearcher.wordpress.com). The researcher targeted firms through a systematic analysis of 
Central Greenwich’s small business community online, specifically networking with them using their 
business name in a keyword search. Then the researcher informally engaged them in dialogue, announcing 
the focus and intentions for thesis research in order to gain a ‘foot in the door’ and develop mutual trust. 
Twitter not only provided a gateway into what can often be difficult networks to access but also served as 
a tool for organising spontaneous interviews, where it was not uncommon for the researcher - through 
providing regular Twitter updates – to be contacted by small firms to organise interviews whilst in transit 
down to London. This illustrates not only the power of social networks but also small firms’ desire to ‘tell 
their story’ of the Games’ impact - the later empirical findings perhaps indicate why. 
Furthermore, social media played a major role in accessing SG4 participants too, for rather unexpected 
reasons, offering a ‘back door’ into notoriously difficult to access policy networks. For example, the 
researcher used two techniques to engage with SG4 participants online: a) through the official ‘Talk 
London’ forum (http://talklondon.gov.uk) to publicise the research study (see image below), and b) 
through direct microblogging engagement via Twitter. Twitter, due to its informal communication style and 
conversational nature breaks down the usual formal boundaries usually erected by public (governmental) 
organisations, providing unique opportunities for research engagement. Such opportunity is further helped 
by the rather public nature of Twitter conversations – a somewhat ‘lobbying effect’ pressurising public 
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organisations to respond to questions deemed in the public’s interest – whereby local constituents (e.g. the 
small firms in Central Greenwich) help to ‘amplify’ and intensify public interest through ‘re-tweeting’ and 
joining in with the public conversation between the researcher and organisation.  
 
Figure 13: 'Talk London Blog Forum' 
LinkedIn, document analysis and database searching all helped provide access to the networks of 
stakeholders interviewed for this research, alongside attendance at over ten different research, policy and 
practice events hosted by a range of organisations (e.g. UEL, UCL, Birbeck etc.). It was in fact networking 
at the UEL Legacies conference in September 2013 that allowed me to gain access to major gatekeepers 
for the research (e.g. DCMS). One of the major reasons why SG2, SG3 and SG4 engaged with the study 
was the promise and focus of the research and its subsequent results; helped by a well-written pitch to hook 
these stakeholders in. One drawback of using social media in this context is the potential for excluding 
respondents who are unavailable via digital media but could have been a potential part of the data collection. 
3.4.6 Secondary Data Collection 
The data and evidence collected across this thesis to support assertions, conceptualisations, and conclusions 
comprise of both detailed primary and secondary data. It draws up on an eclectic range of secondary 
sources, including a systematic analysis of policy documents released between 2005 – 2015 (document 
analysis) and archival material: from media articles, HC Hansard House of Commons records, other 
governmental records (e.g. local authority reports, London Assembly documentation et cetera) right 
through to detailed practitioner reports (e.g. Work Foundation, Oxford Economics et cetera). As explored 
earlier, Yin (1994) claims that the analysis of such documental evidence and archival material are key sources 
for informing the case study method. To provide an overarching sense of the scale and scope of secondary 
material analysed, Table 22 outlines the types, and approximate quantity of, sources used – these are used 
where suitable across all chapters of this thesis.  
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Sources used Quantity Justification  
Academic journals, books, 
chapters, PhD theses, 
working papers; conference 
proceedings  
 
Approx. 
250 
Necessary prerequisite for analysis of prior case study, theoretical positions and 
methodology construction. Both ‘theoretical’ and ‘research’ literature (Wallace and 
Wray, 2002). 
Policy document analysis 
 
Approx. 
35 
Systematic discussion of ALL London 2012 government-related documents released 
from 2004 – 2015 – constituting Wallace and Wray’s (2002) notion of ‘policy 
literature’. The product of this became an old chapter, ‘London 2012 Olympic 
rhetoric - what was promised’ (which has now been integrated into the thesis review).  
 
Several questions provided a useful guide for the analysis, including i) what were the 
key promises made for host communities, and specifically small businesses in light 
of London 2012 planning and delivery? ii) What were the key hoped-for 
opportunities, and challenges for host community small businesses? iii) Who 
appeared to be priority stakeholders who would benefit? iv) Which geographical 
areas were to be most impacted? 
Media discourse and reports 
(e.g. websites and online 
articles) 
Approx. 
60  
Systematic review of all media reports produced before, during and after London 
2012, constituting what Wallace and Wray (2002) refer to as ‘practice’ literature. 
a) Static media pages (e.g. BBC, newspaper sites like the Guardian etc) 
containing single reports of events 
b) Television broadcasts of, for example, the BBC News, ITV, Channel 4, 
Financial Times news etc. – providing visual media accounts of events 
Of course, across all media, government etc. sources one must understand the 
somewhat biased and limiting factors influencing the ‘truth’ of these sources. 
YouTube videos and 
documentaries  
Approx. 
75 
Useful for context and theoretical review, including i) documentaries related to 
London 2012 specifically, including local host community reports (e.g. Central 
Greenwich small firms’ plight), and ii) talks, lectures, conferences et cetera related to 
theoretical ideas across the review (e.g. David Harvey’s ‘Neoliberal City’ lecture). 
Legal documents Approx. 5 Including the HCC, London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Act etc. 
 
Table 22: Examples of Secondary Sources and Literature Used. 
According to Poulson and Wallace (2004), the objective of a review is to provide ‘a critical account designed 
to convince a particular audience about what published (and also possibly unpublished) theory, research 
practice or policy texts indicate what is and what is not known about one or more questions framed by the 
reviewer’ (2004). The review, and secondary evidence, provides a solid foundation on which to build 
research arguments, defining ‘problems’ (e.g. Oliver, 2008) to be studied across different ‘contexts’ and 
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‘theoretical’ frames. As such, the focus of the review process often reflects the guiding study objectives, 
whilst simultaneously influencing them as knowledge is accrued. The review, as alluded to earlier in Chapter 
1, also affords the author and the read to, implicitly and explicitly, understand the gaps in literature to 
determine what we ‘do know’ vs. ‘what we do not know’. It affords an opportunity to indicate both 
empirical and theoretical gaps to be discovered, and for the author to write in both an ‘interesting’ (e.g. 
through looking at things in a new light, shedding light on old texts, connecting previously unconnected 
idea, pointing counter-intuitive areas, and challenging assumptions) and ‘convincing’ manner. Convincing 
in this sense with respect to the deciphering of arguments, the development of individual positionality and 
justifying why certain positions are taken through evidence collection, whilst simultaneously creating a 
coherent and logical ‘line of reasoning’, ‘narrative’ and ‘storyline’. Throughout this process, it is critical that 
the study and author remains reflective during the construction of the story, flexible enough to respond to 
new ideas, empiricism and evidence, and underpinned by a sense of humility, appreciative inquiry, 
appreciation for prior ideas, and the attitude of ‘polite-doubt’ where appropriate.  
Through engagement with a significant body of inter- and cross-disciplinary sources of literature and 
secondary sources, the review provides a critical appraisal of existing knowledge. References were organised 
through both ‘RefWorks’ (for management) and ‘NVivo 10’ (for analysis), alongside a ‘local folder’ system 
for sources in ‘current use’ during particular phases of the research. In order to keep up to date with recent 
literature developments, Google Scholar alerts were used to capture new literature related to the key words 
and search strings identified in the table below. Methods books (e.g. Collis and Hussey, 2009) claim that 
there are several ways of looking at the purpose of a review, for example a) ‘context’, b) ‘theoretical’, c) 
‘methodological’, and finally d) ‘historical’ review – as identified in Table 23 below, all of which played a 
key implicit and explicit role in the construction of this thesis.  
 
Table 23: 'Four Types of Review’ (Adapted from multiple methods books (e.g. Collis and Hussey, 2009; 
Wilson, 2010; Creswell, 1994)) 
Type of review Explanation Integrated in to this thesis 
Context review Research in chosen context e.g. policy document analysis, media reports, YouTube 
videos, previous event case studies. 
Theoretical review Analysis of theoretical 
orientation examining similar 
issues 
e.g. event leveraging, subject theory (e.g. gentrification), 
legacy conceptualisation, neoliberalism [and associated 
middle theories e.g. commodification of culture]. 
Methodological review  Analysis of methodologies 
examining similar issues 
e.g. Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; Raco and Tunney, 
2010; O’Brien, 2006; Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Vlachos, 
2012; Pappalepore, 2011; FSB, 2013. 
Historical review 
 
Exploration of history and 
development of research issues 
over time 
e.g. Gold and Gold, 2008; Vigor et al, 2004, MacRury and 
Poynter, 2009; Roche, 2000; Essex and Chalkley, 2002; 
Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Hall, 1992; Ritchie, 1987. 
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The thesis incorporates several typologies of key literature and secondary evidence. ‘theoretical’, ‘research’, 
‘practice’ and ‘policy’ literature (Wallace and Wray, 2006). In order to keep abreast of emergent secondary 
and literature sources a series of alerts were set-up across (e.g. ‘Google Scholar’) alongside a regular 
systematic trawl of the online databases (e.g. Scholar, university library (both Anglia Ruskin University and 
University of Cambridge, JStor, EBSCO, SCONUL libraries, etc.)). Through connecting with academics in 
the field via Twitter and LinkedIn, regular feeds of up to date information sources were channelled into the 
author’s social media stream. 
Theoretical literature Research literature Practice 
literature 
Policy literature 
 
- Often developed based on 
empirical observations of the 
world, and a construct about what 
the world is like 
- Not always based on evidence, 
often based on convincing 
argument, as theory does not have 
to be confirmed 
-  Always remember, it’s just a 
theory – so look critically on its 
validity, robustness and its quality 
based on critical appraisal and 
assessment. 
 
- Generally in the form of a systematic 
investigation, in response to a set of 
research questions, answered through 
data collection (collected through 
empirical or secondary texts) 
- Can often come in the form of 
combined review, and often labelled as 
‘research reports’ 
- Always requires research to identify its 
methods, and how data was collected to 
help judge its validity and potential 
contribution to my study. 
 
- Written 
usually by 
practitioner 
in the field, 
usually in 
the form of 
‘how to’… 
- Do not 
confuse 
with 
research 
literature. 
 
 
- A form of literature that tells 
practitioners/professionals how to 
act 
- Can be based on theory, research 
or practice, therefore requires 
researcher to explore on what 
literature that policy was based  
i.e. policy literature stemming from 
‘theory’ and ‘practice’ will have less 
weighting than that from ‘research’. 
 
 
Table 24: ‘Different Types of Literature’ (Wallace and Wray, 2002) 
3.5 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative analysis can be broadly defined as ‘any kind of analysis that produces findings or concepts and 
hypotheses, as in grounded theory that are not arrived by statistical methods’ (Glaser, 1992: 1). In 
qualitative, inductive work, empirical findings is thus often the largest section of any thesis. This is due to 
the large number of data extracts used and the significant amount of discursive writing required for 
analytical elaborations (Oliver, 2008) – and is the case for this thesis.  
Such quantities of data often require systematic methods for organising, fracturing, analysing and 
subsequent synthesis of key themes; a process often referred to as ‘coding’. Computerised packages 
currently exist across both quantitative (e.g. SPSS and STATA) and qualitative analysis (e.g. NVIVO) to do 
this, as opposed to manual forms of thematising, which can often be very burdensome and unsystematic. 
An example of how NVIVO10 was used in this thesis is shown in Figure 14 below. Coding requires the 
researcher to assign key words/themes to data extracts, grouping together empirical analyse into 
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ideas/concepts/themes in order to group together textual data and conduct advanced search functions 
across the data set. Appendix 1 details how this was conducted for this study.  
 
Figure 14: ‘Overview of Thesis NVIVO Coding Framework Used’ 
Alongside this, some of the other major benefits of using CAQDA are improved speed and efficiency of 
analysis, especially for larger data sets, easier data storage and retrieval, and greater transparency of coding 
strategies, helping to enhance connectivity between data evidence which support theoretical developments 
(Bryman, 2001). It is however important to note that CAQDA poses several challenges for the researcher 
: 1) the construction of themes is still a manual process as the researcher him/herself interprets data extracts 
to determine meaning, and 2) the problem of over-coding and fragmenting the data to the extent to which 
the data become decontextualized (Holloway and Todres, 2003). Denzin and Lincoln (1998) thus claim that 
the researcher must continuously analyse extracts in light of the ‘situational’ and ‘contextual’ factors in 
which the data is embedded in both specific ‘temporal’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions (1998: 4). To negate these 
potential effects, key quotes used in constructing the empirical analysis of this thesis remained in larger 
paragraphs to ensure that they were closely associated with the context they were mentioned in. In order 
to retail qualitativeness of the data set, Bryman (2002) notes that researchers should also refrain from 
quantifying numerically qualitative data, rather than solely focusing on in-depth complexities afforded by 
qualitative analysis.   
All but eight audio files were transcribed by the researcher to ensure verbatim accuracy. Oliver (2008) 
stresses the importance of accurate qualitative data but also the need to analyse the speech linguistics of 
respondents. This specifically pertains to the interpretation of pauses, repetitions, emotion et cetera that 
convey important meaning; a level of analysis which, according to Oliver (2008), is often missed in opting 
for a more standard transcription technique.  Although commonplace and widely accepted, the inclusion 
of linguistic patterns serves to offer additional depth and interest to qualitative analysis.  
3.5.1 Data Selectivity and Organisation 
Although qualitative data analysis affords researchers a considerable amount of creativity and initiative in 
presenting the major themes underpinning empiricism, Oliver (2008) identifies a number of challenges for 
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dealing with large data sets, alongside key advice. Qualitative researchers seldom use all of their collected 
data in empirical chapters for two key reasons: 1) too much data to comprehend for thesis completion, 2) 
portions of data are superfluous to the research objectives (Oliver, 2008). A major challenge is therefore 
determining which data qualifies for inclusion; formally referred to as ‘selectivity’. In light of concerns that, 
at the best of times, qualitative data is often undermined with respect to rigour and validity, researchers 
must be transparent and systematic in data inclusion and exclusion strategies – otherwise, for example, the 
reader may wonder why particular data sets were omitted that could have been interesting and relevant 
(Oliver, 2008). This is of course a critical issue for more grounded - inductive research, since the nature of 
scientific enquiry is solely based on the data selected for theoretical development.  
Oliver (2008) proposes taking the following considerations into account for data inclusion: 
 Issues raised and dominant themes identified by large number of respondents  
 Where data may concur with previous research findings from other case studies/theory 
 Researcher subjectively argues and chooses that certain viewpoints must be included and 
constituted as more important than others – ‘key informants’   
 Similar data findings identified across methodological triangulation worthy of noting  
 Multiple periods of time identify different data findings, this could be of interest. 
Researchers must also consider balancing empirical perspectives across data sets, although it is common 
for an imbalance of data sets to be used whereby particular respondents’ views are included more than 
others (Oliver, 2008). Oliver (2008) believes that this can often lead to unbalanced perspectives on the total 
research sample. Special coding can help negate such issues; something invoked for this study (e.g. SG1 
#Interviewee 40) as identified across Table 19. In this case the researcher can stay aware of overuse of 
specific SG responses in light of empirical analysis. Oliver (2008) believes that, by using such special codes, 
one can identify additional themes, for example a dominant perspective and argument by one particular 
SG. This was detailed where appropriate across the proceeding chapters.     
Constructing empirical finding chapters in an ordered and relational manner is critical as they can be often 
lengthy and complex. Oliver (2008) suggests a number of tactics for developing a coherent empirical 
analysis: 1) explaining specifically how data was analysed and why sections were developed the way they 
were, 2) use of sub-headings splitting and allowing for a hierarchy of themes to emerge, 3) continuous 
signposting to related points, reminding the reader how current writing relates to pre and proceeding 
sections. Providing directional guides helps to connect related analytical points together across the 
preceding and proceeding chapters of this thesis.   
3.5.2 Thematic Networks Analysis  
Once a marginalised approach, derided as anecdotal and solely useful as an exploratory stage in the research 
process, qualitative research has been subject to growing popularity across the past decades within the social 
sciences (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). This shift is largely down the fact that 
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various social scientific disciplines continue to recognise more subjectivist anti-positivist forms of inquiry, 
as opposed to the previously dominant traditions of positivism that have tended to direct both natural and 
social science inquiry (Barnes et al, 1999; Black, 1996; Richie and Spencer, 1994). Attride-Stirling’s (2001) 
notion of TNA is thus considered as a framework for thematically developing the empirical data collected 
throughout the thesis – a step toward deeper understanding of social phenomena and their dynamics – 
helping to systematically bridge the gap between ‘evidence’ (e.g. empiricism) and ‘claims’ made through the 
course of, and underpinning research arguments presented in, this research thesis.  
Attride-Stirling’s (2001) TNA method was chosen in light of Miles and Huberman’s (1994) concern that 
there is a shortfall in qualitative analysis techniques helping researchers to analyse ‘textual’ data collected 
through a research thesis. As explained earlier, in order to improve the validity of data, researchers must 
analyse data in a systematic and methodical manner. Unfortunately, a number of authors (e.g. Lee and 
Fielding, 1996) claim that researchers tend to omit the ‘how’ and specific process decisions taken 
throughout the execution of qualitative analysis – and in fact methodology in general. Attride-Stirling (2001) 
laments this as enhancing methodological transparency may 1) serve to enhance the value of interpretations 
made, and 2) aid other researchers wishing to carry out similar projects (also see Diversi, 1998; Pandit, 
1996). It was therefore a major objective, given the critical theorist (and radical humanist) stance of this 
research, and the need to enhance the ‘reproducibility’ of the study, to encourage meta-evaluative study of 
similar inquiries. The author intentionally used the clear process of Stage 1 – 12 (see Figure 10), self-
reflection (see for example sections 3.8 and 6.4), and transparency of philosophical and methodological 
positions and tactics used across the construction of this thesis to illustrate how and why decisions were 
made. 
To further enhance reproducibility, empirical analysis has been developed and thematised using Attride-
Stirling’s (2001) TNA; a model proposing that web-like illustrations can visualise major research themes 
underpinning empiricism. Attride-Stirling (2001) claims that such networks can simplify a way of organising 
thematic analysis of qualitative data, providing a robust and sensitive presentation technique that ‘unearths’ 
themes often salient in texts at different levels by structuring, ordering and depicting themes. This approach 
was used for the proceeding chapters, and illustrated in Appendix 1 and 2.  
Thematic networks are, however, not new. They share key features with any form of hermeneutic analysis 
and interpretation but offer the researcher explicit explanations of the procedures taken from ‘text’ to 
‘interpretation’. The methodical step-by-step process discloses a series of analytical steps which in turn 
affords an ‘insightful and rich exploration of a text’s overt structures and underlying patterns’ (Attride-
Stirling, 2001: 386). In order to systematically structure arguments presented across the thesis, Toulmin’s 
(1958) theories of ‘argumentation’ and associated framework (see Figure 15 below) provide structural 
methods for analysing negotiation processes - defining and elaborating on formal elements of arguments 
as a means of exploring the connections between ‘explicit statements and the implicit meanings in peoples 
discourse’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001: 387). Furthermore, they allow ‘arguments to be disentangled and 
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presented intelligibly, thereby facilitating the process of negotiation in decision making and problem 
solving’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001: 387) – a key requirement for complex data sets like those collected across 
this thesis. 
 
Figure 15: Toulmin’s (1958) ‘Theory of Argumentation’ 
Attride-Stirling’s (2001) TNA method comprises three key stages of thematic development: 
Level of TNA Explanation 
Basic (initial level) Lowest-order premises evident in the text. It is like a backing, in that it is a statement of belief 
anchored around a central notion (the ‘warrant’) and contributes toward the signification of the 
organising and super-ordinate theme. Basic themes are simple premises characteristic of the data, and 
on their own say little about the text or group of texts as a whole. For basic themes to make sense 
beyond their individual meaning, they need to be read within the context of other basic themes. 
Together they represent an ‘Organising Theme’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001). 
Organising (mid-level) Categories of basic themes grouped together to form more abstract principles. It is a middle-order 
theme, clusters of signification that summarise the principal assumption of a group of basic themes, so 
they are more abstract and reveal broadly what is going on in the text. Like basic themes, organising 
themes enhance the meaning and provide significance for broader themes – one that unites all 
‘Organising Themes’. As explored by Toulmin’s warrants, they are the organising principles on which 
the super-ordinate theme (Global Theme) and claim is based. They group basic themes together, but 
also help to dissect main assumptions pertaining to the Global Theme. To be clear: ‘Organising 
Themes’ collectively make up a ‘Global Theme’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001).   
Global (top-level) Super-ordinate themes encapsulating the principle metaphors in the text as a whole. It is like a claim, 
in that it is a concluding/final tenet. The global theme gathers all previously discussed themes to present 
an argument, position or an assertion about reality. They are macro, which makes sense of their lower 
and middle-order that are abstracted from and supported by the data. Thus they provide what the text 
is wholly all about, within the context of a given analysis, and both summarise and reveal interpretation 
of the texts. Depending up on the complexity of the analysis and/or topic, some research may yield 
more than one global theme at the core of the thematic network(s) (Attride-Stirling, 2001).   
 
Table 25: Attride-Stirling’s (2001) ‘Basic, Organising and Global Thematic Development’ 
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These networks do not aim to discover the beginnings of arguments or the end of rationalisation but 
provide a technique for breaking up the text and finding within it explicit rationalisations and their implicit 
significations. Miles and Huberman (1994) claim that such analysis allows for patterns, clustering, making 
contrasts and drawing references whilst building ‘a logical chain of reference’ (1994: 245). Furthermore, 
such thematic analysis affords the study of ‘part meanings’, as described by Holloway and Todres (2003) – 
partial explanations to be pieced together through back and forth analysis, contributing to holistic analyses 
and constructed by the researcher to make the ‘whole story’, being constructed through both participant 
and researcher realities. To help make sense and to better understand the spatial-relational nature of themes, 
TNA often uses web diagrams to depict relationships socially-constructed by the researcher themselves. 
 
Figure 16: Organising Themes in TNA (Extracted from Attride-Stirling, 2001) 
Thematic networks are presented without any notion of hierarchy, giving fluidity to the themes and 
emphasising their connectivity throughout the network. Once constructed, the network provides a useful 
organising principle, and illustrative tool for interpreting the text, facilitating ‘disclosure’ for the researchers, 
and creating understanding for the reader. This is further helped by the construction of the Conceptual 
Framework presented early on in Chapter 1. It is however important to note that these networks are only 
a tool for analysis, not the analysis in itself, it is therefore essential to consider methods for effectively 
fragmenting and systematically analysing data. In order to do this, the author conducted a short systematic 
analysis of major analytical methods from some seminal authors and their respective papers (Loftland et al 
(2006); Strauss (1987); Wilson (2010); Oliver (2008); Attride-Stirling (2001); Denzin and Lincoln (1998) 
Bryman (2001); Holloway and Todres (2003); Coffey and Atkinson, (1996). The aim was to establish 
effective coding frameworks and techniques, to analyse and ask the right questions of the data with respect 
to both descriptive and interpretive analytical stages. A systematic, transparent approach to analysing 
qualitative data is essential given large quantities of rich complex data sets; the methodology of which is 
stated in Figure 17 below. It is important to note that this focus does not constitute the methodology of 
‘discourse analysis’ but rather borrows key principles to better the researcher’s analysis of qualitative data.   
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Figure 17: ‘Stage 1 – 3 in Data Abstraction and Interpretation’ (Developed by author, adapted from 
Attride-Stirling, 2001) 
Broadly speaking, the figure above identifies three steps in the analysis of qualitative textual material; 
however, due to the difficulty of articulating the specific abstractions, Attride-Stirling (2001) provides an 
operational step-by-step guide to creating and analysing systematic TNAs.  
 
Figure 18: Attride-Stirling’s (2001) ‘Step 1-6 Analytical Framework in TNA’ 
According to Strauss (1987: 29), ‘the goal of coding is to fracture the data (analyse) and rearrange it 
(synthesise) in to categories that facilitate the comparison of data within and between these categories and 
that aid in the development of theoretical concepts’. Coding the material aims to reduce the data, dissecting 
text into manageable and meaningful text segments using a coding framework. Attride-Stirling (2001) breaks 
this first step into two key areas: (a) ‘devising a coding framework’, and (b) ‘dissect text in to text segments 
using the coding framework’.  
Thematic analysis of text as developed by Holton (1973; 2003); and according to Boyatzis (1998: 7) states 
that a theme ‘at a minimum describes and organises possible observations or at the maximum interprets 
aspects of a phenomenon’. A theme is a unifier that converts experience in to a meaningful whole (DeSantis 
and Ugarriza, 2000), identifying themes and patterns of experience, and behaviours (Aronson, 1994; and 
Attride-Stirling, 2001), and organises a group of ideas (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003). As alluded to earlier, 
this is reflected by the way proceeding chapters have been both organised, analysed, and theorised.  
Coding frameworks can be based on: a) theoretical issues guiding the research study (deductively applying 
a priori/theoretical ideas and codes to be systematically discussed), b) salient issues emerging from 
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empiricism (inductively applying emergent codes) or c) on the basis of both – which is most common as 
qualitative research often starts with some form of theoretical idea guidance (literature themes, 
preconceptions, or even episodic memory/world experiences).  Codes (sometimes referred to as ‘themes’ 
or ‘categories’) are developed to ‘describe’ the data, unpacking what the textual data is literally saying (and 
what’s it all about…) Here, the researcher looks for cumulative instances of similar descriptions throughout 
the data and adds extracts from the data to existing codes – allowing ‘dominant’ themes to emerge (this 
step is similar to Bryman’s ‘Stage 1’ of analysis). This stage is classed as ‘open ended’; an exploration of 
preliminary ideas. It is however sometimes difficult to know, especially in the early phases of exploration, 
what inductive researchers should look for in the data. Alongside Oliver’s (2008) earlier advice on 
‘selectivity’, both Loftland et al (2006) suggest the following points as a guiding lens: 
 What is going on? What are people doing? Loftland et al (2006) claim that contextual ‘events’ can be split into 
‘acts’ (short term events) and ‘activities’ (longer-term events), and one must explore what the text says about the 
‘context’ under study (referred to by Strauss (1987) as ‘conditions’). Furthermore, Loftland et al (2006) claim that 
one must consider ‘participation’ issues, for example what role does the interviewee take within the whole situation? 
And what kind of ‘relationships’ they have within the scenario (e.g. between all SGs in the context of this research), 
referred to by Strauss (1987) as ‘interactions’. 
  
 What are participants directly saying in the text? Both literal analysis of ‘in-text’ statements but also an interpretive 
analysis of ‘out-of-text’ meaning (e.g. what concepts and language participants are using to understand and describe 
their social worlds, and the significance to them). And what do these actions and/or statements tell us about the 
underlying assumptions that underpin them (e.g. capitalist ideology)? 
Following familiarisation stages of textual exploration, Bryman’s (2001) ‘Stage 2’ refers to the development 
of codes, demarcation of themes (e.g. through highlighting, labelling textual data with specific events, 
concept, idea, feeling, or even key words or analytical ideas/interpretation or conclusions of the text). 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) refer to this as ‘Open Coding’.   
The final part of Step 1 is the dissection of textual data, specific coding applied to data extracts (e.g. passages, 
direct quotes, events – or any other criteria judged to be important for analysis) to create meaningful 
segments (also see Bryman’s (2001) ‘Stage 3’). Parallels can be found in the literature (e.g. Bryman and 
Burgess, 1994; Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Although 
initial coding is rudimentary, much rigour and detail is required – all codes must have discrete and explicit 
boundaries (e.g. well defined) to ensure they do not become redundant/interchangeable – limited in focus 
– to avoid over-coding. However, it is common for researchers to invoke what Miles and Huberman (1994) 
refer to as ‘simultaneous coding’, whereby several codes are used for a single response, justified as much of 
the data often is deeply descriptive, rich/dense in content with respect to participant experiences and 
inferentially meaningful (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Once coded, repeated codes are eliminated or 
merged/grouped (e.g. if codes reflect similar ideas/concepts). Researchers find in analysis phase ‘A’ an 
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abundance of codes to be inevitably cut down at a later point (e.g. due to irrelevancy or grouped together). 
It is important to note that coded segments should ideally remain within their contexts, to avoid 
decontextualizing the data – as explained earlier, this is a common drawback of CAQDA, but an issue 
negated across this thesis where possible.  
The first part of Step 2 is to extract the salient and dominant themes in the coded text segments, often re-
reading text segments within the context of the codes under which they have been classified and abstracted 
from the full text. This allows the researcher to reframe the reading of the text, allowing for the 
identification of key patterns and structures. Ryan and Bernard (2003) suggest a number of ways one may 
abstract themes from coded segments:  
Method Explanation 
Repetitions The amount of times specific responses/key words come up 
Indigenous typologies Specific terms used in the SG under investigation (e.g. SG1 claim challenging spaces, whilst 
SG4 claim strong ‘legacy’ 
Metaphors and analogies Often underlying reason why specific metaphors are used over others (e.g. ‘like the Gestapo 
has landed in Greenwich’) alludes to intensity of feelings 
Transitions Changes of tone, pauses, speech characteristics and linguistics etc. 
Similarities and differences How data compares and contrasts against other case studies, evidence, research, literature etc. 
Linguistic connectors Language that suggest potential connectivity between stories and for example their impacts 
(e.g. spatial striation = challenge for tourism and trade) 
Missing data  Data expected to be there but has been omitted, and why (e.g. limited reference to the reality 
of challenging before, during and post-Games impact and legacies) 
 
Table 26: ‘Abstracting Themes from Coded Segments’ (Ryan and Bernard, 2003) 
The final part of Step 2 is refining themes specific enough to be discrete (non-repetitive) but broad enough 
to encapsulate a set of ideas contained in the respective text segments – thus reducing the data to a 
manageable set of significant themes that fully summarize the text. This step re-presents the text passages 
succinctly, a painstaking process requiring attention to conceptual detail and significant interpretive work – 
referred to by Bryman (2008) as ‘Stage 3’: the initial creation of conceptual and theoretical ideas. Corbin 
and Strauss (1990) refer to this process as ‘Selective Coding’ – interpreting what the codes say about both 
the ‘context’ and more generally about, for example, the economy and society we live in. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) claim that this process ‘begins the process of abstraction and conceptualisation’ (1994: 
313); however, to ensure strong validity and a strong argument one must continually refer back to literature 
and secondary data, rooting empiricism in light of the evidence (Aronson, 1994). As outlined above, the 
three key phases of the TNA method: from reductionist breaking down of themes to the higher levels of 
abstraction required for theoretical development at micro, meso and a grander theoretical level, forms the 
structural approach taken for the construction of proceeding chapters. 
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3.6 Research Validity and Quality  
Broadly speaking, research validity questions the extent to which: ‘is one measuring what one intends to’ 
(Wilson, 2010) in order to appropriately answer the desired research questions. This requires the researcher 
to be critically aware of whether they are measuring effectively through the chosen collection methods. 
Some of the key threats to validity are found in Table 27 below. Yin (1994) claims that it is up to the 
researcher to provide adequate grounds for legitimising observations as well as reasoning or inferences 
made during the research process, given that validity is one of the key issues pertaining to qualitative 
research in general, especially in case study research (Yin, 1994). Maxwell (1992) suggests that five types of 
validity are key for qualitative research, although the first three: ‘descriptive’, ‘interpretive’ and ‘theoretical’ 
validity, are arguably central to construction. Table 27 below provides definitions, and briefly illustrates how 
this study specifically responds to these key issues:  
Type of validity  Description 
Descriptive Pertains to factual accuracy of the account produced by the researcher – in other words the concern 
around the researcher distorting findings, particularly events and specific situations. To limit this, 
arguments produced by the thesis were a) discussed with the key gatekeepers of this study, and b) 
discussed by the supervisory team and empirical findings were scrutinised prior to write up. 
Interpretive As established, qualitative, subjectivist research, by virtue of its philosophical (ontological and 
epistemological) position attempts to comprehend phenomena from both the research participant 
and the researcher’s perspective – through the act of interpretation. Both language and the rich 
context for findings must therefore be taken in to account (hence the in-depth explanation of East 
London and Central Greenwich ‘Last Mile’ spaces). It was thus important in the context of this 
research that the researcher analyse some of the in-text language structures (semiotics) of respondents 
to provide adequate emphasis and capture the narratives of participants. This can be seen in the 
analysis of discourse structures across the empirical findings chapter, for example, the extraction of 
semantics and metaphors used to describe experiences.  
Theoretical Theoretical validity entails consensus on concepts and terms commonly adopted within the 
community of researchers pertaining to a phenomenon. This is akin to what Yin (1994) describes as 
‘construct validity’ and relates to the appropriateness of the information, and not accuracy of facts 
or interpretations, which are the objectives of descriptive and interpretive validity. In light of this Yin 
(1994) suggests three key ‘tactics’, including multiple sources of evidence (as clarified in the earlier 
sources used), establishing a chain of evidence (e.g. the use of ‘argumentation’ theory), and reviews 
of case study reports by key respondents – all of which help to enhance construct validity.  All three 
were strongly encouraged during the construction of this thesis. 
Generalisability  Generalisability refers to the extent to which findings from one study are generalisable to other 
settings, labelled by Yin (1994) as ‘external validity’. In the context of subjectivist paradigms and 
qualitative research, such forms of ‘intensive’ research are seldom ‘representative’ of the whole 
population. They are not meant to be, and that is not the purpose of such research. To combat issues 
of generalisability, as explained earlier, the joint FSB study will adopt a more pragmatic paradigm to 
encompass more statistical data for a more ‘representative’ finding. This is a particularly key issue 
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given the desire for this and subsequent research to ‘drive change and research impact’ given the 
critical and ‘radial humanist’ position taken in the construction of this thesis.   
Evaluative validity Evaluative validity is akin to what Yin (1994) refers to as the ‘test of reliability’, ensuring that errors 
or biases are minimised to the extent that if the researcher was to execute the same procedures they 
would arrive at a similar set of findings or conclusions. As explained earlier, it is thus an absolute 
priority to provide a transparent, clear and accessible research methodology for future researchers to 
conduct similar studies – a meta-evaluative approach to incrementally build knowledge (again in light 
of the ‘critical’ stance and desire to drive change and research impact).  
 
Table 27: ‘Different Types of Research Validity’ (Adapted from Yin, 1994) 
Specific threat Threat in the context of this research 
History  Research bias risks due to the historical and current contextual scenario (e.g. studying perceptions 
of government just after recent tax hikes) 
Mortality Research participant drop out and/or unavailability to interview (e.g. moved organisation) 
Ambiguity Falsely connecting cause and effect relationships 
Sampling issues Wrong sampling methods used to measure phenomenon 
 Line of questioning Asking the wrong interview questions, only vaguely linked to the overall research objectives 
 
Table 28: Wilson’s (2010) ‘Threats to Research Validity’ 
Questions of reliability pose the question of ‘how far and to what extent does the phenomenon provide 
stable and consistent results’, according to Wilson (2010). However, Denscombe (2007), in the context of 
qualitative research, calls for the need to study ‘dependability’ as opposed to issues of ‘reliability’ – 
specifically issues of integrity and trustworthiness. Reliability in such a holistic case study analysis may be 
difficult to optimise, however, given the intense contextual variability affecting research results. In addition, 
‘plausibility’ regarding how far the results are ‘acceptable’ will be derived from an in-depth critical analysis 
and debate throughout all sections of the thesis but also through coherent and comprehensive adherence 
to Toulmin’s (1958) framework of ‘argumentation’. This will allow the researcher to build strong research 
arguments to support the reliability, dependability, credibility and plausibility of all research findings. 
According to Denscombe (2007), transferability and confirmability form two major components of 
qualitative research design, with the argument that, in order to allow meta-evaluative studies to take place, 
and for future researchers to explore similar research issues and methods in different contexts, one must 
keep a clear audit of all methodological activities conducted and provide detailed but transparent 
explanations of processes used. In light of this, the researcher has endeavoured to visualise, quantify and 
fully clarify, through the use of simplistic language and graphical aids, the rigour and transparent processes 
undertaken in this study.  
Rigour is particularly important given Gummerson’s (1991) argument that qualitative research can often be 
subject to quality control. This highlights the particular friction between qualitative and quantitative studies. 
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Quantitative researchers believe that without statistical, positivist evidence qualitative research can suffer 
from issues of ambiguity, inevitable researcher bias, unreliability and high degrees of error (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998). However, Leonarsden (2007) critiques quantitative research, claiming that ‘figures cannot 
speak’ (2007: 15) and thus provide little narrative and lack the in-depth nuances that inevitably exist in 
research.  
This research’s objective of amplifying local narratives thus lends itself to a subjectivist, qualitative design 
– as outlined in detail earlier in section 3.4. In light of inevitable research bias, the study understands the 
impact this may have on reliability, credibility and generalizability. The author is, however, that the approach 
to convey rich, in-depth experience may be at the cost of reduced credibility – particularly as the researcher’s 
interpretation of empirical and evidence gathered, data is of equal importance to the construction of the 
story – especially in light of the epistemological notion that a ‘subjectivist’ paradigm requires the researcher 
to personally experience, albeit through second-hand qualitative data collection, the research issue. 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Wilson (2010) states that all researchers ‘have a moral responsibility to carry out your research in an accurate 
and honest way’ (2010: 79). This research was subject to stringent ethical consideration and approval. Firstly, 
a detailed internal ethical approval process required the researcher to submit via an internal Faculty Research 
Ethics Panel (FREP). The key documents submitted here are addressed by points i) – iii) below. Informed 
and agreed consent was also sought from all participants in the study. Such mechanisms allow researchers 
to carry out their ‘moral duty’ when executing research and to protect participants (see Mason, 2002). The 
ethics approval required strict adherence to the University’s ethical guidelines. One must be aware of ethical 
implications not only during data collection, analysis and presentation but also during the dissemination 
and application of findings. This is particularly so in politically orientated research like this thesis (Wilson, 
2014). As illustrated earlier in the chapter, all audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and agreed upon 
by the respondents. Although all participants had the opportunity to withdraw at any point, as shown by 
the PCF below, every respondent remained in the study. All forms adhere to Wilson’s (2010: 87) outline 
for key information types required across ethics applications and inclusion in ‘informed consent forms’. 
i) ‘Participant Information Sheet’ (PIS) – a document fully outlining the nature and scope of the project, 
confidentiality details and how data will be used. See Appendix 6 for exact form used.  
ii) ‘Participant Consent Form’ (PCF) – distributed with the PCF, requiring all participants to sign and 
agree to be part of the study. This also incorporated a separate form that participants could use to 
‘opt out’ of participation at any stage. See Appendix 4 for exact form used.  
iii) ‘Ethics Checklist’ (Appendix 5) and ‘Ethics Application’ (Appendix 7) – two key documents 
outlining all ethical dimensions associated with the construction of this thesis. See related 
appendices for exact forms used here.  
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From a more technical ethics perspective, the ‘Ethics Application’ illustrates several other key ethical 
considerations. Firstly, effective research and ethics training of the researcher was sought through i) 
EPIGEUM official ethics training, and ii) extensive background research and reviewing of ethics theory. 
Secondly, the methodological process and execution attempted to be transparent as possible. This this was 
helped by i) clear step by step breakdowns of stages taken, as illustrated across this chapter, alongside ii) 
reasoning being provided for ‘data selectivity’ to try to negate ‘confirmation bias’: the act of choosing 
themes and data which support the point the researcher is trying to make, as opposed to following dominant 
and key themes. Thirdly, risks to participants were identified. These included: i) protecting the anonymity 
of individual respondents and their roles, ii) ensuring audio was transcribed verbatim and opinions 
accurately represented in the analysis, iii) and the issue of ‘social desirability’ and issues of respondents 
finding interviews intimidating. With respect to protecting anonymity, all personal and professional details 
were kept securely, and only the researcher had access to research participant information. Any confidential 
details required, i.e. disability and financial information, were kept in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act 1998. This applied to every data set collected as part of this research. With respect to accurate 
representation, all transcripts were sent to individuals for their validation. This is key as Rowley (2004) 
suggests that ‘conducting research ethically is concerned with respecting privacy and confidentiality, and 
being transparent about the use of research data. Ethical practices hinge on respect and trust and 
approaches that seek to build, rather than demolish, relationships’ (2004: 2010). To invoke a sustainable 
approach to the researcher’s ambition to conduct future research in this field, it is vital that respectable and 
credible relationships between the research and its key stakeholders are maintained.  
Regarding intimidation factors, the researcher provided a relaxed environment for research participants, 
and opted to talk through the structure of the questions and the format of the interview. Furthermore, 
confidentiality agreements were clearly stated, and the researcher made it very clear that participants were 
free to withdraw at any time, and were by no means obliged to answer questions if they felt uncomfortable. 
This builds on earlier discussion around ‘cognitive ease’ (see section 3.4). The risk to the researcher was 
also considered, identifying the fact that interviewing face-to-face and one-to-one may pose physical risks; 
for example, if local small business owners’ experiences had been traumatic this might have induced upset 
responses. Open public environments at the respondents’ organisations were therefore opted for. The 
researcher was also aware that, when constructing semi-structured questions, these must be developed in 
an emotionally intelligent way and not be provocative, and that, when asking questions, the researcher must 
try to maintain a non-biased and neutral approach to avoid any research bias (and confirmation bias). 
Researcher bias (see Denzin and Lincoln, 1998) is a major issue in data collection and is it therefore 
important that both verbal and physical influences are negated.  
With respect to the ability to provide ‘informed consent’ (see O’leary, 2004), all respondents were above 18 
and fully able to give consent. With respect to protecting participant identity and affording anonymity, the 
aliases provided earlier illustrate how generic titled roles were used. With respect to storing data securely, 
all research participant data was kept on audio recordings which were synced with the researcher’s laptop. 
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This data will at all times be kept under a password protected server in a password protected folder to 
optimise protection. All transcriptions were placed under exact same protective environment – and will be 
only accessible by the researcher. This ethics section covers all key issues outlined by Wilson (2014).  
A full breakdown of issues pertaining to informed consent are illustrated by O’leary (2004) in Table 29 
below: 
 
Issue  Detail 
Competent They have the intellectual capacity and psychological maturity necessary to understand 
the nature of the research and their involvement in the study. 
Autonomous They are making self-directed and self-determined choices. Others, such as parents and 
guardians cannot make the decision to participate for them. 
Involved voluntarily  They must be made aware of the research being conducted. Research ‘on them’ cannot 
be conducted without their knowledge and consent. 
Aware of the right to 
discontinue 
Participants are under no obligation to continue their involvement, and pressure to 
continue should not be applied. 
Not deceived Researchers need to be honest about the nature o0f their research, about the affiliation 
or professional standing, and the intended use of their study.  
Not coerced  Positions of power should not be used to get individuals to participate in a study, as can 
happen when employers or teachers apply pressure on their charges to engage in research. 
Not induced An offer of money or some other reward that entices individuals to participate in research 
they would otherwise avoid is considered an inducement. Whilst it may be acceptable to 
compensate individuals for their time and effort, it should not be an extent where it 
compromises a potential participant’s judgement.  
 
Table 29:  O’Leary’s (2004) ‘Issues of Informed Consent’ 
3.8 Self-Reflection: Shifting Paradigms, Perspectives and Axiological Drivers 
I began the thesis journey somewhat naïvely. As a spectator of mega-events - my personal favourite among 
all sporting events – I approached my scholarship title, ‘The local impact of the London 2012 Games on 
small businesses’, with enthusiasm, thinking all I would find would be stories of hope and positivity. What 
could go wrong? The world’s largest sporting event, stimulating mass visitation impacts on a stakeholder 
group which predominantly relies on existing close-knit networks of neighbours, and tourism footfall. 
Surely, small businesses would benefit from the spill over? My 1st supervisor at the time, Dr Ilaria 
Pappalepore, smiled as I stated my positive stance… I do feel a little bit silly, looking back. 
Prior to commencing the PhD, I worked at the Research Councils UK (RCUK) in the field of Skills and 
Researcher Development for their nationally funded organisation: ‘Vitae’. The role allowed me to meet and 
work with PhD researchers and early career and senior academics on many things related to researcher 
development. On my travels, researchers frequently reported feelings of ‘isolation’, and being ‘locked-out’ 
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during the research processes; often feeling like their research had no purpose and overarching vision for 
completion. Given that I heard 10s of stories like this, you are probably asking (like my colleagues), ‘why 
did you decide on the PhD route, how on earth weren’t you scared off?!!’ To that I answer: I haven’t the 
foggiest. However, I must say, those feelings did not hit me at all. The early phases were, as in any 
honeymoon period, full of novelty, new experiences, integrating myself in both the peer networks of 
established academics and aspiring doctoral researchers. Then, I soon became acquainted with the ‘critical’ 
literature of my field, a growing community of academics, practitioners, policy makers and lobbyists et 
cetera, illustrating the criticisms of such event-led policy. My world changed – quite literally. 
It is important to note that, prior to the PhD, my business education was somewhat mainstream, uncritical, 
lacking fundamental knowledge about the most basic of critical economic and political economy theories – 
often required to understand the dilemmas posed throughout this research. I think I was a bit ‘centre-right’ 
– heavily influenced by my family’s political dynamics. Although I was already turning a bit ‘left’ – thanks 
to my partner Alexandra – the critical readings transformed my outlook on, let me crudely call them, ‘big 
projects’ and the role of ‘capital’ in today’s free-market-orientated society. Through continued reading (the 
crux of which was the reading of initial ‘pilot study’ data), my knowledge of the ‘research problems’ 
underpinning this research became greater and the objective of the study, and my role as an emergent 
critically orientated scholar, became clearer. As opposed to a sprint to the end [to get the ‘Dr’] and return 
to a management position at RCUK, and an end in itself, my personal objectives shifted. The PhD became 
a means to an ethical standpoint, and no doubt an academic career. In turn, my critical stance and 
theorisations as established in this thesis had a major influence, not only in the reconstruction of my 
research objectives but further in my philosophical positions, and the methodological decisions that 
underpin the entirety of the professional (and personal) research strategy and approach in this thesis. It is 
however important to note that this research was not led by respective positions of ‘research philosophy’ 
but rather in response to the research problem and emergent moral crusade I found myself on.   
With my world changed, and a sense of moral purpose, I woke up most mornings feeling invigorated to 
read, write, listen, communicate, present, teach and debate. A stark contrast to earlier PhD accounts, but 
one which genuinely provides the values and guidance I use in my day to day early career academic life. 
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Chapter 4 – Findings 
4.1 Introduction to the Findings 
This chapter brings together predominantly primary data, complemented by a range of secondary sources 
as illustrated in Chapter 3, which forms the main empiricism and evidence base for the proceeding chapters. 
The structure of all the next three Findings, Discussions, and Conclusions and Recommendations is 
reflected by the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1. And as such, it is written in a semi-
structured, story-telling form based up on the chronological sequence of events and interviewee 
experiences, for example, starting with pre-Games ‘rhetoric’ – moving on to pre, during and immediate 
post-Games impact – and then on to the longer-term reflection up on ‘legacy’. Throughout the chapter, 
faint linkages to literature is made, to provide a coherent thread between theory – empiricism, which then 
leads back again to conceptual and wider theoretical reflection across Chapter 5 and 6. 
4.2 Rhetoric of Host Community and Small Firm Inclusion 
4.2.1 ‘Opportunity Rhetoric’ – Tourism and Trade 
Through a retrospective analysis of host small firm experiences of London 2012, this findings chapter 
begins by establishing local expectations, hopes and perceptions. The data reveals that for businesses 
geographically positioned across official HEZs, near to event venues, and situated on the ‘Last Mile’ stretch, 
opportunities were purveyed to capitalise on increased trade, Olympic tourism footfall, and network and 
supply to the Games. These bounded spaces formed the key spatio-empirical focus for this research. 
The data reveals that small firm expectations were mostly high, echoing similar sentiments found in 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016). Predicted bounties of mass event visitor footfall to and from venues, and 
the possibility of tourists remaining in the area after live events, were thought of as lucrative opportunities. 
Several reports supported such assertions, including that of Powell (2004: 2), who suggested that around 
‘six million’ visitors were expected over the three-month period – mainly during but also before and after 
the Games. The influx of tourists and Olympic-affiliated staff offered a ‘massive potential source of 
business’ and research suggested that the UK as a whole would benefit from a ‘£750m consumer spending 
boost’ (BBC, 2011b). From policy to media sources, there was no shortage of what this thesis coins as: 
‘opportunity rhetoric’ – at both national and local levels. Pre-Games claims suggested that the Olympics had 
already ‘developed a series of programmes that are already delivering benefits to Londoners and local 
businesses’ according to Ken Livingstone (Mayor of London, 2007: 3), and that the Games would bring 
significant ‘new opportunities for business in the immediate area and throughout London’ according to 
Jack Straw MP (Hansard, 2005). This established a dominant and prevailing rhetoric that this was a Games 
for the people and the idea that London would be ‘big enough for all potential visitors’ and ‘open for 
business’ during the Games (see DCMS, 2007b). As explored later, this notion did not match the realities. 
The broader rhetoric here matches that of the chosen Greenwich case study area almost identically. 
Greenwich Council stated that the Games should ‘increase competitiveness of local businesses’ and 
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‘increase prospects from winning contracts’ (2012b); claiming that ‘we very much hope that all Royal 
Borough of Greenwich businesses are able to capitalise as much as possible on the opportunities as 
presented by the Games, and the large number of visitors who will come in to the Royal Borough’ (RBOG, 
2012a). An interview with the Senior Business Engagement officer for Greenwich Council, who played a 
role in constructing the above report, outlined that: ‘one or two years before the Games it was said we will 
have millions of people – spectators, visitors and tourists coming to London and we will have to 
accommodate that requirement’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). With three Olympic venues, including 
Greenwich Park, there was no doubt that Central Greenwich’s Last Mile was to see a plethora of Olympic 
spectators. Such trading opportunities were noted by Gillie Bexton, Chief Spokesperson for Greenwich 
Hospital Estate: the sole landlord for the majority of small firms interviewed for this study, claiming that: 
‘…Everybody’s expectation throughout London with the Olympics was that trade would increase 
with the enormous number of spectators coming to London and that the entire Olympic Games 
would not only benefit the Olympiad but also benefit trade throughout London both across 
London, the West End and in the outlying areas (…) including Greenwich’ (BBC, 2012h).  
Sentiments shared by a Senior Business Engagement officer at the RBOG echoed the council’s position, in 
stating that they were ‘trying to ensure benefits for local businesses, particularly in the areas immediately 
surrounding the Olympics sites’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). This was because, according to another Senior 
Business Engagement officer for Tower Hamlets, the Olympics provided a ‘once in a generation 
opportunity to have local businesses on a world stage’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). Greenwich’s position was 
reflected in the type of advice purveyed to local firms, which sought to advise them on how to effectively 
leverage optimum conditions for capitalising on Olympic trade opportunities. Small firms interviewed 
consolidated this view, claiming that there were ‘multiple letters and meetings to inform us of expected 
footfall, and how to expect an increase in customer footfall’ (Interviewee #39 (SG1)), and others stressing 
that ‘we were told [by the council] you couldn’t cope with all these thousands of people that are going to 
be walking past your shop’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). One small firm went on to say: 
‘We had months of newspapers that it was going to be the best thing since sliced bread, your profits 
are going to go through the roof and you don't need to put your prices up, you'll be all right’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
Respondents alluded to several other ‘hyping’ mechanisms, including wider media rhetoric, news stories, 
and documentation released from the local council urging local business to prepare for a wave of challenges 
and opportunities from the Games, despite the obvious disruptions to business operations (e.g. deliveries, 
staffing etc., as discussed in further depth later). This prevailing narrative was captured by a key gatekeeper 
respondent for the research: 
‘Let's [Greenwich community] not overlook the amazing opportunity and hang onto your hats if 
you want to go faster sort of thing. So that was a strong message that was being propagated [by the 
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council at official meetings], so, yes, we're aware of all of the troubles and, yeah, we're probably 
going to have road closures, and we're probably going to have this and impacts here, there and 
everywhere. But, regardless of all of that, we're all going to make a lot of money’ (Interviewee #24 
(SG1)).   
In light of the opportunity rhetoric, it is unsurprising that interviewees – across all SGs – believed the 
Games was going to significantly boost tourism and trade. Policy perspectives claimed that ‘local businesses 
expected a killing’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)), with most small firms claiming that they ‘expected to do well’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)) and ‘had massively high expectations’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)), often referring 
back to key policy rhetoric highlighting that: ‘they [project actors] often promised in one of the things that 
won us the bid, was [Lord] Coe saying it would benefit you [local communities]’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). 
The idea that the Games would benefit hosting (and broader) East London communities, who were likely 
to be impacted hardest by the Games coming to town, was the prevailing view, as established above. Claims 
by the Head of Olympic Legacy at the DCMS agreed with this, claiming that the Games: ‘ought to be, 
generally, for most people a good thing and an opportunity that businesses could prosper from’ 
(Interviewee #2 (SG4)).  
Repeatedly highlighted across a series of media interviews with small firms during the Games, across both 
Greenwich and other Olympic boroughs and HEZs, businesses emphasised their tourism expectations 
claiming: ‘we had huge hopes for the Olympics’ (BBC, 2012g [Central Greenwich market trader]); ‘we were 
hoping that we were going to literally make a lot of money (…) it is the Olympics and I just think it’s a time 
for everyone to try and earn more money out of it instead of the big boys’ (BBC, 2012g [Central Greenwich 
market trader]). The prevailing narrative, indicated by a significant number of cross-stakeholder 
perspectives, was a ‘bonanza’ for the small firms of Central Greenwich– and they were pumped to prosper 
through a series of ‘hyping’ mechanisms. The hype helped to provide legitimisation rhetoric and unite host 
communities together toward a positive Olympic project, small businesses positive of the benefits that were 
to come… 
‘We were really positive. We were looking forward to it, we even opened until late because we have 
realized that people will come at certain time, as the scheduled, we’ve talked to all Greenwich 
council about making the place vibrant and cleaned (…) – but we were really positive – really 
looking forward to it!’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
As explored in the closing ‘legacy’ section 4.7 of this chapter, the promise of short-term tourism benefits 
was simultaneously matched by a longer-term tourism ‘legacy’ focus. This formed a major ambition for 
London 2012, and was illustrated by the five government policy promises and the ‘This is GREAT’ 
campaign discussed earlier in section 2.3.4. With predicted tourism benefits to the visitor economy 
amounting to approximately £2 billion in terms of both short-term tourism boost and respective longer-
term image enhancement (ETOA, 2005: 4), aided by ‘enhanced image exposure’ (PWC, 2004: 18), the aim 
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was to ‘radically improve London’s image (…) and establish the East End as a key destination in the tourism 
economy of London’ (DCMS, 2007: 6). Longer-term, legacy issues are unpacked across section 4.7.  
4.2.2 Legacy Rhetoric 
One must also consider the contextual dynamics at play within London 2012. Identified by a systematic 
policy document analysis, it is important to note that the Games were delivered under the umbrella of what 
the literature identifies as a major regeneration programme for the host boroughs – including Greenwich. 
Regeneration was firmly emphasised throughout the evolution of policy promises (DCMS, 2008a, 2008b, 
UK Government, 2013), forming the ‘core of the legacy promises initially made in the London 2012 bid’ 
(House of Lords, 2013: 4). The use of socio-economic deprivation statistics situating several East London 
boroughs in the top 10% of deprived areas (e.g. Government Office for London, 2007) was a key strategy 
in securing the London 2012 bid (e.g. Institute for Government, 2013). As alluded to in section , findings 
from the policy document analysis reveal how juxtapositions between dystopic post-industrial East London 
spaces and the promise of utopian ‘legacies’ appeared to provide a justified and powerful legitimisation 
rhetoric to intervene across official Olympic host boroughs. A new ‘paradise’ was promised - an urban 
quarter, and a place of community and ‘national pride’ (ODA, 2007: 7) uniting communities against the 
enemy of deprivation.  London’s bid leveraged this problematic well, underpinning the London 2012 bid 
with a ‘Convergence’ strategy – and operationalising through the ‘Strategic Regeneration Framework’ (SRF), 
as highlighted earlier in the review (2.3.2). As identified by Smith (2012) and Raco and Tunney (2010) these 
visions are often difficult to resist and argue against, often forming a common tactic for pushing through 
such projects.  
The evidence collected so far suggests that East London, its communities and, in several cases, their small 
businesses, indicate the imperative for achieving positive, local legacies for host communities most affected 
by the Games. This is further echoed by a major House of Lords (2013) legacy report claiming that: ‘it is 
the local people who should stand to gain most from the Games (…) it is for this reason that the 
regeneration of East London was a major plank in the promised legacy’ (2013: 7). As argued in the review, 
event-policy provides exceptional opportunities for change – but what kind of change does this form of 
cataclysmic urban planning bring, who are the likely beneficiaries, and what about small firms? This thesis 
continues to reflect, implicitly and explicitly, up on this question.  
4.2.3 Legacy Critiqued 
In order to inform critical debate, we must consider the barriers that host communities, and specifically 
small firms, may face in light of the significant promises of positive short-term impacts and legacies. As 
identified earlier, DCMS (2008b) claimed that the Games was ‘an opportunity for everyone (…) where 
legacy plans reflect this aim by ensuring they are open to as diverse range of people as people and 
communities as possible’ (…) where local people, businesses and the third sector organisations will have a 
real input in to the plans at every step (…) as we [DCMS] recognise that local people could feel excluded 
as the regeneration and construction work changes the environment around them’ (DCMS, 2008b: 37). In 
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light of this, critical narratives from academic and practitioner perspectives have continued to emerge 
around the exclusionary nature of mega-event planning as illustrated earlier in the review. For example, 
Professor Ward, a Senior Planner for the London 2012 Games, claimed that ‘localism was lost’ (Ward, 
2013), sentiments echoed by several authors arguing that there is often a ‘lack of humanism present in the 
planning and delivery of regeneration strategies’ (Sorenson, 2013). Such issues were raised across this thesis, 
based on empirical and secondary evidence, including Edwards (2013) who claimed that, generally and in 
the context of London 2012: ‘the people side of regeneration seems to get lost, often a tendency to forget 
about community perspective, often ‘displacing’ and ‘erasing’ (…) often starting with what should be done 
with the ‘physical’ space rather than people – which many would agree – should be the other way around 
(…) about legacy improving the lives of people, not just the structures’. These critical concerns were echoed 
repeatedly, including by the Chair of the London Forum for LOCOG, a body responsible for cross-host 
borough community consultation, highlighting that: 
‘The major mistake, in my view, was that they simply ignored local communities living around 
them (…) I guess the question for them is, would they be ignored in this process or would they be 
listened to and, if so, how would they be listened to? (…)  Engage them in the ways that they saw 
as being appropriate, but also ensuring that at all steps along the way, they got feedback to what 
they were doing. (…) Now, that happened - I was much more still aware and in control of that 
during the bid phase, particularly working with the boroughs, which I did. I mean, I started that 
work off and continued to be involved in it, really, until the bid was won. When after that it was 
just after that everything expanded and in the end became out of control’ (Interviewee #6 (SG4)). 
Critically speaking, although the inclusion of communities of small organisations is frequently encouraged 
at bidding stages, the concern is that low-order stakeholders are excluded, de-politicised and marginalised 
once the project becomes ‘real’ (e.g. Gilmore, 2014; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016)). Such shifts, as found 
through the research findings, lead to an emergent dichotomy between ‘rhetoric’ vs. ‘reality’ – a major issue 
for Central Greenwich and considered throughout this, and proceeding chapters. The accumulation of 
negatives, challenges, and dichotomies in this sense, identified theoretically and across this and previous 
case study analysis, serve as a valuable on-going contribution around host community exclusion, and as 
highlighted in the reflections (section 3.8) a moral driving force, and ethical-critical standpoint for the thesis. 
4.3 Realities of Host Community and Small Firm Exclusion 
4.3.1 Olympic ‘Acceleration’  
The review earlier noted that mega-events help catalyse policy objectives based on a multitude of reasons. 
And it was highlighted by the systematic policy document analysis of this research that ambitions for urban 
‘acceleration’ and change (House of Lords, 2013) formed a major hoped-for ‘legacy’ of the London 2012 
Games (see DCMS, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2012a and 2012b). Identified across the policy discourse of the 
London 2012 Games, this was amplified repeatedly:  
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‘…with the London 2012 Games [is] a unique catalyst, [of] existing objectives across a broad range 
of government and local activity can be achieved more quickly or effectively’ (DCMS, 2008b: 5);   
‘…the London 2012 Games have definitely served as a catalyst for development and 
improvements, both tangible and intangible, which would have otherwise taken decades to achieve’ 
according to IOC President Jacques Rogge in (UK Government, 2013: 7) and; 
 ‘…a neglected and run-down part of our capital city has been transformed, with London 2012 
providing the spur for a huge regeneration project that would have otherwise taken decades’ 
(DCMS, 2012b: 6).  
Although speeding up the rate of development naturalised as an obvious justification for intervention 
centred around ‘improving lives’, ‘enhancing communities’, ridding spaces of ‘socio-economic deprivation’ 
and ‘criminality’; the risks posed for existing communities can be significant and negative, as well as positive. 
Their highly speculative nature, can give rise to projects attributed to ‘economic gambles’ (e.g. Zimblist, 
2015), and indicative of what Harvey (1989a) pejoratively refers to as ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of governance. 
Critical reflections here can be found in section 2.5, preluding and following negative host community 
impacts and exclusions found across the primary and secondary evidence of this thesis.  
4.3.2 The Olympic Satellite  
Although the London Development Agency (LDA, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) placed considerable emphasis in 
their literature on obligations around community negotiation, the major challenge identified by this research 
is that major aspects of Games delivery, both generally and specifically at the Central Greenwich level, were 
presented as ‘non-negotiable’.  
In light of this, and established rhetoric vs. reality concerns, the findings reveal a series of ways in which 
host small firms felt ‘locked-out’, poorly consulted, excluded and marginalised from major aspects of 
Olympic planning and delivery. Respondents referred to the Games as an ‘autocratic’, ‘top-down’ project. 
Several described the Games’ character and effect as an ‘alien’ entity, ‘force-field’, ‘satellite’ and the ‘Games 
machine’, symbolising their belief that the Games manifested as a series of undemocratic practices. This 
prevailed as a key local narrative as the Olympics efficiently captured local territory. Small firms felt that 
London 2012 was a hostile takeover with little consideration for the day-to-day use of local space, and the 
very socio-economic practices and qualitative dependencies that occur within close-knit community 
networks. This was detailed as a major cause for concern in the earlier review (section 2.3). In response to 
whether small firms could have been better consulted with, one respondent claimed: ‘no, I don’t think they 
are capable of it, I don’t believe that they are capable. I don’t believe, actually they care about engaging local 
business – that’s not their agenda’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). Furthermore, one small firm exclaimed: 
‘It was a matter of people coming in and posing and not taking into consideration the local. It was 
the way it was done, we will be coming to Greenwich Park you can't do anything about it. If there 
would have been more engagement in the first place, we possibly could have… I do know... It 
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could have diffused the situation - from the Olympics to the locals’ point of view we got told by 
the local council, and the council got told by LOCOG. Hang on why were they all told, where was 
the consultation? You're coming into the area and messing us up, what are we getting out of it?’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
These feelings were echoed repeatedly, with another small firm exclaiming: 
‘How can you [the Council] engage with the community when you don’t know your community? 
You can send people around with clipboards but sorry you have to be here. And the only people 
who know what is going on are shopkeepers and the public People who talk to people every day, 
I’m like a doctor, because people come here and tell me stories (Interviewee #38 (SG1)) 
Interviewees clearly felt disenfranchised, and the data quickly saturated here illustrating shared opinion 
across the majority of small firms, and a significant number of senior stakeholders cross-SGs too. Small 
firms stressed their interests were superseded by the Games ‘project’ objectives, highlighting that ‘they 
blocked everything for us – made it as hard as possible – they didn’t even discuss with us basically, they 
came in and just said this is the way it was going to happen – they just took charge!’ (Interviewee #34 
(SG1)). Others strongly disagreed that any useful and legitimate support was given to help business through 
what was a challenging and disruptive trading period: ‘no, they [the council] didn’t support us at all before 
the Games, they didn’t done nothing for us – I strongly disagree! (…) they haven’t done nothing for us – 
they didn’t come and listen to us at all! – no, it was not good at all’ (Interviewee #32 (SG1)). Further 
narratives revealed the anguish and severe anger brewing even after the Games, and thus provided more 
candid, and strident responses claiming that ‘these people come in, they take what they want and then they 
leave, they want the next project (…) yes, it’s mega-events, and it’s the stuff. They are self-contained 
satellites that land inside your environment and they basically have a force-field around them’ (Interviewee 
#37 (SG1)). The pejorative stridency of host community discourse found across SG responses serves to 
amplify a stakeholder narrative not fully realised in the literature. This serves to justify the research 
objectives this study, and support contributions to knowledge.  
Permeating throughout the entire qualitative analysis and findings, references to science fiction, totalitarian 
regimes, and war-time and militarised host community shock illuminate the severity of perceived Olympic 
control, as illustrated by one respondent: 
‘Yes it landed, absorbed the resources – it’s like one of those sci-fi movies where aliens come in 
and suck up the whole water from the oceans and then fly off.  They are an alien beast. They don’t 
interact, it was as Columbus, and the fucking conquistadors, turning up on the beaches in South 
America and they went in with their great tone of religion to convert already a civilised nation, 
screwed them all over, and left them a disease… took the riches wherever the IOC are…’ 
(Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
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4.3.3 Displacement and Disruption  
Concerns around direct displacement, and indirect disruptions to host communities and small business 
operations, emerged as dominant themes of this research. They also serve to build on prior case study 
analysis as found in review section 2.3.3. Although physical displacement was not strictly a concern for 
Central Greenwich businesses, the findings suggested it was continuing and pertinent issue across other 
host sites for small businesses. According to Raco and Tunney (2010) and a senior councillor this amounted 
to ‘moving 350 businesses and finding them new locations (…) controlled 350 businesses who were at the 
epicentre of the Olympic Park and didn’t have a choice (…) so the consultation exercise, if we were brutally 
frank, they were going one way or another’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). Various other senior stakeholders 
further claimed ‘displacement, yes will certainly disturb close to the main construction work’ (Interviewee 
#2 (SG4)), and ‘yes there can be significant displacement effects. There are clear business risks aren’t they, 
and you cannot have a Games where people are not displaced, you cannot do it (…) you’ve got to look at 
the balance here, there is going to be impact on some people, whereas other people will gain significantly’ 
(Interviewee #7 (SG4)). The challenge of uneven economic developmental benefits is a major concern, and 
one that indicates that mega-events have the legislative power to decide who is included and who is not. 
Legacy discussions and reflections outlined in section 4.7 illuminate such economic challenges for small 
businesses with respect to the consequential issues of event-policy and its makers engaging in what can only 
be considered cataclysmic modes of ‘creative destruction’ under the guise of the importance of urban 
renewal and regeneration. Alongside disruptive noise and pollution, respondents for this study claimed that 
‘with respect to displacement, we need to give this a critical eye, but is certainly a necessary effect of hosting 
a Games in such an area’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)). Another stated: ‘pre-existing business who will be affected 
in different ways by the Olympics. Some, to be honest, will be displaced or their work will be disrupted 
because of the issues with struggling traffic, or the dislocation caused by Olympic events; and they may, or 
may not be able to recover’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)).  
 
With respect to other forms of business disruption, several small firms claimed that ‘deliveries were a 
catastrophe for a lot of people, completely unable to get a lot of stuff for weeks before and weeks after (…) 
the period and gap between the Olympic and Paralympics was particularly annoying where lots of stuff was 
shut down for no reason!’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)). Small firms claiming:  
 
‘Delivery suppliers that were delivering to shops and stuff, they would freak out and go, 'Well, we're 
not coming to deliver to you, you can't get down there, it's all chock-a-block and there's no, we 
can't go down there and we can tell…’ It was hilarious, because the reality was everybody got so 
freaked out about all of this that nobody was coming down, and literally there was no traffic at all! 
(…) They (local businesses) were suffering at the time with really the road system, and how the 
road system had changed. So where they were normally getting wine deliveries and things like that, 
their suppliers were saying sort of we're not delivering to you. So then they were having to facilitate 
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doing drops and picking up stock, and there was… I seem to remember he gave me comments at 
the time which were different to my issues’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
Congestion, trouble with deliveries, and other forms of local disruptions clearly emerged as a key theme – 
specifically in the build-up and during the Games. This was indicated by small firms and several other SGs 
as a key issue, not just in Central Greenwich but also in other Olympic Boroughs and HEZs. From small 
firms to a senior legacy manager at DCMS claimed: ‘I can imagine that in the years leading up – traffic noise 
etc. could have been an issue, and I know it was for certain parts of the community and I’m sure that was 
a hassle for people’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). Support documentation provided by Olympic Borough 
business engagement officers also clarified the intense disruption to congestion, disruption and 
advertising/trading restrictions, potentially hampering local business operations. It is unsurprising to see 
the findings here also allude to these challenging operational effects. Businesses claimed they had to hire 
‘extra staff and businesses hoped that it was going to be busy and told to get extra stock but you can only 
have your deliveries at different times of the day’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)) but found that delivery suppliers 
were reluctant to deliver to Central Greenwich through fear of traffic congestion (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
Restrictions across Olympic routes also meant that businesses could only have deliveries during unsociable 
hours. One small firm reflected on the specific effect of this claiming: ‘we had come to the restaurant at 
three o'clock in the morning (…) they [Greenwich Council] made it as difficult to deliver, we couldn't 
deliver before one o'clock in the morning, they could only be collected after one o'clock in the morning’ 
(Interviewee #34 (SG1)). This was echoed repeatedly, with another claiming: ‘it was the planning for 
deliveries would meant I spent time liaising with staff and making deliveries into the middle of the night. 
Annoying delivery was ice cream, it's not like you can put it on the steps, it will melt. It was that in terms 
of how it impacted on how the businesses run. Also working with the various agencies, we had to put in a 
waste plan, a delivery plan’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Whilst disruption is an inevitability of such projects, 
which small firms appeared to understand and appreciate, the challenges that this posed to their operations 
formed one of many disruptions that made operating in HEZs for small businesses a major challenge. This 
was also reflected on briefly by Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) and Osmond’s (2002) analysis in the 
context of the Sydney 2000 Games. Several host borough council business engagement officers validated 
such problematic, for example one highlighting below that: 
‘5 weeks before the Games started road works in Trafalgar Road disrupting our evening economy 
(…) business became notably poor the Tuesday before the Games started when traffic restrictions 
were introduced (…) Then the phasing of the lights on the ORN kicked in and caused serious 
congestion around East Greenwich which meant traffic tried to avoid the area (…) when they 
started monkeying around with the local road systems, suppliers were not willing to deliver to the 
area which then added to business costs having to collect their goods (…) the wrong business 
parking permits were issued by LOCOG/council. In addition, the council put pay and display signs 
in some places that should have been free parking, including extended parking restrictions stopped 
the usual ‘after work’ trade’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
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And several other small firms candidly made their point clear with respect to the operational disruption: 
‘They made it as difficult as they could for us – with the rubbish, what time to deliveries, allocating 
deliveries early in the morning for us – they blocked everything for us – made it as hard as possible 
– they didn’t even discuss with us basically, they came in and just said this is the way it was going 
to happen – they just took charge!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
‘They [Greenwich Council] gave us packs about what to do and they came and saw my staff and 
told them about how they would not be able to get on the DLR and they have to do alternate this, 
alternate that and problems with delivery, we had come to the restaurant at three o'clock in the 
morning (…) They made it as difficult to deliver, we couldn't deliver before one o'clock in the 
morning, they could only be collected after one o'clock in the morning’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)). 
‘Before the Games the closing of the road network and road works were very disruptive (…) during 
the Games it was difficulty with loading and challenge to buy stock – and of course the barriers 
and the roads – all of that made a big difference’ (Interviewee #35 (SG1)). 
4.3.4 Limited Two-Way Dialogue 
The review earlier illustrated that meso-level actors, like the local-host borough authorities interviewed for 
this research, often play a vital role in stitching and connecting project territory with context territory – a 
buffer and mediating actor between ‘project’ demands and ‘local demands’. See section 2.5.4 for further 
detail here. 
Empirical data of this study reveals that the seamless integration between the two forced, emerge in 
opposition and contestation. Local authorities themselves emerge ‘hand-tied’, with limited autonomy to 
steer and push back the regime of standard Olympic planning. The determining force of the Games was 
thus highlighted as being forced upon these meso-level actors. Whilst deemed instrument in localising 
aspects of delivery, and protecting local interests, empirical evidence suggests that their role appeared to be 
restricted to simply ‘serving notices’, ‘informing’ and ‘enforcing’ regulations and plans, as opposed to 
facilitating any form of meaningful two-way dialogue between the ‘context’ territory (e.g. the existing socio-
economics of Central Greenwich) and ‘project’ territory (e.g. Games project requirements). This was 
indicated by almost all SGs, inclusive of local authorities and small firms in the thick of it themselves. For 
example, one small firm claimed that ‘the Council I think was a bit fooled as well - their take will be ‘we’re 
a victim of this as much as you are…our hands were tied with LOCOG’s restrictions and requirements’’ 
(Interviewee #24 (SG1)).  This rather ironically contrasts earlier rhetoric of community and cross-
stakeholder inclusion, as alluded to earlier.  
Following on from this point, a BBC (2011a, 2001b) pre-Games report echoed such reflections, with small 
firms claiming that ‘Games organisers were not taking the concerns of local people and businesses seriously 
as they drew up their plans’. Interestingly, interviewees tried to rationalise this position, sometimes directly 
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blaming overarching project organisations like LOCOG, and even the IOC, as the ‘nasties’ in between, with 
one claiming:  
‘They weren’t allowed to [councils to have any autonomy]. LOCOG were the nasties in between. 
But the IOC got off spotlessly, but the local Council get away with it – and LOCOG are the beast 
in between the delivery plan from the top – and the councils are a marionette’ (Interviewee #38 
(SG1)). 
 
The limited capacity of the Games to establish and champion the needs, stunting opportunities for small 
firms to feed in local viewpoints and influence Olympic planning was a dominant theme of this research. 
Small business communities, particularly across Central Greenwich thus emerged marginalised and 
vulnerable stakeholders. Head of Policy for the FSB, echoed these concerns claiming: ‘…I think they [the 
councils] were more like ourselves, there to kind of inform and not to state new policies, inform their 
stakeholders of what was coming out of the TFL’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). Small firms agreed, claiming: 
‘everything seemed ‘top-down’ with any consultation, seeming more about letting people vent, rather than 
about listening. Most consultation was simply telling us what was going to happen to transport and Games 
regulations - as far as the people telling us knew … which wasn’t always a lot!’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)).  
Across all stakeholder groups, but especially small firms, although several credited the council’s engagement 
with the locale their overarching belief was that community concerns and opposing narratives were either 
silenced or ignored. Thus, consultative exercises with small firms and the host community represented 
modes of ‘manufactured consent’ (e.g. Cashman, 2002) as discussed earlier in the review. Small firms 
claimed: ‘there were several meetings we attended but the concerns of many people were not taken on 
board – I don’t expect too much from the local council, I don’t know what they do’ (Interviewee #42 
(SG1)), as well as that the council ‘came to talk to us’ but did not incorporate concerns into local plans. 
Others simply claimed that ‘consultation seemed to be so off’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)) and, when asked 
whether their small firm view was taken into consideration, a frequent response was ‘not at all!’ (Interviewee 
#35 (SG1)). Time and time again, these concerns were reflected in the data, with one small firm claiming: 
‘I strongly disagree; the council did not help us at all. They were not for us, they were all for big 
corporates – we were completely pushed aside and the council made that obvious [during the 
Games] as well (…) they [the council] are not very good [at supporting small firms] I am afraid – 
not with local businesses anyway – they prefer the big companies, they are pushing the big 
companies in here (…) they do not support you at all, we don’t get an inch of help at all’ 
(Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
The idea that small firm exclusion was the direct consequence of overtly favouring official sponsors and 
corporations (earlier described as ‘deep sponsorship’) was a dominant criticism candidly expressed by small 
firms interviewed but also explicitly recognised across the majority of SG. This was recognised earlier in 
the review, and will be detailed in further empirical depth in shortly on in section 2.5. 
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Several firms not only recognised limited engagement in the planning of the Games but also noted that no 
one was around when problems arose during the live event phases. Several respondents raised this as a 
major bone of contention in the locale, and the House of Lords (2013) explicitly criticized Games 
management, claiming that the Olympic governance for London 2012 involved a bewildering number of 
stakeholder organisations and a cacophony of conflicting voices. Although the complexity of governance 
emerged as a major sticking point for good Games communication, several respondents believed that the 
very people who should have been on the front line, supporting and solving immediate local problems, 
were absent. One frustrated small retailer claimed: 
‘I tell you what the local government, ministers, town centre managers, all disappeared – they were 
all over there – sipping champagne – when we had a problem with that, we couldn’t find anyone, 
absolutely couldn’t find any local representative – they were all over there pressing the flesh, 
avoiding the people who pay for the taxes (…) They [council officials] hid. They didn’t, they just 
hid. Greenwich Council, when the tourists come here – they hid, they left here, they are too busy, 
celebrity spotting and getting their pictures taken in the paper. It’s a political tool for them ‘oh we 
are here with Prince Charles (…) oh we are here with the Olympic committee’. I know that one of 
town’s managers never going out of that site in the whole period of time’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
Several other small firms emphasised these concerns: 
‘It was too big and dealt with from somewhere else. They could have set up a localised office 
covering the three Olympic sites – we may have more of a localised impact and someone to speak 
to – instead you were told to speak to LOCOG!’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
What we can derive from this is the concern that mega-event planning happens on local people, as opposed 
to with local people, despite local actors, pressure groups and organisations (e.g. the Blackheath Society - 
who were not interviewed for this study) opposing, for example, the decision to transform Greenwich Park 
into an official event zone for the equestrian events (see Smith, 2013 for further detail). This reflects what 
will later be described as Zizek’s (2008) concern over ‘permissions’ and ‘rights’ afforded in power relationships 
and decision making. It was therefore unsurprising that several senior stakeholders, including councillors 
and civil servants of the Mayor’s London Assembly, agreed that ‘there should have been a space for more 
local engagement’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)) ‘and the thing with mega-events is that they occur to you, not 
really with you (…) where in the run up to the Games that macro agenda is forced up on business’ 
(Interviewee #20 (SG2)). The same respondent further commented that ‘at that stage [pre-Games planning 
and delivery] business and residents, to an extent, are way down the pecking order in terms of how they 
feel they are in engaged in what is no longer, really, a democratic process’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)), and 
that in the context of Central Greenwich, a Senior Business Engagement officer clarified that project 
striation is so intense that ‘as a local authority there is not much you can do about it (…) that is the story 
throughout the Games’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). In light of this, it is unsurprising to find a series of candid 
responses littered across the empirical data, including one angry small firm owner exclaiming: 
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‘When does social planning go out the f*cking door, because this tic arrives called the Olympic 
committee – we want this, we want this, we want this (…) all those projects have been sitting in a 
queue waiting to happen, waiting to the impetus to happen, waiting for the political winds to 
change. If they hadn’t re-developed Stratford, since the Germans bombed, what the f*ck, why was 
it suddenly a priority because the Olympics turned up?’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
With such limited leeway for change; consultation and responding to local needs is squashed by the 
determining force of Olympic planning. This concern forms the overarching viewpoint of this thesis: that 
so many aspects of Games practice represented modes of undemocratic, unfair and unethical practice. One 
local activist and small firm owner captured this concern well, exclaiming ‘how can that [unnegotiable 
practices especially with reference to the closure of Greenwich Park] happen (…) why weren’t they swinging 
from the yardarm the next morning? (…) In all those places (for example, universities where they previously 
worked) if you did something you required a mandate, and if you didn’t have one and you did it, you got 
slung out. That doesn’t happen here’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Interviews with key stakeholders in the host 
borough councils revealed that overarching organisations like the IOC themselves, but also city-wide 
organisations including the Greater London Authority (GLA), LOCOG, the Olympic Delivery Authority 
(ODA) et cetera, left many facets of Olympic planning unclear and poorly communicated to the councils. 
Such concerns typify the linear dialogues enforced through legislatively inscribed IOC and Host City 
Contractual demands (see UK Government, 2006 - London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Act 2006), as 
discussed further across this and proceeding chapters. The immovability, inflexibility, and stridency of 
Olympic project planning and Games regulation was reflected on – and encapsulated by - one senior 
business engagement officer at Newham Council who claimed:  
 ‘So when I was having conversations with businesses in the run up to the games, they were asking 
me what was going on and I, as a representative of the local authority, of the host local authority, 
couldn't tell them, because the local authority hadn't been told, as yet, by central government, 
because central government was still negotiating with this super organisation (…) I think it depends 
on what that mega event is that really determines whether businesses are consulted with, or I would 
say consulted to. Something like the Olympic Games, even Newham Council has very little 
practical leeway over how it could change things, because it was actually government being told in 
itself what needed to be done; they were told that this was going to be a success. If you take 
something like London you can have the GLA above Newham, so at that stage businesses and 
residents, to an extent, are way down the pecking order in terms of how they can feel engaged in 
what is no longer, really, a democratic process’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)).  
Simply speaking, empirical evidence suggests a conflict between ‘what the project wants’ and ‘what local 
people want’, and a concern that event-policy favours the spectacular rather than the ‘less visible’ 
neighbourhoods of host communities. Delivering a ‘good event’ aimed at appeasing the more macro, 
national economic and social agenda was often prioritised which, according to one MP and Shadow 
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Minister, means ‘local stakeholders are much less visible in such [mega] projects – this is a core problem 
with big projects – you cannot always consult with everyone’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)), thus making it ‘very 
difficult for a small business to get its point across to government (…) there is no way you can consult with 
businesses along that route [Last Mile]’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). The search for utilitarian goals, as 
discussed further later on in the thesis, thus creates a scenario whereby host spaces are efficiently turned 
into spaces of capital accumulation for networked, economic and political elites - over-riding the interests 
of local stakeholders residing in low priority and spaces less economically vibrant and contributory to 
London’s regional development (e.g. Raco and Tunney, 2010).  
Findings here, and across the thesis so far, illustrate the powerlessness and vulnerability of smaller, hosting 
actors – of whom were barely given a part on the grand stage of the London 2012 Games. Their limited 
capacity to thrive, and, survive, across the disrupted environments mega-events induce, specifically across 
HEZs, but also city-wide. The pejorative nature of the Games was candidly reflected on by one vexed small 
firm experience, exclaiming:  
‘They are self-contained satellites that land inside your environment and they basically have a force-
field around them and unless you’ve got a huge corporate key to get through vast funds I mean, I 
have lived here 10-15 years, I couldn’t get the ticket to any other events, nothing, you are totally 
excluded. Even in summer there are test events and you couldn’t get into them. We have paid 
thousands of pounds for the rates and everything here of living here, and they just walk away and 
buggered us’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
4.3.5 Local Interest in Planning? 
An issue, initially thought to be a side-note, but in fact emerges as an important issue for future research, is 
the extent to which small firms even wish to engage in pre-Games planning dialogue, and, pro-actively seek 
leveragable opportunities. It is important to note to the reader(s) of this thesis that this point, written in the 
final moments before PhD submission, emerges under-explored in the context of the research but a 
pertinent one to ask. The reasons for this is clear. On reflection of the totality of this thesis, the difference 
between positive small firm experiences [and not] may well be determined by the individual/organisation(s) 
capacity to pro-actively seize event related opportunities and strategically, and effectively, leverage the event 
proposition. This pertinent point was raised by one business engagement officer, claiming that the extent 
of local consultation: 
‘Presupposes that small, local businesses would want to get involved in the organisation and 
management of events, and surrounding development anyway. It has a lot to do with how far in 
general, how far smaller businesses are involved in the economic life of an area.  (…) Apart from 
running the businesses they do, I’m not aware of a huge groundswell of opinion in the borough 
saying ‘for goodness sake, why weren’t we involved in the organisation and management of events 
and the organisation and management or something now on the Olympic side’ (…) they tend to 
just complain when something is badly wrong and say ‘no one asked us’  - but that is rather different 
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from saying, people say, ‘well, we obviously want to really get involved in economic development 
and big public development works, and so on happening in our locality from the start’ (Interviewee 
#21 (SG2)).  
It is worth considering, in light of these issue, of pro-activity, and, reactivity, on the part of small firms, and 
the polarised argument that local authorities and project organisations provided (or did not effectively 
enough) business support – the extent to which small firms were left determined by the project and unable 
to effectively leverage. And, or, whether they were the victim of their own poor strategic and operation 
capability to pro-actively seize event related opportunities. The latter argument, aligns closely with the 
reflections of one interviewee from the House of Lords who claimed that: ‘there is a default whinge position 
[among local businesses], and that is so much so that people don’t even recognise some of the things that 
have happened’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). It is however important to note that by no means this PhD 
attempts to answer this complex question. However, several interviewees mentioned the lack of desire, 
and/or inability for businesses to engage with effective planning; reflected by the Chair of a local Greenwich 
chamber who highlighted that: ‘a lot of people, if they went to the public consultation meeting, would have 
found out a lot more fact than fiction, but of course, only a small amount of people actively go along to 
these things and gain the information’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). As illustrated in the Conclusions and 
Recommendations of this thesis, the section outlines that this question is of critical importance for future 
academic study - one which is under empirical investigation by the author for Rio 2016 Games.  
4.3.6 Local Business Support Mechanisms 
Despite the aforementioned challenges of limited local inclusivity and consultation, top down approaches 
and limited local capacity to change striated spaces of project control, the data identifies varying ways in 
which both project and council supported local small business during the Games. A matrix coding analysis 
reveals that some of the senior business engagement officers believe there were opportunities for businesses 
to comment on elements of the project, and to take advantage of local support workshops to develop 
expertise in, e.g., bidding for contracts, marketing yourself through the Games, how to function internally 
with delivery and staffing issues, and even how to successfully prepare and capitalise for a large event 
visitation. The types of focus and activities led by local authorities, were reflected on, several claiming: 
‘The job was two-fold really (…) to ensure that regulations did not have an impact on businesses. 
And then to finally ensure that businesses were finally aware of those changes in terms of road 
networks, delivery times etc. To make sure they were aware and mitigated those impacts. So it was 
to minimise the impact of any change around trade, parking, transportation. And secondly it was 
the requirement to make sure businesses, where possible, could capitalise on the opportunities 
brought by the Olympics’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)).  
‘We held meetings, four meetings for businesses, about the effects of the Games, about delivery 
times, restrictions and all the rest of it. These were reasonably well attended, but they didn’t catch 
fire, you know’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). 
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Information packs, alongside local briefing sessions outlining key impacts and changes happening across 
Greenwich, played a major part in local communication according to one local councillor (Interviewee #19 
(SG2)). Details on transport arrangements and local logistical issues were also disseminated according to 
another interviewee: ‘local leaders were having meetings with LOCOG about Greenwich Park, how road 
closures were going to happen (…) and those in charge of the venues who were saying typically what would 
happen with visitor flows’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). In addition, the interviewee mentioned that they were 
partaking in ‘exploratory’ meetings, helping them to ‘strategise’ and solve local problems, and several 
business engagement officers referred to a series of localised business support initiatives, outlined below: 
‘25 workshops, throughout the borough in the evenings and weekends, during the daytime - some 
were even all-day events where we would e-mail businesses, did leaflet drops, and there were 25 of 
those prior to the games. And businesses were invited to see them and speak to transport, waste 
removal specialists, all those various departments, and the partners involved in servicing businesses 
- and businesses were invited to comment. These comments were collated and fed back into the 
final proposals. Obviously prior to the games we produced an information pack, around waste and 
transportation, and trade regulations, delivery times. And every business within the venue zones 
were briefed about the key impacts and the changes that were happening in that particular locations. 
Those briefings took place where there was an impact, businesses had a named individual [at the 
Council] responsible for resolving that’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
This may indicate a sufficient level of consultation, or, perhaps again indicates the issue of manufactured 
consent. It is however important to note that the overarching dominant view across the locale, as illustrated 
by one key gatekeeper involved in local planning and affairs, is that the project failed to communicate 
effectively, claiming: 
‘They didn’t say what would happen, but say this will probably happen – which doesn’t put you in 
the right place to deal with the potential (…) but this is really the whole point, the Games did not 
engage in the first place. We had negativity around the bounce that we never got. Then we had the 
barriers. Then it seemed to be a fight but by that time the fight was over – it was crazy that you 
have to fight’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)).  
Furthermore, another business similarly claimed:  
‘There was lots of duplicated literature but very little of it of any practical help: no-one could even 
tell us what the traffic regulations would be outside the shop until painfully close to the start’ 
(Interviewee #28 (SG1)).     
‘There were workshops running on how to prepare your business, and they did quite a strong 
theme about that nearer the time (…) some of it was good advice like you may not be able to get 
an engineer out (…) to plan ahead [e.g. deliveries and staffing]’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)) 
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Throughout the policy document analysis, the researcher came across a multitude of business information 
booklets, and through an interview with a local business the author was given a business pack with all key 
information pertaining to preparation, regulations etc. This study thus argues that support information was 
accessible with regard to how local businesses should plan and prepare for the event. However, one cannot 
comment on to the extent to which the intellectual content of the material helped to support and prepare 
business for what could be understood as local inevitabilities and challenges bestowed up on these 
communities, particularly during Games-time. Furthermore, it is important to note the argument that 
project practices and regulations imposed (and distributed via booklets/council sessions et cetera.) before 
and during Games-time represented the locale being forced to comply with dominant project discourse. In 
response to the question of whether local councils tried to encourage small businesses to benefit from the 
Games, the FSB stated: ‘I think they were not probably on the top of the agenda, really’ (Interviewee #12 
(SG3)). This was further reflected by another respondent who claimed: 
‘Yeah, absolutely. I mean, that's - I would say that's the result regardless of whether you're engaging 
over something like the Olympics or engaging with… The public sector role in supporting 
businesses is not to read, is never really to get involved with the businesses themselves, it's more 
to enable. So it's about the networking opportunities that we can provide, the businesses themselves 
can't fund in themselves. It's about breaking down those markets - it's addressing the market 
failures, such as information to supply around contract availability, and also it's taking…it's an 
educational function. So it's all about education, so in the same way if you were a kid and didn't get 
an education, or didn't want to get involved in education, you're not going to do as well as someone 
who grabs all opportunity through all hands, and try to develop themselves, and it's the same with 
businesses. I mean, particularly this is one of the problems which has occurred with retail, and I've 
worked at.’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)) 
As indicated earlier, it was, however, clear that some of the businesses interviewed felt they did not receive 
enough support. One small business claimed: ‘I might be speaking out of turn but I can’t see that my 
borough [Greenwich], I can’t think of any one point that the borough gave us anything (…) I think there 
was some networking, joint networking but no, our own borough did very little (…) It was led by us [local 
chamber of commerce] more than anything because we tried to look after our own businesses and the local 
chambers too as well (…) our borough was not caught up in the highest regard there’ (Interviewee #16 
(SG3)). Although it was claimed by an interviewee from the London Network that networking events were 
held in ‘London House’ in central London, it is questionable to what extent local smaller businesses 
capitalised on these opportunities. The data highlights the limited networking potential here. It is, however, 
important to note that there appears to be a limited feeling of genuine small firm support across the case 
study area, whereby one high-level project actor claimed: ‘our view is that more could have been done to 
support the small businesses – pre, during and after (…) to support businesses that have been most affected 
by the lack of footfall for the Games’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). There were, however, claims by Newham 
Council of regional marketing support mechanisms for small firms before the Games to drive trade. 
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According to one councillor, ‘we [Newham Council] ran two programmes which were very very successful. 
We ran a programme called the Local Tourist. So the Local Tourist was a visitor economy programme 
whereby we took the residents in Newham and we educated them in what Newham had to offer for when 
family members came to stay. So they’d act almost like local ambassadors for the borough. So if you came 
to visit a friend in Newham, normally the traditional pattern would have been you would have gone up 
West, or gone to Lakeside, or something like that. We said that for people, and for people about the offer, 
how to act in a far more professional manner to capture a market of people who might only turn up one 
or twice but who could also spread the good word more than regular day-to-day customers. That 
programme was voted second best tourism programme in London by VisitLondon Awards. We were 
narrowly beaten by the Terracotta Army Exhibition at the British Museum (…) We were the only local 
authority to win in the entire awards – the businesses responded to it very well, and the residents – and 
London as a whole started to copy some of the ideas that we had’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). In the context 
of Central Greenwich, whilst one or two small firms appreciated the local maketing and events initiatives 
conducted by the council around Greenwich, for example one claiming that: ‘during the Games they [the 
council] did something good – they put dancers in the street which meant people stopped for tea and 
coffees’ (Interviewee #32 (SG1)) – for the most part, and according to one small firm speaking on behalf 
of the community: ‘…they [Central Greenwich businesses] felt the council provided ‘no effective way at 
all’ for preparing small firms for the Games’ (Interviewee #39 (SG1)).  
Evidence presented amplifies the rich narratives that illuminate local feelings of exclusion, whilst empirical 
detail affords further understanding of how power and control is enacted in big projects. Findings also 
illustrate the limited extent to which the locale can influence ‘project’ vs. ‘context’ demands and push back 
the all-encompassing force of Olympic territorialisation.  In light of the paradoxical positions of rhetoric 
and reality, the findings agree with the sentiments of one key respondent, the co-author of the London 
2012 bid, who claimed: ‘if one looks at the local communities there, the real challenges for them was how 
they could perceive any gain or benefit to come to them. Because if I take the Sydney example, the local 
community living around the park there felt that lots of things were being done to them, and not with them’ 
(Interviewee #6 (SG4)). This study echoes similar concerns; what really were the benefits to be attained for 
small firms in light of hosting? This has been, and will continue to be implicitly and explicitly reflected upon 
in the following sections, and proceeding chapters.  
4.3.7 Networking Opportunities 
The development of B2B networks (see O’Brien, 2006; Osmond, 2002; Work Foundation, 2010; DCMS, 
2008b; also see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016) formed the second major strand in the hoped-for business 
impact and legacies of the Olympics in general, and London 2012 specifically. Based on the success of 
Sydney’s ‘Business Club Australia’ initiative (see O’Brien, 2006), one major ambition of London 2012 was 
to enhance access to business networks and their resources, and thus help to reduce environmental 
uncertainties The range of these should ideally be facilitated through a variety of clear, strategically 
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programmed and structured events rather than messy, one-off ‘ad-hoc’ events. Such events were created 
for London 2012 as a vehicle to leverage such relationships within the global spotlight of the Games and 
to create more sustainable business outcomes (O’Brien, 2006). Initiatives included, for example, the ‘British 
Business Club’ (daily events covering series of high growth business sectors at ‘Lancaster House’, and an 
online forum to help UK and overseas business to network. Twinned alongside the ‘Global Investment 
Conference’ bringing together business leaders – see DCMS, 2012a for more detail), the ‘Springboard for 
Success’ programme developed by UKTI [programme to build contacts, including contact database for 
suppliers and buyers – see DCMS, 2012b], and ‘Beyond 2012’ [one off event for 400 London businesses to 
learn/identify practical ways of winning contracts from international sports events]. In Greenwich, RBOG 
(2012a) highlighted the ‘Royal Greenwich Business Club’, established prior to the Games for bringing 
together investors and leaders, developing contacts, contract support, business CVs, and 1-1 needs analysis 
[developed by range of collaborating actors; council, South East Enterprise, and South East Chamber of 
Commerce, host borough unit, and ELBP]. The business networking objectives for London were very 
clear, claiming: 
‘London 2012 is the perfect shop window: not just for our sporting talent, going for gold this 
summer, but for another proud Team GB - our businesses (...) with Billions watching on TV, the 
world's media in our capital city, and political and business leaders joining the spectators in 
London, this is a unique opportunity to promote the best of British’ (DCMS, 2012b: 4). 
Although the aforementioned opportunities for networking existed, the extent to which small firms 
effectively benefitted from these initiatives appears limited. One small business claimed: ‘I might be 
speaking out of turn, but I can’t see that my borough [Greenwich], I can’t think of any one point that the 
borough gave us anything (…) I think there was some networking, joint networking, but no our own 
borough did very little (…) It was led by us [local chamber of commerce] more than anything, because we 
tried to look after our own businesses and the local chambers too as well (…) our borough was not caught 
up in the highest regard there’ (Interviewee #16 (SG3)). Although it was claimed by an interviewee from 
the London Network that networking events were held in ‘London House’ in central London, it is 
questionable to what extent local smaller businesses capitalised on these opportunities. The findings 
highlight the limited networking potential for the type of small firms interviewed for this study. 
4.3.8 Olympic Supply Chains, ‘Fitness to Supply’ and Organisational Learning 
One of the major opportunities of mega-events, as purveyed across London 2012, is direct procurement 
and supply chain opportunities (House of Lords, 2013; FSB, 2013; London Assembly, 2006; DCMS, 2008b; 
Osmond, 2002; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; Cashman, 2006). Engagement with these can improve 
business skills (officially referred to as ‘fitness to supply’ for London 2012) (see Osmond, 2002; DCMS, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2012a, 2012b; Mayor of London, 2007). The DCMS (2007) claim in its pre-Games 
report ‘Our Promise for 2012’ was that to enhance fitness was to better develop business internal 
operational and bidding/contractual capability, exporting product/services to other mega-events (e.g. Rio, 
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2016 and beyond, contract opportunities annually worth £150bn – see DCMS, 2008: 61, and House of 
Lords, 2013) in order to ‘create fitter, more innovative UK companies’ (DCMS, 2007: 19). Furthermore, in 
light of ‘restoring’ the ‘UK reputation for delivering large scale projects’ the business legacy was to 
‘showcase the expertise of UK PLC (…) improve the ambition and capabilities of British businesses (…) 
and support the UK’s economic recovery by maximising trade and investment opportunities’ (DCMS, 
2012a: 12), a major ambition of UK Trade and Investment (UKTI). Such rethinking of quality management 
procedures, enhancing internal operations and systems, expanding knowledge and the capability to bid and 
secure contracts (including future domestic contracts – see ODA, 2013) formed a major hoped-for business 
legacy from London 2012, as claimed by DCMS, 2012b: 
‘[In light of the London 2012 opportunities, business should] Turn expertise they have acquired 
from working on the London 2012 Games into export capability’ (DCMS, 2010: 6) (…) ‘we need 
our companies to be winning contracts all over the world’ (UK Government, 2013: 11) (…) ‘open 
up new opportunities for British business abroad’ (DCMS, 2012a: 31) the next ‘12-18 months post-
Games’ (late 2012 – early 2014) will be critical for UK businesses to capitalise on using ‘the 
experience they can use to win business at home and abroad’ securing work on other mega-sporting 
events, ‘a fast growing sector that is creating many new opportunities’ (DCMS, 2012b: 4). 
All supply-chain Games-related opportunities were facilitated through the ‘CompeteFor’ programme (e.g. 
House of Lords, 2013; DCMS, 2012b) – an ‘online brokerage service’ giving registered businesses advanced 
notifications of contractual opportunities between buyers and suppliers (DCMS, 2008a: 61 – refers to this 
system as a ‘business dating agency’). This mechanism, according to DCMS (2008b), was developed fully 
as a direct result of the London 2012 Olympics offering ‘thousands of new contracts that UK business can 
win’ (…) providing opportunities ‘spread widely as possible – both geographically and in terms of the size 
of the companies that bid’ (DCMS, 2008: 61). In the major DCMS ‘Before, During and After’ report, the 
government claimed ‘we are opening opportunities up to small firms, social enterprises, and businesses with 
diverse ownership, as well as the large multinationals’ (DCMS, 2008b: 61), and that CompeteFor itself 
would provide one of the key legacy benefits for local businesses and SMEs, specifically in London, to help 
‘gain access to the commercial opportunities brought about by the Games (…) to learn about the range of 
local Games-related opportunities available (…) and to ‘help business to pool resources and expertise and 
bid to work on Games related opportunities, which would have otherwise been out of reach for smaller 
companies’ (Mayor of London, 2007: 11). Several respondents claimed that London’s commitment to 
opening up Games’ contracts set a major benchmark in mega-event delivery. One high-level stakeholder 
described CompeteFor as ‘a good feed that’s never been seen in many other mega-event deliveries around 
the world. London actually set the benchmark really for creating such a technology platform like 
CompeteFor’ (Interviewee #8 SG4). Afforded by the digital turn and ease of accessibility, the virtual online 
domain provided direct access to specific Games’-related contracts, allowing any business to bid and 
compete for contracts as long as it satisfied basic capability requirements and financial criteria – the 
challenge was, however, the extent to which smaller business would be muscled out by larger corporations 
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and their ability to tackle the everyday and special red tape conditions stimulated as part of Games-related 
regulation.  
The idea was that opening up such contracts was a significant achievement in itself, contracts that would 
seldom be there without the Games, and difficult to access based on previous evidence from prior mega-
event supply chain processes. One councillor claimed: ‘CompeteFor have done a lot, so people had less to 
do with the business as it did with the attitudes of the local authority and the public section – to how they 
went about procuring goods and services. It created a system which enabled multiple boroughs to put 
contracts all in one place and businesses had to register one form et cetera’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)).  
‘Olympic organisers set up CompeteFor and that was seen to be highly successful in ensuring that 
firms from across the UK were able to bid for various contracts in order to deliver to the Games’ 
(Interviewee #1 (SG4)). 
‘The Games can help to increase and sustain UK business, particularly many small firms (…) by 
encouraging more firms to consider bidding for public and private sector contracts, increasing 
tourism and overseas investment and showcasing the best of British exports to a global audience’ 
(DCMS, 2008b: 4). 
Direct Olympic supply chain opportunities were, however, not the only opportunities for engaged small 
firms. A systematic policy document analysis of London 2012, alongside empirical evidence, suggests that 
in addition to direct supply chain opportunities firms had the opportunity to improve organisational 
capabilities and skills – formally referred to as ‘fitness to supply’ – through engagement with the whole 
contractual bidding process. Through experience of bidding for contracts, such organisational learning was 
thus a key hoped-for objective of London 2012’s business legacy, a future in which UK firms were in a 
stronger position to bid for and deliver other public and private supply contracts, especially in the context 
of major events supply chains. The idea was that bidding for complex supply chains would ‘build 
procurement capacities’ and ‘help businesses grow and become better’ (Interviewee #10 SG4)). According 
to one local chamber of commerce: ‘it [London 2012] got their [local businesses] processes and systems 
fine-tuned, in place with risk assessments, with backup policies, with looking internally, very anally, at how 
they were going to be able to operate (…) and all of those issues that, actually, have moved businesses here 
along’ (Interviewee #16 (SG3)). Furthermore, Games’ rhetoric hoped that firms would have greater 
confidence and prowess to better ‘export’ their talents, products and services abroad in future (Interviewee 
#12 (SG3)). One high-level stakeholder claimed that the Games was about ‘showcasing ourselves across 
other countries, and creating ambassadors across the world really push what London can deliver and what 
UK can deliver during the games, really selling ourselves and exporting what we can produce’ (Interviewee 
#12 (SG3)). Additionally, it was about being more proactive in terms of their value and ability to reach 
wider domestic and international markets, alongside more peripheral issues like taking on apprentices and 
creating more jobs (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). According to one small firm: ‘that’s [organisational learning 
from being in the top 8 for London 2012 contracts] the legacy. That is a good legacy of how to do, to work 
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through a procurement basis (…) the Rugby World Cup 2015 is coming, and we’ll do that like a breeze (…) 
we’ll be able to supply that like a breeze. Any big event, nothing is going to faze us. So, really, we’re robust 
enough to be able to take any of it’ (Interviewee #36 (SG1)). Afforded by perspectives gathered across 
London, as well as Greenwich, such concerns around business ‘supply’ to the Games emerged as a major 
dominant theme and risk for small firms in light of empirical data across all SGs in this thesis. 
‘Taking the positives out of it, [the procurement bidding process] it was more about the learning 
process (…) that’s the legacy. That is a good legacy of how to do, to work through a procurement 
basis (…) It [procurement process] made you look at how your staff were going to get to work and 
the risk assessment behind that, and assess ways your business could operate differently’ 
(Interviewee #36 (SG1)).  
In light of London’s vague definition of ‘businesses’ and ‘SME’, we can assume that small firms, like those 
chosen for this study, are included within this remit. This is a logical deduction given that supply chain 
opportunities feature as one of the major hoped-for ‘business legacies’, alongside the fact that host 
communities, including small firms, emerged as key beneficiaries in earlier London rhetoric. This is further 
deduced in light of Greenwich’s major legacy policy document rhetoric (RGOB, 2012b) explicitly 
highlighting how local business would be able to gain access to opportunities, inclusive of tourism and 
supply chains. However, again, empirical evidence suggests that small firms themselves, alongside key 
stakeholder narratives, claim that such ‘invisible’ stakeholders were directly ‘excluded’ from procurement 
beneficiaries. As such, the findings of this research reveal little success with respect to the overall inclusion 
of small firms in Olympic supply chains, as reflected by DCMS (2012b) themselves: 
‘Smaller contractors have not enjoyed the same degree of success as larger businesses, and do not 
have the same optimism and confidence about the future’ (DCMS, 2012b: 17). 
Tourism and trade were the major hoped-for benefits, however policy rhetoric clearly indicates access to 
opportunities pertaining to Olympic procurement and supply chains too. Whilst directly benefitting from 
contractual opportunities, the idea that small firms could use their engagement with these processes and 
varied engagement with the Games to enhance their skills, knowledge and capabilities, and benefit from 
such forms of ‘organisational learning’ along the way, was one of several hoped-for benefits and ‘legacies’ 
of the Games. However, it is important to note that pre-Games governmental narrative prior to the Games 
quite clearly identified small firms as key potential beneficiaries of the Games (e.g. Mayor of London, 2007), 
as defined by policy documents in the aforementioned areas of direct procurement, Fitness to Supply, 
greater abilities to bid for contracts (London 2012 related and beyond), enhanced image, immediate, short 
and longer-term tourism visitation and investment, and further development of B2B networks (also see 
Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). The combination of policy, media and local rhetoric emerged as a tri-
partite wave of opportunity narrative, raising small firm expectations prior to the delivery of London 2012. 
The findings, however, turn to the idea that pre-Games rhetoric and the hoped-for benefits of the Games 
strongly contrast with the perceived realities emerging from the data.  
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‘We were really positive. We’re looking forward to it, we even opened until late because we have 
realized that people will come at certain times, as the scheduled, we’ve talked to all Greenwich 
council about making the place vibrant and cleaned (…) but we were really positive – really looking 
forward to it – but it did not happen (…) It’s just crazy, absolutely crazy, anyway we were expecting 
a positive thing but it was absolutely horrendous, absolutely a waste of time’ (Interviewee #38 
(SG1)).  
It is widely known that hosting mega-events opens up various business opportunities to supply both 
products and services during planning and delivery phases. Games construction opportunities (e.g. Stadia) 
and other associated infrastructural projects, for example ‘Cross Rail’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)), are tendered 
out by governments – in the case of London 2012, facilitated by ‘CompeteFor’.  
‘I would think most of the time most opportunities would be, in round terms, related to 
construction one way or another. But, I mean, having said that, that's a pretty broad area, so it 
might be landscaping, it might be surfacing, it might be building works of one sort or another, it 
might be supplying, I don't know, furnishings and fittings by way of fitting out of buildings and 
the like, so pretty broad brush’ (Interviewee #10 (SG4)). 
In light of concerns over exclusion, the prevalent view emerging from this thesis is the overt favouring of 
big (non-risky) business at the expense of small firm inclusion. With respect to Central Greenwich, this also 
rang true. There was a notion that ‘a key element [of the Games] was to ensure that local companies secured 
contracts in the construction and staging of the Games’ (RGOB, 2012: 23) – a major objective highlighted 
in the Royal Borough of Greenwich’s post-Games legacy report. Small firms were to benefit and secure 
additional business through sub-contracts from the upper tiers (major contractors) with the hope of 
business growth and stimulating local employment (and/or supporting business in difficult economic 
recessionary times). Yet again, as evidence suggests, the rhetoric outweighs the realities here – all-in-all 
highlighting that issues around red-tape (e.g. London Assembly, 2006) and elitist Olympic and procurement 
practices and frameworks emerged as a key reason for exclusion (Raco, 2014).  
Issues pertaining to risk and the internal capabilities required to deliver such demanding contracts emerged 
as a dominant theme in the research – highlighting the pragmatic risks of supplying to such a mega-event. 
For example, one London Assembly member claimed with respect to construction supply: ‘if you looked 
at some of the contracts (…) the initial contracts for the stadia, there were only three firms in the country, 
at any one time, capable of delivering those scales’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)).  This highlights the widespread 
problem across, for example, delivering food/drink contracts too. Furthermore, another interviewee 
explained that such big projects desire to work with a smaller number of corporates as opposed to large 
numbers of smaller firms, claiming: ‘if you've got something at a very strategic level with government, which 
tends to work more easily with a small number of big corporates than a large number of smaller businesses, 
but the kind of results that we would expect (…) Because that's just the nature of the world that a lot of 
very high-profile, strategic developments are done and designed to benefit bigger businesses because they're 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
129 | P a g e  
 
the ones that actually organise this and are celebrated, I suppose, by governments’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). 
Another interviewee claimed: ‘we were quite keen to do was to see if we could encourage the catering on 
the park to be from the local communities. To have SME pop-ups, to have catering on the park to allow 
SMEs and small caterers to come in and deliver their food. But that never got anywhere. That may be 
because some of the key sponsors are involved in catering and supervision. I think it is also because of the 
volume and sheer volume of people who needed to be fed in a short period of time, the games organisers 
did not want to make a risk. They did not want to manage 150 contracts; they just wanted to deal with one. 
And you can understand that (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). These risk factors are particularly accentuated in light 
of time, cost and global political pressures on host cities during the planning and delivery of mega-event, 
requiring the wholesale mitigation of risk – epitomised by one London Assembly member laughing, ‘you 
wouldn’t want salmonella on a global scale now, would you?’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). This typifies the 
discourse from high level project actors, the rhetoric of promise but in reality, by virtue of project demands 
a significant challenge in including the interests and welfare of small firms in the delivery of mega-events. 
It raises the question regarding the extent to which small firm can ever realistically benefit from mega-event 
related contracts. 
These concerns were reflected across SGs, encapsulated by the Head of Business Support at London 
Network: 
‘The thing is, is that this was a real point of contention that CompeteFor, and this was right at the 
beginning of the Games, actually. Because, basically, the way CompeteFor works is that it will 
naturally contain both public and private sector contracts, and then procured for it in very different 
ways. A public sector organisation, they have - for example, a lot of public sector organisations 
have a general rule, which is your turnover has to be four times the amount of the value of the 
contracts’ (Interviewee #14 (SG3)). 
Across the findings, CompeteFor was spoken of both ‘celebrated’ and ‘demonised’ senses. Although supply 
chain contracts were transparently promoted, primary and secondary evidence suggests that small firms 
seldom benefit from such opportunities. The data reveals that small firms can often be muscled out by a 
range of factors, and that Olympic procurement manifest as elitist modes of supply chain processes (also 
see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). According to one senior London Assembly member, opportunities 
were restricted and ‘tied up in procurement frameworks which were dictated by IOC (…) so you had private 
suppliers and so on for the opportunities within the Games, because the Games are a big business 
opportunity, and the IOC is guarding its interest there. Which the interest of the IOC, in my view, were 
not very open to local business involvement because they were more interested in high-level sponsorship 
deals to cover their costs’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). Such sentiments were shared across SGs, from small 
firms to high-level stakeholders, with one interviewee highlighting that ‘with respect to the wider 
procurement for the Games, including Compete For – there are a couple of success stories for construction 
companies, but by and large it is not a great full picture for local businesses involved in this process’ 
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(Interviewee #3 (SG4)). Another claimed: ‘I think there was some activity there (small firm contract success) 
but it was actually quite limited in terms of numbers (…) I don't think there were a lot of headline successes 
with that’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). Epitomising the concern about corporates muscling out smaller firms 
in the procurement process, one small firm claimed: ‘no, I didn't win the actual LDA contract; we only got 
to the final eight, it was won by Adecco, which is a multinational company’ (Interviewee #36 (SG1)).   
Critical sentiments were shared across SGSs, claiming that: 
‘A lot of people played a lot of the Olympics themselves, the opportunities, so when you can sell 
your burgers at the Olympic Park or not? That tended to be tied up in procurement frameworks, 
which were dictated by the IOC as much as by the local procurement frameworks (…) there were 
aspirations that the subcontractor network, okay, a lot of local businesses would be relatively small 
and CompeteFor is a big animal, so would they have any opportunities to tender for work? So there 
was a hope that subcontracting structures would allow local businesses to enter in but did it… (…) 
the story that people came to me with was that they'd done all the paperwork, they completed all 
the bits and there was not any work at the end of it’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). 
‘Things like the fact that LOCOG had a lot less commercial opportunities or procurement 
opportunities than people probably thought because they would often use their sponsors, they 
would always, in the first instance’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)). 
‘One of the benefits with CompeteFor and some things including promotion, and so once it goes 
beyond that top direct contract, those direct contracts with the ODA, they're essentially private 
sector contracts (…) the new supplier of the incumbent system obviously won the contract and 
they fundamentally changed it. To be quite honest I’m quite embarrassed at what CompeteFor at 
the moment; it’s got the right intentions but it’s not working the way they should be’ (Interviewee 
#14 (SG3)). 
Empirical data suggested that small businesses were repeatedly encouraged to bid for Games contracts, 
particularly for smaller Tier 2, 3 and 4 contracts. A cascading effect was hoped-for, however the data notes 
that such trickling down of contractual opportunities was limited, despite providing suitable opportunities 
for small firms to deliver. However, one high-level actor claimed: ‘just opening up these types of public 
sector contracts down the line, down the different tiers and down to smaller organisations is crucial’ (…)  
‘the process [of procurement], it stayed at Tier 1 and did not pass down at all. They [multinationals who 
won Tier 1 contracts] found they did not have to cascade down lower tier contracts so that was a 
disappointment’ (Interviewee #16 (SG3)) according to senior member of the East London Chamber of 
Commerce. Despite the initial rhetoric of supply opportunities, one high level interviewee claimed: ‘they 
[LOCOG/CompeteFor] essentially said that they would engage with locale and they said, 'Oh, we'll engage 
with local food suppliers' but it didn't really happen. You look at venues which had in-house facilities like 
Excel and other official existing venues, and things like that. These guys were shut out and they were also 
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in exclusion zones as well, and that didn't help the situation either’ (Interviewee #13 (SG3)). Empirical 
analysis clearly highlights the systematic challenges for small firms in accessing Games-related contracts, 
with key business engagement officers around Olympic boroughs claiming: 
‘I don't think that people's expectations were managed in the right way even at the time. 
Multinationals were all awarded the contracts, and people kicked up a big stink about it. There was 
more - even at that point there, because response from LOCOG to pass on to these guys 
[subcontractors] was, oh, part of the supply chain agreement that they need to… It was almost 
passing the buck, really. So these guys did engage with you, and subcontracts and stuff like that. 
But, at the end of the day, throughout the games and I didn't see any of that happening. It was a 
massive shame as well, and it was a massive shame…that wasn't profiled in the press, so it's not 
profiled. But I think you get that in most event contexts’ (Interviewee #14 (SG3)). 
‘When you get these big projects you do have big companies who are spending big money and the 
big sponsors, and that not very supportive of small business inclusion (…) the number of valued 
contracts weren't enough for micro and small businesses’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)).  
In response to such challenges, the data interestingly found the emergence of non-London 2012 sanctioned 
support organisations like the East London Business Place (ELBP), the East London Business Alliance 
(ELBA) et cetera – primarily playing a role in alternative contractual opportunities, up-skilling businesses 
(fitness to supply), informing of export opportunities. These two organisations were frequently mentioned 
as pivotal for non-London 2012 affiliated alternative small business support, across all stakeholder groups. 
According to one senior business engagement officer, this was put in place as ‘CompeteFor was a very 
laborious process for small businesses (…) in the end the Host Boroughs set up an alternative model, which 
almost ignored the Olympic Games as an opportunity for all the small businesses because they were just 
being crowded out by this… The Olympic Games was a national programme, so local businesses were very 
much competing with international firms and it just meant that they were so far down the procurement 
supply chain, and they weren't ever going to really win a lot of money, contracts. So we created something 
in conjunction with Westfield and Canary Wharf, which was very much a business-to-business contract 
called East London Business Place’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). 
‘I think it's far exceeded anything that local businesses won out of CompeteFor, so I think the 
principles are sound. But I think that CompeteFor is very much an international/national system, 
and as a consequence it's unfortunately still geared to firms that have procurement specialists taking 
the time to research and help. Whereas the legacy of East London Business Place system was very 
much more about those business networks, getting people to engage in different business. I think 
for the networking, again, I can see why the Government was quite keen on that at a very higher 
level, yes that works again. There was a lot of that in UK Great - the Great Britain Campaign is 
kind of the legacy function of the Olympic Games. But that, again, didn't really touch the local 
environment, if you see what I mean? The local environment was all about promoting themselves 
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to people who would come to the park post-games. The networking there is still limited, really, to 
traditional councils and forums and chamber of commerce, which have always existed’ (). 
The findings also reveal that embedding small firms into the supply chains of mega-events poses major 
risks to the delivery of the project, due to their lack of experience and ability to successfully fulfil contractual 
demands. According to one high level actor: ‘in terms of micro and smaller organisations [to supply to the 
Games], I think there was an issue around, well, it seems to be an issue around risk management (…) the 
problem [resulting in poor small firm engagement] was that there was this immovable deadline and there 
was a huge credibility risk that needs to be managed, and they [project organisers] was to squeeze and 
mitigate out any risk with project delivery. So the important thing here is that they wanted to get seasoned 
companies in here so they can manage the labour that has the experience of turning through volumes of 
food preparation’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). The same interviewee commented on the intense work between 
the London Assembly and a community of small food firms [Brick Lane and Green Street] with respect to 
collaborating to bid to supply to event venues, with little efficacy. These issues are discussed in significant 
depth in the Discussions Chapter (5), however, such sentiments were shared across SGs here highlighting 
that: 
‘There was a piece of work done looking at the businesses of Brick Lane and Green Street, very 
culturally distinct business who provide a lot of catering and food preparation and restaurant 
experience (…) very keen to benefit from the games and there was a movement to rebrand them 
in time for an Olympic promotion so that they would benefit from an influx of tourism coming to 
London. That didn't get very far. But what we were quite keen to do was to see if we could 
encourage the catering on the park to be from the local communities. To have SME pop-ups, to 
have catering on the park to allow SMEs and small caterers to come in and deliver their food. But 
that never got anywhere. That may be because some of the key sponsors are involved in catering 
and supervision. I think it is also because of the volume and sheer volume of people who needed 
to be fed in a short period of time, the games organisers did not want to make a risk. They did not 
want to manage 150 contracts, they just wanted to deal with one. And you can understand that. So 
that ran into the stands we never really got anywhere with helping and supporting that. And I don't 
know if you on the park but the food offer was dire- at £9 a treat’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)).  
‘In terms [contractual opportunity terms] of micro and smaller organisations, I think there was an 
issue around, it seems to be around risk-management’ (Interviewee #14 (SG3)). 
4.3.9 The Inabilities of Small Firms to Leverage? 
Findings from this thesis also confirm sentiments from Chalip and Leyns (2002) and Pappalepore and 
Duignan (2016) in that small firms often ‘lack the capabilities’, ‘capacity’ and ‘resources’ (e.g. skills, internal, 
financial; and human resources, access to elite networks et cetera - also see London Assembly, 2006) to 
fully leverage effectively (e.g. Malone and Jenster, 1991). Before the Games, policy-makers identified such 
problems, noting that small firms seldom have the ‘necessary expertise, experience or structures in place to 
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compete effectively’ (London Assembly, 2006: 9 – also see London Chamber of Commerce (LCOC), 2005), 
and the need for a ‘capacity that small and micro businesses often do not have’ according to the House of 
Lords (2013: 78) inquiry. In response, empirical and secondary evidence showed that leveraging 
programmes to enhance small firm capacity were sought by city and local municipalities/councils (e.g. 
networking events, skills development workshops, contract/bidding support, public meetings to discuss 
operational issues (e.g. delivery, regulations, spaces etc.)) alongside consultation meetings and regular visits 
to premises. The House of Lords (2013) inquiry also noted the role of London 2012 Business Network’, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Business Opportunities Network’ (BON), in ‘up skilling’ businesses, 
supported through the publicly-funded organisation ‘Business Link’ – with 40000 companies receiving 
some kind of assistance, and 6500 receiving ‘intense assistance’ according to DCMS (2010). Several authors 
(London Assembly, 2006; London Chamber of Commerce, 2005), however, claim that ‘lack of information’ 
may be one of the key issues affecting small businesses, either in terms of knowing about potential 
opportunities (London Assembly, 2006) or knowing how to exploit them (Chalip and Leyns, 2002). 
Respondents from this study echoed such concerns, claiming either that they were unaware of leveraging 
programmes or that they felt they were a waste of time and not applicable to them. Despite this, we cannot 
ignore RBOG’s (2012b) claim to have supported over 500 businesses, 250 intensively, ‘with over 850 
businesses visited by Greenwich’s business engagement team’ (RBOG, 2012: 3). Although initiatives were 
mentioned by interviewees, they indicated their limited efficacy and/or relevancy.  
A major issue indicated throughout the empirical findings was ‘red-tape’ and being locked-out/inability to 
access ‘elite’ networks restricted to big businesses and corporates. Such issues appeared to play a key role 
in restricting opportunity; the prime example of which is ‘CompeteFor’. Although celebrated by several 
stakeholders as a ‘tremendous boon’ through opening up public contracts to the private domain (a success 
for London 2012 and a feat other host cities have never achieved), Games procurement appeared to offer 
very few procurement opportunities and value for small firms to supply to the Games; this was criticised 
by almost all SGs. Several reasons were cited for this: limited cascading of contracts; red tape and high 
barriers to entry, the view that inviting small firms into the supply chain would 1) pose a risk for provision 
and 2) complicate contractual management as organisers would have to manage 100s of contracts, as 
opposed to a few corporates (who do not pose a risk to provision delivery, and have the expertise to deliver 
etc.). Such concerns were echoed by the London 2012 lobbying organisation ‘London Assembly’, in 
claiming that small organisations often suffer from the lack of formal procedures required by the public 
sector with respect to ‘business willingness and capacity to meet the required standards in terms of health 
and safety, workforce development, equal opportunities and employment standard’ (London Assembly, 
2006: 9), according to evidence submitted by the Trades Union Congress to the assembly.  
Issues of ‘bureaucracy’ facing small business throughout the procurement process often prove to be too 
problematic, as these smaller organisations have limited human and financial capital resources compared to 
larger businesses for complying with stringent ‘legal and compliance issues involved in tendering for new 
contracts’ (London Assembly, 2006: 16). Such issues formed a major barrier to small firms capitalising on 
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legacy benefits, something unlikely to be resolved in the near future given emerging requirements around 
sustainability and environmental issues which further complicate and barricade small firms out of supply 
chains. In addition, the European Procurement Directive (EPD) highlights that is it now ‘illegal to 
discriminate against firms on the grounds of where they are based’ (London Assembly, 2006: 20). Even if 
project actors wished to distribute contracts evenly, current EU regulations prohibit this. 
As a form of resistance against some of these aforementioned issues, a new contractual system emerged 
from the ashes, developed by several city-wide and host borough actor organisations [e.g. ELBP] (also see 
Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016) as already discussed above. Developed in parallel with CompeteFor, this 
new system was developed in resistance to the ‘officialdom’ of London 2012. Interviewees and policy 
makers (e.g. House of Lords, 2013; London Assembly, 2006) claimed that much of the difficulty 
experienced by small firms in applying to supply arose from the lack of skills, knowledge and resources 
needed to comply with formal regulatory pressures (e.g. health and safety directives, financial commitments 
needed). 
As alluded to earlier in the findings, the notion that small firm performance was highly impacted by strategic 
leveraging and internal competencies emerged as a major theme for this research. Empirical data suggests 
that small firms with the ability to leverage associated opportunities and event trade had greater potential 
for and emergent feelings of success. According to one senior Greenwich councillor, ‘those [small firms] 
that had not perhaps thought about how to attract customers – they did not benefit (…) however we found 
that the businesses healthy before the Games and had astute managers tended to do very well out of the 
Games’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). A number of high-level SGs mentioned the importance of savvy business 
approaches to successful strategic leveraging attempts. One interviewee claimed: ‘we did hear that a lot of 
small businesses really took advantage of the Games, and I would say that was the majority but at the end 
of the day you have to prescribe the theory that if you want it, you have to go out and get it yourself rather 
than wait for the opportunities to come to you (…) you’re [small firms] going to have to foresee and try to 
identify where the real opportunities are, rather than just reject it [Games opportunities]’ (Interviewee #13 
(SG3)). In the context of supply chains, the same interviewee claimed: ‘if you want to play with the big 
boys, or if you want to bid for these type of contracts, you can't just rock up at the front door and expect 
to win a contract. You have to take the necessary steps to position yourself in the most advantageous 
position to win them’ (Interviewee #13 (SG3)). This was agreed with by several other respondents, 
including a senior London Assembly member: ‘absolutely [the importance of proactive savvy business 
approach], I mean I would say that regardless of whether your engaging with something like the Olympics 
or anything else business related (…) there is a real tension here, we've got on the one hand - we want to 
help business - but on the other hand businesses survive through their own wits’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). 
It is, however, important to critique the extent to which real opportunities exist – can small firms actually 
access opportunities or are, for example, the determined striated topologies and contractual elitism a 
systemic barrier locking these actors out? Further, to what extent can small firms break through striating 
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forces of mega-event planning and delivery – this major question is covered in the thesis discussions. These 
sentiments, again, were shared across all SGs, from major organisations to small firms themselves: 
‘It is not like somebody turns up on your doorstep on the night of the Opening Ceremony and 
says ‘here’s an opportunity’ – it doesn’t work like that’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). 
‘Like any business, at any time, it is fundamental that they [small firms] get involved with Games 
opportunities and for example improve their business operations to put them in good stead for 
bidding’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)). 
4.4 Host Space  
4.4.1 Securitising the ‘Last Mile’ – Olympic Takeover 
The chapter now shifts attention toward systematically analysing the specific ways in which small firms 
were excluded from capitalising on opportunity rhetoric. Through an in-depth analysis of primary data 
collected, alongside policy, practice, media and other academic reports, this section attempts to unpack the 
complex, messy and critical ways in which Central Greenwich’s Last Mile was subject to fear tactics, spatial 
striation, Olympic control, corporate power Games and project territorialisation effects. Qualitative analysis 
demonstrates how the consumption patterns and expenditure of regular-local, domestic and Olympic-
focused tourism shifted away from local spending and toward new commodified and re-commercialised 
spaces of corporate Olympic consumption. Findings suggest that most small firms cited territorialisation 
effects and attributable controls bestowed upon Central Greenwich’s artisan Last Mile as having severe 
detrimental effects upon business performance during the live phases of the Games’ delivery. Details 
surrounding the extent to which tourism and trade was negative affected feature in section 4.6. 
Narratives of ‘Olympic takeover’ are illuminated, complete with explanatory theories underpinning why the 
author conceptualises Central Greenwich as operating under the realm of an ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’ (see 
section 5.5 in the discussions for detailed conceptualisation here). Although concerns over tourism 
challenges have been noted in prior Games (see section 2.3.5) the attempts map out the complex ways a 
host community tourism system can be immobilised throughout key temporal phases of Games delivery. 
It is through providing rich insights in to local narratives, alongside a range of informed cross-stakeholder 
perspectives, concerning the destructive effects on small business communities may provide a valuable 
contribution to the literature. 
In light of the empirical evidence, strident Olympic regulation appeared to be placed upon London and its 
host borough spaces. Civic and soon-to-be Olympic hosting spaces were efficiently captured – the act of 
‘territorialisation’ (e.g. Dansero and Mela, 2007) attempting to interweave with the normal day to day 
practices of the host community. The findings reveal how host areas ceded national-legislative sovereignty, 
offering up civic spaces across Central Greenwich as blank canvas ready to be painted with the desires and 
agenda of the mega-event. Central Greenwich appeared to be opened up to territorialisation processes in a 
number of ways. Civic spaces (streets, roads, market squares etc.) were securitised and controlled, including 
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the green spaces of the Royal Greenwich Park - historically prohibited to commercial transactions [in such 
intense manner] but now commodified and opened up for corporate consumption. Empirical findings, 
supported by media and academic reports, suggested that London invoked a series of very precisely 
organised processes and interactions throughout Olympic territorialisation. At the time, this was deemed 
particularly important given Games-project concern about Central Greenwich and Greenwich Park area 
‘spectator congestion’ – which subsequently led to the construction of footbridges over key roads in the 
area (BBC, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). In other words, the whole project lifecycle, from candidature to the (rather 
enigmatic) legacy phases, found host ‘space’ emerging as a key commodity - major symbolic and material 
resources, moulded to suit London’s 2012 goals and objectives. ‘Public goods’ (see ‘Public Goods Theory’) 
symbolised and materialised as a wholesale permeation of private, corporate and big business interests into 
the life and soul of public spaces (also see McGillivray and Frew, 2015). Critically reflected on in the latter 
half of the section 4.4.9, evidence illuminates and suggests how the re-commercialised spaces of Central 
Greenwich simultaneously exacerbated small firm exclusion from Games-related opportunities. The 
commercialisation of security issues, empirically grounded and found in the context of this study, form a 
dominant viewpoint established, implicitly, and explicitly across this thesis.  
Visual images, thanks to a local photographer (Sony Jim, 2012), illustrate the barricades, how visitors flowed 
in and around Central Greenwich, and provide further evidence and support concerning why small firms 
felt symbolically and physically locked-out from visitor and event tourism. Interestingly, according to a 
matrix coding analysis of small firm experience, those firms located on the Greenwich Island, situated in 
the middle of the spatio-empirical focuses, emerged as stranded on a desert island – locked-out of tourist 
flows. This was, in a roundabout way, recognised as a potential problematic feature indicated by 
Greenwich’s pre-Games information pack to businesses, as stated below: 
‘Official information pack provided to small firms in Central Greenwich claimed impact was 
dependent upon several factors, ‘like where you are based and what kind of business you run’ (…) 
and ‘if your business is close to one of the three Olympic venues, the impact will be felt greatly and 
you may need to make various changes to your usual arrangements’ (RGOBa, 2012a: 12). 
 
 
Figure 19: Central Greenwich’s Securitised ‘Last Mile’ (Sony Jim, 2012) 
4.4.2 Greenwich and the Gestapo – the Impact of Last Mile Controls on Visitor Consumption 
As alluded to earlier, in the context of Greenwich and reflected across the host boroughs, Olympic tourism 
and trade opportunities were dramatically impacted by the intense barricading, marshalling and control 
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mechanisms used across the Last Mile. Driven by project demands, empirical evidence illuminates how 
Central Greenwich’s Last Mile was subject to a series of contrived and complex material and symbolic-
regulatory controls. Spaces and public goods – usually subject to multiple ownership – were removed from 
general public use (e.g. Smith, 2013; Guardian, 2012; Boycoff, 2012) in order to permit ‘officially sanctioned’ 
Olympic event spaces. The findings reveal controlled spaces fraught with contestation, enacted by a range 
of human and non-human ‘securitising actors’. Visitors funnelled between transport hubs and event venues, 
and visitors’ event experiences were manipulated through strategically placed bright orange 4ft barriers. 
Games volunteers and their pink foam hands exclaimed ‘this way to the park, this way to the event’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)) according to one interviewee, and experienced by the author himself. Respondents 
claimed that ‘the centre of Greenwich was turned into a fortress (…) you couldn’t get out, there were 
barricades all the time’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Visitors were ‘physically marshalled’ all the time, and 
enclosed in a ‘barrier that was ¾ metre high’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Visual imagery, and the narratives 
amplified here and throughout the findings, contribute to our deeper understand as to how host 
communities, and their spaces, can be subject to Olympic power, security moves, and control.  
The findings reveal that such controls had a major impact on tourism consumption behaviours, dictating 
how visitors engaged with and explored the area. A significant number of respondents recognised these 
systemic challenges, claiming that in light of the aforementioned controls tourists were being ‘shoehorned’ 
and ‘manhandled’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)), ‘brainwashed’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)), ‘treated like cattle’, 
‘sheep’ and ‘idiots’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)) and ‘physically marshalled’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), with 
‘bullying’ the public to go ‘their way’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). One respondent from the FSB claimed the 
flow of event visitors was akin to a ‘ghost train’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)) where visitors were ‘put in to a 
narrow band and then ushered down Church Street’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). Then, after the live events, 
‘they [event visitors] came out and they had no opportunity for anything, they were being shoehorned like 
small school children’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). Clarified here, local narratives alluded to feelings of 
immense anger, disappointment and frustration that the rhetoric was so distanced from the reality – a party 
quite literally on their doorstep that they were not invited to. Media reports, alongside the primary data of 
this study repeatedly reflecting the view of the community, not only in Central Greenwich but across 
territorialised HEZs and Last Mile spaces, claiming: 
‘We [Central Greenwich small businesses] had huge hopes for the Olympics here in Greenwich 
market, things have however got off to a very slow start, and we had barricades and over 
marshalling. But we are hoping now the barricades are coming down and LOCOG and Greenwich 
Council we hope [emphasized] are listening to the traders. And hoping for things to pick up as we 
are just a stone’s throw away from the Equestrian events’ (BBC, 2012h [market trader]). 
Evidence suggests that Olympic security, and regulatory policies, prevented the physical dispersion of event 
visitors across host community and prohibiting access to many of the small firms wishing to capitalise on 
the event. This viewpoint was reflected across almost all small businesses interviewed claiming that 
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‘Greenwich Market had all been gearing themselves up to literally print money and no one could get to 
them!’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)); ‘the marshalling and barriers, from a pedestrian point of view, was an 
absolute killer’ (Interviewee 26# (SG1)). Similar viewpoints were also shared across other small firms and 
policy perspectives, illustrating that: 
‘LOCOG marshals and fencing ensured visitors were corralled between the venue and the train 
station (…) visitors were physically restricted’ (Interviewee #18 (SG3)). ‘Yes they did have an 
effect [barriers] – if they would not have been there much better for the market (…) if 
tourists would have had free rein it would have been better’ (Interviewee #30 (SG1)). 
Thousands of people that are going to be walking past your shop – only to be barricaded in – 
blocked in – and nothing, forced past each individual’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). ‘Everyone got 
funnelled away from the shops’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)). ‘Customer footfall wasn’t as great as 
it could have been due to the barriers – local council were making people walk past and not able 
to stop!’ (Interviewee #39 (SG1)). ‘We were completely blocked out by the barriers so we 
missing out on any potential business! (…) barriers and marshals should not have been so 
strict (Interviewee #31 (SG1)). ‘They wanted them in as quickly as possible in to their events and 
out as quickly as possible – they didn’t want them milling around at all’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
Several firms were more candid in their responses, describing the controls as though the ‘Gestapo had 
landed in Greenwich’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)), Games security as a ‘force field’, and the entire Olympics 
as a ‘self-contained satellite’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). The Games and those involved in its organisation 
were also described as ‘the f*cking Conquistadors, turning up on the beaches in South America’ 
(Interviewee #37 (SG1)). Military signage warning potential visitors/residents to avoid host areas, 
strategically parked trucks, overzealous authoritative figures from traffic wardens to subtly disguised 
Olympic adverting and trading enforcers, right through to the installation of elite Olympic Route Networks 
(ORNs), a new special parking permit policy, and the overarching tactic of invoking fear through policy 
and media discourse, epitomised the militarised, wartime economy and war-zone like exogenous shocks 
imposed upon the artisan Last Mile of Central Greenwich.  
The scenarios epitomised ‘states of emergency’. Locked-down spaces and zero-tolerance policing operated 
under the realm of ‘emergency politics - from the covert operations of the FBI and the CIA, right through 
to the overt presence of the London Met, UK police force and armed forces control. Here, the findings 
support a juxtaposition between informality and friendly volunteer ‘Games Makers’: waving their foam 
hands, directing the herd and commanding the direction of drift toward newly commodified, commercial 
spaces of corporate consumption (the Olympic venues) whilst security operations simultaneously provided 
a ‘safe’ Games. Enough security to settle, but not enough to worry. A series of well-articulated and executed 
spatial controls emerged that cut the blood supply to the local economy of Central Greenwich – restricting 
the flow of event visitors into the local business communities, influencing consumption behaviours and 
stunting the capacity to consume local products and services, much to the dismay of the small firms 
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interviewed. Respondents claimed: ‘they guided everyone away from us, not letting them cross [over the 
road to where their business was] – bullying the public to go ‘their way’ – the way they wanted’ (Interviewee 
#34 (SG1)). Others claimed that: ‘when they put the barriers nobody could cross the road from one side 
to another – even the road was closed. And with the pink hands pushing… them fingers – they were 
pushing them to the ‘goal’ [the venue] (…) even if you were not a visitor [e.g. a local] you still had to follow 
those fingers, you still had to go with the flow’ (Interviewee #32 (SG1)). Central Greenwich emerged as a 
battleground, subject to resistance from small firms engaging in modes of deterritorialisation and modes of 
creative resistance to emancipate themselves from the emergent ‘determined striated topologies’ as 
illustrated by one small firm account below. A full account of ‘resistance’ attempts are detailed in section 
4.5 and later on in the discussions section 5.16; small business repeatedly illustrating local conflicts: 
‘There was a gentleman down here, now out of business, and he actually went out and try to… the 
Olympics had to fight him because they wanted to put a board over his shop, they wouldn’t let 
anyone over the barrier to go in to his shop – even when people were asking to go in. He said ‘you 
have to let them in to my shop!’’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
What we can derive from this is that the overt threat of terrorism and political unrest afforded pragmatic 
but ultimately undemocratic and exceptional circumstances to securitise public spaces at the expense of 
locking small firms out. The naturalised assumption and prevailing view was that the safety of Last Mile 
spaces was held by Greenwich Council, who claimed in a (RBOG, 2012b) policy report that the ‘safe’ and 
‘successful’ hosting of the Games was paramount, with security controls executed to ensure ‘…the safety 
of large numbers of spectators passing through the area’ (RBOG, 2012a: 4; RGOB, 2012b). Although 
appreciated by several stakeholders as a pragmatic and logical necessity, the majority of respondents 
believed such measures were confusing and illogical in places, referred to by one respondent as so over the 
top it was akin to ‘crushing a nut with a sledgehammer’ ((Interviewee #15 (SG3)). Even major support 
organisations, didn’t quite understand the reasoning behind the intensity of Games control here, with one 
senior manager at the FSB claiming:  
‘Our [FSB] report itself shows plight, particularly business in Central London that did not get the 
footfall they were expecting. But, as I say, out of our research for instance, the catalyst for 
problems, really, due to mismanagement by LOCOG’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). 
Complementing this view, metaphors pertaining to science-fiction were mixed with a series of dictatorial 
political references in relation to the ‘distanced’ and ‘unengaging’ nature of the Games – local narratives 
alluded to the ‘Stalinist marshalling’ effects (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), explaining that the overall 
securitization effects seen across these spaces were so fortified that the ‘Berlin Wall got nothing on that!’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)). This was an escape from democracy, the avoidance of progressive and 
consultative processes found in the ‘normal’ sphere of daily politics and governance of everyday life – 
echoing Marrero-Guillamón’s (2013) sentiments that host cities symbolise ‘Olympic states of exception’, 
which will be detailed further shortly on. 
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As identified earlier, the exclusionary tendencies of mega-events, specifically in the context of empirical 
findings, suggest marginalisation of host actors both before and after the Opening Ceremony of the Games. 
The findings partly echo a few other empirical studies, illuminating how the Games can ‘mark’ space and 
decide who is included and who is excluded (for London 2012 see McGillivray and Frew (2015), and for 
Germany 2006 World Cup and the Commonwealth Games see Hall (2006)) – see review section 2.5. 
Findings from this research echo Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) concern that London proved to be a 
‘missed opportunity, not only for local businesses but also for the tourists themselves and for local 
authorities’, who were unable to take advantage of cultural diversities existing beyond spaces of striation 
(2016: 15). The metaphors, language use, phrasing, emotion and stridency, alongside a variety of semiotic 
linguistic connectors (see methodology section 3.5 for detail here), provide a strong evidence base to suggest 
that, in the context of Central Greenwich, Olympic controls directly stunted consumption, influenced 
consumption behaviours, and stimulated challenging and disruptive business environments for small firms 
to try to thrive in and effectively capitalise on opportunity rhetoric. Epitomising the small business 
community concerns of rhetoric vs. reality here, was reflected on by one key Greenwich gatekeeper:   
‘So we were thinking great, there'll be all of these trillions of people we've been told about, they'll 
be milling around…all over the place. Even if they do all want to stay in the town centre for food 
and drink or whatever, and there's just too many of them, they're all going to have to be forced 
down to some of the, you know? Let's try and do some advertising in advance, let's put on some 
deals, let's do some, you know? Next thing we thought is, oh hey, well at least there's going to be a 
sea of people soon enough. Then there was no sea of people either and it was just like, holy shit, 
we have really been sold a short straw here!’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
4.4.3 Abandoned Event Spaces and Olympic ‘Fear’  
So far, the data reveals how direct spatial controls dramatically impacted on tourism movements and visitor 
consumption patterns, excluding small firms from capitalising on opportunity rhetoric. However, the 
evidence suggests that limited opportunities to capture passers-by were compounded by ‘abandoned’ spaces 
whilst the live events were taking place. They were abandoned by ‘regulars’ using civic spaces on a day-to-
day basis and tourists who would normally enjoy the fruits of Central Greenwich’s artisan high street and 
heritage offering. Respondents described the area as ‘dead’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)), ‘literally tumbleweed-
ville’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)), ‘devastatingly quiet’ (…) so much so ‘we could have easily had a game of 5-
a-side football and we would not have been in the way of cars, pedestrians or anything – it was dead!’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)). This was also reflected by the LCOC (2012) post-Games report suggesting that 
the Olympic Park operated in a ‘bubble’ (see 2012: 6), and claiming that pre-planned visitor traffic 
management systems (e.g. barriers) provided ‘little opportunity for visitors to spill out in to surrounding 
areas’. One hospitality business claimed that one of the Olympic Park entrances, within three minutes’ walk 
from them, was closed, so ‘visitors were redirected via other routes, so the area was completely dead’ (2012: 
6). Similar to the findings of this research, negative effects of diverted visitor trade were compounded by 
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the fact the business invested in a new hospitality facility to cater for big event crowds, which emerged as 
wasted investment. Evidence suggests that Central Greenwich became a ghost town, and the Senior 
Business Engagement officer for Greenwich claimed: ‘people changed their behaviour patterns which did 
have an impact on usual trade (…) to conclude the Games was a very mixed picture’ (Interviewee #19 
(SG2)).  
Visual metaphors permeated throughout, including comparing these spaces to those in the zombie film ‘28 
Days Later’ to describe the sense of desertion. This scenario was encapsulated by one small firm perfectly, 
exclaiming: 
‘Totally. Absolutely [locals stayed away]. You could do anything up and down the street and you 
wouldn’t bump in to someone during the day. So in the morning thousands of people walking pass 
the shops, you have this gap of what can only be described as the start of 28 Days Later, you know 
where there were zombies, nothing on our streets, and then sixty thousand people are zoomed, 
forced past your shops in the eventing – and you can stand there and think “am I the only human 
being who can see this!” That is how it felt. It felt as though you were the only person on earth and 
that street was just dead’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
 
The findings suggest several other explanations for why host spaces became ghost spaces. As discussed in 
detail below, concerns were identified over the militarisation of Olympic space and spatial control, ‘fear’ 
tactics installed prior and during the Games, venue restrictions, special parking permits, and difficulties 
accessing and staying within host spaces, right through to direct loss of key public space and local 
attractions. As detailed in the latter part of this section, in light of the negative tourism impacts, policy 
makers should consider the consequences ‘fear’ tactics can have, and perhaps consider pragmatic solutions 
to necessary securitisation of host community spaces whilst at the same time avoiding alienating and 
excluding small firms from Games-related trade. Such moves may afford greater small firm leverage, 
specifically during live-event phases of Olympic delivery, as outlined across the recommendations of this 
thesis.  
 
4.4.3.1 Fear of Venue Restrictions 
Firstly, venue restrictions emerged as a major reason for stunted visitor consumption across Central 
Greenwich. The findings reveal that official Olympic venues prohibited event visitors from re-entering 
stadia and venue zones, in fear of not being allowed back in once the live events commenced. Small firms 
believed this to have prevented any form of mid-morning – afternoon trade, reducing local demand and 
consumption, which would have otherwise been a perfect opportunity for small retail and F&B firms to 
capitalise on. Small firms claimed ‘they were just - they were coming past businesses from the station to the 
venue. They weren't allowed to come out - once they'd gone in, they couldn't come out and they couldn't 
come out at lunchtime, say, to buy a sandwich. People were - this is where people started, this is when they 
started to complain. The local sandwich makers could have sold sandwiches to the spectators but the 
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spectators weren't allowed to come out and buy them, or they wouldn't be allowed back in’ (Interviewee 
#29 (SG1)). Repeatedly, small firms described being perplexed by such regulation, claimed: 
‘We thought that they were there for the Olympics for the day, so we thought they were going to 
come out and get something to eat and then you got in, you cannot come out. If they would have 
been allowed out and had 2 to 3 hour break in between the events they could've wandered around 
and bought a pair of shoes, they could have walked around the High Street, they could have got a 
souvenir and grabbed something to eat’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
Compounding and further exacerbating this issue were the security regulations prohibiting event visitors 
from entering official event spaces with pre-purchased food and drink. One small firm claimed: ‘you 
couldn’t even take food in there’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)) and, as drink wasn’t allowed in the venues, ‘few 
visitors were ever likely going to buy anything’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)). Respondents claimed this 
drastically changed visitor consumption behaviours, causing tourists to purchase food and beverage items 
at either ends of the marshalled routes (host event venue and/or transport hub), consuming on their way 
to the venue and consuming and/or disposing at security gates. One small firm illustrated this point, 
claiming: ‘we did not get anyone in (…) as they [event visitors] arrived from the station they were propped 
up by the coffee shops and sandwiches and just walked down, eating and drinking these snacks, and 
finishing them before they got to the venue’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)). Echoing such concerns, small firms 
repeatedly highlighted this issue: 
‘They had everything in the park, they were pushing everyone into the park and they didn’t buy 
one cup of tea from us because they knew they could purchase in there (…) they couldn’t even 
take water or food in there – nothing at all – so they didn’t buy anything from us (…) it could have 
been handled much better!’ (Interviewee #32 (SG1)). 
‘None of the restaurants did well out of it, the Olympics took away from us. Tourists were not 
allowed to take food in with them so each restaurant outside the venue was affected. So you had 
to by the food from inside’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
‘The market was empty. 50,000 people coming to Greenwich. But even the restaurant the other 
side of the road did not make any money. Because it was morning, afternoon and evening and it 
was people going in and out and that is it. From there to the station and that's it. It was because of 
these foam fingers, and you stand there watching it, thinking why on earth there is no one remotely 
engaging… Whether it's because they want to get to their seats and sit down… You couldn't even 
take food in there’ Interviewee #32 (SG1). 
New spaces of consumption servicing event visitors, potentially displacing consumption across existing 
host firms, was raised as a key issue – the idea that Central Greenwich was subject to ‘commodification’ 
and new re-commercialised spaces of consumption emerged. Evidence suggests that Olympic controls and 
venue restrictions may have been a direct tactic to preserve visitor pennies for spending in those firms 
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affiliated with the Games –as such, this forms yet again another explanation and an Olympic control used 
to exclude small firms from effective leveraging. The idea that the contrived and planned spatial and 
overarching Olympic controls were engineered to control visitor experience and their consumption toward 
new spaces of commercial consumption will be discussed shortly, and was highlighted in review section 
2.5. Such sentiments rippled throughout small firm narratives:  
‘It was engineered. The thing they also did was ‘water’...there were a lot of families, and they had 
bottles of water, and on some of the hottest days of the year, and they are asking them to leave the 
bottle at the front, so that they could sell them smaller bottles of water for 5/6 quid ... We had 
people fainting ... they were coming down here lobster red from being in the sun – they weren’t 
allowed to take their own sunscreen in. That’s health and safety, which is putting people into danger 
- for money!’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
With another small firm claiming: 
‘They are self-contained satellites that land inside your environment and they basically have a force 
field around them and unless you’ve got a huge corporate key to get through vast funds (…) you 
are totally excluded’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
4.4.3.2 Fear of Host Space ‘Chaos’ 
Secondly, the notion of ‘fear’ and warnings to avoid ‘chaotic’ host event spaces, including central London, 
resulted in the formation of abandoned spaces and the formation of ‘aversion markets’ (see Spilling, 1996; 
Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). In aversion markets, locals, regulars and would-be tourists avoid 
community areas and fear to travel across host city transport links. Respondents referred to Olympic fear 
tactics locally and city-wide as directly contributing toward the dampening of trade performance, tourism 
and visitor footfall across London, its host boroughs and Central Greenwich specifically, during the Games 
and for some parts before and after (e.g. between the Olympics and the Paralympics). This was identified 
in the LCOC (2012) post-Games report statement: ‘as well as London residents and commuters from other 
locations or taking annual leave, the usual types of tourists were mostly replaced with Olympic visitors who 
concentrated on the Olympic Park and surrounding venues’ (2012: 5). This was noted by Pappalepore and 
Duignan (2016) claiming that: ‘in the preceding weeks London’s mayor, Boris Johnston, ran a campaign 
inviting people not attending the sporting events to avoid Central London and the Olympic Zones unless 
strictly necessary (…even Londoners were encouraged to work from home during the Games if possible)’ 
(2016: 350). Sentiments were echoed in the media during the same time period, claiming: ‘they [the UK 
government] poisoned people’s minds with terrorism, traffic, and I have never seen a July as bad as this 
ever’ (BBC, 2012h). Repeatedly respondents across all SGs illustrated ‘fear’ as a major sticking point, as 
illustrated by the Head of East London Chamber of Commerce who claimed their business consortium 
was directing informed: 
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‘You're not going to be able to get to work, this, that and the other, and everything's going to fall 
apart! I had the easiest journey to work I've ever had in London since 1993, coming to Canary 
Wharf. It was a joy, and the whole thing went smoothly, with business, but there was a lot of fear 
factors beforehand’ (Interviewee #16 (SG3)).   
A House of Lords (2013) post-Games reflection on small firm experiences revealed that retail in the city 
suffered, with retailers expressing concerns that pre-Games government warnings to ‘stay away’ and avoid 
Central London to avoid problems of overcrowding and transport disruptions ‘deterred’ shoppers 
according to the The Telegraph (2012). The resulting effects reported at the time found temporary 
‘crowding out’ and ‘tourism displacement’ issues, particularly during the live Games phase – similarly to 
issues found in prior mega-event contexts (see section 2.3.5). This was also reported by London and 
Partners (2013) in their post-Games analysis of tourism numbers coming to London. Economic 
substitution effects on tourism behaviours (e.g. Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Osmond, 2002; Fourie and 
Santana-Gallego, 2011; ETOA, 2005, 2010; Work Foundation, 2010) caused major disruptive trading 
environments for small local businesses – echoing Chalip and Leyns’ (2002) findings from their analysis of 
the Indie Car race across Australia’s Gold Coast region. In response to the fear, the chaos and the concern 
over aversion markets, one small firm claimed that ‘due to all the disruptions our local customers stayed 
away from our area fearful they couldn’t park to visit local stores (…) many regular customers left the area 
completely as their lives were so disrupted’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)).  
These issues continued to be raised by small firms interviews, encapsulated below: 
‘A lot of people might be local residents and they were also anticipating the problems with locally 
driving about: there was a lot of scaremongering (…) the tube is already dodgy that there was quite 
a deep-seated paranoia about us messing up on the transport. There was so much effort and energy 
putting in to make sure that we need everything to run smoothly, it was like crushing a nut with a 
sledgehammer. They invested so much effort in doing it that there was really… So people really 
had the fear of God put in them about, 'Oh God, don't get in your car, don't even try going here, 
de, de, de'. So even for people who were local residents - regardless whether you were running a 
business or not running a business - local residents were freaking out because they were getting 
this very heavy-handed sort of fear-mongering about not being able to get about, and every where's 
going to be blocked’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
Concerns resonated across Central Greenwich, revealing that small firms felt event zones were subject to 
intense ‘scaremongering’ – rooting a ‘deep-seated paranoia’ in the minds of visitors. Small firms claimed 
that ‘people who would normally spend their Sunday shopping in Greenwich during the Olympics stayed 
clear (…) we lost our regular customers because our regular customers would have said ‘you’re crazy going 
in to Greenwich during the Olympics’ (…) people really avoided Greenwich unless they were here for the 
Games’ (Interviewee #33 (SG1)). Several others claimed: ‘you probably know from reading the central 
tourism stuff, people just decided to give London a miss this year’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)), and specifically 
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that ‘road transport problems were exacerbated by the degree of uncertainty in the run up to the event 
about what would happen – which caused customers to avoid the area as a precaution’ (Interviewee #28 
(SG1)). Such concerns were echoed by the Senior Business Engagement officer for Greenwich: 
‘A lot of the businesses, they could have done without it because actually a large number of their 
customer base didn't come out - normally people would go shopping on Saturday and Sunday but 
they listened to the campaign and thought they will avoid the town centres during that period of 
time (…) so you had this issue where people change their travel patterns, work from home, and 
the high streets and the road networks were very empty. This was a broader issue. (…) the town 
centres, experience change their patterns of behaviour, and avoid what they believed to be the most 
congested periods during the Games’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
Further illustrating this issue, the Head of Small Business for key East London support organisation 
‘Business in the Community’ claimed: 
‘I do not think there was any short-term benefit for smaller business through increased tourist and 
trade, and indeed people were put off by scare stories about how busy it was going to be and the 
transport was going to be blocked – it was a bit of a ghost town. So I don’t think there was much 
benefit to the local businesses or in the surrounding boroughs, if anything it would have had a 
negative effect (…) certainly thought it [congestion] was going to be much worse than it was, and 
they didn’t know how the system would cope, they were scared – I didn’t go [in HEZs] to face the 
hassle of queuing and that sort of stuff so it definitely put me off’ (Interviewee #17 (SG3)). 
Echoing findings from this research, Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) postulations directly relate 
disappointing footfall to similar ‘fear’ and ‘control’ factors  stemming from: (1) Boris Johnson’s 
announcement telling everyone to ‘stay away’, (2) ‘parking restrictions’, (3) ‘tourists being marshalled 
between train stations and sports venues’, and (4) the ‘nature of event tourists’ (Pappalepore and Duignan, 
2016). Sentiments resonated across small firm narratives claiming that ‘my customers were either not here 
because they expected it so busy, or they were enjoying the Olympics or went away. They were listening to 
Boris for the Olympics saying don't come into town’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Others highlighted that: 
‘You must have seen some of the footage, they completely barricaded off Greenwich market so 
nobody could get to us – not even our regular customers (…) so no people came because they 
were told to avoid it on the news and all the millions of visitors were completely barricaded off, so 
there was literally nobody over the busiest weekend ever. I literally made 20 quid’ (Interviewee #25 
(SG1)).  
Again, ‘ghost town’ images and references to 28 Days Later were used to visualise the host spaces: 
‘My son called me up and said ‘mum come down you'll love it here [central London] it's like the 
film 28 Days Later, it's a ghost town’. There is nobody there. After that it really brought it home. 
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They didn't get the right impression, like come to London to see the Olympics - it was like go there 
[to the event] and go home because you're going to be stuck because there will be too many people 
in London” (Interviewee #27 (SG1)).  
4.4.3.3 Fear of Olympic Route Networks, Parking Restrictions and the ‘Disaster Zone’ Effect 
The findings reveal that the aforementioned public announcements were accompanied by a string of other 
city-wide and localised tactics to invoke a sense of fear and contribute toward the militarisation effort. The 
installation of the Olympic Route Network (ORN) across London and militarised signage warning would-
be visitors not to drive into Greenwich, alongside special parking permits in Central Greenwich, appeared 
to further discourage regulars, visitors and tourists from travelling into and across host event spaces. Travel 
anxieties about complicated ORNs, fear of restrictions and the ease with which one could accrue penalty 
fines were reflected on by several respondents: ‘everyone was so scared to drive anywhere because of the 
Lane Olympic route restrictions’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)), and ‘they [visitors] were scared to come, I was 
even scared to move (…) I didn't want to go and wander into the wrong lane’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)). In 
addition to the above, the parking restrictions, permits and associated confusions around the release of 
them compounded the aversion market problematic for Central Greenwich. 
‘In the first week there was no traffic, there were no people left in London. Only the people who 
came to the Olympics - no one seemed to go anywhere’ (Interviewee 29# (SG1)). 
Special parking permits, alongside general parking restrictions threatening would-be visitors with clamping 
and towing enforced across Central Greenwich emphasised the zero-tolerance approach to Olympic 
policing, as alluded to earlier in the chapter. Respondents claimed: ‘regular customers were driven away 
because of the parking permits in Greenwich’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), ‘our customers who are normally, 
couldn’t get into the town centre because you had to have a special permit (…) even in a bad day we can 
get people coming through the door but they weren’t allowed to stop’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)), and that 
‘local residents who maybe would normally drive their car and pop down here for half an hour, or do 
whatever and bugger off home again, they'd been issued with the wrong parking permits’ (Interviewee #24 
(SG1)). A regional FSB representative for Greenwich illuminated the ‘fear narrative’ distilled throughout 
Greenwich, highlighting that ‘everyone had been talking: ‘oh my God, the fine you're going to get if you 
park in the wrong place, and they're just going to tow your car’.  We had a tow truck parked just on that 
junction there 24/7, just like if anyone even slightly slowed down they'd like flash them. It's like - it's zero 
tolerance…’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). As we can identify, and from the author’s experiences of being in 
Greenwich at the time, the fear tactics were efficacious and clearly had their desired impact. This was 
encapsulated by the Senior Business Engagement officer for Greenwich Council claiming that:  
‘Transport for London, LOCOG and the ODA were arguing they were too successful in changing 
people's behaviours and travel patterns to accommodate the millions of people coming into 
London. And that is the story throughout the games’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)); 
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The final theme here refers to the damaging visitation effects of Greenwich’s militarised signage, installed 
across the boundaries of the host borough warning would-be visitors away. According to one respondent: 
‘the TFL installed huge motorway signs telling our local traffic to avoid Greenwich’ (Interviewee #18 
(SG3)). 
Illustrated by the visual, respondents believed that the erection of these signs discouraged visitation by 
typifying Greenwich as being in a sort of state of ‘emergency’, installing a ‘fear factor’ and a perception of 
being a ‘disaster zone’, describing ‘these motorway signs that put the fear of God in people’ (Interviewee 
#18 (SG3)). One small firm remarked: ‘it [fears around Greenwich] just got more and scarier if you lived 
here, the approach to all the threats and the destruction. You know there were signs, Interviewee #24 
(SG1)'s probably told you, there were dot matrix signs - Stay out! Stay out! – and so they [visitors and 
regulars] did!’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Others claimed the key issue was: 
 ‘Getting customers to walk past the barriers to find the market place instead of walking around 
was an issue (…) the barriers took the cars around the market and avoided the area – making it 
hard for people to find us’  (Interviewee #43 (SG1)). 
 
Figure 20: 'Example of Olympic Warning Signs in HEZs' (Sony Jim, 2012) 
In light of the damaging effects on visitation, some respondents felt completely bamboozled about why 
signs were erected in the first place, especially because one of the major points of the Games was to 
encourage tourism and increase consumption to ultimately create economic opportunities for small firms 
to capitalise on. This was reflected on by one firm: 
‘So you get a signpost on the road that says don't travel in this area… Just don't travel in this area. 
And you think to yourself what on earth you are trying to tell people’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)).  
This was echoed by another: 
‘The huge motorway signage that was installed weeks before all of this changed, which put the fear 
of God into the usual commuter traffic or whatever, and they were like, no. I mean, you see a sign 
like that, like you do on the motorway, and it largely means an emergency of some sort, and it must 
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be really bad if they've gone and stuck that up there, you know what I mean?’ (Interviewee #24 
(SG1)). 
Further to this, one regional FSB representative encapsulated this dynamic perfectly, claiming:  
‘They [the TFL] put up- I mean, they would have had these all over London - but they had these 
horrible like motorway signs that have got these big orange flashing lights that they make the letters 
out of. Just like when there's an emergency at junction 1 on the motorway is closed, or whatever. 
So they put - they dotted these things at tactical places where roads were coming onto certain 
arteries, and basically told you keep away this is a disaster zone, pretty much. I can't remember the 
exact words now but expect heavy congestion, keep away, use other routes, things like that. So 
when they introduced the traffic light synching, which they did some weeks in advance of the 
games anyway, it created a whole different dynamic for the traffic (…) Anyway, the knock-on effect 
of that was that whatever notifications were down here, basically traffic stopped coming through 
here (…) Delivery is - suppliers that were delivering to shops and stuff, they would freak out and 
go, 'Well, we're not coming to deliver to you, you can't get down there, it's all chock-a-block and 
there's no, we can't go down there and we can tell…'. It was hilarious because the reality was 
everybody got so freaked out about all of this that nobody was coming down and literally there 
was no traffic at all! Like none at all! Of course, there was the traffic that traverses through 
Greenwich that were not coming’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
The aforementioned controls and fear tactics had the cumulative effects of reducing footfall, diverting 
regular visitation et cetera and emerged as being directly responsible for devastating trading periods. As 
alluded to already, small firms claimed that customers just could not get to them, and that for the most part 
‘all the residents left, it was heaven to go anywhere to drive, everyone was told to stay out of London’ 
(Interviewee #25 (SG1)), and one firm felt as though they were ‘robbed for weeks – we didn’t gain anything! 
(…) a hundred percent decrease in trade and our turnover in that month’ (Interviewee 37# (SG1)). The 
concern over devastating impacts on small firms, over key Olympic time periods, is discussed in detail in 
the ‘Olympic trade and tourism’ section but is briefly highlighted by the Chair of the East Greenwich 
Business Association (EGBA) claiming that: 
‘Greenwich Market had all been gearing themselves up to literally print money and no one could 
get to them! (…) and when people stopped coming in their cars then that was when we really 
started to suffer (…) the restaurants of course service local people and the tourists, and without 
either tourism or local people, plus having bought stock and nobody coming in to their restaurants 
at all, from the research that I did with local businesses in this patch, they were the ones that were 
worst affected’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
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4.4.3.4 Fear of Advertising and Trading Restrictions 
Empirical analysis revealed that intense advertising, trading and venue restrictions had a challenging effect 
on the performance and trading period of small firms, negating the efficacy of strategic event leveraging 
moves attempted by small firms. Several authors (e.g. Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Hall, 2006; O’Brien, 2006; 
Gold and Gold, 2008) claim that advertising and trade restrictions are often imposed to keep sponsors 
happy. Various small firms revealed that, although they conducted a series of leveraging exercises (e.g. 
Chalip, 2004) based on the predicted event visitor trade bounty, these were stunted by the intense regulatory 
pressures of HEZs. Restrictions were referred to as ‘threatening’ and ‘a bit scary’, ‘absurd’, a ‘tactic’ to 
intimidate and ‘bully’, ‘highly controlled’ and ‘very sanitised’ host spaces. 
Advertising and trading regulations appeared to stunt entrepreneurial leveraging and creativity to attract 
event related custom. For example, the loss of trading spaces (e.g. outside seating) reduced revenue 
potential. Secondly, products could not be affiliated with any part of the Olympic brand, ‘precluding any 
related advertising’ and product developments. Thirdly, existing pop-ups were forced out of trading in 
HEZs. Fourthly, already existing small firms were displaced from chosen ‘event venues’ – as illuminated in 
section 2.5.2 illustrating how  ‘they [existing business] may just have to sit out these Games on the side 
lines’ (BBC, 2009). Sponsorship expert Nigel Currie claimed in the same report that ‘whatever venues come 
in to use for the London Olympics will be completely clear from any sponsors, other than the ‘official 
sponsors and sponsors’ of the Olympics (…) ‘major governing bodies know how vital sponsorship income 
is to them, and therefore they have got to go out of their way to make every protection possible for their 
sponsors’ (BBC, 2009). The idea that corporations form a major powerful influence on the planning of 
mega-events, enough so that local traders are at risk of being ‘side-lined’, is a key point for this research 
(and evidenced throughout the literature, secondary and primary findings gathered for this study).  To 
expose the intensity of advertising and trade, it was even noted by respondents that the ‘O2 arena’ was 
required to change its name to the ‘North Greenwich Arena’ to avoid upsetting associated sponsors.  
With respect to the intense regulatory pressures restricting small firms throughout all phases of Games 
delivery, a small firm epitomised the undemocratic and striating forces of mega-events, claiming ‘that’s 
[intense regulation] crazy, we are all bound, we all have freedom of speech but we are bound by the five 
rings [Olympic rings]!’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). Across all data collection, arguments allude to the overtly 
commercial and corporate nature of the Games, and the IOC as a major advocate for escalating big business 
needs and sponsors, thus posing a potential risk of poor local inclusivity with respect to alienating smaller 
business. It is therefore unsurprising that corporate’ vs. ‘small, local’ enterprise should emerge as a major 
conflicting theme, despite initial rhetoric epitomised by one high-level SG as ‘our [London Assembly] 
purpose is (…) to look out for Londoners and to find ways in which Londoners can access those 
opportunities. This is what we have tried to do over the years. But it is very, very difficult given the corporate 
side and the operational side of the project, it is essentially about risk management for them’ (Interviewee 
#8 (SG1). As identified in the review, and detailed in the Discussions, findings here and across this chapter 
illustrate the overarching concern that the ambition of such large events often surmount to the prioritisation 
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of the spectacular elements of cultural production and economic discourse, as opposed to more locally 
rooted ones (e.g. Garcia, 2004a).  
It was however frequently highlighted that such restrictions, regulations and favouritism towards corporates 
were just a necessary evil of delivering the Olympics in host areas: ‘…the games have been a corporate 
event for as long as I can remember. It's all about big sponsorship, within venue zones - this is how they 
generate their money’ in order to claw back excessive public expenditures (e.g. Smith, 2012). Sanitised 
spaces ready to be painted with ‘brand IOC’ effectively ignore ‘contextual’ imagery, transcending the ‘local’ 
in order to deliver safe, standardised event experiences, delimiting risk, appealing to the populace, whilst at 
the same time ignoring diversity, plurality and multiplicity of discourses.  
Striated and controlled spaces orchestrated in light of appeasing and protecting sponsors and corporations 
(and protecting the Olympic brand) was a common theme across a number of SGs, epitomised by one 
high-level SG as ‘how do you get some of that magic Olympic dust to rub off on your small business? You 
couldn't even talk about Olympic kebabs. The Olympics is highly controlled’. In this position, ‘big players 
tend to muscle in’. One small firm said: ‘we didn’t want to tread on LOCOG’s product line’, and even the 
DCMS claimed that the prioritising of corporates indicates (although not a fault of the Games per se) ‘that 
is the kind of society we are living in (…) a wider argument around capitalism, isn’t it?’ (Interviewee #2 
(SG4). In light of such concerns, this thesis claims that mega-events are subject to – in several overt and 
covert ways - neoliberal doctrine, engineered in a multiplicity of ways, as identified across the findings and 
discussions of this thesis, to favour capital accumulation, indicative of ‘deeper’ forms of sponsorship.  
Across Central Greenwich small firms reported several tangible challenges such regulation has up on 
business operations, and ability to effectively thrive. One small firm claimed that enforcement officers 
threatened to prosecute her ‘to a point where I took my table and chairs for the entire summer, and because 
of the Olympics we lost 20% of our seating (…) which was a big problem for us before the Olympics’, a 
clear loss of trading space as ‘on a busy day it can improve our revenue by 20% (…) that has obviously 
affected us and has had a measurable financial impact on my business’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)).  Other 
businesses were fearful of advertising anything Olympic-related: ‘we weren’t allowed to do this, we weren’t 
allowed to do that (…) the community was very angry’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)), claiming that the ‘absurd 
Olympic branding and promotion regulations were an irritant that had to be understood but simply told us 
all the things we couldn’t do (…) where regulations largely precluded any related marketing’ (Interviewee 
#28 (SG1)). According to one Greenwich councillor ‘but the Games is all about the big sponsors, even 
businesses in the O2 could only sell certain types of beer - you couldn't even call it the O2! On the Olympic 
Park only certain businesses could sell food and drink - you walk in and there were no logos but just had 
fish and chips, a lot of people just had McDonald's and Coca-Cola, the games have been a corporate event 
for as long as I can remember. It's all about big sponsorship, within venue zones - this is how they generate 
their money’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). The idea that such striated and controlled spaces were orchestrated 
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in light of appeasing sponsors and corporations was a common theme across a number of SGs, repeatedly 
mentioned by small firms:  
‘We weren’t allowed to [conduct related marketing], we were told strictly if we mention the Olympic 
Games we would be prosecuted, and that was a day before they came in – the day before they came 
in and said if you advertise, and you do this, and do that you will be prosecuted – that is the way 
the approach it – it was just tactics to threaten us really – counts as bullying really – cleaning our 
act up. Clean streets before the Olympics, and then the day after, back to normal again (…) It was 
a waste of time doing anything, we were not allowed to do anything’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)).  
‘The food trader here, they wanted to put a way street market, so that people who come through, 
that want to put street entertainers – the council jumped on that, they wouldn’t have that and the 
Olympic Committee said that wasn’t allowed (…) For competition [not allowed as Games in favour 
of corporations] I think’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
‘The nature of our art is quite popular with tourists so Olympic visitors did like our items (…) but 
we could not have Olympic themed stuff which was negative for us (…) unable to strategically 
leverage because of the copyright issues – we didn’t want to tread on LOCOG’s product line’ 
(Interviewee #43 (SG1)). 
Across both literature and the data presented in this chapter, arguments alluding to the overtly commercial 
and corporate nature of the Games, and the IOC as a major advocate for escalating big business needs and 
sponsors, illuminate potential risk of poor local inclusivity with respect to smaller business. As explored 
across a range of the data analysis themes, the theme of ‘corporate sponsors’ vs. ‘local trader’ interests is 
clearly dominant – despite initial rhetoric focused around the Games being for the benefit of local people 
and East London communities, and specifically small firms. This is interesting in light of one interviewee 
comment claiming: ‘our [London Assembly] purpose is (…) to look out for Londoners and to find ways in 
which Londoners can access those opportunities. This is what we have tried to do over the years. But it is 
very, very difficult given the corporate side and the operational side of the project, it is essentially about 
risk management for them’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). Even the Head of Olympic Legacy in the DCMS 
claimed: ‘yeah, well it is [a corporate bonanza] (…) without doubt yeah. You can’t deny it, it’s a massive 
financial exercise, Coke and McDonald’s and all the others are involved (…) if you look at Westfield 
Shopping Centre which might have gone to Stratford, might have come a bit later had the Games not been 
coming. Now, I guess your Ian Sinclair probably thinks that Westfield is an abomination, and (…) I'm not 
personally a great lover of massive shopping centres but there's undoubtedly lots of local people who've 
got jobs in the area, undoubtedly lots of local people who love going to the Westfield shopping centre and 
love spending time there. Now [pause] does the money go to Jamie's Italian and all the other restaurants, 
rather than the local cafe? Probably yes, so I kind of know where he's coming from’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). 
This highlights the concern that larger corporations may, in various guises, overshadow local business 
interests, as discussed by a significant number of stakeholders. Throughout, it was highlighted that the 
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corporate nature of the Games and the way in which the IOC operates may form a playground where the 
‘big players tend to muscle in’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)), particularly in the cases of smaller local business, 
locking them out of, for example, construction-related opportunities. 
4.4.4 Inability to Market Games Involvement and the Guarding of Corporate Interests 
The findings further reveal that firms who were lucky enough to secure Games-related contracts were 
unable to promote their involvement and thus were unable to leverage the kudos-enhancing effects of being 
a ‘supplier’ to the Games (see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). The House of Lords (2013) claim that, due 
to the ‘no marketing rights protocol’ on suppliers advertising themselves as official suppliers to the Games, 
restrictions were placed in order to ‘protect the interests of main IOC sponsors, as well as the sponsors 
attracted by LOCOG (…) this measure, in effect, prevented British companies from freely using their 
experience of supplying to the Olympics to secure new work’ (House of Lords, 2013: 78). According to a 
DCMS (2012b) report this is a ‘commonly cited reason for not having capitalised to date’ (2012b: 14) to 
avoid ‘upsetting’ official partners. Whilst this was not a specific issue for small firms across Central 
Greenwich, it is still a pertinent issue raised for supporting non-corporate and sponsoring businesses to 
effectively leverage up on events related opportunities.  
Although a major part of the business legacy was to maximise supply opportunities for British business, 
this concern reveals a contradiction. One business interviewed for the report asked, ‘how can we shout 
about learning and achievements as this can’t be made public, as we are unable to promote it?’, while another 
mentioned that ‘to get any real commercial benefit, companies need to be allowed to demonstrate that they 
have, and are indeed working, on the London 2012 Games and this is virtually impossible in any real sense 
at the moment’ (DCMS, 2012b: 12). Again, this indicates the significant power of sponsors and ‘official 
suppliers’ to the Games to dictate such pertinent opportunity areas for small firms. The power which 
corporates have in relation to small firms here indicates neoliberal tendencies for such projects to overly 
accommodate the demands of big business whilst simultaneously ignoring, avoiding engagement with and 
downplaying the challenges faced by smaller firms. It is thus clear that an amalgamation of several factors, 
including red-tape, lack of skills and capabilities, restrictions on promoting involvement, all have to be taken 
into account with respect to including small firms in mega-event supply chain. The same is true for real 
assessment of small firm ability to leverage successfully. This was epitomised by the Head of Business 
Support, at the London Business Network, who claimed: 
‘Things like the fact that LOCOG had a lot less commercial opportunities or procurement 
opportunities than people probably thought because they would often use their sponsors, they 
would always, in the first instance, and sponsorship and things like that. Then this flowed into 
contracts as well, and the other thing is that each one of the contracts you couldn't bloody well 
promote the fact that you wanted to, and that was an initiative from day one’ (Interviewee #14 
(SG3)). 
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Interviewees felt that the Games project and the IOC tended to ‘guard’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)) the interests 
of corporations across a range of Olympic-related business opportunities. One senior civil servant at the 
London Assembly claimed: ‘in my view, [the IOC] were not very open to local business because they were 
more interested in high-level sponsorship deals to cover their costs’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). Businesses 
interviewed as part of this research described feelings of being ‘left out’, superseded by Games-corporate 
interests and an opportunity that only corporations could afford to be a part of. Discourses of dissent and 
anger clearly emerged too, as businesses felt they should have been the main beneficiaries of the Games, 
with the option to pitch and become part of the Games opportunity. One business claimed: ‘it [the Olympic 
Park space] is only for the commercial sponsors. We were not offered that option, the option to pitch up 
their business in Greenwich Park. It wasn't like, let's put our locals there, the ones that are here all year and 
paying the local rates. And you are the ones who are disrupted by the parking and traffic congestion’ 
(Interviewee #27 (SG1)). Local businesses felt detached from the Games, frustrated by overt corporate 
takeovers, as summed up by one business claiming: “the Games itself was, yes, I think probably won by the 
corporates” (Interviewee #36 (SG1)). Strident concerns were further expressed even at the higher project 
actor levels, with claims about ‘the disgraceful level of commercialisation of the Games, leaving it so 
dominated by rules designed to protect a few massive corporate sponsors, it's more a question of whether 
it [potential benefit] would be possible. Any improvements would involve greater cost of local consultation 
and promotion of local businesses who do not necessarily have marketing budgets to pay for it, while the 
corporate sponsors have no interest in paying for anything other than promoting and protecting their 
brands’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)). This was crystallised by one final comment by a senior Greenwich 
councillor: ‘I don't think there is a debate about it, the Olympic Games is a corporate games. It won't be 
on if they didn't secure those sponsorship deals’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
4.4.5 Concerns Beyond Greenwich 
Such concerns were not just confined to Central Greenwich, as the findings reveal that both Central 
London and Stratford, the main site of the Olympic Park, were subject to similar challenges. One Senior 
Business Engagement Officer argued that such effects were ‘not just for Greenwich - it was across the 
country. Look at the West End - the place was deserted. As a local authority there was not much you could 
do about it, the Transport for London, LOCOG, and the ODA were arguing they were too successful in 
changing people's behaviours and travel patterns to accommodate the millions of people coming into 
London. And that is the story throughout the games’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). Others claimed: ‘even 
Stratford was saying the same thing, people just aren’t doing the shopping like we expected. It wasn’t just 
Greenwich’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)).  
The spatial controls throughout Stratford’s Last Mile and the role of Westfield, a key part of the transitional 
entry point in to the Olympic Park, served to funnel tourism away from small firm communities close to 
and around Newham centre. Event visitors funnelled through newly designed spaces of corporate 
consumption. A Senior Business Engagement Officer at the time highlighted that ‘we had a key entry point 
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over in Stratford where the people came out of the tube station and then went via the bridge into Westfield” 
(…) if you came to Westfield they were booming. Westfield is a shopping mall, hundreds and thousands of 
people will go through to get to the Games’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). Additionally, a Senior Civil Servant 
at the ODA mentioned that: ‘so they [Westfield businesses] benefited hugely because you had to go through 
it to get there’ (Interviewee #7 (SG4)). One senior member of the London Assembly lobbied against spatial 
controls at the time, and reflects on such challenges across Stratford:   
‘If you think about the management of the footfall, it was very well managed, particularly through 
Stratford. There were other entrances to the park but it was mainly through Stratford, you got off 
the tube and funnelled through the marketplace of Westfield. So there was no chance for capturing 
the passing trade. Some of the footfall may have drifted out into smaller parts but in terms of the 
volume of the day-to-day tourists quite little of the visitors would have leaked out’ (Interviewee #8 
(SG4)). 
There is evidence, however, that this spatial arrangement actively excluded small firms operating outside of 
these orchestrated controls – a dominant narrative found in the empirical analysis here. This was 
encapsulated by the Head of Marketing at the London Chamber of Commerce: 
‘All these businesses that had been there for years and years and years had been expected a strong 
number of visitors but to see all the visitors being funnelled through Westfield, Stratford, straight 
into the park and then straight back out again. So it is, I guess, it's difficult to swallow’ (Interviewee 
#13 (SG3)).  
‘Arrived at Stratford, along with thousands of others, streamlined by fuzzy fingers, shocks of pink, 
butt-wrenching half-human, half non-human actor policeman [smiling?], his gun and his German 
Shepard (…) herded through Westfield, with the desire to buy a Boots meal-deal, excitement, 
blinded by the shine of Westfield’s cream stone interior (…) and as I recall never seeing much of 
the surrounding area, poised for the only destination in mind (…) into the Park I went with my 
partner, confronted with vibrant-but-sanitised spaces, happy people, cheer and laughter and mega-
structures that filled me with awe – and at the time – inspiration’ (Author’s auto ethnographic event 
experience observations).    
‘There was very, very little footfall from any foreign visitors, for example, or visitors to the 
Olympics. They basically saw the local shopping centre and they probably thought it was Westfield, 
and they walked around, did a quick loop, and then they'd got a bottle of water and then walked 
straight into, back into the park’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). 
4.4.6 Loss of Public Space and Local Attractions 
The empirical evidence suggests, as alluded to earlier, that in addition to Greenwich’s civic pedestrianized 
spaces, the loss of public spaces, including the Royal Greenwich Park, and the full and/or partial closure 
of renowned tourist destinations (e.g. the Royal Observatory), was believed to have been a key contributing 
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factor in de-incentivising cultural and heritage tourism, locals and regular visitors. This was seen to be an 
issue before, during and after the Games, a major issue for small retail and F&B firms, who often rely on 
regular footfall, especially for well-established tourism destinations like Greenwich. Several respondents 
claimed that the closure of civic spaces and local attractions significantly reduced regular local, wider 
domestic and international visitor footfall in the area. According to one small firm, the area would usually 
benefit from such footfall, claiming that ‘Greenwich Park was closed for three months before the Olympics 
so all the people who come to Greenwich just to the park, which is one of the main royal parks in London, 
and it was pretty much shut down for the spring. So we lost a lot of visitors to Greenwich’ (Interviewee 
#25 (SG1)). This view point was shared across small firms, with one claiming: 
‘Greenwich Park closed weeks before the Games started which impacted the number of visitors 
coming in to Greenwich’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)) 
Small firms were baffled by losing attractions and spaces, and by the Olympic controls, all of which played 
a significant role in stunting local consumption, to the detriment of business performance. This was 
reflected on by small businesses and, again, sentiments around the rather heavy ‘top-down’ planning 
emerged here:  
‘The poor Observatory was shut down… No one could get into the park… They had to shut down 
for their summer season. They must have been compensated some amount but either way - but 
hang on a minute but we are attracting tourism to Greenwich as part of the Olympics but we are 
closing down the tourism attractions. It looked as though someone sat down in Stratford in central 
London, and this is what we are going to do for everybody. The whole point from Greenwich’s 
point of view was to get the people in as tourists not just people straight in and straight out’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
Visual evidence uploaded by Sony Jim (2012) to the public image site ‘Flickr’ illustrates the ways in which 
local attractions were taken out of public use before, during and after the Games. 
 
Figure 21: Closure of Central Greenwich’s Local Tourist Attractions (Sony Jim, 2012) 
As highlighted next, the regular footfall trade is key for small firm trade but a major vulnerability for their 
bottom line, with one respondent claiming: ‘I mean, you are serving tourists and visitors, they're flowing 
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past to the observatory and the museum, and they've got to eat. When they stop coming to the Observatory 
and the museum, you have no customers’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Others amplified these concerns, 
include another small firm below:  
‘I would expect to have a number of people out for the day who would come in just because they 
were passing. But then you have 2/3 and then all of the Park closed, and it changes the way people 
move around. So I probably saw a decline in business during the lead up of walk-in business (…) 
these effects appeared to be further exacerbated by the known wider tourism displacement effects 
seen across London during the lead up and during the staging of the Games’ (Interviewee #23 
(SG1)). 
The findings also reveal that several transport hubs, including the Cutty Sark DLR and Maze Hill train 
stations, were closed to help control visitor footfall:  
 ‘That’s what I was trying to say about the stations, where you were expecting them to come in and 
they weren't because they were all sort of wiped off. There would have been some that would have 
gained from it but, again, it may well have happened after the event rather than during, the benefits. 
But, as far as having them all coming into their restaurants and/or retail; no, because, of course, 
you couldn't get to a lot of it” (Interviewee #16 (SG3)). 
4.4.7 Importance of Footfall for Small High Street Firms 
In light of the challenges around poor local footfall, it is pertinent to note that the evidence suggests that 
the Olympic effects discussed here proved to be a major problem for small firm performance, particularly 
in light of the importance of local and regular residential trade, regional, national and international visitor 
footfall when visiting the attractions and tourist destinations. This was reflected by a small business advisor 
at the LLDC claiming that ‘generally, high street type of businesses and organisations and generally more 
geared around the retail market, and dealing with individual consumers. People who want to buy whatever, 
as opposed to more business-to-business type ventures and contracts (…) retail markets and any high street 
depends, it might be the whole, be directed towards the retail market and passers-by’ (Interviewee #10 
(SG4)). Furthermore, ‘fixed’ location businesses like retailers and F&B providers claim that ‘retail is a 
slightly different beast, because retail is very much about… retail is much more location dependent, it’s 
much more footfall independent’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)). Empirical evidence therefore suggests that 
closing the aforementioned attractions and territorialisation of civic spaces, compounded by spatial controls 
and fear factors, illustrates further how Central Greenwich was subject to the ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’.  
Therefore, a significant concern arises in the context of mega-events: the importance of footfall, and the 
unfortunate propensity for Olympic environments to stunt the trading opportunities that Greenwich’s small 
firms were hoping for. This was encapsulated by one small firm claiming that: 
 ‘You [visitors] were physically marshalled, there was a barrier three quarters metre high. This is 
why these shops have got doors open – you need as little barriers as you can between you and the 
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customers’ (…) How do I as a single retailer understand where my market is? It is only footfall and 
passing trade’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
4.4.8 Event Tourists and their Behaviours  
As already alluded to earlier, findings reveal that Central Greenwich visitors’ experiences, their behaviours 
and consumption patterns, posed a major challenge for small firms. These behavioural changes were 
attributed to the control of local space, the marshalling, barricading and overarching militarisation of 
Olympic space. The resulting effects were abandonment of space during the live events, desertion by 
regulars and locals (e.g. aversion markets), limited local trade footfall across interviewed small firms, and 
little by way of event visitors ‘sticking around’ after the events. The purging of local space and established 
attractions compounded such issues. Such effects were seen prior to, during and after the Games (e.g. 
security and closures remained for weeks between the Olympics and the Paralympics). One senior business 
engagement officer for Greenwich council claimed illuminated these concerns: 
‘The town centres experienced a change in patterns of behaviour [by regulars and visitors] and 
avoided what they believed to be the most congested periods during the Games’ (Interviewee #19 
(SG2)). 
Although wider London tourism displacement was expected during the intense staging of the Games, the 
damaging tourism effects seen in Greenwich formed a major surprise for local businesses interviewed for 
this study. The intended and/or unintended consequences of Games planning and delivery symbolised and 
actualised the exclusionary tendencies of mega-events to ‘lock’ small firms out of the Olympic party as 
outlined earlier in the review. The propensity for small firms to enjoy local-event spend is thus limited. 
Despite strident pre-Games rhetoric around tourism bounties, even at the national level doubt over the 
true benefits emerged from then Culture Secretary, Jeremy Hunt MP: ‘it is very difficult to predict what will 
actually happen to consumer spending in one part of London during something like the Olympic Games 
because the upheaval is so huge. We are hoping to come away net positive in terms of the overall period of 
the Games but we don’t know’ (Independent, 2012). Empirical findings from this thesis echo these 
sentiments and illuminate the reality of such concern – despite promises and hopes for host communities 
to benefit from immediate event tourism and trade as established in both the review (section 2.3.4) and first 
part of the findings.  
4.4.8.1 Limited Local Knowledge and the ‘Unknowns’  
The findings also highlight two other potential reasons why event visitors may offer little value for local 
consumption. Firstly, several respondents claim that, by virtue of often having limited local knowledge of 
Olympic areas, event tourists may be more likely to stick to where they know and remain within controlled 
event spaces to avoid any form of uncertainty. One small firm claimed: ‘their choice [to stick to official 
event routes] was made easy with the marshalling - but [for visitors] it's that thing of well I don't know the 
area and where I am going, and it is easier to go the way I have been told and by and large unaware that a 
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thriving community of small firms were within reach’ (Interviewee #38 (SG4). A senior Greenwich 
councillor claimed: ‘for a lot of people the main priority was to see the event and then go home. If I was 
younger I may have hung around. (…) but if you are a tourist you are not going to wander off, you will 
stick to what you can see, you don't want to get lost’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). This theme of ‘fear’ of the 
‘local unknowns’ and ‘getting lost’ was joined by the idea of ‘crowd mentality’, which emerged as an 
additional explanation for event visitor behaviours in the context of this case study, with one small firm 
claiming: ‘the tourists were still following the foam fingers and did not explore local areas’ (Interviewee #26 
(SG1)). Interestingly, such concerns mimic Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) findings and are reported 
across several senior host borough councillor responses: 
‘It's that crowd mentality, people not knowing where they're going and if you're a local that can 
really impact on your day-to-day, I guess that is the issue we had with the businesses (…) I went 
to the Wembley Cup Final - I don’t think I have ever gone outside of the immediate circle of my 
entry point from the Wembley Tube station (…) so there was no way they were going to go beyond 
that immediate thoroughfare [of event zones]’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)).   
‘What happened was, people came along and they concentrated on the games, and concentrated 
on the work. The people who came to see the games tended to see the games, I think, and that 
meant that it didn't have a huge economic benefit [on the Olympic areas] (…) I think there were 
unrealistic expectations of what was actually going to happen (…) the games were remarkably well 
planned, and there were all kinds of trials and tribulations, as everybody knows in the run up to 
the games with security and everything else (…) the games were superbly well-organised, and that 
meant that promoters of the organisation, meant that people didn't actually go out and wander all 
over London (…) They just didn't wander out and go and see London, thinking this is a once in a 
lifetime opportunity, typically, and therefore were not going to go to all these obscure parts of 
London, which might have a great offer for the people who come to London from overseas’ 
(Interviewee #21 (SG2)). 
4.4.8.2 Fatigued Tourists, Lack of Local-Cultural Interest, and the ‘Crowd Mentality’ 
Secondly, a mix of event exhaustion after a full-day of activities in live sites, and the concern that event 
visitors might have limited interest in the local-cultural aspects of their tourism experience was raised. The 
issue was limited numbers of visitors sticking around, and appearing to be more concerned with just 
returning back to their hotels and/or central London areas – away from Olympic areas. Several respondents 
hoped that visitors would stick around; one small firm thought: ‘surely when they [event visitors] come out 
they were hungry… But they were going straight, train straight back to the hotel, and wherever home’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). However, a senior councillor for Greenwich reflected that: ‘I suspect these people 
were from further away, they were very keen on getting to the venue that was their destination – not to 
have breakfast in Greenwich or Stratford! Their destination was the venue. They came from another 
country; they didn't want to spend a lot of money. Their seat was their primary goal, everything else outside 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
159 | P a g e  
 
it was just… [ignored]’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Small firms were, however, not the only stakeholders to 
share this view, time and time again senior stakeholders from local host borough authorities, right through 
to the UK Government echoed these sentiments:  
‘The other thing you need to bear in mind is that it is a long day for many people, visitors get there 
very early on and for many they just wanted to get home. We did a lot of animation and additional 
events during that period of time but if you had been up since six o'clock in the morning to get 
through the gates at 8.30 to get a decent spot and you had been there all day long for some people, 
particularly the older ones, come four or five o'clock you aren't going to stick around, you are going 
to go home. And they were also there to just watch that aspect of the Games and then go back 
home. And then watch it on TV at home. Many were from close counties like Kent and were not 
here to soak up the culture. This was something we were conscious of, that it was a long day for 
many people - to see the Olympics and then go home afterwards, and then maybe a small 
percentage of people would be interested in staying on’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
‘Tourism and footfall was a key issue around the main event areas, the marshalling and barricading 
was a problem, and the behaviour of tourists meant they did not stick around. They were tired. 
They had spent all day in an Olympic Park and just wanted to get back to their hotels (…) due to 
the nature of event tourists they did not stick around, and as they had eaten already and funnelled 
back to the station - they had minimal footfall’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)). 
‘Where we struggled a little bit, by this time I had ten years' worth of experience of the visitor 
economy and town centre management, was really how you would divert people during the 
games from the destination. So the problem with a mega event that we noticed quite quickly was, 
if you're only in London for the day and you weren't sort of going to leave the park. You were 
going to enter the park, do whatever you had the ticket for, and actually you'd probably stick 
around in and around the park for the day, while the weather was good. Then unless you had a 
hotel in and around the area within which - such as Newham or Tower Hamlets, or Greenwich - 
you're unlikely, therefore, to then go and explore the local area. You might then go - so your train 
was from Central London, and you'd go back into Central London to the Olympics there’ 
(Interviewee #20 (SG2)).  
Several small firms claimed: ‘they [event tourists] were going to the venue and then just going back to their 
hotel. They weren’t spending any money’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)), and that ‘after the event we just thought 
tourism would come out of Greenwich and have a look around town, maybe go for a drink and have 
something to eat but they didn’t. Again the people with the pink fingers was shepherding back to the station’ 
(Interviewee #25 (SG1)). The argument and qualifier to be considered here is the extent to which 
behaviours are indicative of event tourists themselves or are, in fact, a product of aforementioned venue 
and spatial controls enforced upon Central Greenwich. The prevailing view from small firms indicates the 
latter: 
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‘I saw how they had this, saw the people, warding them on. Then what was even more hilarious 
and surprising was, in the evening when people were coming out and you'd be thinking… I mean, 
we'd been told the council, I mean, the council was I think a bit fooled as well, 'Oh yeah, everyone 
is going to be hanging around and de, de, de and chilling out, and having a bite to eat or go to the 
pub, or something like that'. They came out and they had no opportunity for anything, they were 
being shoehorned like small schoolchildren…’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
Complementing the above perspectives, one of the co-authors of the London 2012 bid claimed that they 
were advocating that event tourists always tend to behave in these particular ways, and highlighted that 
‘Greenwich fell into a trap, in my view’, believing that ‘people would come into Greenwich and want to 
hang around, and will want to use all the venues around it (…) People don't do this when they go to a 
games. You've got to understand how people behave when they go to the Games… Tourists are completely 
different… and they don't behave this way’ (Interviewee #5 (SG4)). The interviewee drew on some of the 
aforementioned concerns: 1) little desire to engage in cultural activities, 2) issues of ‘crowd mentality’, 3) 
desire to be in central London inner city areas. The resulting effects served to compound tourism and trade 
challenges, and illustrate potential reasons why the dichotomy between opportunity ‘rhetoric’ and realities 
emerged. Encapsulating this point perfectly, Chair of the London 2012 Forum for LOCOG claimed:  
‘They [event visitors] are completely different, and they're much focused and I think the prime 
example for me was Atlanta in their cultural festival. What did they do? Quite counterintuitive of 
them, they put on classical music concerts during the games. Why? Who would go to them? 
Nobody. People don't go to Atlanta for the Olympic Games to go to classical concerts, and but 
that was their view of cultural festival around the games. It wouldn't work. (…) I said, 'You're not 
going to have tourists like you normally have. People are going to come to the West End and 
they're going to stay in the West End but where are they going to go each day? They're going to be 
in the Olympic Park, they're not going to be where you are’ (…) Many of them were not [prepared] 
- I think many of them weren't and that was the problem, and partly because the anticipation was 
built-up they're going to get loads of people, and that they didn't because they wouldn't. Unless 
you've been there and you see it, you don't understand the nature of how an Olympic Games 
works. It's just a very, very unusual event, and people don't operate in them as they do in other 
ways. They're not normal tourists’ (Interviewee #5 (SG4)).  
‘I think there was a real lack of understanding, actually, from the point of view of the local 
authorities, in particular around what they should be promoting, and then, in a sense, charging local 
businesses to try and come into it and set up their stalls, and the stalls didn't work. They felt very 
let down by this, and I can understand that. It wasn't due to anything particularly iniquitous for the 
local authorities but it was just due to just not understanding how people behave during a games. 
So the consequences are that some businesses folded as a result of that; not many, but some’ 
(Interviewee #5 (SG4)). 
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4.4.9 Elite Spaces – The Commercialisation and Commodification of Host Spaces  
One additional dominant theme reveals that host space was subject not just to control but also to an intense 
corporate gaze, with commodified and re-commercialised routes – succumbing to the overt demands of 
corporations and official sponsors. Such territorialised and controlled spaces subject local ‘public goods’ to 
commodification. This was a new Olympic commercialisation agenda – from the Royal Park of Greenwich 
to the transportation entry routes and barricaded routes along Central Greenwich’s Last Mile. This was 
echoed across stakeholders perspectives, from small firms on the front line seeing their public spaces 
become capture, territorialised and then re-commercialisation, to major project actors across UK 
Government, including the three below: 
‘One is that there are big corporates who are engaged as sponsors of the Olympics, and their 
interests are given very…every allowance is made for them’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). 
 ‘Yeah, well it is [a corporate bonanza] (…) without doubt, yeah. You can’t deny it, it’s a massive 
financial exercise, Coke and McDonald’s and all the others are involved’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). 
‘I don't think there is a debate about it, the Olympic Games is a corporate games. It won't be on if 
they didn't secure those sponsorship deals’ (Interviewee #19 (SG3)). 
The findings reveal barricaded spaces transformed into new and exclusive re-commercialised commodities 
and pitching locations for commercial exploitation – a narrative reflected across several respondents who 
claimed that the barriers merely posed as a façade. One small firm claimed: ‘there was no reason for it [the 
barricades]… apart from to preserve some exclusive space to capture everybody for their temporary market 
at the expense of people who actually run the business in the area’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)).  
Narratives emerging from small firms illustrated perplexed and angry concern that new spaces for 
entrepreneurial opportunity occurring on their door step manifested as risk for existing permanent firms – 
displacing potential trade for regular, business-rate and tax-paying local businesses across Central 
Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’. Frustrated by this scenario, small firms felt this was a direct tactic to further exclude 
existing business from leveraging established opportunities – event crowds were ‘already serviced’ across 
the Last Mile service stop. Several respondents claimed: ‘it was large amount to pay [for the new re-
commercialised spaces] but you also had to give away a percentage of the takings, it was ridiculous. I don't 
think anyone did it. It was chains from outside who did’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). Another claimed: ‘there 
were a number of pop-up coffee shops and it was out of towners who made a killing. We all suffered. There 
were food and cake stalls in front of their restaurant selling food’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)). Not only were 
the spatial controls, marshalling of tourism, venue restrictions, and all the other aforementioned concerns, 
a challenge but small firms also highlighted ways in which Central Greenwich was commercially re-
purposed, making it unaffordable for them to purchase new Olympic spaces to sell their goods and letting 
new pop-ups and official venue suppliers further disrupt and stunt local consumption. Small firms in the 
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locale told of being locked out; their public spaces re-framed as new spaces for a more corporate, ‘official’ 
form of consumption: 
‘We were offered a stall or a pitch inside the barricade and the Olympic space for like £3 million 
pounds an hour. It was a ridiculous amount of money. So much money that everyone in the market 
knew that none of us could afford to do it’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). 
‘It was engineered. Here were a lot of families, and they had bottles of water, and on some of the 
hottest days of the year, and they are asking them to leave the bottle at the front, so that they 
could sell them smaller bottles of water for 5/6 quid … We had people fainting, they were 
coming down here lobster red from being in the sun – they weren’t allowed to take their own 
sunscreen in. That’s health and safety, which is putting people into danger - for money!’ 
(Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
 ‘It [the Olympic Park space] is only for the commercial sponsors. We were not offered that option, 
the option to pitch up their business in Greenwich Park. It wasn't like let's put our locals there the 
ones that are here all year and paying the local rates. And you are the ones who are disrupted by 
the parking and traffic congestion’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)).  
Several critical theories (and conspiracies) emerged from interviewee respondents, such as claiming that 
Central Greenwich was subject to host space engineering to divert and preserve visitor pennies for new 
commercial outlets and corporate ends. An analysis of media discourse at the time referred to the selling 
off of host space as ‘eBay’ style, symbolising the privatisation of public assets, raising concerns over free-
market neoliberal doctrine whereby city and national assets are bought and sold, and that mega-events 
represent a withering of the public realm, aided through aforementioned ‘emergency politics’ and the 
territorialising tentacles of the Games. Thus, there was another entry point for capital to accumulate in the 
life and soul of the city.  Such arguments are built upon further in significant detail during the ‘Discussions’ 
chapter. A range of viewpoints encapsulated these issues: 
‘We weren’t offered stalls or anything, we were kept separate – it was their own companies who 
came in – none of us could do anything, we were not informed of anything – maybe we might have 
a stall somewhere and sell food because we are here all the time – paying the rates – but we weren’t, 
we were completely blown away’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
In light of such host space concern, one senior civil servant at the London Assembly stated:  
‘If you think about how they manage the flows of people onto those spaces [inside and outside 
event spaces] which are corporate spaces aren't they? There isn't some areas where they have pop-
up restaurant…. And a market fair - that is just not how it is done. It is much sanitized. Very 
controlled. To make sure that those key brands are what is on offer and you associate the positive 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
163 | P a g e  
 
experience and buzz of being on the Olympic Park with Coca-Cola and sponsors’ (Interviewee #8 
(SG4)). 
One small firm encapsulated the issue perfectly:    
‘They’ve [Games actors] put barriers across in front of the market. Basically they were discouraging 
people from engaging with the community so they could go in there [event venue] where they sold, 
you know, franchisees, merchandising – they didn’t want anybody spending money where it counts! 
(…) it’s [Olympics] a rolling industry, that goes through and sucks the life out of every community 
goes into it, it has happened in Sydney, happens in many other places (…) When they had the 
Olympics in Sydney, it was a huge boost for tourism but it was not a boost to businesses around 
the events because they were excluded. The impact after the event, I mean, you know they are still 
trying to [recover…?] (…) These people come in, they take what they want and then they leave, 
they want the next project (…) They are self-contained satellites that land inside your environment 
and they basically have a force field around them and unless you’ve got a huge corporate key (…) 
you are totally excluded’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
‘That is a just big cooperate business, as the World Cup, these events are supposed to be to 
engage people and they’re not, they suck money out of you (…) they market something that is 
supposed to be very cool and everyone gets sucked in to it - but once you have the experience, 
you’ll never want to come back in your city’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
4.4.9.1 Rule 50 and Corporate Spill Over 
On a related note, the relationship between the overt commercialisation and territorialisation of host space 
outside official venue(s) and ‘Rule 50’ of the Olympic Charter (IOC Olympic Charter, 2013) may provide 
a suitable explanation of such spatial dynamics. Rule 50 simply states that ‘No form of advertising or other 
publicity shall be allowed in and above the stadia, venues and other competition areas which are considered 
as part of the Olympic sites. Commercial installations and advertising signs shall not be allowed in the 
stadia, venues or other sports grounds’ (IOC, 2013 – in section: ‘Advertising, demonstrations and 
propaganda’). Although championing the sterilization of brands, the idea that official sponsors and 
corporate brands were prohibited in the stadia, which in turn required alternative ‘event spaces’ to extend 
their market reach, may have led to an extension and corporate spill over into peripheral event spaces like 
HEZs and the Last Mile, and thus the creation of ‘brandscapes’ (see Smith, 2013). Evidence provided in 
this thesis thus argues that spatial control may have been a direct strategy to help capture such exclusive 
spaces; afforded and legitimised by the aforementioned new legislative order. Similar concerns are echoed 
in McGillivray and Frew (2015) – the idea that the Games corporate agenda stretched into a milieu of host 
spaces, including: ‘Live Sites’, with the claim that ‘during the summer of 2012, London was kneeling at the 
altar of the Olympic brand’ (2015: 2658). The gathered evidence suggests that spatio-commercial creep re-
engineered host landscapes and transformed passive spectators into Olympico-corporate sponsors – local-
civic host spaces captured as prime temporary real-estate for commercial gain. Sentiments shared across 
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the media echoed such points, claiming that: ‘the key issue for corporates is that they do not have any 
opportunity to promote in venues, so they look to maximize mass impact outside the venues, and this 
includes any venue that comes into use for the Games’ (BBC, 2009). The resulting effect is that ‘there is 
actually very little in your face advertising in the Olympic village itself, and there is none in the sporting 
venues (…) ‘however, step outside the park though – this isn’t billboard advertising, this is landscape 
advertising’ (Channel 4, 2013). The idea of corporate spill over and the effects of this up on the locale was 
detailed earlier in the review (section 2.5.4).  
The deeper permeation of corporations across Games spaces illustrates ‘deeper’ forms of influence upon 
the scheduling and planning of Games-space, alongside manipulated spectator gaze and consumption 
patterns. As illustrated earlier in the review, and to be explored later in the Discussions chapter, such 
concerns directly highlight McGuigan’s (2005) concern over the shift from ‘associative’ to ‘deep’ 
sponsorship, and the effects this has up on the planning, delivery and host impacts of the Games. Such 
risks were raised repeatedly across SGs, encapsulated by one small firms below: 
‘The disgraceful level of commercialisation of the Games, leaving it so dominated by rules designed 
to protect a few massive corporate sponsors, it's more a question of whether it [potential to benefit] 
would be possible. Any improvements would involve greater cost of local consultation and 
promotion of local businesses who do not necessarily have marketing budgets to pay for it, while 
the corporate sponsors have no interest in paying for anything other than promoting and protecting 
their brands’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)).  
4.5 Resistance  
4.5.1 Factors Causing Resistance 
In light of the addressed small firm challenges, the perception of lies and deceit, and rhetoric vs. reality, the 
theme of local ‘resistance’ from the Central Greenwich community became dominant. A significant number 
of respondents across the stakeholder groups alluded to the illogical, commercialised and damaging nature 
of Olympic security on small firm performance – and the overarching feeling of being marginalised and 
excluded from event opportunities.  
Narratives from small firms to policy makers alluded to the ‘heavy handed’ and ‘over planned’ (Interviewee 
#25 (SG1)) and ‘fortified’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)) nature of Olympic security. One senior host borough 
councillor claiming that the TFL executed an ‘unbelievable job’ in controlling host spaces but that control 
mechanisms were ‘a bit too strong in places’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)), resulting in the public ‘having the 
fear of God put into them’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). The controls clearly ‘did not allow people to spill over’ 
(Interviewee #19 (SG2)), and thus small firms were ‘not getting enough footfall into local areas due to 
LOCOG mismanagement in places’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). Narratives from small firms, as identified 
earlier in the chapter, described such controls as though the Gestapo and Christopher Columbus had 
landed, and referenced the Stalin-esque marshalling tactics, and the Games as an alien project which did 
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not interact. Cross-stakeholder concerns over the mismanagement of space and its contrived nature, which 
actively marginalised small firms, prevailed, described by one as akin to ‘crushing a nut with a 
sledgehammer’ ((Interviewee #15 (SG3)) – as discussed earlier in the chapter. 
As touched upon earlier, several respondents did not understand why such intense barricading and 
marshalling was there in the first place, given the natural spatial arrangement of Central Greenwich – as an 
already built-up square. Small firms believed that ‘they [London 2012 actors] don't need to [have the 
barriers] (…) There could have been gaps in the barrier. But the key thing, the barrier did not have to be 
there. That's why we got it removed. I'm sure they suddenly realised we don't need, why have we spent 
money hiring these blocks’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). Another firm claimed: ‘a lot of it could have been 
avoided, the barrier did not have to be there and there didn’t have to be that many people directing so many 
families (…) the people who come to the Olympics are not your usual football hooligans’ (Interviewee #27 
(SG1)). Secondly, several respondents claimed the elongated route, designed to get visitors to the event 
venue, and did not make sense. One small firm claimed: ‘instead of walking through the market or down 
Campton Lane past Red Door, which would've been the most direct route… They have walking all the way 
around the outside and into the Olympics area where they had their own cafes and shops and stalls (…) it 
was kind of bizarre, it was like the council agreed. Why people can’t just make their own way through the 
town, we were told because it was because of safety’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). It was because of the illogical 
nature of Games planning, that the theme and acts of resistance appeared to emerge: 
The perceived illogical nature of visitor marshalling was further emphasised by another small firm: 
‘When the council said it was going to be in the Park, and the naval college was going to be the 
main ticket area, why on earth would they send them down that way down College Approach, 
which then they had to put a bridge over Bromley Road? You would have thought they would have 
shoved the tickets down the other end and brought everyone in from Maze Hill. It did not seem 
to make any logical sense as to why they have funnelled everyone. Even people who got off at 
Maze Hill had to walk down here and join the line down here. They couldn't walk down King 
Edward Walk. It is just weird why they are walking all the way round’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
Although earlier in the chapter the idea was raised that security was a practical necessity, the overarching 
view was that host space was too controlled, and it was thought of as being a façade to direct footfall toward 
the event venues. This was echoed by one firm claiming that controls were designed to ‘preserve some 
exclusivity to capture everybody for their temporary market at the expense of people who actually run 
business in the area. We really didn’t need stewards. They said there was going to be dangerous numbers 
of people, that’s why we had to put our tables and chairs in because people might trip over them. Not one 
person walked down Turpin Lane. So I think if they let people make their own way, people would have 
ambled through the market and seen a little bit more of Greenwich – obviously use the businesses there. It 
was over-planned’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Obvious concerns over security ‘risk’ aversion were the driving 
force but needed to be rationalised with respect to the detrimental effects controls can have on host small 
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firms. The theme of risk permeates throughout the analysis of this thesis, and is illustrated in context by a 
range of stakeholders: 
‘It’s their own risk management, isn't it? Risk management and it was very heavy controls that, 
okay, there might be some logic as to why that…it didn't have to be like that. (…) you don't need 
literally to shoehorn them and physically push - I mean, literally they were even being manhandled’ 
(Interviewee #24 (SG1)).  
‘I remember the word ‘risk’ coming up all the time [during planning phases]’ (Interviewee #16 
(SG3)). 
What we can identify from the empirical findings so far is a host space subject to multiple economic 
challenges, all of which ultimately amount to small firms being unable to capitalise on event visitor and 
tourism footfall. Small firms did not understand why there were no gaps in the barriers, causing a limited 
propensity for visitors to explore the local area: 
‘The whole of Church Street - it was pedestrianized, there was no traffic coming in this way and 
turning right, so it was completely pedestrianized…. So why do you need a barrier then? Yes, it 
makes sense, barriers on the other side because you have traffic, so the picture house over the 
wrong side couldn't do anything because the people were over the other side (…) There could have 
been gaps in the barrier. But the key thing, the barrier did not have to be there (…) I know they 
were looking for ultimate numbers and worst-case scenarios, just in case (…) I am however unsure 
whether they needed the barriers anyway. Couldn’t they just allow tourists to explore the areas?’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
Exacerbating such issues, small firms felt there were hardly any local contact points to voice their concerns 
over the security problematic – as discussed earlier in the findings. The poor consultative nature of the 
Games emerged as a dominant theme of the research. Small firms felt that, if they had been supported 
better, they would have been able to mitigate the prolonged damage of Olympic controls. One respondent 
claimed:  
‘It was too big and dealt with from somewhere else. They could have set up a localized office here 
covering the three Olympic sites – we may have had more of a localized impact and someone to 
speak to. Instead you were told to speak to LOCOG (…) if there was more engagement and 
consultation and there was a better situation with someone to talk to, it would have made life much 
easier, to talk to (…) for example if we could have contacted someone about the barrier, we could 
have got this thing moved and it would have been two days max. But because it was a shock at the 
start, people started to moan and then it took me to organise it’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)).  
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4.5.2 Local Resistance Tactics – Verbal and Physical Action vs. Passive Resistance 
In light of the challenges the barriers to trade and tourism, several respondents highlighted that the local 
host community pushed back against project striation and resisted the intense securitisation controls 
invoked by London 2012 during the Games. The aforementioned findings reveal that Olympic controls 
were met with forceful local resistance and attempts to find their voice, amplify their narrative and make a 
change. Acts of creative resistance were sought in several ways, with some resolving matters through 
physical and verbal action directly on the streets. Others took a more passive approach to bringing about 
change. However, it is clear that the strident Olympic territorialisation invoked local lines of flight and acts 
of creative resistance in order to achieve emancipation from the Games regime. Such acts provide practical 
tactics – a resistance manifesto perhaps, as reflected on later in the discussions as a potential contribution 
to knowledge (see section 5.16 for the ‘Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage’).  
4.5.2.1 Breaking Through the Barricades 
Firstly, the findings reveal that small firms took physical action out on the barricades. Several respondents 
highlighted that attempts were made to handcuff themselves to and dismantle the barriers in order to allow 
for a greater spill over of event visitors. Cross-stakeholder narratives reveal that small firms ‘were still 
suffering with the barrier problem (…) some people were so pissed off that they actually man-handled the 
barriers themselves’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), whilst other small firms were willing to ‘handcuff themselves 
to the barricades’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)) as a show of protest against the unfair controls across Central 
Greenwich. One small firm remarked: 
‘During the Games they considered handcuffing themselves to the barricades, that’s why they 
panicked and we had to have publicity. Most of the restaurants and the people at the market got 
together!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
The main idea was to break open the barrier to simply allow for greater visitor footfall and to encourage 
local exploration. Several respondents claimed that traders were disappointed and angry with the effects 
controls were having well into the live Games phase, so much so they ‘took it up on themselves to dismantle 
the barrier and put some signs up to welcome people in (…) as these people were just trying to change 
something’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Small firms attempted to create new signs in an attempt to encourage 
and direct blocked off visitors onto the Central Greenwich Island – as described by several respondent:  
‘The market in particular were up in arms and they had to put signs saying ‘market this way’ because 
no one could access the market, there was no entrance for them to go in to’ (Interviewee #27 
(SG1)). 
‘It got to the point that we got so furious that we went out into the street and try to talk to the 
stewards and to say this is really unfair and to actually try to direct people, we put up a big sign 
with there is a market here, come through the market’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). 
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Interestingly, the battle to relax controls across Greenwich was also contested by the council themselves. 
One senior councillor at Greenwich Council claimed they too were resisting and attempting to hold back 
against LOCOG, ODA and TFL demands, claiming that ‘prior to the Olympics the council tried 
vociferously to make sure that LOCOG and ODA requirements were controlled and held back to some 
extent and to compromise for those regulations did not have an impact on businesses’ (Interviewee #19 
(SG2)). The same respondent referred to the initial proposals by the LOCOG and ODA as ‘truly horrifying’ 
(Interviewee #19 (SG2)) in terms of ‘loss of parking space and transport flows…’ and thus claimed the 
council ‘pushed back quite aggressively, against what the [initial] requirements were’ (Interviewee #19 
(SG2)). Resistance, both during and before London 2012, appeared to be sought across Greenwich actors. 
However, as discussed in the section ‘Marginalisation and exclusion of local community’, the idea that small 
firms and the council were both hand-tied with respect to major aspects of Olympic planning emerged as 
a key problematic.  
4.5.2.2 Lobbying Against Olympic Controls and Re-commercialised Routes 
Secondly, the findings reveal several ways in which small firms directly lobbied (to council, local MPs and 
LOCOG) against the Olympic controls with respect to 1) removal of barriers and changing marshal 
behaviours, 2) removal of new businesses across the re-commercialised spaces of the Last Mile, and 3) to 
tone down militarised signage discouraging would-be visitors. Several respondents highlighted that ‘once 
this [barricading and marshalling] started to happen we [small firms] collectively lobbied our local council 
and MPs and just tried to change some of the behaviours of the marshals’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). The 
efficacy of this movement, and efforts to change behaviour and Olympic controls, were amplified by the 
involvement of council senior management. It was through local lobbying that resistance efforts were 
helped, as ‘the leader of the council got involved and changed those requirements to spill over and to cross 
the streets, to not so aggressively barricade or corral/channel visitors to the park’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
The idea that small firms, the local community and Greenwich Council were together resisting project 
striation and controls emerged as a key theme here.  The Chair of East Greenwich Business Association 
mentioned: 
‘There was a lot of lobbying going on and fights in terms of what LOCOG, were they going to be 
allowed to do or not to do, and the goalposts seemed to be moving quite a lot at one point (…) I 
don't know how many days it took before everyone worked it out, and then we got on BBC News 
and it was just Greenwich is a complete joke. Anyway, then the council had to have meetings with 
LOCOG about trying to relax their barrier policy, and anyway it took a few days. So, finally, there 
was breaks in the barriers that somebody who was very determined could scoot out from the odd 
little break if they saw it, to be able to cross the road. But, of course, when you see that nobody 
else is doing that…’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
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One local FSB representative claimed:  
‘At the end of the day, after there was complaints, when we finally were complaining (…) they 
softened the toning of the wording or something like that’ (Interviewee #18 (SG3)).  
Small firms also opposed the re-commercialisation of ‘Last Mile’ stretch and the number of pop-ups 
servicing event crowds and displacing local consumption in the permanent tax-paying small firms – 
according to several small firms:  
‘Everyone from the stations, there were a number of pop-up coffee shops and it was out of towners 
who made a killing. We all suffered. There were food and cake stalls in front of their restaurant 
selling food. Then [we] went out and moved them’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)).  
‘They [organised community of protesting businesses on the Greenwich Island] complained and 
they took them down. Three days later they took down the barrier but they kept the stalls out there’ 
(Interviewee #27 (SG1)). 
‘This was the whole point; the games did not engage in the first place. So we had the negativity 
around the bounce that we never ever got. Then we have the barriers. Then it seemed to be a fight 
and completely missing the point because by the time the fight had been fought it was over. It was 
crazy that you have to fight (Interviewee #29 (SG1)).  
Resistance and local frustration was not just limited to small firms. Across Greenwich, a wider network of 
resistance against the Games in terms of the closure of local public spaces and tourist attractions was 
captured by local photographers – visually showing local anguish before and during the live stages of the 
Games. 
 
Figure 22: Example Visual Evidence of Host and Greenwich Borough Resistance (Sony Jim, 2012) 
4.5.2.3 Small Firms vs. Games Makers 
The findings reveal several skirmishes between small firms, the local community and Games makers, who 
were contributing toward the marshalling of visitors. From directing visitors past the doors of businesses, 
standing in front of shop windows and entrances, blowing their whistles and directing drift in the direction 
of event venues and back to transport hubs – small firms actively confronted Games makers to change 
their behaviour. One firm claimed ‘it got to the point that we got so furious that we went out in to the 
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street and tried to talk to the stewards [Games makers] and to say this is really unfair’ (Interviewee #25 
(SG1)). 
Several respondents claimed that these problems got to such a point that small firms had to use verbal (and 
close to physical) action towards marshals outside their stores, warding and overtly preventing visitors from 
entering their stores. There was a clear friction between small firms and Games makers, whereby shop 
owners argued for stopping the herding of visitors and easing up the physical corralling in order to 
encourage tourism and trade along the routes. In several cases, small firms resorted to physical threats, as 
one respondent highlighted: ‘they [event visitors] weren’t allowed to stop, and some idiot’s standing out 
there all day with a whistle – to the point where I had to go out say ‘if you don’t put that whistle away I will 
put it away – I am trying to work in here and you are a public nuisance Go outside the residential places, 
when nobody is there – don’t stand outside my door and irritate me’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). Interestingly, 
the manager of the same retail firm claimed local businesses should have just told Games makers to ‘F*ck 
off … you have no authority here; you cannot do this to people!’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). As we can 
identify, the level of stridency against Games control became so intense that one firm highlighted that their 
neighbour resorted to physical action: 
‘There was a gentleman down here, now out of business, and he actually went out and try to… the 
Olympics had to fight him because they wanted to put a board over his shop, they wouldn’t let 
anyone over the barrier to go in to his shop – even when people were asking to go in. He said ‘you 
have to let them in to my shop!’ – they [the marshals] actually had to restrain him – he was in all 
the papers and made local headlines, they held him back, and he had to get someone to remove 
them from his doorway!’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)).  
Local acts to de-territorialise were clearly visible but the findings clearly highlight that in places these were 
met with zero-tolerance policing. Local resistance met with physical restraint and the naturalised logic that 
host spaces require safety bubbles in the interest of the project, nation and event visitors.  
4.5.2.4 Using the Media to Politicise 
Thirdly, in light of the challenges and subsequent strident acts of resistance, the findings revealed that a 
consortium of small firms intentionally invited London media (e.g. BBC. 2012a, 2012g, 2012h), alongside 
the aforementioned local newspapers and reporters, along to politicise the scenario and amplify the local 
narratives often silenced by Olympic planning (e.g. . One respondent highlighted that ‘so many people were 
out there demonstrating. Then [named person] got in touch with the ITV and BBC and that’s when it was 
on the telly’ (Interviewee #28 (SG4). Interestingly, as discussed shortly, the tactic and direct ploy to 
politicise spatial control effects across Central Greenwich was prevalent, and proved to be effective in 
influencing Olympic planning during the live event phases as illustrated by the author’s analysis of several 
media reports during that time (e.g. BBC, 2012d, 2012g, 2012h et cetera).  
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Importantly for improving the general validity of these findings – as identified earlier in this section – similar 
spatial and trading effects were seen across Stratford’s Olympic host spaces, accompanied by several local 
traders within similar event proximity to those of Greenwich Park taking to the media to voice their concern 
and amplify their plight (Financial Times, 2012). Several firms commented on the wider effects happening 
across the host boroughs: 
‘We got rid of the barriers, I say we got rid of them. I was getting complaints from all over the 
place, so why, God all the shopkeepers from the place. You've all been moaning, now do something 
about it. Then Lara got all the press involved. The press had an interview with her, asking what is 
going on. Even Stratford was saying the same thing; people just aren't doing the shopping like we 
expected. It wasn't just Greenwich’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
Additionally, such findings mimic a small number of other mega-event instances where small firms have 
resisted and protested against being ‘locked-out’ of Games related-opportunities. Similarly, to this case 
study, such protests were invoked in the context of the Germany 2006 World Cup, largely based on the 
fact that the German FIFA bid was in-part justified by the supposed economic benefits it would bring to 
Germany and host cities (see Hall, 2006). Such issues directly mimic those found in this thesis, as discussed 
earlier in the ‘rhetoric vs. reality’ section, and mimic current resistance attempts currently been seen across 
Rio de Janiero for the 2014 and 2016 Games as discussed in both the review and discussions of this thesis. 
4.5.2.5 Efficacy of Resistance   
Acts of resistance proved to have some level of success for small firms across Central Greenwich. From 
the relaxation of barriers to the toning down of messages warning visitors to stay away, right through to 
changing the behaviours of marshals, the actions of small firms bought about important changes that were 
to help turn around fortunes. Of course, the main change of relaxing security regulations was helped 
through breaks provided in the barriers, which were reported to have had a positive effect on visitor footfall 
and trade. One firm recalled: ‘after this was changed [barriers removed] the market and shops highlighted 
it was better’ (Interviewee #43 (SG1)). This was echoed by several other small firms claiming: ‘everyone 
got funnelled away from the shops, which stopped after a few days, it was lessened after a few days, and it 
improved a little bit after that’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)), and ‘when the barriers came down it worked 
particularly well’ (Interviewee #30 (SG1)). One respondent claimed: ‘trade was much slower than expected 
– but increased toward the end of the Olympics’ (Interviewee #43 (SG1)). 
According to one small firm, involving the media not only helped to relax controls, allowing for greater 
dispersion, but also acted as a way to encourage further Olympic tourism into the local area, claiming: ‘after 
this was changed [barriers removed] and the market and shops were better highlighted it was better (…) 
Olympic tourists returned and investigated the area after seeing it on TV’ (Interviewee #43 (SG1)). One 
small firm further stated: 
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‘They [organised community of protesting businesses on the Greenwich Island] complained and 
they took them down. Three days later they took down the barrier’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)) 
However, despite the relaxation of barriers days in to the live event phase, small firms highlighted that the 
damage was already done. One small firm claimed: ‘although after a few days we managed to get the council 
to take down some of the barriers, but it decimated our summer really’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)), echoed 
by another explaining how the ‘Council realised that they had made a big mistake and rectified it [the local 
controls] – but it was a bit too late!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). Sentiments were echoed around the small 
business community: 
‘Like I said with the barriers coming up, the BBC and the ITV did some news reporting and then 
after that the barriers came down – but it was only made possible by the media getting involved – 
but it was too late by then!’ (Interviewee #33 (SG1)). 
Others claimed that, despite some relaxation in the barrier, there was still little propensity for visitors to 
find the breaks and be encouraged to explore locally, and thus little trade increase was seen despite new 
measures being taken.  
… ‘I don't know how many days it took before everyone worked it out, and then we got on BBC 
News and it was just Greenwich is a complete joke. Anyway, then the council had to have meetings 
with LOCOG about trying to relax their barrier policy, and anyway it took a few days. So, finally, 
there was breaks in the barriers that somebody who was very determined could scoot out from the 
odd little break if they saw it, to be able to cross the road. But, of course, when you see that nobody 
else is doing that…’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
What we can take from this analysis is that, in light of the Games, several key drivers helped to catalyse 
resistance efforts by local actors. More importantly, though, in light of such spatial concerns, the findings 
reveal a series of practical ways in which locals resisted and fought back, with moderate success. Despite 
the notion that damage was already done to the bottom-line of small firm performance, what we can 
positively take out of this are methods with which future small business communities may be able to push 
back in similar event scenarios. This is a valuable finding, and will be discussed in the final recommendations 
section at the end of the thesis.  
4.5.3 Olympic Power Struggles and Concerns over Spatio-Political Relations 
In light of such scenarios of active exclusion, power struggles and imbalances against small firms there 
emerges the question of why London 2012 appeared to constitute, institutionalise and sequestrate host 
public space in favour of project ends. The findings thus reveal the need to 1) appreciate the pragmatic 
measures required to create safe event spaces but 2) consider the extent to which event zones are locked-
down and consider better ways to engage with the host community, as opposed to ‘locking-in’ visitors and 
simultaneously ‘locking-out’ small firms. The amalgamation of evidence gathered so far substantiates 
McGillivray and Frew’s (2015) call for a ‘deeper analysis’ of spatio-political relations but also raises critical 
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economic questions about mega-events and their territorialising tendencies to support undemocratic project 
practices, symbolically and materially extending in to public-civic spaces that support modern consumer 
capitalism (also see Gotham, 2005). These are battlegrounds with epic spaces of contestation, guerrilla 
landscapes and warfare, where messy, complex and thick narratives play out across host spaces exogenously 
shocked by the intense economic and social implications of mega-sporting-event projects. These spaces 
saw war over local vs. corporate capital accumulation played out, opening up questions of morality and 
ethics, and the critical nature of ‘who wins’ in such a series of cataclysmic event-led policies.  
4.6 Olympic Tourism and Trade Impacts  
The findings reveal that, despite the established rhetoric for Olympic tourism and associated trade for small 
firms across London, and specifically Central Greenwich, opportunities to capitalise were missed. As 
highlighted earlier, significant footfall graced the streets of Central Greenwich. According to the Senior 
Business Engagement officer for Greenwich, ‘between 20,000 – 60,000 people - depending up on the event 
-coming to the town centre to watch the equestrian’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). Small firms, however, 
reported devastating effects on footfall in their retail units. The evidence suggests that small firms felt 
excluded not just from Olympic planning but also locked-out and unable to capitalise on projected Games-
induced footfall. A rich analysis of local narratives reveals that, despite being ‘promised a bonanza’, small 
firms felt actively marginalised due to the aforementioned strident Olympic spatial controls, militarisation 
and securitisation of public space.  
4.6.1 Down on Trade 
The following sections outline, specifically, how the tourism and trade of small firms were directly affected. 
Across the small business communities, small firms reported revenue decreases. Some claim of ‘about an 
80% decrease! Maybe more – 80-90%! ((Interviewee #34 (SG1)), others ‘down around 50% much worse 
than we would normally be. It was completely dead, we were not getting one person in!’ (Interviewee #27 
(SG1)), and ‘most businesses suffered 50 – 90% (…) the impact started long before the Olympics and 
remained long after’ (Interviewee #18 (SG3)). To emphasise the extent of trade damage to the community, 
the research found other businesses reporting a ‘20% decline in sales, alongside an increase in labour and 
delivery costs due to the difficulties of receiving deliveries from suppliers and making them to our 
customers’ (…) ‘locally most stories have been negative, surprisingly including from a number of restaurants 
in the town centre’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)). Others claimed: ‘although I have been an advocate of the 
Olympics, I thought they were a magnificent thing to win - but certainly when it came to the Olympics and 
the Para-Olympics my takings dropped by about 75%’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). This was echoed by 
another F&B firm claiming: ‘we were massively down – by 40% during the Games’ (Interviewee #31 
(SG1)). Even as we entered the post-Games legacy phase, one FSB representative claimed: ‘businesses are 
still trying to recoup their losses from last summer’ (Interviewee #18 (SG3)). This was, quite clearly, a small 
business community severely affected by trade loss. 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
174 | P a g e  
 
‘Most businesses suffered 50 – 90% (…) the impact started long before the Olympics and remained 
long after’ (Interviewee #18 (SG3)).   
The data found that businesses felt ‘helpless’, ‘disappointed’, ‘heartbroken’ and ‘devastatingly quiet’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)), ‘properly stuffed’ and ‘literally jaw dropped’, ‘deeply’ and ‘badly affected’ 
(Interviewee #24 (SG1)). One firm went so far as to say ‘LOCOG humiliated the businesses [of Central 
Greenwich]’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)) in reference to the contrast between the ‘rhetoric’ and actual trading 
‘realities’ during the Games. The findings closely match Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) analysis too, 
indicating a reduction in usual trade and visitor footfall, and an overarching feeling of being terribly 
disappointed during the Games. The view that the projected opportunities for small firms to effectively 
leverage were ‘missed’ was a prevailing narrative identified in this study. Time and time again, horror stories 
emerged from small firm narratives: 
‘Very negative. Very negative. We had 7 people in the all fortnight of the Games (…) you could 
throw a stone down this street and not hit a single person with it. (…) It’s just crazy, absolutely 
crazy, anyway we were expecting a positive thing but it was absolutely horrendous, absolutely a 
waste of time (…) Very negative when nobody came to us for most of all. But when it all went 
away, people started coming back to us. We actually should have shut up shop for that whole time, 
it was absolutely negative. I took it as positive aggression against our shops on the route’ 
(Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
Another small firm claimed: 
‘The Olympics was a fantastic event, I watched a few events on the outside screen, and it was 
magnificent. The atmosphere was wonderful and the facilities there were great. But then I came 
back to my shop and wondered if I could pay the rent. I couldn't and it nearly drove me out of 
business. Because if you think of my business being down simply 75 to 80% for that many weeks 
in a busy time of the year, that equated to my whole profit last - I did not make a profit last year 
because of the Olympics. And I traded below my break even last year (…) my takings for August 
would be roughly around £30,000, last year it was £12,000. So the Olympics cost me personally 
over £20,000. That was my profit for the year. That means that I worked for the year for nothing. 
That's really hard. It hurts to know that I have it working all year for nothing’ (Interviewee #23 
(SG1)). 
The findings reveal a significant consensus that the devastating trade and poor footfall effects caused by 
the Games were further exacerbated by its occurrence during the high-season of tourism in Greenwich. 
Firms claimed that London 2012 ‘decimated our summer really’ and that ‘anyone who was reliant upon 
summer business was stuffed last year (…) I literally made 20 quid! (…) millions of visitors were completely 
barricaded off, so there was literally nobody over the busiest weekend ever (…) nobody was over the moon 
with their results – people were down 20 – 30%’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Shockingly, one small firm 
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claimed a 95-100% loss in revenue, claiming they had no-one entering their business. Such findings echo 
Vlachos’ (2012, 2015) findings, where small firms claimed significant losses of 20-75%.  
Respondents believed that that small firm trade performance was negatively impacted directly by the intense 
spatial problems during the Games, claiming that the Games were ‘deadly for businesses and ‘devastatingly 
quiet’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), ‘deeply affecting us’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)) and that ‘the barrier – at least 
– reduced tourism by 50% but probably more than that’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)). Another small firm 
claimed: ‘we were not able to benefit from any event-related tourism – none at all – they [Games organisers] 
kept the public away’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). The findings reveal that this was due to controls, the 
Olympic restrictions and regulations discussed throughout this section, that although thousands of visitors 
graced host communities the reality was that commercial opportunities were almost non-existent. Although 
prevalent across all small firms, this view was also shared across all SGs – including one of the Directors 
of the LLDC, who stated that he had heard of ‘local businesses and communities having trouble with the 
barricading of space (…) and poor immediate business performance around the event areas’ (Interviewee 
#3 (SG4)). Further, a senior MP distinctly highlighted that poor ‘tourism footfall was a key issue around 
the main event areas (…) and that the marshalling and barricading was the key problem here’ (Interviewee 
#4 (SG4)). One senior business engagement officer for Tower Hamlets actually used Central Greenwich 
as a case in point for small firm challenges, stating: 
‘In Greenwich they had quite central areas which were actually barricaded off (…) there were 
barriers between the… [pause] let’s put it this way, they’re supposed to be for people going to see 
the Games themselves’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). 
Even key stakeholders across Government, and host local authorities illustrated these significant challenges: 
‘Their [local small firms’] expectations and hopes would have been quite high and they would have 
got pretty meagre returns (…) ‘if you think about the management of footfall, it was very well 
managed, particularly through Stratford (…) you got off the tube and funnelled through the 
marketplace of Westfield – so there was no chance for capturing the passing trade (…) Some of 
the footfall may have drifted out in to smaller parts but in terms of the volume of the day-to-day 
tourists quite little of the visitors would have leaked out’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). 
‘It was around the time when all of the special planning conditions had to come in as well in relation 
to use of the park, and what was going on. I think at around about that time there seemed to be an 
effort brought in to be a bit more positive and encouraging, going, yes, there is going to be an 
impact and some inconvenience, and some troubles here and there, there's going to be some fallout 
from this’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
Respondents across the board simply claimed that visitors were just unable to access and consume across 
Central Greenwich, being physically locked out of accessing small firms and marshalled in and out of the 
venues. Small firms claimed ‘they [event visitors] were just literally, they were being shouted at 'Greenwich 
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train station is this way. Greenwich train, keep going, keep going and keep going!’ Literally, the entire God 
knows how many millions of people were like in and out of Greenwich in probably about an hour or so, 
all gone, just like a thick tube of people’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). Also, ‘the place was empty because you 
would get a huge flow in and then a huge flow out, there were plenty of marshals about, plenty of police, 
and there were these lines of fences around a metre high’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). One business went so 
far as to say that ‘I took it as positive aggression [marshalling, barricading etc] against our shops on the 
route’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). On a similar note, one small firm claimed: ‘visitors were actively 
discouraged from coming anywhere near us (…) visitors to the event were so carefully channelled into 
venues that there was no prospect of seeing any other than the most adventurous off the direct access 
routes’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)). Visitors being locked out and discouraged from entering the heart of the 
community, on their way to the Games and on their way back, forced back to transport hubs with a limited 
number sticking in the local area, was the prevailing narrative. This was epitomised by several small firms 
stating: 
‘No we didn’t benefit, they put barriers up so they stopped everyone from coming into the shop 
so it reduced my customers (…) the barriers completely stopped people coming into the shop 
because they put a barrier between the people and the shop so how are people supposed to come 
in – they were just shepherded along (Interviewee #35 (SG1)). 
‘So when the people were forced to come along here and then down here, they weren't getting any 
of this at all. Oh, and they weren't even allowed to explore at all?  No, they couldn't, there were 
barriers. It's unbelievable (…) They [another local small firm] were the ones that were literally jaws 
dropped open watching these millions of people go past their restaurant six feet away, barricaded 
off and were just like, ‘what!’ (…) It was just like if somebody said, ‘you’ve got to steer some people 
that haven’t got a brain’ (…) you would be using control mechanisms akin to what they have going 
on (…) LOCOG, obviously the way that visitors were treated like cattle and that you just felt people 
were … that everybody is an idiot and has to be literally told what to do, where to go, how to do 
it (…) you do not need to literally shoehorn them, and physically push – I mean literally they were 
being manhandled’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
Another small firm claimed: 
‘I literally made 20 quid (…) people with the pink giant hands were preventing people coming into 
a shop and sending them all the way around – so nobody even knew that the market was there – it 
was kind of bizarre, it was like the council agreed’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). 
Another small firm referred to being on the ‘dark side’ [the side without simply any visitors on] of the park: 
‘Here [Central Greenwich] of course, we were badly affected by being on the ‘dark’ side of the 
[Greenwich] park, in an area that visitors of the Games were discouraged from visiting and where 
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local transport was made difficult for the locals in a number of ways, so we lost about 20% of our 
regular sales over the three-week period’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)). 
It is unsurprising therefore that a gap between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ emerged, with a senior director of the 
London Chamber of Commerce claiming: ‘the business community [around event zones] in general were 
encouraged to put on activities around the Games because obviously there was a perfect model for London 
2012 for themselves to do it (…) however, they [event visitors] were all herded through a certain route, and 
they never really got to see it’ (Interviewee #13 (SG3)). Small firms agreed with such sentiments: 
‘Consequences of this walking route and barrier from the station was absolutely deadly for business 
her’ (…) 50,000 people were managed into the venue and out again without having any ripple on 
the local area (…) it was devastatingly quiet, all you could see was the shop owners looking’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
4.6.2 Impacts Beyond Greenwich 
The findings from the Greenwich case study mimic both prior mega-event case study findings and several 
live Games media reports and post-Games reflections upon the tourism and trade challenges that emerged 
during London 2012. As illustrated in the review findings from prior case studies illustrates the dampening 
effects such events can have up on businesses across host city and host spaces. This was no different, as 
alluded to by the review and empirical findings of this thesis. It is therefore unsurprising that the small firms 
of Central Greenwich, alongside the FSB (2013), reported concerns over the ‘ghost town’ effects that 
emerged not only for small firms caught in the storm of the Last Mile but also across the central urban 
areas of London. A comprehensive evidence base from primary interview data, as well as published media, 
industry, policy and academic reports, suggests that anxieties over the formation of ‘aversion markets’ and 
tourism ‘displacement’/’substitution effects’ have the genuine potential to disrupt local and regional small 
firm competitiveness – certainly during the Games. The concepts of ‘aversion markets’ and ‘tourism 
displacement’ are illustrated earlier in this findings chapter, and detailed later in the Discussions. These 
themes were repeatedly claimed across all SGs, including Newham’s senior business engagement officer: 
‘They [local businesses] prepared themselves for was people were more - lots of footfall in their 
area - but that footfall was the one displaced the footfall of the regular consumers (…) So for 
example the Granny shoppers were already going to town once a week, rather than once a day of 
what they might have done previously (…) on the whole, the Olympic footfall just displaced the 
footfall of the regular punters who stayed away from the areas’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). 
In light of both localised and city-wide tourism challenges, what we can identify is that empirical findings 
from this case study coincide with trade challenges across London. For example, negative trading effects 
reported by the Association of Leading Visitor Attractions (ALVA) reported some London sites as having 
‘60% fewer visitors’ compared to the same time in 2011, claiming: ‘it was the worst trading period in living 
memory’ (The Guardian, 2012a). Additionally, top museums and tourist attractions were reported to be 
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down more than 30% in the last two weeks (prior to 31 July 2012) according to the Association, and traffic 
was down by 20% according to Transport for London (BBC, 2012h). Establishing such findings helps paint 
a more general picture of the trade and tourism dynamics that affect the host city. Dr Andrew Smith 
claimed, in a media report at the time, that more broadly ‘other cities have suffered similar problems’, and 
tourism bosses claimed that ‘regular visitors were always going to stay away this summer’ (BBC, 2012h). It 
is therefore unsurprising to find a post-Games House of Lords (2012) report stating that ‘commentators 
have expressed disappointment with the tourism figures during the Olympics’ (Telegraph, 2012a), making 
an interesting juxtaposition with the rhetoric established earlier in the findings of this chapter. This was 
echoed in the primary data findings:  
‘My son called me up and said ‘mum come down, you'll love it here [central London], it's like the 
film 28 Days Later, it's a ghost town (…) There is nobody there’. After that it really brought it 
home. They didn't get the right impression, like come to London to see the Olympics - it was like 
go there [to the event] and go home because you're going to be stuck because there will be too 
many people in London’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)). 
Reports emerging from the Last Mile route of the Olympic Park further echo the aforementioned concerns 
found in Central Greenwich and Central London, thus helping to enhance the generalisability of the trade 
and tourism dynamics. According to the Financial Times (2012), there were significant trade downturns for 
local traders just a few hundred yards away from the immediate thoroughfare between London [Stratford] 
Underground, the Westfield Shopping Centre and the entrance to the Olympic Park. As discussed in more 
detail later in the section ‘Securitising and regulating the Last Mile’, reports at the time supported the 
primary findings of this research suggesting that visitors were funnelled through transitional routes - 
between transport hub and event venues. In the context of Stratford, event tourists were ‘not necessarily 
visiting Stratford centre (…) the atmosphere changed after the Opening Ceremony (…) the ‘gold rush’ that 
many of the traders were hoping for hasn’t materialized and the excitement is subsiding (…) there is a 
general feeling that there is a party on their doorstep that they are not invited to’ (Financial Times, 2012). 
Furthermore, a Federation of Small Business (FSB) report further claims significant adverse effects on 
tourism, confidence and ultimately small business performance during the intense staging of the Games 
(FSB, 2013). 
Small firms interviewed in both this study and the Financial Times (2012) report claimed at the time: 
‘We are suffering around here, all the tourists that are here for the Olympics are not doing anything 
for us. If you ask all the traders, they will tell you the same thing I am telling you, it is not doing 
anything for us at all’ (Financial Times, 2012 [market trader]).  
‘For the short-term it [the Games] has been a disaster. Shops aren’t taking the money. And over 
the next 2-3 months I am sure that some shops are going to struggle to remain afterwards’ 
(Financial Times, 2012 [market trader]).  
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‘The normal people like me in the street are getting nothin’ out of this. They should have had it 
[the Olympics] up in Thurrock where nobody lives (…) tell David Cameron to get out of his 
comfort zone and Robin Wales [Leader of Newham Council] to come down to Stratford and have 
a look how it is. There is nothing here for us’ (Financial Times, 2012 [market trader]). 
‘The Olympics trade wise have been down on expectations (…) not as good as we hoped’ 
(Independent, 2012, market trader). 
‘The amount of people that came, if we would have had a portion of that, which would have 
boosted my business massively – people spend a lot of businesses in light of the Olympics – but 
we lost money (…) I lost massively during the Olympics – massively!’ (Interviewee #35 (SG1)). 
Such wider concerns were also juxtaposed with one respondent’s small firm experience of the Sydney 2000 
Games, claiming that ‘when they had the Olympics in Sydney, it was a huge boost for tourism but it was 
not a boost to businesses around the events because they were excluded. The impact after the event, I 
mean, you know they are still trying to [recover] (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). This is not just an issue confined 
to the specific case study of Central Greenwich, but one to be found across a series of event spaces – and 
a challenging environment requiring intervention to redistribute Games benefits. 
4.6.3 Cross-Stakeholder Narratives in Relation to Real Impacts 
In light of the findings of this research, what can be identified as the great challenges that host communities, 
and small firms specifically, face from mega-events generally and from London 2012 specifically? The 
findings of this particular research are particularly important in light of, firstly, the high density of small 
firms situated around HEZs and the Last Mile, which was certainly case for the focused empirical effort 
for this research. Secondly, the aforementioned vulnerabilities of small firms, their inability to respond to 
regulatory pressures, and the ease with which they can be negatively impacted by changes in footfall and/or 
visitor and tourist behaviours. Thirdly, the emergent concerns that host community spaces are subject to 
intense determined striated topologies and securitisation measures. The section now shifts to the emergent 
dichotomy of the Central Greenwich and wider host borough problematic: the concern over ‘rhetoric’ vs. 
‘realities’.  
Despite the aforementioned forecasted opportunities, a key finding of this research is that a major 
dichotomy emerged between the pre-Games ‘hype’ and ‘rhetoric’ and the actual ‘realities’ for small firms, 
through both the narrative/lens of interviewed small firms and wider stakeholder perspectives. Again, the 
data saturated here, providing a dominant theme for the findings of this research that a major gap existed 
between what small businesses thought was going to happen and what actually happened, particularly 
during the intense ‘live’ stages of hosting. The interpretive and qualitative objective of this research is 
reflected in the amplification and illumination of stakeholder narratives. The following descriptive and 
analytical findings are thus enriched with emotive language, and often reflect the somewhat ‘charged’ 
responses, revealing emotions of, for example, ‘anger’ and ‘disappointment’, that help to paint a detailed 
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picture of stakeholder perceptions and feelings at the time of interview. This is important given that one of 
the objectives of the thesis is to amplify local narratives and local micro-level discourses that have rarely 
risen to the surface in prior mega-event impact analyses. Small firms alluded repeatedly to these issues: 
‘I remember us having opportunities to hear from people who had worked at previous Olympics 
that were in charge of the venues, who were saying typically what would happen with visitor flows 
(…) we were thinking ‘great!, there’ll be all these trillions of people we’ve been told about, they’ll 
be milling around’ (…) every six weeks prior we got letters about what to do and how to get ready 
for the Games. At that point we were going to make a killing, after the first day they realised it was 
a joke’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)).  
The Games as an opportunity was certainly a viewpoint shared across most respondents. One senior 
member of the London Assembly claimed: ‘a lot of people played a lot of the Olympics themselves, the 
[business] opportunities (…) a lot of play was made with the opportunities with the Olympic Games, and 
I always thought that was overstated’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). Similarly, another councillor for the Borough 
of Tower Hamlets claimed: ‘there was a lot of rhetoric about [the Games] benefitting local business (…) 
there have been high expectations but there was actually less performance than expected (…) the hotels, 
the restaurants, the kinds of places that expected a tourism boost, which didn’t actually arrive (…) these 
expectations were perhaps a little bit excessive’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). Additionally, a senior minister in 
the House of Commons claimed: ‘local businesses expected a killing but didn’t get it’ (Interviewee #4 
(SG4)), and a senior director at the LLDC highlighted that ‘by and large it is not a good picture for local 
businesses (…) local businesses were expecting an absolute steal but for most part did not benefit’ 
(Interviewee #3 (SG4)). The idea that expectations were (falsely) high saturates quickly in the data and 
further emphasises the contradictory gap between initial policy, media and local hype, and actual realities. 
Small firms continually referred to these hoped-for ambitions of trade and tourism: 
 ‘They took away the trade. They took away everyone’s trade. Because on one hand it was the 
‘perfect storm’, on the other hand, everyone, business, the councillors had been bought off, and 
promised them a bonanza, you know, there were going to be 50,000 people coming through here 
every day (…) So they were promised a bonanza and what happened, in fact, was that many people 
lost a turnover of 50 per cent… 80 per cent’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). 
‘We had months of newspapers that it was going to be the best thing since sliced bread, your profits 
are going to go through the roof and you don't need to put your prices up, you'll be all right. It just 
never happened’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1). 
‘We thought there were going to be more people in the area, and there weren’t. Everyone [all firms] 
will sing the same song. We thought there were going be more people but there were much fewer 
people than there are normally at this period’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)). 
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The disappointment, anger and frustration caused by the dichotomy between the rhetoric and the reality 
permeated the majority of respondents’ narratives. The emotive language found across perspectives 
provides a rich snapshot of local micro-level discourses and indicates the plight of small firms, who felt like 
they had been ‘shat on from a height’, ‘sold a short straw’, ‘properly stuffed’ and ‘taken for a ride’, for 
example (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). Others felt ‘slaughtered’ and ‘heartbroken’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), 
treated ‘like a fool’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)), like they had had a summer ‘decimated’ by the Games 
(Interviewee #25 (SG1)) and that ‘it [the Games] had a negative effect, like everyone in Greenwich was 
f*cked’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)). Another two respondents went so far as to say that the Games created a 
‘divide’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1) and led to a ‘huge amount of negativity’ (Interviewee #16 (SG3)) across 
the whole community. As illustrated by the following section, small firms, time and time again, illuminated 
their anguish for the project’s effect: 
‘It was about getting the vote for London, a lot of tax payers that were under this influence, that it 
was going to be good for commercial and viable for giving back to the tax payers - all the people 
who paid for all the stadiums, they get nothing! We were just robbed for weeks – we didn’t gain 
anything! (…) I certainly do not have love for these big events. And that is so disappointing given 
my hopes for the events’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
 
‘The story is beginning to build on this. The politicians will not want this to reach the media. It is 
a bad news story’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)).  
‘Absolute waste of time and we came into the whole thing with a positive attitude (…) they market 
something, that it’s supposed to be very cool and everyone gets sucked in to it - but once you have 
the experience, you’ll never want to come back in your city’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
4.6.4.1 Lies, Deceit and Dishonesty 
Given the stratified gap between rhetoric and realities, it was unsurprising that several respondents alluded 
to the notion that both project and council pre-Games rhetoric manifested as a web of ‘lies’, ‘deceit’ and 
‘dishonesty’. Such narratives emerged across both SG1 and SG3, and illuminated how the dichotomy may 
be characterised as a way to ‘save face’ and withdraw the real truth from host communities as a tactic to 
avoid pre-Games contestation. Whilst some reflected that they were directly lied to, others believed that, 
rather than deliberate deceit, the challenges faced were created through project and council ‘inaction’, 
allowing initial consultation and the promises of opportunity rhetoric and commercial bonanza to wither 
and die. One small firm claimed: 
‘I don’t think they did [positively engage with small firms] – if they wanted it [the Games] to have 
a positive effect they would have been out and about making actual moves to impact my business 
in a positive way but by them not doing anything or doing the bare minimum, that falls on the 
negative side because they didn’t do anything – by lack of action that’s a negative consequence’ 
(…) they didn’t help me prepare for the Games’ (Interviewee #30 (SG1)). 
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Small firms and several other stakeholders highlighted that the rhetoric of local councils and the London 
2012 project ‘piped it [Games trade opportunities] up (…) piped it up completely out of control’ 
(Interviewee #27 (SG1)), promised a ‘bonanza’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1) and predicted the scenario whereby 
‘you’d have tens of thousands of people flowing past your door needing food and drink, and mementos 
and you would just pick up some of it’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). The findings, however, reveal that despite 
this opportunity rhetoric there was little mention of the true nature of the spatial controls planned for 
Central Greenwich – which would prove to be one of the key determining factors contributing to small 
firm feelings of poor business performance. Various small firms claimed: ‘nobody said anything about the 
barriers (…) if the authorities had been honest with business, everyone would have known but they weren’t 
(…) they [local businesses] were lied to (…) they were consulted but what they were told was completely 
untrue’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Another stated that: ‘we were not explained to about any barriers in front 
of the shop, people stand in our door way, forcing people past our shop - I had to go out and ask them to 
remove that but we were really positive, really looking forward to it but it did not happen’ (Interviewee #38 
(SG1)). Furthermore, the findings point to the idea that small firms were not only kept in the dark about 
spatial controls but were simultaneously encouraged to make ‘capital investments’ and engage in what the 
literature refers to as ‘strategic event leveraging’ to maximise potential event-related opportunities – which 
would later prove to be wasted effort, as indicated by the findings of this research. Such concerns emerged 
as a key theme of the research, serving to explain and exacerbate the perceived poor business performance 
characterising the views of small firms across Central Greenwich.  One senior policy advisor for FSB 
London claimed: 
‘There was that real anticipation that this was going to be a big boost to the local economy, there 
was going to be a high footfall and huge number of tourists coming to those areas (…) but I think 
there was a general feeling that during it wasn’t what they were expecting, the expectation didn't 
quite match the reality, and that a lot of businesses ordered more stock for the occasion’ 
(Interviewee #12 (SG3)). 
And small firms, including one frustrated key gatekeeper below, illustrates: 
'Why, of all people, having been to so many meetings and had the real inside track on probably 
more than most, I was fairly confident that I knew how it was all going to fall. God, what a surprise! 
You know what I mean? Just like felt such a fool and, obviously, from my point, trying to help the 
other businesses and encourage, and there was a lot of negative attitude around here. I was the 
happy clapper going, 'Come on now, and don’t be like that. Look, there's all sorts of things we can 
benefit from here, de, de, de'. Then afterwards everyone was just going, 'Told you so' and I did feel 
a fool. I did feel a fool because we were taken for a ride. Not deliberately so but just the way various 
things happened, we were properly stuffed in this area (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
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4.6.4 Strategic Event Leveraging – Doomed to Fail? 
Compounding aforementioned disruptions and challenges was their occurrence during the high-peak of the 
tourism season, which forms for many businesses the key annual opportunity to increase their bottom-line 
and make a profit. Revenues and profits were further diminished by ‘wasted capital investments’ in response 
to the rhetoric hype of trade and tourism opportunities – a dominant emerging theme from the empirical 
analysis. Small firms implicitly thought about and were explicitly empowered to conduct what Chalip and 
Leyns (2002) refer to as ‘strategic leveraging’ tactics only to find their efforts ‘numbed’ (e.g. restricted in a 
variety of ways) or in vain (e.g. little spill over of visitor footfall), resulting in limited efficacy and ultimately 
compounding trading challenges and prolonging periods of uncertainty and disruption. Although wider 
London tourism displacement was expected during the intense staging of the Games, the damaging tourism 
effects seen in Greenwich formed a major surprise for local businesses interviewed for this study. These 
were intended and/or unintended consequences of Games planning and delivery symbolising and 
actualising the exclusionary tendencies of mega-events to ‘lock’ small firms out of the Olympic party. Such 
feelings echo findings emerging across this case study: 
‘Very negative.  Very negative. We had 7 people in the all fortnight of the Games (…) you could 
throw a stone down this street and not hit a single person with it. And when they were coming out 
of the Games, the time when we could not have done anything with them – as I said, they put 
people in front of the doors and told them to move and not let them stop and look at the shop. It 
was horrendous. They barricaded the market in across the way so nobody could even get to the 
food, even though they were saying that this [Central Greenwich] would be open. We opened until 
9 o clock at night as that is what they [the council] told us to do. To make the place look vibrant 
and attractive to people. Greenwich Council were even looking forward to a busy event and having 
all these people to Greenwich, so they said make it look vibrant, make it look good for people 
coming out of the events. We did that. The Olympic Committee had other ideas, and they forced 
everyone past your shop (…) It’s just crazy, absolutely crazy, anyway we were expecting a positive 
thing but it was absolutely horrendous, absolutely a waste of time’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
4.6.4.1 Leveraging Tactics 
Research findings identified several forms of leveraging efforts spearheaded by small firms before and 
during the live phases of event delivery related to ‘increasing stock levels’, ‘conducting new 
marketing/product developments’, ‘increasing staffing levels’ and ‘consuming local commercial space’. 
With respect to increasing ‘stock’ levels to cater for demand, this was a pertinent issue fuelled by the rhetoric 
of opportunity: local businesses were encouraged by council and government ‘advice to get televisions, to 
get extra food for the month’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)) and ‘a lot of businesses ordered more stock for the 
event’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). Businesses mentioned that they were told directly to stock up, and indirectly 
made these decisions based on the predicted tourism footfall levels in the host event area of both 
Greenwich and Newham’s Olympic Park. Both the primary and secondary evidence found in this study 
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support these claims. According to a high-level project actor at the ODA: ‘many of them [local businesses 
around HEZs] lost a packet of actually few resources that they had, and they thought they were going to 
gain’ (Interviewee #7 (SG4)). With reference to the distinct confusion between opportunity rhetoric and 
the real challenges, one small firm noted: 
‘Many businesses put on extra staff and businesses hoped that it was going to be busy; they were 
told to get extra stock but you can only have your deliveries at different times of the day and this 
was all organised. But then you get signposts on the road that say don't travel in this area… Just 
don't travel in this area. And you think to yourself what on earth you are trying to tell people’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). 
Amalgamating several other small firm responses, local narratives claimed: 
‘It [the Games] deeply affected us. There were letters from the council and the government, get 
your televisions on, let everyone use the toilets, get extra staff, get extra this, to all of this get them 
on extra hours’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)) (…) ‘People had hired extra staff, employed, told to do 
the late shift because we were told you couldn’t cope with all these thousands of people that are 
going to be walking past your shop – only to be barricaded in – blocked in – and nothing, forced 
past each individual. People put extra wages in to make this a welcoming place, and… nothing! We 
got nothing! And then we get hit by the recession – how do you survive all of that! With the High 
Street down as it is – yeah’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)) 
‘Businesses brought in extra stock then found it wasn’t used and perished – losing them money’ 
(Interviewee #24 (SG1)).  
The data also illuminated a range of new marketing and product development initiatives conducted by small 
businesses in light of the predicted opportunities. One business claimed: ‘we did the advertising, we opened 
early (…) we had bunting up – but we were not allowed this, we weren’t allowed that (…) Opening early 
did not help - we did it for 3 to 4 days and after that I did not because it was costing me more on electricity 
and staff and we did not get anyone in’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)), thus highlighting the constraining effects 
of Olympic advertising-trade regulations. One councillor claimed: ‘they [local businesses] were not overly 
satisfied that they were not able to promote themselves during the Games – particularly around advertising 
restrictions’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). Other businesses refereed to: ‘an independent had laid out in the sun 
some tables and cloth with a breakfast service – but between him and people coming in there was this 
orange barrier and there was not a single person. Because they were saying ‘this way’ with their big fingers, 
‘this way to the park’, ‘this way to the event’ (…) it must have cost him thousands to have the staff’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Aspects of project striation and security regulations, as explored shortly, serve to 
compound negative financial impacts regarding rhetoric vs. realities, despite the inevitabilities of planned 
intense security controls and footfall movement.  According to a senior stakeholder at the London Chamber 
of Commerce: ‘the business community [around event zones] in general were encouraged to put on 
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activities around the Games because obviously there was a perfect model for London 2012 for themselves 
to do it (…) however they [event visitors] were all herded through a certain route, and they never really got 
to see it’ (Interviewee #13 (SG3)). Promise of trade and tourism, and thus encouragement to invest in 
resources to ‘supply’ inevitable event visitor demands was the rhetoric but the reality was rather different. 
Repeatedly, small firms illustrated this issue: 
‘People bought large amounts of whatever they’d be trading in, thinking they were going to make 
a lot of money, and they didn’t want to be running out [considering the predicted bounty/demand] 
(…) they brought loads of whatever their particular stock was and then found out that like none 
of it was used (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). 
‘Well of course we did [promote themselves]. We opened for breakfast (…) It didn't work because 
they diverted everyone away, if anybody crossed the road the games makers would push them away 
(…) they [the event visitors] were about a metre away from us. The metre to our pavements, that’s 
how far they were from us. And when I say thousands, I mean thousands. And all these ‘Games 
makers’ with the foam hands going this way, this way…’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
‘We made a special menu, we wanted them to be happy [customers] when they are coming in, and 
to welcome them, but there wasn’t enough customers’ (Interviewee #32 (SG1)). 
In light of these securitisation effects, local market traders who secured extended trading times in and 
around the central market square also found that such commercial investment was bought in vain. 
According to one local business: ‘some people believed that and prepared for a bonanza, and the traders 
negotiated later opening hours in the market with the landlord, they negotiated opening until nine o'clock. 
Then when the trade wasn't there they still had to stay open, you know, they were paying the rent for that 
time. Then it didn't happen, so people who could have cut their losses, they were shutting down and were 
stuck. I mean, some people did cut their losses despite the potential of the Games they were being told. So 
they were promised a bonanza and what happened, in fact, was that many people lost a turnover of 50 per 
cent, 80 per cent…’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Another business even used the potential opportunity to 
invest in the internal infrastructure of their business, to ‘fast-track’ borrowing a ‘few grand to do some bits 
and pieces (…) I still have the debt and we have not capitalised on that and that is the story for a lot of 
businesses (…) I’ve still got the debt sitting there and it doesn’t make me feel good (…) we paid out and 
didn’t really get much back (…) we didn’t get a return on our investment, if we would have had a normal 
week without all of it, it would have been better’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). The co-author of the London 
2012 bid also claimed that ‘what people thought they could do was make a killing, so you had hundreds of 
people who were fairly poor, lots of them, who designed and made T-shirts and every street corner was full 
of people with T-shirts. Did they sell anything? No, they didn't sell anything because people didn't want 
those. If they're going to have merchandise, they're going to have merchandise that related absolutely close 
to the games that were allowed, and not the ones that weren't. Many of them lost a packet of actually few 
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resources that they had, and they thought they were going to gain’ (Interviewee #7 (SG4)). A point 
mentioned earlier in the findings, but again apt for this section, illustrates that:  
‘There was a real lack of understanding, actually, from the point of view of the local authorities in 
particular, around what they should be promoting, and then, in a sense, charging local businesses to try 
and come into it and set up their stalls, and the stalls didn't work. They felt very let down by this, and 
I can understand that. It wasn't due to anything particularly iniquitous for the local authorities but it 
was just due to just not understanding how people behave during a games. So the consequences is that 
some businesses folded as a result of that; not many, but some’ (Interviewee #5 (SG4)).  
‘It wasn’t what they were expecting, the expectation didn’t quite match the reality, and that a lot of 
businesses ordered more stock for the event, and they were not overly satisfied that they were not being 
able to promote themselves during the Games, particularly around logo restrictions’ (Interviewee #12 
(SG3)). 
‘I would have thought their expectations and hopes would have been quite high and they would have 
got pretty meagre returns. If you think about the management of the footfall, it was very well managed 
particularly through Stratford. There were other entrances to the park but it was mainly through 
Stratford, you got off the tube and funnelled through the marketplace of Westfield. So there was no 
chance for capturing the passing trade. Some of the footfall may have drifted out into smaller parts but 
in terms of the volume of the day-to-day tourists quite little of the visitors would have leaked out’ 
(Interviewee #8 (SG4)). 
Interestingly, but outside the field of this case study, one key point was raised by two high-level stakeholders 
with respect to the Walthamstow food festival planned for during the Olympics. The idea was to use the 
opportunity of the Games to stimulate footfall to the local festival, whilst people subsequently made their 
way to the Olympic Park. Referred to as an ‘enormous cock up’ (Interviewee #31 (SG1)), it was highlighted 
that local traders rented local space to promote and sell their wares, only for the festival to be deserted and 
to be closed almost immediately due to security regulations and the partial closure of transport hubs. 
According to one interviewee, ‘local businesses were told to get their food and hygiene certificates (…) 
there was a lot of people who were out of pocket, a lot of them would have been local businesses all due 
to miscommunications that people would get off at the tube station (…) but this did not happen, no one 
got off’ (Interviewee #31 (SG1)). One senior civil servant at the ODA further claimed: 
‘What happened in Greenwich as well was that they developed areas where they would have 
encampments, so of people selling things, so markets and things like that and they just didn't work. 
The one in Waltham Forest didn't work either, and Walthamstow, and there was a lot of 
recrimination around it because the boroughs were promoting them, particularly the one in 
Waltham Forest, the boroughs were promoting them and people didn't go to them. The one in 
Waltham Forest was one in one of the entrances to the park in the north, but when people come 
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to the games they're focused on going into it, they're not focused on doing stuff around it’ 
(Interviewee #7 (SG4)). 
Time and time again, small firms illustrated stories of doomed to fail investments:  
‘Businesses bought loads of whatever their particular stock was and then like found none of it was 
used (…) that was one of the most surprising things, really, because you would… The thing that 
was quite fascinating about this from looking at it beforehand, and then the reality of what 
happened. It was almost whatever you thought was going to be good was bad, and whatever you 
thought was going to be bad was good. It was almost like the complete opposite of how you 
planned and what you anticipated (Interviewee #24 (SG1)) 
‘It was heart breaking the amount of effort and time and planning that went in to what I did’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
‘Nobody considered the negative effects on anybody's business. And the last thing anybody will 
publicly say is that the Olympics is going to slaughter you. That will make the press so fast it would 
make your head spin and that would be their head on the line. Nobody will say this statement 
unless you put the pieces together yourself. You have to remain positive otherwise you would not 
get out of bed’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
Small firms claimed: ‘we got a lot of advice but it was all rubbish advice, it was all the wrong advice (…) we 
were advised to prepare and get televisions in for passing visitors and ‘extra food for the month’’ 
(Interviewee #27 (SG1)). Others provided more candid responses, claiming ‘you [local business] can’t plan 
if you’re being lied to. If they’d [local council] told them the facts, what was going to happen, they would 
have closed up shop and not bothered [to try and leverage]’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Another claimed: 
‘look if they would have told us that no one is going to stay in Greenwich after the Games then we would 
have not bothered’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)).  
One regional representative of the FSB and Greenwich business owner claimed: 
‘If the authorities had been honest with business, everyone would have shut up shop but they 
weren't, they lied. They told people about more of a bonanza, and there's a film by LOCOG, and 
they got local people saying, 'Oh yeah, I'll sell more ice-cream'. Of course, no one came within 100 
yards of their ice-cream (Interviewee #24 (SG1)) 
The chair of the East London Chamber of Commerce noted that:  
‘Yes, they [local businesses] were supposed to benefit from it; whether they did was a different 
story (…) at the time there was a huge amount of negativity, to be fair, because people, a lot of 
companies, did not get anything to be fair (…) there are two messages being given out by boroughs 
and/or governmental organisations, 'Oh, it's got to be about local people, it has to be about local 
businesses' but they are not following through on actually what they say (…) that [negative impacts], 
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I think, is your killer, that is where public sector has got to get their act together, they cannot say it 
and then not follow it through’ (Interviewee #16 (SG3)).   
Such discourses help encapsulate the narratives emerging from small firms, indicating feelings of being lied 
to, disengaged, left out and in the lurch. The idea that the Games represented a top-down, autocratic and 
undemocratic project, marginalising small firms and the host community at large in favour of more macro, 
grander project objectives, is discussed in significant detail in the following findings section.  Either way, 
what we can logically deduce from the evidence is that local expectations appeared to be poorly managed. 
However, whether this was an intentional tactic or a product of unintended consequence and/or a lack of 
understanding concerning local dynamics and opportunities for small firms to leverage is an argument to 
be revisited throughout the findings and discussions of this thesis.  
‘I think the first place where they went wrong was telling and raising people's expectations, or the 
business community's expectations, at the wrong level’ (Interviewee #14 (SG3)). 
Explanations emerge throughout this and the following chapter which explore why this gap emerged and 
illuminate the contradictory dynamics at play across the planning and delivery of Olympic HEZs, and 
specifically the ‘Last Mile’. Issues of intense spatial control and strident Olympic regulation uncover and 
explain why Central Greenwich emerged as a battleground, subject to spatio-political, economic and power 
struggles over ownership of public space, just before, just after, but mainly during the ‘live’ delivery of 
London 2012 (25 July – 14 August). Such concerns over the contested and contrived engineering of 
Olympic-host space are discussed shortly. It was, however, clear from the narratives of small firms that, 
despite advice to leverage, the efficacy of such tactics was determined by Olympic restrictions and local 
controls: 
‘It [Games rhetoric] was all very positive (…) we were told we were going to have plenty of 
opportunity [for trade] but they [the Games organisers] just walked in like the Gestapo the day 
before the Olympics and said you can’t do this, if you do this you will be prosecuted!’ (Interviewee 
#34 (SG1)). 
‘Their [local small businesses] expectations and hopes would have been quite high and they would 
have got pretty meagre returns (…) if you think about the management of footfall it was very well 
managed (…) there was no chance for capturing the passing trade’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). 
4.6.5 The ‘Final Straw’  
One key finding from the data was the prevailing view that the aforementioned trade and tourism 
problematic may have contributed to the decline and failure of small firms immediately and progressively 
after the Games. Similar concerns were also raised by the author’s recent article, claiming in the context of 
East London’s creative industries negative impacts on small firms which had a direct bearing on the failure 
and subsequent folding of local firms (see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). Environmental disruption, 
prolonged periods of economic uncertainty for small firms and Games’ spaces, typifying zones threatening 
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business survival before, during and after the Games, were identified as a major concern in a post-Games 
report by the Work Foundation (2010) – particularly for small firms unwilling or unable to make the 
necessary structural adjustments to the way they operate and leverage as discussed earlier in the review. 
 
Although difficult to attribute directly to the occurrence of the Games, in light of the challenging and 
disruptive trade period, the idea that London 2012 proved to be the ‘final straw’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)) 
or ‘nail in the coffin’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)) was prevalent metaphor among several small firms. The 
scenario of those who might have been struggling before the Games being subsequently unable to continue 
competing in the local economy following aforementioned trade disruptions is a potentially valid argument. 
Such concerns were reflected in a statement by the lead business engagement officer for Central Greenwich 
claiming that those small firms who were struggling before the Games ‘could have done without it’ 
(Interviewee #19 (SG2)), in light of a local post-Games impact report conducted by the council in which 
an interviewee mentioned few positive findings for small firms. This is unsurprising in light of the findings 
of this thesis.  
 
However, it was a surprise to find one of the co-authors of the London 2012 bid and a senior LOGOG 
official emphasising that the opportunity rhetoric was to be ignored and, in fact, that ‘the Games may be a 
time when you [local businesses] lose money, not gain money’ (…) you must buy in to a longer term vision 
of future tourism increases – that when you’ll gain from it [tourism benefits] – you just ‘write-off’ the 
Games’ (Interviewee #6 (SG4)). The shift in perspective from ‘short-term’ gain to longer-term legacy was 
thus a prevailing idea, indicated by several respondents claiming ‘there will be losses potentially during the 
Games but gains afterwards as Greenwich as a destination has become better known as a consequence of 
the Games’ (Interviewee #6 (SG4)). Other project actors at the time also claimed that ‘locals expected a 
killing and didn’t get it – legacy is certainly a much longer vision – I am not sure businesses were meant to 
benefit in the short-term. There was certainly confusion at the local level of expectations, however, 
essentially by and large these stakeholders did not do very well out of the Games at all’ (Interviewee #4 
(SG4)).  
 
The emergent concern here is thus the contradictions between the idea of the Games offering genuine 
short-term trade and tourism gain, and other perspectives conceptualising the Games as a probable ‘blip’. 
The empirical findings of this research suggest the latter, despite the aforementioned lines of established 
opportunity rhetoric promoted to small firms.   
 
‘But you can’t blame them [host small firms] for it [having high expectations] (…) when I spoke at 
business meetings, I tried to tell them what it was they’ve got to be careful about (…) part of what 
I said to them was look long-term not short-term, I said ‘don’t expect you will make money’’ 
(Interviewee #5 (SG4)). 
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Several respondents illuminated such concerns, highlighting that the devastating effects of the games were 
‘disgusting’ and ‘horrendous’, as illustrated by one small firm: ‘I get quite passionate about it (talking about 
the Olympics). It was just disgusting. I was just sitting down here seething at night. I just spoke to the 
customer upstairs, and they said it was horrendous. It was ruining the town centre. And there were lots of 
shops that are now closed now because of it, and they never get their say’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). Such 
sentiments were echoed across SGs, including one remark by the Chair of the East Greenwich Business 
Association: 
 
‘A lot of the shops in the town, a lot more shops have closed since the games because they couldn't 
stomach the impact (…) For them having their business decimated for a period of time, they 
couldn't even hang on by their fingernails (…) so a lot of closures; a lot of closures happened in 
the town centre and if you wander down into the town centre, you'll probably see that there's still 
quite a few that are empty now. This is prime town centre kind of tourist-ville but they couldn't 
hang on’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
One interviewee gave several instances of small firm post-Games failures in the ‘Last Mile’ area under 
scrutiny for this study, claiming:  
‘Compendium [have gone]. Bell down on College Approach [have gone]. It was a variety of 
businesses. Mambo Latino have gone. Because it was such a bad year already the Olympics was a 
final straw (…) the only point in which we could have done well was during the Olympics and we 
did not have that. January 2013 it really did hit home that it did not do well - you really can't lose 
that many businesses in one row without having a specific reason. Two or three we lose every year 
but to lose that many was no - hang on a minute - the only thing that could have been was the 
Olympics was making it that bit worse for that year (…) We have had a quiet year business-wise in 
Greenwich. January 2013 we lost upwards of eight businesses in January alone just in this central 
block of Greenwich. Between Nelson Road and College Approach. One was a toy shop who was 
here for 20 years and he decided to close up, was it because of the Olympics? Possibly yes (…) 
when it came to January this is the reason why we lost so many businesses. We've had our 
Christmas, we will save until Christmas, once Christmas is over we may have well shut down (…) 
we also had a bad summer the previous year, with the low visitor numbers’ (Interviewee #26 
(SG1)). 
Another small firm claimed: 
‘I mean, some people have closed and it might not have been wholly due to the Olympics but it 
might have been the last straw (…) yes, it's… It's [Central Greenwich’s business demographic and 
environment] sadder. It's sadder because it's so - some people closed. I've been here all the time 
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and when I first came here there was a range of local shops and it had a lot of character. Maybe it'll 
come back but we all mourn the shops who had to go’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). 
Alongside the sad narratives from some of the interviewees, others exuded and assumed angrier and more 
strident positions, as evidenced by some of the language and metaphors used to describe the Games. The 
prevailing narrative, explanatory reasons and major attributable factors for destructive trade and tourism 
environment induced by the Games emerged through what the majority of interviewees illuminated as the 
intense striating and determining forces of the London 2012 project in local space – the contrived nature 
and practical reengineering of host community spaces to stage a ‘successful’ Games.  
 
4.7 Small Firm Legacies 
4.7.1 London’s Legacy Ambition 
As established in the review, mega-events provide extraordinary capabilities to drive economic and social 
change, and it is of significant importance that cities leave positive, long-lasting and sustainable legacies for 
hosting communities (e.g. OECD LEED, 2008). The anticipated legacies around both Summer and Winter 
Olympic and Paralympic Games, as well as the FIFA World Cup, have thus become an ‘increasingly 
prominent part of the dossiers of cities bidding to host them since the 1990s’ (House of Lords, 2013: 21). 
This has clearly been partly stimulated by recent amendments to the IOC Charter that require host cities to 
‘promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to host cities and host countries’ (House of Lords, 
2013). As such, whilst never ‘officially’ labelled as a part of the initial revival of the Games, the ambulatory 
and somewhat enigmatic concept of legacy was created as a mode of mega-event discourse designed to 
support an Olympic bid (e.g. Gold and Gold, 2008). It is therefore unsurprising that Jacques Rogge, 
President of the IOC, claims that ‘legacy has become an integral part of the Games preparation from the 
very start’, something he believes ‘London has raised the bar on, on how to deliver a lasting legacy by 
incorporating long range planning in every aspect of the London 2012 Games’ (DCMS, 2012a: 7). The idea 
of creating sustainable, longer-term benefits for hosts continues to play prominent role in the strategic 
objectives demanded by the IOC (2016) according to the newly developed Olympic 2020 agenda. 
London 2012’s legacy ambition was clear. Supranational political support coupled with a raft of ‘legacy 
promises’ were devised and revised throughout the bid, planning and delivery phases of the Games, with 
the UK Government and key stakeholder organisations explicitly emphasised the ‘after effects’. 
The government’s overarching vision for London was clear: 
‘Our vision was to transform this landscape and unlock the potential of Lower Lea Valley and 
beyond. We stuck through it through thick and thin, we did what was promised, delivering decades 
of regeneration in a handful of years (…) London 2012 has been the catalyst for one of the most 
biggest and most ambitious transformation projects in Europe’ (DCMS, 2012a: 42).  
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London’s 2012 bid honed in on these could-be legacies, using the Games to enhance the lives of its local 
people (e.g. House of Lords, 2013; DCMS, 2008). Such ambitions, aided through supranational political 
support and a raft of ‘legacy’ promises – devised and revised throughout the bid, planning and delivery 
phases of the Games - emphasised the ‘after effects’. Repeatedly, it was to be this focus that would 
distinguish London’s bid from the rest. Sorenson (2013), one of London’s key urban planners, supported 
such ideas, claiming: ‘the core aim of the Olympics was centred on regeneration and developing 
neighbourhoods to benefit communities (…) this should be honoured’ (Sorenson, 2013). This was further 
echoed by a post-Games House of Lords (2013) report claiming that: 
 ‘It is the local people who should stand to gain most from the Games (…) it is for this reason that 
the regeneration of East London was a major plank in the promised legacy’ (2013: 7). 
Published between 2005 and 2012, a range of ‘legacy’ ambitions were projected across local, city and 
national levels – presented in the table below. What we can clearly identify here is the supposed 
incorporation of ‘community’, local ‘inclusivity’, ‘economic growth’ and, more specifically, that Londoners 
would benefit, including business. Even more specifically, in the context of Greenwich there was a need to 
‘achieve a lasting legacy for the local economy from hosting the Games’. One would assume this to include 
the livelihoods of small firms, particularly in light of the council’s second objective of ‘increasing the 
competitiveness of local businesses’. One of the issues found in this research is that, due to the 
departicularised nature of policy objectives (also see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016), and unspecific 
stakeholder objectives, project actors had the potential to divorce themselves from delivering any form of 
responsibility toward a single set of stakeholders. 
Official policy document Legacy ambition 
 
London 2012 bid (HC Hansard, 
2005) 
 
 
 Delivering the experience of a lifetime for athletes 
 Leaving a legacy for sport in Britain 
 Benefitting the community through regeneration 
 Supporting the IOC and Olympic movement  
 
DCMS (2008b) ‘Before, during and 
after: Making the Most of the 2012 
Games’ 
 
 
 To make the UK a world-leading sporting nation 
 To transform the heart of East London 
 To inspire a generation of young people 
 To make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living; and 
 To demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive and 
welcoming place to live in, to visit and for business 
Added in 2009: 
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 To develop the opportunities and choices for disabled people 
 
DCMS (2010): further four-point 
legacy plan: 
 
 
 Harnessing the United Kingdom’s passion for sport to increase grass 
roots participation, particularly by young people 
 Exploiting to the full, opportunities for economic growth 
offered by hosting the Games 
 Promoting community engagement and achieving 
participation across all groups in society through the Games 
 Ensuring the Olympic Park can be developed after the Games as one 
of the principal drivers of regeneration in East London 
 
Mayor of London (2007) ‘Five Legacy 
Commitments’ 
 
 
 Increasing opportunities for Londoners to become involved in sport 
 Ensuring Londoners benefit from new jobs, business and 
volunteering opportunities 
 Transforming the heart of East London 
 Delivering a sustainable Games, and developing sustainable 
communities 
 Showcasing London as a diverse, creative and welcoming city 
 
Royal Borough of Greenwich (2012b) 
‘A London 2012 Legacy for Royal 
Greenwich’  
 
 Achieve a lasting legacy for local economy from hosting the 
Games 
 Increase the competitiveness of local businesses and increase 
their prospects from winning contracts 
 Attract new businesses to the borough 
 Use the Games to build relationships that could achieve long-term 
benefits for the borough 
 
Table 30: 'London's Evolving Legacy Ambitions' (Various sources) 
4.7.2 Legacy Lost? 
Before and after the Games, concerns about the over-stated legacy benefits from London 2012 emerged. 
Clued-up stakeholders, from governmental bodies (e.g. House of Lords, London Assembly) to critical 
academics, and the practitioners, who played a central role in the planning and delivery of the Games itself, 
criticised the project’s ability to deliver on its rhetoric, alongside questioning the neglect of legacy oversight 
as we move further into the post-Games phases. It was noted by several organisations, and Lord Coe 
himself that legacy ‘must be seen as a 10 year project’ (see DCMS ‘Inspired by London’, 2013), ‘we were 
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repeatedly told that the regeneration legacy is a longer-term project’ (House of Lords, 2013: 7), and that in 
the context of Greenwich it is an ambition that can ‘only be judged fully over time for the local economy’ 
(RBOG, 2012b: 25). However, the fact that the official Olympic Games Impact Report concludes just over 
three years after the Games [the actual launch date being 12 December 2015 at the LLDC HQ, Stratford], 
raises questions over legacy being a depoliticised ambition, seldom fully measured, and thus ineffectively 
scrutinised. Such view was reflected across policy rhetoric but also highlighted in participant responses: 
 ‘Well, one of my criticisms of the Olympics is that we haven’t really given enough thought about legacy 
stuff’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). 
This was raised frequently by several respondents across the spectrum, with both the FSB and the London 
Chamber of Commerce claiming limitations in their funding to measure any sort of post-Games legacy for 
small businesses. This extended to the downsizing of the UK Governments DCMS department which had 
projected much of the pre-Games rhetoric around legacy in the first place. One Senior Policy maker at 
DCMS indicated this, claiming that since April 2014 ‘I have taken over as head of the now quite small legacy 
unit’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). Furthermore, several others, including one of the co-authors of the London 
2012 bid, claimed that: 
‘My worry about the future [of East London] is that – and the mistake that’s been made by the 
mayor here - is that the government have effectively handed over responsibility for the regeneration 
of the Thames Gateway to the mayor. Now, I don’t believe a mayor ever has enough money to do 
it properly, and so the problem is that what it becomes, if we’re not very careful, is a whole range 
of disparate ideas where private finance is put in. So you’ve got the Chinese development for 
example in one part of Silverton and you’ve got other bids that will come in. But I don’t know 
how, when you haven’t got the resources, you can make it [East London’s development legacy] 
particularly coherent. I would have said that the mayor has to have a role here, but the government 
need to stay involved, and because it actually does need investment by the government’ 
(Interviewee #6 (SG4)). 
The findings of this research indicate that London’s legacy ambition continues to be scrutinised, given 
concerns over pre-Games rhetoric of local promise being neglected without responsible oversight (see 
House of Lords, 2013) – as echoed by one respondent who believes the government has ‘taken their eye 
off the ball’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). Although the UK Government, alongside an eclectic range of other 
official and unofficially elected entities, played a major role in the intervention of the Games in order to 
‘make it happen’, this research indicates that the same stakeholders appear to have adopted a rather laissez-
faire approach to scrutinising legacy itself. Reflecting on how these stakeholders may have washed their 
hands of it, several respondents highlighted that the post-Games phases may be moving towards more free-
market principles, so-much-so that one senior London Assembly member referred to such development as 
‘a bit too neo-liberal at the moment’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)).  
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Both the secondary and primary-empirical evidence collected for this research supports such assertions, as 
further postulated by one House of Lords respondent: 
‘I think the planning of mega-events is very much focused on the event itself (…) my worry [as 
also expressed in the House of Lords (2013) legacy inquiry] is that they drop the ball and that 
there’s nobody with a clear ownership of it. I mean as far as the Mayor’s Office is concerned, yes, 
they still talk the legacy talk, but the reality is that the Mayor’s mind has moved on to other things 
– to Westminster and so on. That there’s no DCMS is they perceive a legacy responsibility in terms 
of sport but there’s no overarching responsibility for the regeneration of East London’ 
(Interviewee #1 (SG4)). 
Such concerns are further exacerbated in light of the ‘perception of insufficient long-term benefits, or even 
adverse long-term consequences for cities and countries having hosted the Games’ (House of Lords, 2013: 
21), and the risks to hosting communities. These concerns echo loudly across the short and longer term 
legacy challenges for small firms in this case study. In light of the ‘neoliberal’ concern raised above, we can 
see that private development, international investment et cetera are both overt legacy strategies formed for 
London 2012. This was echoed at the Greenwich level by one Senior Business Engagement officer claiming 
that ‘the Games were good for showing our strengths as a borough and as a country, in terms of planning 
for major events, but more importantly it has bought confidence to developers and investments. Enquiries 
from hotel developers, office developers, are going up, and people are investing in major chains and this is 
has a ripple effect where smart local small businesses can capitalise on that’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
Another small firm claimed that corporations are starting to see more ‘potential in the town’ (Interviewee 
#26 (SG1)), and significant post-Games ‘interest by developers in the Borough’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
However, although potentially beneficial for the local economy at large, when assessing small firm impacts 
and legacies one must be critical of the challenges such forms of private-led urban development may have 
for small firms. This was reflected on by several major stakeholders, one of which claimed that:  
‘Managing these developers, it's very complicated and you have to have a proactive strategy. So the 
local authorities say, 'Yeah, yeah, give us, give us, give us' and if they don't think about what the 
impact is going to be on the surrounding areas, it won't work. Well, it won't necessarily have the 
desired effect’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). 
The same respondent further claimed that ‘I think what you're really talking about are the corporate interests 
in relation to local development that follows on from the relationships with local councils. The point about 
the larger corporates is they tend to deliver more potentially than some of the smaller businesses and, 
unfortunately, that may be, but that is the way it works’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). Interestingly, on numerous 
occasions the idea was raised that ‘big business’ is the only viable way forward to a) supply to and form 
major partners in global projects like the Games (before and during Games) but also b) that inviting 
corporate, private financiers into host community private-led development was an ‘obvious’ way to drive 
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forward the necessary development (post-Games) era marked for these spaces. This highlights naturalised 
assumptions around the way in which 21st century urban spaces should develop, look and ultimately feel in 
an era of sustained and unadulterated capitalism. The idea that mega-events justify and induce modes of 
‘creative destruction’, creating spaces for capital to flourish only to withdraw from intervention once host 
spaces have been prepared for capital accumulation, indicates two very different modes of political 
economic governance. This is a major theoretical point to be unpacked later on in the Discussions chapter.  
4.7.3 Risks to Local Legacy 
London 2012 was clearly, according to the analysed rhetoric, supposed to be a democratic project for the 
people, for East London’s hosting communities, to showcase to the world the (cultural) diversity of what 
the glorious city of London was about. However, in light of concerns raised by the thesis findings, serious 
questions must be asked about the totalitarian regimes that emerge under the guise of the departicularised 
and planetarised nature of the concept of ‘legacy’ itself. As identified above, legacy promises reflect a 
somewhat top-level, unclear and ill-defined nature of legacy, as reflected in the often ‘wishy-washy’ 
interview responses by several senior stakeholders. In light of this, one of the key conclusions to be derived 
here is that legacy serves only to provide legitimisation rhetoric for Games intervention, something that 
remains overly decontextualized and divorced from reality. As recommended in Pappalepore and Duignan 
(2016), policy makers and academic inquiry must consider legacy in the specific contexts under its influence, 
and explore this vague concept against the idiosyncratic and nuanced local dynamics it will inevitably 
interact with. The idea that legacy should be seen as contextual, subjective and analysed using in-depth 
qualitative analysis techniques is alluded to by Vigor et al (2004) claiming that: ‘business, government (local, 
regional or national), community groups, residents, environmental organisations and the Olympic 
Movement itself all have a view, and many are actively telling their story about what a London Games in 
2012 could mean for them. All of these potentially entail long lasting legacies, but each has a different 
impact on the ground’ (2004: 8). This is what has been attempted by this ideographic study, through 
narrative and rich qualitative ‘subjectivist’ analysis to amplify the opportunities, but mainly challenges, for 
host community small firms through an empirically driven systematic analysis of the shorter term small firm 
impacts, supported by policy, media and academic analyses to enhance the validity of findings.  
4.7.3.1 Gentrification and Rising Rents – Winners and Losers 
Structural economic concerns that hosting the Olympics inevitably causes real estate values to increase and 
rents to rise due to increased desire and demand to live in spaces that have hosted a global event is not new. 
In fact, this ‘risk’ is very well known, and as the earlier review indicates, symbolises and materialises in event 
mega-event delivery [aka the ‘Olympic Effect’]. Of course, amplifying such concern in yet another mega-
event case study is important for building our understanding that, yes, the Games has yet again placed its 
Midas touch upon another community and unequal developmental effects can be seen. Critically, on several 
occasions the idea was raised of ‘winners vs. losers’, the Olympics as marking who is ‘included vs. excluded’ 
as key beneficiaries – even the idea of the Games bringing mainly ‘macro’ benefit vs. ‘micro’ neglect. 
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Such economic concerns were indicated by a significant number of respondents across all stakeholder 
groups claiming that, since the Games, ‘business rates are going sky high (…) so property prices around 
East London have seen upper [price] increases in those areas’ (Interviewee #17 SG3)) and that in general 
‘regarding the risks of gentrification and rental increases, this is a major issue for the East End. The LLDC 
and I need to consider how we can use our planning powers to maintain the fabric of businesses in the 
local area’ (Interviewee #3 (SG4)). Respondents, due to their overarching East London remit, reflected on 
these concerns across ALL host Olympic boroughs, indicating that communities are ‘all slowly but surely 
being unfortunately forced out of their locations because land value has started to increase as people… as 
the ‘haves’ push out the ‘have nots’ (…) I used to work in Newham and I think in Waltham Forest 
residential prices have jumped 100 per cent’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)). One key Senior Business Engagement 
officer reflected on this scenario in the context of the main Olympic borough of Newham:  
‘What's happened is, all those reasons for not visiting the east, all the environmental factors have 
disappeared. What you have is lower value land prices that, to be honest, it's not just the businesses, 
it's the residents, it's the housing residents as well, all slowly but surely being, unfortunately, forced 
out of their locations because land value has started to increase as people, as the haves push out 
the have-nots (…) ultimately what it amounts to is that people are priced out of formally rich areas 
that are looking at new areas – and I think it is East London’s turn [having previously referred to 
Notting Hill going through similar transition in the 1960s]’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). 
The risks of such economic change to small businesses was captured perfectly by a Shadow MP cabinet 
minister: 
‘Again, with respect to gentrification, prices around Olympic areas will (!) rise, have to rise, and yes 
this poses problems, but this is the changing face of the high street. But again, legacy is a longer 
term concern and there have to be winners and losers in this game’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)). 
In the context of Greenwich specifically, the Senior Business Engagement officer responsible for the very 
small firms interviewed in this study echoed similar concern: 
‘You have the landlords that know the site will be developed, and you will find gentrification and 
they will put up their rent as the market price and land values are increasing (…) and the type of 
appliance that they can attract for their sites will change and that will have an impact on the high 
street’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
In addition, several media reports and critical commentaries at the time suggested that London and its 
hosting communities would succumb to the Olympic Effect. This was highlighted in a House of Lords 
(2012) report that ‘tenants fear a permanent increase in rents’, and further commented on by the City 
Mayor’s Archive (2011a): ‘local’s feel that being so close to the event, they may suffer from rising rents 
forced resettlements and general hikes in living costs and council taxes’ (City Mayor’s Archive, 2011a). 
Furthermore, one social housing campaigner exclaimed in the New York Times (2012) that ‘what we are 
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going to find, once the carnival has moved on, is that very few people who live in the area and need housing 
are going to be able to afford to live in the neighbourhood’ (New York Times, 2012). 
As already discussed, the findings conclude that the amalgamation of short-term financial challenges (due 
to e.g. host space control etc.) and linkages between this and business failure, alongside aforementioned 
structural economic changes across London (including Greenwich), has been singled out as a major concern 
for key local stakeholders (e.g. House of Lords, 2013; Work Foundation, 2010) – the very ‘supposed’ 
beneficiaries of London’s event-led policy with respect to small firm survival post-Games. This view was 
shared across all reports and respondents – from retailers to the lead legacy investigator at the House of 
Lords. So-much-so that the earlier thesis conceptualisation of the ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’ could quite 
easily be widened into a general ‘anti-perfect economic storm’. The empirical findings clearly suggest a 
period of economic activity and systemic risk apparent throughout all stages of the TDR cycle, way beyond 
the periods of time after the carnival has moved on and affecting small firm survival, which may pose 
uncertain futures for ex-host borough small firms. This storm is to be weathered for some time, eroding 
slowly-but-surely the ability of smaller, independent firms to survive. We must however recognise that 
economic changes, Olympic impacts and items pertaining to small firm survival are influenced by a series 
of complex factors – as discussed shortly on in this section.  
4.7.4 Reengineering Olympic Spaces and Populations 
Although a key hoped-for legacy was to ‘speed-up’ the process of urban development and renewal, as 
explained shortly in this section, such processes emerge quite clearly as modes of ‘creative destruction’. 
Such projects are not necessarily aimed at the regeneration of existing communities but creating a ‘tabula 
rasa’ and the demolition of close knit socio-economic communities, which often reflect the identity and 
diversity of town centres but may not provide optimum modes of economic vitality. This new urban order 
favours new people, communities and businesses who have the propensity to ‘contribute’. As critically 
explored in the Discussions chapter, this thesis concludes that it is these naturalised ideologies, assumptions 
and conventional wisdoms that underpin late 20th – early 21st century capitalist society – whereby the only 
feasible way of continuing our existence is to accumulate capital without considering ‘to what end’. The 
projection of utopian futurities is set against a backdrop of dystopia, forming an irresistible juxtaposition 
against years of East London economic decline, deprivation and criminality, and rhetoric is harnessed well 
throughout the TDR cycle. This was discussed earlier in review section 2.3 illustrated by Figure 23 below. 
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Figure 23: Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 for London (Government Office for London, 2007) 
In light of the research findings, London’s project of a ‘socially inclusive’ Convergence strategy may be at 
risk of manifesting as an elitist political and economic agenda excluding the very communities it had hoped 
to help. Interestingly, this concern was alluded to by the Head of Olympic Legacy at the DCMS, who 
commented that ‘if we look back in 20 years' time and all the housing in the park is really high-price, high-
value, it's you've got gated communities and so on, and the only people who use the facilities are wealthy 
people, then it's a missed opportunity and in that sense we'll have failed’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). However, 
despite such reflections, the House of Lords (2013) expressed concern that London’s regeneration strategy 
may emerge as merely a synonym for ‘gentrification’, claiming that: ‘we heard concerns that the ‘Olympic 
effect’ would increase house prices still further in surrounding areas, leading to ‘convergence’ being 
achieved through gentrification, rather than improved outcomes for current residents’ (House of Lords, 
2013: 68). A scenario in which the ‘wrong kinds’ of residential and business communities are wiped from 
the face and space of the new visions of geographical regions like East London is a valid risk and one also 
raised by this thesis, specifically in the context of small firms. The problem identified here, and by the Chief 
Executive of the LLDC in the House of Lords (2013) inquiry, is that one of the key contradictory challenges 
at play is that the idea of rising land, rent and real estate value is often synonymous with an effective project 
outcome, specifically claiming: ‘one measure of increasing house prices could be seen as an outcome of 
successful regeneration’ (House of Lords, 2013: 68). Such concerns were raised by several major 
stakeholders throughout the interviews conducted by this study as we move in to the legacy phases of the 
Games: 
Co-authors of the London 2012 bid:  
‘Owners of them [commercial properties] are trying to get much higher value as a consequence of 
the Games. That’s the danger of the Games, of course, and even more so because of what’s 
happened since – which is the property prices go up! That remains a real danger, that people get 
priced out’ (Interviewee #6 (SG4)). 
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Leader of the House of Lords (2013) inquiry: 
‘Gentrification would be a symptom of that change, so you improve the infrastructure and that 
makes it a more attractive area, it means rents go up, it means that different people move in’ 
(Interviewee #1 (SG4)).  
Leader of the council, further stressing the unequal development benefits arising from the Olympics: 
‘Elected representatives of these [Olympic host] boroughs told us that the situation had already 
started to change, and that house prices were increasing, heightening issues of affordability (…) 
the prices are ridiculous (…) The cost of properties is still, in my view, exorbitant, and I think this 
is a major problem. I have no idea how the country is going to deal with that but we are pricing a 
whole generation of people out of London (...) Obviously the improvements that we have seen as 
a consequence of the Olympics will only make that situation worse’ (Cllr Robbins cited in House 
of Lords, 2013: 68). 
 
In a major Work Foundation (2010) report, supported by ‘Oxford Economists’ and commissioned by 
DCMS, one major issue for the city is that whilst: 
 
‘Capitalising on its strengths as a global knowledge city in order to grow the economy, and 
managing the risk that some individuals and places in London will be left behind without 
intervention (Work Foundation, 2010: 4) (…) the games project has the propensity to ‘displace 
individuals from communities’’ (2010: 42). 
The idea is that the Games may sanitise space, slowly ousting and removing deadwood businesses with 
limited economic importance and political power in favour of more profitable land owners – a project in 
favour of capitalist re-shaping. This view was shared by a significant number of stakeholders, as epitomised 
by a Senior Manager at East London’s leading small business support agency ‘Business in the Community’ 
(BITC): 
‘I am sure that rising rents and gentrification has had a detrimental effect on the traditional 
businesses operate in that area [East London] (…) they must be facing increasing pressures for 
the increased charges they will inevitably face when they sign their tenancy agreements (…) it’s a 
feeling through speaking with people in the area’ (Interviewee #17 (SG3)). 
4.7.5 Gentrification: Small Firm Narratives 
The research found that small firms believe that gentrification and rising rents are, having, and will continue 
to have, a significant effect on their survival and business performance. One small firm claimed: ‘well my 
days are numbered ultimately. I am on borrowed time. Our lease has run out and we are already overstaying. 
I have to pay my rent obviously but Greenwich Hospital have said to me that they are going to put my rent 
up (…) sooner or later they will get us’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Across the language used, small firms 
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believe that the structural economic problems represent a ticking time bomb, independent shops merely 
waiting for their contracts to renew only to be informed of unaffordability. Although the research does not 
fully analyse the longer-term rental value increases due to the time constraints of thesis production, the 
evidence from prior mega-events, and concerns across almost all perspectives (primary and secondary data 
sources), represents fait accompli. This was epitomised by several worried small firms, and across business 
support perspectives: 
Local retailer perspective: 
‘We are lucky we are tied in to a long term lease but this is due to renewal soon, and the effect is 
yet to hit us. However, we know that some rents here have gone up 300% - some rents in Central 
Greenwich were £10000, and now are looking at £30000. That is pretty much central London 
[prices]!’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
 
Local F&B firm perspective: 
 
‘They have quadrupled the rents, they put the rents up by four fold – driving all the small 
businesses out (…) I expect the rents to increase further, large extent, apart from this place [their 
business] everything is owned by the trust [Greenwich Hospital Trust], now they are driving them 
all out, turning them into flats [as mentioned by Interviewee #25 (SG1)] to rent them out (…) for 
example Café Sol had the business for 40 years and he was paying so much they obtained his 
building and put rent up four-fold’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
 
Federation of Small Business (FSB) perspective: 
‘I think there's been, I think those businesses in Greenwich where it was really tough and for some 
went to the wall after the games itself and whether as a result of the games was the final nail in the 
coffin. But those that have stayed, and those that are in the area, and I think as long as there is not 
greed from the council or from the landlords to hike up rents, and to ensure rents do not go sky 
high in areas that have business in the East End of London where you've seen a real increase in 
house prices, for instance’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). 
The East Greenwich Business Association (EGBA) claimed:  
‘A lot of the shops in the town - a lot more shops have closed since the games because they couldn't 
stomach the impact (…) For them having their business decimated for a period of time, they 
couldn't even hang on by their fingernails’ (…) the resulting effect was ‘so a lot of closures, a lot 
of closures happened in the town centre and if you wander down into the town centre, you'll 
probably see that there's still quite a few that are empty now. This is prime town centre kind of 
tourist-ville but they couldn't hang on’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). 
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Others, however, claim that they are already struggling to respond to increased rents in recent contract 
renewals. This was epitomised by one small firm who claimed: ‘well I am moving out of East London 
because I can’t afford it! (…) whether that has something to do with the Olympics – I am not sure (…) but 
people are being forced out of East London due to gentrification’ (Interviewee #33 (SG1)). Businesses 
interviewed across Central Greenwich described how business demographics had already changed, 
highlighting the closure of several independents and stating that the community feeling had become ‘sadder. 
It’s sadder, because it's so - some people closed. I've been here all the time and when I first came here they 
were thriving and it was more bustling and they [small firms] had a lot of character’ (…) we mourn all the 
shops that had to go’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). The same respondent went on to complain that this scenario 
was a result of ‘lack of planning and the multinationals would go away again if they didn't make enough out 
of it (…) Greenwich Hospital put the rents up, a long time ago (…) they proposed what they wanted on 
top of it and did a lot of damage in the process, and took a lot of the community, and they've taken away a 
lot of our shops and, as I say, some have closed. They've - I mean, it's incredibly socially divided’ 
(Interviewee #29 (SG1)). As we can identify, London’s ambition to regenerate and inviting private 
internationals to lead the developmental effort for East London and Greenwich’s urban economic legacy, 
quite clearly poses major challenges for the survival of small firms. The overarching narrative from small 
firms here was filled with concern, negative connotations and thoughts of a challenging time ahead, as 
indicated by one angry small retailer:  
‘The sports were great – but everything around it just fell apart. (…) How many lifestyles did they 
corrupt and bend there. (…) it was great for all the sportsmen and women who were part of it – 
but for anyone outside of it – suffered (…) the best thing that modern Olympics could do is choose 
a site, set up this Olympic site, make sure it is like the Vatican, run there every four years. You 
know why they don’t do that? Because they won’t be able to get the income, they suck off every 
individual communities they land on’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)).  
This was echoed by a Senior Business Engagement officer for the Borough of Tower Hamlets: 
‘We saw the Olympics there [East London], people think that it’s a desirable place to be in East 
London, so they want to start a business here and start living, so it pushes rental values up, which 
means that only big business can afford them’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). 
The findings now turn specifically to the direct economic consequence of these structural economic 
changes in terms of concerns over corporatisation in Central Greenwich’s high street and beyond. 
4.7.6 London’s Sanitisation Project? 
Gentrification was widely acknowledged, mainly by high-level more strategically focused project actors, 
who recognised that such economic change was a major opportunity for East London, despite the concerns 
and risks posed for small firms, as previously recognised. The findings clearly reveal that London 2012 
emerged as a way to sanitise and include the right stakeholders, indicating ways in which spaces can ‘renew’ 
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through a mode of creative destruction to transform blighted spaces and their non-optimal economically 
prosperous high streets. A new entrepreneurial playground was created, with opportunities for new start-
ups who strategically align better with the industries and business demographic that would play a greater 
part in London’s economic future at the expense of small, local firms. Such issues were reflected by several 
respondents, including one interviewee from the House of Lords, who claimed: ‘some change to existing 
communities was always inevitable, and those are the communities which are changing all the time (…) It’s 
[gentrification] is not necessarily a bad thing in itself, it could be a reflection of change but if you wanted to 
see greater economic development, more job opportunities in the area and that would probably have led to 
gentrification’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). This was also reflected on by a senior minister claiming that: 
‘It’s [London 2012] critical for the future of the East End to attract creative and hi-tech firms – 
these are key for economic prosperity and employment – perhaps more important than dying high 
street sectors and local retail (…) the introduction of Westfield was a corporate bonanza but 
although it may overshadow businesses and detract local custom – the place has employed over 
2000 Newham residents – employment is critical in my current role (…) gentrification is welcomed. 
Although it is difficult for local people and businesses, it enhances an area, brings significant 
employment benefit and better for the wider development of an area’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)).   
Such questions were further echoed by one Senior Civil Servant at the London Assembly, claiming: 
‘The sort of business that would be attractive post-Olympics would be far more service economy 
end, focused in London, into which the Olympic Games was inserted, was still a bit of an industrial 
hangover area, albeit that in London's economy there is this large culture for those sorts of 
traditional industrial jobs, which is why we did the Olympics (…)  it [the Games] was an 
opportunity to help this area [East London] transition through a weaker economic position to a 
stronger one (…) to inject new life into the economy to try and get more businesses into the area. 
Actually, if that is going to succeed there is going to be a certain amount of randomness and creative 
destruction in that a lot of the old businesses will be screened out, their rents will go up and unless 
they can improve their margins and their business offer some will go to the wall. But hopefully in 
the longer run the opportunity to put new inspiration from younger people with business ideas or 
whatever, will mean we are up on the deal’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). 
One key point for this study is the major importance of specific sectors being promoted and favoured in 
light of East London’s economic development ambition: high-growth, creative, hi-tech and service 
industries. This notion was discussed across many of the high-level stakeholders. The desire was for East 
London to ‘re-orientate’ itself toward more service-orientated economies, to ‘be far more service economy 
than perhaps it was in the past’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)) to fuel the growth of East London, helping to 
alleviate socio-economic disadvantage and thus contributing to the overarching objective of ‘Convergence’. 
This was re-iterated by a senior manager at the LLDC: 
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‘Creative industries and high-tech firms are key for East London growth – the challenge for East 
London is that existing local businesses are often tired and run down’ (Interviewee #3 (SG4)). 
Inevitably, with creative destruction comes inherent risks, with one interviewee claiming: ‘inevitably that 
[Games development] was going to lead to a high degree of creative destruction’, and another claiming: ‘the 
Games themselves, I think, was a big risk, really, to be honest’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). This is highly 
indicative of Harvey’s (1989) idea of ‘entrepreneurial strategies’ as opposed to more progressive managerial 
modes of urban development as symbolised by East London’s post-war development over the last half-
century. Numerous respondents referred to the Games as a ‘gamble’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)) and a ‘risk’ 
(Interviewee #2 (SG4)), opening up the question of why host cities decide to bid on interventions where 
legacies are often enigmatic and not guaranteed (this symbolises entrepreneurial governance as stated by 
Harvey (1989)). Furthermore, such concerns pose questions of ‘social justice’ and whether London’s 
undemocratic project should have been allowed to occur. Is this simply a case of a new urban process 
whereby the lower-class are displaced and enslaved by new masters with spaces governed by capital 
accumulation? Is this ethical? And can we make such assertions? The idea that such processes may colonise, 
reduce diversification and restrict local business opportunities was noted by several respondents, with 
concerns raised by a Senior Civil Servant at the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA): 
‘If it [Greenwich] becomes simply for those who can afford it and have the money, then it will 
become more like the kind of Canary Wharf development, which will reduce local opportunities 
and reduce diversification’ (Interviewee #7 (SG4)). 
This was further highlighted by another Senior Civil Servant at the London Assembly, who claimed: ‘to 
what extent to which this [aforementioned economic changes] provides an opportunity for local players or 
the extent to which it is a colonial exercise which outside bodies tend to muscle in is the major question 
(…) so do I think the community businesses the area were meant to benefit from the games? Well, it's some 
of the existing ones had to go, others were potentially going to get the opportunities’ (Interviewee #9 
(SG4)). The question of questionable small firm positives and negative effects permeated throughout 
respondent narratives, highlighting that in the ‘post-games legacy in terms of the transformation of that 
space and how local firms will benefit in terms of that - this is an interesting thing to think about in terms 
of what is happening around property prices and what is happening for local people and businesses in and 
around these areas. Are they forcing them out and/or is it bringing new tourism footfall to cafes there’ 
(Interviewee #19 SG2)). The idea that London has and will continue to invoke the aforementioned 
necessary positive economic change as we move in to the post-Games legacy phase was reflected on by one 
House of Lords legacy stakeholder: 
 ‘I'm not sure the business communities will look the same, there may be different communities 
and businesses. I mean, what I'm looking at, and I suppose I've looked at this with my background 
experience of having been a borough council leader, is what you're looking for is a private, local 
economy. And that might be private, local economy which is a completely different context from 
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the one in ten years or even five years before, an economy which is sustainable. That would be 
legacy. What happened to business X? Well, the answer is well they may have disappeared (…) if 
you're trying to assess this, say, from the local authority perspective, I think you have to take a step 
back and say, 'Okay, I want to give you…I want in ten years' time communities where there is a 
high-level of employment, a high-level of engagement, a high-level of skills and a local economy 
which is working', and that may be a very different thing to what you've got at the moment… That 
may be quite unpopular in the short-term’ (Interviewee #1 (SG4)). 
This view point was also reflected by a Senior Civil Servant in the London Assembly: 
‘A lot of the old businesses will be screened out, their rents will go up and unless they can improve 
their margins and their business offer, some will go to the wall. But hopefully in the longer run the 
opportunity to put new inspiration from younger people with business ideas, or whatever, will 
mean we are up on the deal (…) we wanted to inject new life in to the economy to try and get 
some new businesses in to the area (…) there is bound to be a re-juggling of the business mix in 
the area, it’s inevitable (…) I’m interested in ability of legacy to employ local people, and for local 
people to be inspired by the legacy and see them as opportunities’ (Interviewee #9 (SG4)). 
4.7.7 Corporatisation, Clone Town and the Disneyisation of Central Greenwich 
The findings reveal that one of the major negative legacies for small firms, following the potential structural 
economic changes to East London and Greenwich’s economy, is the risk that gentrification and rising rents 
continue to shift UK high street business demographics from independent traders to more corporate, larger 
business occupants. High streets that are, by and large, determined by rising rents and commercial 
affordability, ‘pricing out’ these rather vulnerable stakeholders. National left-wing organisations such as the 
New Economic Foundation (NEF) continue to indicate such issues broadly across UK high streets as we 
enter the era of ‘clone’ spaces and towns (NEF, 2010). Although this is a wider concern out of the context 
of mega-events, this research suggests that mega-events catalyse this process, speeding up the 
corporatisation of the types of high streets under investigation for this research – as frequently discussed 
by the author across the media (e.g. Duignan (2015a, 2015b)) and academic commentary [as illustrated 
across the review], including the author (e.g. Wilbert and Duignan, 2015, Duignan and Wilbert, 2016). 
With respect to the livelihoods of wider East London and Central Greenwich traders, these effects were 
reflected on by almost all respondents as one of the key challenges for the survival of small firms following 
the London 2012 Games. The findings suggest that, in response to these issues, small firms feel that Central 
Greenwich will become ‘corporate’, ‘horrific’ and a ‘bugbear of a lot of residents’, leading to a ‘destruction 
of artisan culture’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)) and, according to the Chair of the EGBA, a space which ‘in 
another 10 years will be unrecognisable’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). In response to these corporatisation 
effects, one small firm highlighted: ‘you can go anywhere and it will be the same (…) will people still want 
to visit it? I do not know’ but locals believe Central Greenwich will become dominated by ‘American 
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chains’, a case of ‘Greenwich Council slowly but surely destroying the old artisan culture’ (Interviewee #18 
(SG3)). Several small firms echoed this point: 
‘More corporate outlets in Central Greenwich now – it [the business environment] is much worse’ 
(…) it’s more corporate, we have more corporates now than we did before’ (Interviewee #32 
(SG1)). 
 
‘The competition has become slightly bigger, slightly better (…) but yeah I think that [Central 
Greenwich being taken over by corporates] is very likely, well they are tapping around now – in 
years to come individual businesses will succumb to bigger franchises, I am not sure if retail shops 
will go but coffee shops and restaurants and the pub trade are going that way – everyone’s owned 
by someone’ (Interviewee #30 (SG1)).  
Several respondents were very clear that there is a visible permeation of international, big businesses 
morphing into the artisan spaces of Central Greenwich. As reflected on by an independent café owner, 
‘Greenwich Hospital [major landlord of the small firms interviewed] have just let Costa Coffee onto the 
island which is a shame, not just because we are a coffee shop, just because it is the first chain on the island 
[although previous accounts mention Jamie’s as the initial chain starting the corporates off]. Up until then 
it has always been independent’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). A significant majority of small firms and key 
stakeholders indicated that this has come about directly through rising rents and unaffordability, in part 
catalysed by preceding Olympic brand development of the area. 
Several firms commented on this, including one small restaurant:  
‘With rent going up my restaurant, there are many restaurant chains coming [into Central 
Greenwich] (…) more chain of restaurants are coming to the area (…) whilst rents and business 
rates are going up’ (Interviewee #39 (SG1)). 
Another small food firm claimed: 
‘Rent has increased 10% (…) it [rent] always increases! (…) yes it is really [taken over by 
corporations] you got your Nandos, Zizzi and Jamie Oliver – bigger companies are starting to 
come in you know (…) independents are beginning to be pushed out. I do not know whether that 
is because of the Olympics or whether just general policy and town centres changing’ (Interviewee 
#35 (SG1)).  
Another small firm claimed: 
‘The hospital trust [major landlord] has put a lot of the rates and rents up for many of the local 
businesses. And since Jamie Oliver's restaurant has popped up they won't lower them. So it's just 
going to be corporates now, before we didn't have any, we've now got Nando’s, Zizzi’s, Starbucks, 
Costa’s, we even have a McDonald's. Before the DLR, we didn't have the Boots and Marks & 
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Spencer's, every business was independent. Tev has been there for 28 years and it was all 
independent before. With aircraft and antique markets with their village feel. If you go down to the 
river front as you come up on the Clipper where Nando’s is now, if you look up from the Thames 
you can see the Cutty Sark and other traditional heritage sites, now when you come up you don't 
see that you just see these long signs for Nando’s, Ben and Jerry's and Zizzi’s. You cannot now see 
the Cutty Sark they have blocked the whole view. It is just corporate that can afford everything 
now. Every two days she gets an e-mail from someone will they sell their lease’ (Interviewee #34 
(SG1)).  
The regional representative of the FSB for Greenwich claimed: 
‘One of the big bugbears of a lot of residents for Greenwich. Greenwich has historically been very 
artisan, partly because of the maritime thing, and partly because it's always been a bit quirky. Up 
until recently, it was quite off major transport links (…) largely untouched and it's developed its 
own little subculture. Obviously, for the park being here, a lot of people who have dogs and stuff 
like that, and there's a lot of creatives here that are artists, poets, musicians, it's always had that, a 
little bit of that, sort of a quirky thing going on. But Greenwich Council is driving through all of 
these big new developments, all the new, trying to get the big companies in and get all of their 
money out of them. Most of the borough is horrified about what is happening, and where you've 
got the Cutty Sark ship down that was restored after the fire, now the sort of restaurants they've 
built some new buildings right on the waterfront there. So they've removed the waterfront view, 
and it's like Frankie and Benny's and these American chains going in there all with their like neon 
signs and stuff. Of course, the Greenwich Society were the marshals of the historical culture for 
the place, they are constantly up in arms fighting with the planning department, whatever, to not 
allow it, because slowly but surely Greenwich Council is destroying the old artisan culture’ 
(Interviewee #18 (SG3)). 
Several firms explicitly claimed that they believed that replacing small firms with big corporate business was 
an overt strategy from the beginning. They claimed: ‘small business suffered. That was it. Big time. It was 
all about big business and nothing about small and medium sized businesses at all’ (Interviewee #35 (SG1)). 
This was further echoed by another angry small firm owner:  
‘The council did not help us at all. They were not for us, they were all for big corporates – we were 
completely pushed aside and the council made that obvious [during the Games] as well (…) they 
[the council] are not very good [at supporting small firms] I am afraid – not with local businesses 
anyway – they prefer the big companies, they are pushing the big companies in here (…) they made 
it as difficult as they could for us (…) they could have benefited small business who has been 
keeping Greenwich here for years instead of big corporate companies who come in and gets 
everything’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
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The idea that Central Greenwich suffered not only before and during the Games but continues to have 
limited reaping of the so-called legacy benefits saturated in the data as a major concern for this research. 
With Olympic-related place marketing, several firms claimed that rents appear to have been driving up 
more than the rate of inflation, with one claiming that: ‘they say my rent is worth, they say that I'm paying 
30% less than I should even though that is not really true. Because my neighbour opposite me pays less 
than me. Yes, they do want to put the rent up, and they are putting the rent up. They are renting out for 
Costa, two double shops to Costa, for like 90,000 a year - which is a ridiculous amount of money. And no 
independent can afford to pay that. So they are going to come back and say well we can get this for the 
shop, so…’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). These issues were also reflected on by one senior legacy manager at 
DCMS stating: 
‘Obviously, if you've got people moving into an area with much higher wealth and income, you 
do get a change in the business base in the area and it goes from retail to restaurants, and so on 
(…) We saw the Olympics there, people think that it's a desirable place to be in East London’ 
(Interviewee #2 (SG4)  
The aforementioned issues raise a serious social but also economic concern for the legacies of such unique, 
heritage spaces. The concern is that the erosion of Central Greenwich’s artisan and heritage cultural identity 
and once unique spaces, which clearly form a major driver of tourism and visitor demand, will reduce 
longer-term destination competitiveness, impacting on future economic demand for emergent clone spaces 
whilst simultaneously destroying social cohesion and dismantling qualitative interdependent networks that 
underpin the survival of small business communities. This was discussed earlier in the review section 2.3.3. 
Although the Games presents quick-win, short-term economic boosts to host cities, the inevitable Midas 
touch may in fact not only displace and sanitise small business communities, but also jeopardise the 
competitiveness of melancholic (referred to by one small firm as ‘quiet and dull’ spaces (Interviewee #34 
(SG1))) clone town spaces. Interestingly, several respondents alluded to the somewhat ‘Disneyfied’ nature 
of tourism that has developed in Central Greenwich since the Games. One small firm claimed:  
‘Post-Olympic tourism seems to have gone down, tourists don’t seem to stay quite like they used 
to (…) no-one really comes here [Central Greenwich island], only the locals come down as coaches 
of people are dropped off on tourists trips, the bus comes down and left them for an hour to snack 
and then they are gone’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
Following the above finding, the author briefly spoke with the Co-Director of Cambridge-based tour 
operator ‘Travelsights’, who regularly send visitor coaches to Greenwich, and they mimicked the above 
concern, stating that: ‘yes Greenwich forms part of the tour [of London]. We take international students to 
the Cutty Sark and the Observatory for around an hour, then we have a scheduled picnic on Greenwich 
Park, and then they go off on a Clipper tour down the Thames’ (Personal communication, 2016). This 
concern reflects the significant majority view that, alongside the aforementioned issues, the Games has left 
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little to no positive impact on tourism, with one firm claiming: ‘after the Games it has made no [tourism] 
change’ (Interviewee #32 (SG1)), and another believing that there has been ‘no change to footfall around 
Central Greenwich since the Games – just went back to normality (…) and I think [the legacy] will have 
little effect’ (Interviewee #30 (SG1)). The prevailing view from the community, as exclaimed by one 
disappointed retailer, was that:  
‘We didn’t get anything from the Olympics. We were just glad to see it go and everything back to 
normal! (…) they have not left any legacy here’ (Interviewee #35 (SG1)). 
With respect to the Olympic tourism legacy, time and time again small firms clarified that very little effect 
has been seen on Central Greenwich’s tourism numbers:  
‘I don’t see waves of tourists coming here because of the Olympics – they don’t mention the 
Olympic legacy (…) it was an ego boost for politicians, local government officials, petty bureaucrats 
and that. You know, that’s what I think – let’s see what will happen in Brazil next Olympics –that 
is going to be a pig’s ear!’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
The notion that the Games’ tourism legacy will just pale into insignificance was also reflected on. One small 
firm claimed: ‘when these things are done and dusted they fall into the history books – and it will not be 
renowned as the greatest equestrian centre of all time – it was just where the horses were one time, one 
year’ (Interviewee #30 (SG1)). Interestingly, several respondents indicated that although significant public 
funds were spent on fuelling London’s tourism campaign, at the local level it is the more locally focused, 
bottom up and integrative events and activities that are making a positive impact after the Games. These 
include the role of the local Naval College in boosting ‘film tourism’: ‘since the Games we had nothing 
[extra tourism]. We actually get more from films that the Olympics, for example Thor 2 was filmed in the 
Naval College. This has had more impact of people that the Olympics did, whereby people will come and 
say ‘I remember hearing that the film was filmed here’  but no one will say ‘this is why I came, because of 
the Olympics’’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). Others even mentioned that small developments, like the 
construction of a new local library, have been more useful for business, claiming: ‘there has been a new 
University of Greenwich library and that has made more of a difference…nothing to do with the Olympics’ 
(Interviewee #35 (SG1)), and that a recent classic car event brought in much more tangible value.  
With respect to the bottom up, inclusive nature, and small business value of the classic car event, the event 
organiser and small firm owner interviewed claimed:  
‘The classical car event has brought more business [than the Olympics] (…) we are bringing 
business in, you can put stores and sell those off. We bring 60 classic cars, 60 motorbikes, and we 
bring a minimum 2.5 thousands of people on a Thursday night. They have never had those 
numbers on a Thursday night, nobody comes in the town. That place is rammed, it cost nothing 
because we work, we the community, everybody donates their time, everybody come here is free. 
That’s how you make events, I’m not looking for a profit. I’m not the Olympics but that’s the 
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difference, that’s when you make people, people are engaged, they bring the children here, you put 
on events for children. You get people through their kids, you get people through adults and then 
you’ll get into their pockets (…) the traders on New Year’s Day. We’ve never done an event before 
– but they start 2 o’clock, people still early, 11 o’clock, 9, and they had the best trade they ever had 
in ten years and that cost them 50 pounds for each stall (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). 
 
Interestingly, one senior councillor claimed that democratic character is largely precluded by the scope and 
scale of the event itself. They claimed: ‘a national event where the businesses are less engaged because the 
council is not engaged because it is actually the national government which is leading that event (…) I 
suppose it depends on the level of event, so if you've got a local event which is locally organised, that then 
has pretty much 100 per cent business consultation. If you've got a national event like the Commonwealth 
Games, then the business consultation probably drops to about 60 per cent because it's the government 
consulting with the local hosting local authority. Then that business informs the businesses and then feeds 
back but it's very difficult for a small business to get its point across to government. Then you have the 
mega event, the World Cups and the Olympics, whereby it's the governments who are being consulted to 
almost by the super-national organisations. So all the stuff that came out during the World Cup about FIFA, 
et cetera, having one thing or the other, that the fact that you have to have an Olympic group network in 
place before you bid for the Olympic Games. So there's no way you can consult with businesses along that 
route (…) If you take something like London you can have the GLA above Newham, so at that stage 
businesses and residents, to an extent, are way down the pecking order in terms of how they can feel 
engaged in what is no longer, really, a democratic process’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). This reflection from 
the Senior Business Engagement officer for Newham tells us something about the limited ability of small 
firms to influence aspects of top-down Olympic planning. 
4.7.8 Exposing Economic Ideology 
Interestingly, such potential futurities expose ideologies around hopeful economic strategies projected onto 
such spaces – essentially the desire to appear ‘as attractive to foot footloose international finance as possible, 
foregoing any social programmes likely to be a burden on business by multinational companies who might 
otherwise invest in the city’ (North and Nurse, 2014: 8 – also reflected upon by Duignan and Wilbert 
(2016)). As highlighted in the discussions, it has become common parlance that, among national and local 
governments in business policy and strategy, in order to survive, new spaces of capitalist paradigm - like 
those of East London – need to continue to adopt an entrepreneurial approach to urban governance to 
compete for mobile capital.  
‘They [the council] are ruining Greenwich itself, they are about building flats and supporting big 
companies, the smaller man will not be able to survive here and compete – because all the big 
companies are coming in now – and all of these big companies, like Costa Coffee shut at 6 o’clock, 
so the place becomes quite quiet and dull – big companies are taking over the businesses – shutting 
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early and in the evening it is like a ghost town here, whereas it was vibrant and lovely here before’ 
(Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
As explained earlier, and detailed in the discussion this indicates what Harvey (1989) critically evaluates as 
a shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in urban governance. Business competitiveness, rather 
than social justice or equity or citizenship is the internalized logic of entrepreneurial governance, whereby cities 
open themselves to neoliberal commodification of urban assets. This is exactly the same as the processes 
of aforementioned host space territorialisation, right through to the permeation of big business benefits, in 
the new urban order destined for East London and as alluded to in the case of Central Greenwich. This 
emerges as the likely legacy outcome: as opposed to earlier pre-Games rhetoric of local benefit there is a 
legacy of economic exclusion and corporatisation, as epitomised by several small firm narratives: 
‘It’s [corporate takeover] is happening now. I expect around 80% around Greenwich since the 
Olympics – it will become more prominent, that is the way it is heading, that is the way they want 
it (…) all the local businesses are shutting down, for example the arts and crafts (including antiques, 
pottery etc.) will never be able to come back given the rents (…) corporates have pretty much 
come in (…) rents have gone up across East London, if you have plenty of money, but if you 
haven’t you are being pushed out – people without money are being pushed out the East End and 
around here. It is not good for the economy – local businesses are much better’ (Interviewee #34 
(SG1)). 
Another firm simply claimed: 
‘Corporates coming in is the longer term narrative’ (Interviewee #42 (SG1)). 
Such findings indicate that leaders of small city and town municipalities feel the pressure – certainly in light 
of mega-events – to appear ‘bigger by adopting big city policies or the desire to trade-up in scale as part of 
regional and global competitiveness of neoliberal globalisation’ (Jayne, 2006: 1). The findings reveal, across 
primary and secondary evidence, that mega-events can empower communities and municipalities to ‘think 
big’. However, this thesis recognises that this may paradoxically in turn cause a paradigmatic shift away 
from thinking about the key micro socio-economic practices underpinning communities that underpin and 
reflect the cultural diversity of place. This was perfectly captured by one Senior Policy maker in DCMS 
highlighting that:  
‘But is that the fault of the Games? That’s the kind of society we’re living in, isn’t it? (…) I don’t 
think it is evil, Jamie’s Italian and the Westfield Shopping Centre, that’s a kind of wider argument 
around capitalism, isn’t it? In a way it is not really to do with the Games’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). 
One key point to note here is that, yet again, the dichotomy between Greenwich’s hoped-for positive local 
legacy ‘rhetoric’ contrasts with the potential ‘realities’ of being ‘squeezed out’ due to unaffordable business 
and economic conditions. What we must, however, consider in light of these findings is the extent to which 
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this is just part of a series of threats and symptomatic issues around the wider decline of UK high streets, 
and the organic economic trajectories that underpin the way in which London and other prosperous urban 
spaces are developing as we move further into the 21st century capitalist era. The following section unpacks 
the variability’s at play when assessing small firm impacts and legacies, to assess the qualifiers that must be 
taken into account in when evaluating such outcomes.  
The findings also suggest that London 2012 may have induced several direct and indirect subtle new ways 
of economic thinking and governance to underpin London’s East End and Central Greenwich’s mode of 
entrepreneurial development post-Games. Such new economic policies may or may not have been induced 
by the coming and delivery of the Games. Several respondents highlighted that Greenwich Council tried to 
introduce new pavement taxes to charge businesses for utilising outside spaces for trade (e.g. outside 
seating) and promotional boards and signage. However, this was met with resistance. One small firm 
claimed: ‘did you hear about the pavement tax? They brought this pavement tax in but there was a petition 
in the local area and then they got rid of it. They put the tax in and then found out everyone was annoyed 
with it, and that they needed to consult with the local people first’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). Although small 
firms resisted, several referred to an extended period of time before, during and after the Games in 2013, 
when small firm ‘had literally a few months when we weren’t allowed to put tables and chairs outside (…) 
this continued up until the following year (…) this has obviously affected us and had had a measurable 
financial impact on my business’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Several others, including one small F&B firm, 
claimed that before the dismantling of this policy ‘they [the council] has not let us put our mini-boards with 
the restaurant menu – we now [August 2013] have to pay for them’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)). Interestingly, 
others cited additional economic policy changes across the local area, including increased parking charges 
across Central Greenwich, highlighting that the centre of Greenwich is a ‘community shopping centre and 
the council at the time it was 30p per hour to park your car, and now it is £1.20 an hour. All council car 
parks around here are now empty’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)). 
 
‘They did not understand businesses (…) inventing this pavement charge and putting up parking. 
Something will – it’ll really, really blow up before the election!’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). 
 
Another major economic change perceived as being induced by the Games emerged as dominant, 
concerning the changing modes of commercial and residential lettings by Central Greenwich landlords. 
Small firms believe that, since the Games, Greenwich Hospital (sole landlord for small firms interviewed) 
have shifted their tenancy agreements toward splitting off commercial and residential assets integration. 
The problem for small firms is that many use the residential components of such contracts to help subsidise 
the business; a business model adopted by many high street firms across the UK, including in Central 
Greenwich. The detail of this, and its potential effects upon small firm performance, was clarified by one 
small F&B firm, stating: 
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‘They [Greenwich Hospital] have got this new strategy where they want to take back all the 
residential elements of the commercial property and have separate leases on them. So my business 
is twofold, I have got the café downstairs and the flat upstairs – and my flat upstairs subsidises the 
café – and they want my flat. They have kicked some of the people on the island, and taking back 
their flat, who e.g. lived in the newsagents around the corner. And I kind of feel like, it’s not easy 
for them to do it but yes, sooner or later, they will get us (…) my days are numbered ultimately. I 
am on borrowed time – our lease has run out and we are already overstaying. I have to pay my rent 
obviously but Greenwich Hospital [landlord of most of Central Greenwich commercial property] 
have said to me they are going to put my rent up’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). 
 ‘Particularly now any shops that have got pavement frontages, to now be hit with this thing. So 
to bear in mind we have not even recovered from this situation, and now the council is landing 
this on us. I mean, you can imagine how angry people are. Really, really angry’ (Interviewee #24 
(SG1)). 
4.7.9 Variabilities in Small Firm Olympic-Related Impacts and Legacies 
Interestingly, given that these interviews were conducted between 1 and 2 years after the delivery of the 
Games, the data affords and reveals a snapshot into the longer-term effects and the potential local business 
legacies. The narratives across all stakeholder groups tell a story of business difficulty and failure. It is, 
however, difficult and potentially out of the scope of this research to directly link the occurrence of the 
Olympic Games with such effects. As alluded to earlier, as one would expect there are a complex array of 
variabilities that have the potential to influence small firm and stakeholder perspective on impacts and 
legacies.  The findings reveal a range of Olympic-related and non-Olympic-related variables and macro 
influences. Empirical findings identified that participants widely acknowledged that although the 
aforementioned outcomes can be attributed to many aspects of the Games, we must consider that the 
Games did not happen as a single isolated economic intervention in its own vacuum. Rather, it was part of 
a broader micro (e.g. small firms on the ‘wrong side’ of the barrier) and macro context (e.g. recessionary 
and technological factors and wider decline of the high street), and but one of many economic factors 
influencing the narratives revealed in this research. It is therefore wise to add qualifiers and rebuttals to the 
arguments and findings of this empirical data in terms of the direct influence of the Games on changing 
economic structures. 
4.7.9.1 Natural Trajectory of London Development and Games as Catalyst 
Empirical analysis also suggests that the aforementioned gentrification effects emerge alongside a general 
trend in inflating prices of residential and commercial rents, outside the influence of London 2012. One 
senior councillor claimed: ‘I live in Waltham Forest in Leytonstone and prices have gone up quite a lot and 
people were saying before the Games that this is going to have a huge impact on the house prices (…) there 
is an ‘Olympic Effect (…) but I think a lot of this would have happened anyway as a result of what’s 
happening in the London residential market(…) you’re right [about gentrification] but I think the effect of 
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the Olympics is probably difficult to quantify’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). Another highlighted that: “I would 
think parts of East London are detecting prices going up, particularly business rates going sky high. So 
property prices around [Waltham Forest] and I suppose those kind of areas we've seen upper increases in 
those areas. Whether it's down to the games or whether it's due to the areas improving, the move out and 
move in of professionals in tech city already happening? I don't know whether I can label it purely on the 
Olympics’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). Others claim that: “yeah, gentrification is definitely something which 
occurs but I think actually in London it occurs less than it would the Olympics, and more to do with just 
the nature of London in itself” (Interviewee #22 (SG2)), and a small firm remarked: ‘I mean, some people 
have closed and it might not have been wholly due to the Olympics but it might have been the last straw’ 
(Interviewee #29 (SG1)). 
‘Well, it's hard to control it [gentrification], and in particular, I mean, the house price rise that's 
probably had an Olympic effect on it but it's also been a bizarre range of other factors as well. So, 
therefore, the prices of housing in Hackney, for example, has shot through the roof…and that 
creates problems’ (Interviewee #7 (SG4)). 
As identified above, one key legacy ambition, and major point, is the idea that although the trajectory of 
London development was to continue to inflate and potentially oust small firms from the high streets, the 
Games can be seen as a major catalyst for these neoliberalisation processes. Thus it played a role in speeding 
up gentrifying change and the corporatisation and rental increases in and around Greenwich and East 
London.  
4.7.9.2 Economic Recession 
The economic effects of the 2008 financial crisis are to be also considered – again, shifting patterns of 
consumer behaviour, availability of credit et cetera. One councillor claimed: ‘when you look at the impact 
of the Games you have to look at the broader economic context, macro and micro – you cannot ignore 
that (…) The Olympics is happening in the midst of a general recession, how you separate out those issues 
from the impacts of the Olympics? That is a very hard trick to pull (…) it is very hard to tease out the issues 
about the impact of the Olympics on businesses and the broader issues of the recession (…) times are tight 
for people (…) and in that environment where you don’t have everyone’s confidence, people aren’t going 
to throw a lot of money around (…) we still are in tough economic times, the high street in particular, so 
you’re not going to get an environment that we had in 2005 and 2006 where people have got credit cards 
falling out of their pockets, and are spending liberally’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)).  
‘The actual shops themselves probably didn't see a significant uptake in turnover until the 
immediate commencement of the games. Simply because the good old process, et cetera, for the 
Olympics and the build up to the Olympics also clashed with the credit crunch, so many of the 
businesses, particularly in the high street areas, but particularly focused on non-Olympic backers 
in Stratford’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)).  
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‘We got nothing [during the Games due to security and controls]! And then we get hit by the 
recession – how do you survive all of that? With the high street down as it is – yeah’ (Interviewee 
#38 (SG1)). 
 
4.7.9.3 Impacts of Technology, Structural Issues of the High Street and High Failure Rate 
The data also highlighted that structural issues on the high street, including the impact of technology on 
online shopping, shifting consumption patterns away from high street shopping, are a vital point. In light 
of such issues, one councillor claimed: ‘the last greatest innovation in retail really was the internet, and 
actually, it’s killing off the traditional… it’s had a much bigger impact than anything else on the traditional 
high street’ (Interviewee #20 (SG2)). Another senior Greenwich councillor claimed: ‘a lot of businesses, 
who were struggling after the Olympics, were struggling before the Olympics. Even 2, 3 or even 4 years 
before – there is a structural issue about the high street and small businesses in particular’ (Interviewee #19 
(SG2)). 
Furthermore, several respondents highlighted that the nature of small businesses (due to their high risks 
and statistical chances of failure) is that the high street is often characterised by churn. One interviewee 
highlighted that one characteristic of small firms on the high street is ‘the way business is being done on 
the high street is changing constantly’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)) and continuously morphing according to 
the LLDC. They are ‘changing address, they’re succeeding, taking over other businesses, they merge or 
even moving to other locations (…) the only constant is change…and you can start off working with one 
person in one company, and in the space of six, nine, twelve months that whole business and the people in 
it can be, for whatever reason, transformed completely. They might gain a big contract, they might lose a 
big contract, they might…who knows, a whole range of things can happen. So nothing stands still; nothing 
stands still at all, so it's a constantly changing market that you are working in’ (Interviewee #10 (SG4)).  
 ‘We have always had churn on the high streets, you have landlords make their money and it is 
a competitive world out there, running businesses is very competitive and you will get 
competitors come along and see a new way of doing the same thing or who will do different 
things that have not been done on the high street before, you just have to walk around 
Shoreditch and the West End and some of the high Street here’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
4.7.9.4 Localised Variables Impacting on Short-Term Performance and Longer-Term Legacy 
The data alluded to a number of variables at play when looking at small firm impact: 1) the specific location 
of small firm across the ‘Last Mile’, 2) the types of products/services offered determining whether event 
visitors would want to consume, 3) the internal business health of the small firm itself prior to the Games, 
and finally 4) the strategic internal capabilities to successfully leverage on event opportunities.  
Firstly, with respect to point 1), across interviewees it was largely agreed upon that small firms who were 
close to the main entrance sites and initial entry points across the Last Mile, and on the ‘right’ side of the 
barrier, were able to capture event trade. One senior councillor for Greenwich claimed: ‘it was interesting 
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to see how things change dependent upon the location - for example if you were on the wrong side of the 
barrier, just around the corner or slightly off the beaten track, if you are a tourist you are not going to 
wander off, you will stick to what you can see, you don't want to get lost (…) if you were in the right 
business sector and location you did well (…) if you were the right sort of business in the immediate vicinity 
you did very well’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). A small firm mentioned, ‘it’s just the luck of the draw to where 
you are’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). For example, one business claimed to be ‘40% up on previous year’ 
(Interviewee #30 (SG1)), solely based on being a pub which also sold British souvenir goods, further 
commenting, ‘as far as I concerned, and other businesses will disagree, but because I am in the food industry 
and it is a necessity – I know for a fact I have had more people through my building’ (Interviewee #30 
(SG1)). This reflects Osmond’s (2002) conclusion that ‘retailers who sold tourism-related products (e.g. 
souvenirs, Olympic merchandise, photographic equipment) earned up to 8 times more revenue than 
expected.  
‘Locally, most stories have been negative, surprisingly from a number of restaurants in the town 
centre. The only businesses who have told us positive things were on the direct access route from 
Greenwich station to the main access to the events in the park’ (Interviewee #19 SG3)).  
‘Although I have been an advocate of the Olympics I thought they were a magnificent thing to win 
- but certainly when it came to the Olympics and the Para-Olympics my takings dropped by about 
75% (…) I don't think I am different to anybody else really. Apart from one or two places that 
serve food on certain key junctions near the Greenwich Park and the stations [benefitted]’ 
(Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
In addition, point 2) illuminates the issue of having the right product/service to offer to event crowds. 
Complementing point 1), one business engagement officer claimed: ‘there was a very broad-brush campaign 
that thought it was going to be a lot of money for many businesses, and that’s not the case – as with all 
business you’re not just going to benefit simply because the Olympics is here. Certain sectors in certain 
locations will benefit and that is the view that we have got from our view of the Olympic Games – and 
these businesses did very well but it is not going to be the case for everyone – some people just had to be 
realistic (…) it’s difficult to extrapolate how well or badly business did as it depends upon the type of 
business, how well prepared, positioning, sector, and the ‘health’ of the business before the Games (…) we 
found that the businesses healthy before the games, that were well run, and had astute managers tended to 
do very well during the games as well. It really does help to be in the right sector - if selling drinks and run 
a cafe you will do well. If you are small merchant on a side street, you wouldn't do very well but you 
shouldn't do badly either’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). Interestingly, the idea that smaller, more peripheral 
firms should not do ‘badly’ [in this case referring to Central Greenwich] contrasts with the actual realities 
emerging from the data. The point above also alludes to issues pertaining to point 3), the idea that small 
firm performance and success was largely down to the health of the particular business themselves. This 
was reflected in the following quote by a senior business engagement officer for Greenwich: 
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‘But in terms of the overall perspective it was a mixed picture. Those businesses that were well 
positioned, they had been proactive in terms of their campaigns to attract customers, they had the 
right goods and services, they had a lot of good news stories and case studies (…) if you were in 
the immediate vicinity of the venue, selling food, drinks and souvenirs and well-positioned – and 
you had been smart about your marketing, getting the right stock in – they did well (…) businesses 
that were 10-15 minutes away from the locations, who were not in the hospitality and catering key 
sectors would not normally benefit from visitor numbers’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)).  
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Chapter 5 – Discussions 
5.1 Introduction to the Discussions 
This chapter attempts to distil and crystallise the findings of this thesis. It links apriori and posteriori themes 
back to earlier knowledge identified in the review, and considers new theories and ideas to understand 
emergent empirical findings of this study. The themes found broadly cover the analysis and examination of 
i) tourism, trade and commercial impacts, ii) rhetoric vs. realities, iii) host exclusion, marginalisation and 
vulnerabilities of small firms, iv) spatial and regulatory shock and controls, and v) interpreted, contextual 
small firm legacies. The chapter offers reflections, detailed analysis and critical examinations, linking up to 
existing knowledge whilst judging what has been learnt as a product of this research – and ultimately where 
contributions to knowledge can be argued for (see Evans et al, 2014). Alongside theoretical contributions, 
this study provides an empirical contribution by documenting, in detail, a particular aspect and temporal 
dimension of Games planning and host community impacts, whilst reflecting on the on-going process of 
legacy construction. A re-statement of the study’s research objectives and an explicit mapping of the thesis’s 
likely contributions to knowledge are presented below.  
5.2 Re-statement of Research Objectives 
 
Research 
Objective 1 
Critically analyse and fully unpack how small firms were impacted throughout the Olympic delivery 
cycle [before, during and after], specifically those in host borough HEZs and across Central 
Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ – an exploration of short vs. long, positive vs. negative effects. 
Research 
Objective 2 
Examine how and why local space was impacted by the occurrence of the London 2012 Games, and 
the impact this had on tourism dynamics, trade and commercial opportunity for small businesses. 
Research 
Objective 3 
Reflect up on the elusive concept of ‘Olympic Legacy’ in the context of host small business 
communities; can we identify the emergence of a ‘legacy’ for London’s East End, and specifically Central 
Greenwich’s small businesses? 
Research 
Objective 4 
Identify lessons learnt and recommend practical ways to better re-distribute Games-related benefits 
to vulnerable small business communities. 
 
5.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
Table 31 provides a brief overview of the area this research contributes to knowledge, all of which are 
detailed and justified across their respective sections across the thesis, and this chapter. The author 
provides a rough outline of these contributions further in Appendix 3. 
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Contribution Section 
1. Re-conceptualisation of critical tourism effects in the ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’ thesis.  5.5. 
2. Empirically driven ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping, supported with linkage with literature and secondary evidence 
from London 2012 and prior mega-event case study analysis. 
5.6. 
3. Amplification of small business narratives, specifically those across HEZs and Last Mile spaces -key in light 
of host spatial effects, local challenges identified, and the exclusionary effects faced. 
All chapters. 
4. Illumination of series of Olympic dichotomies between: ‘Rhetoric vs. Realities’.  All chapters. 
5. New conceptualisations and reflections around small business community gentrification and potential ‘Clone 
Town’ legacies. 
4.7 and 
discussed in 
5.17 and 5.18. 
6. Building on Klein’s (2007) Shock Doctrine thesis: the new development of the ‘Tremor’ and ‘Aftershock’ 
principle and the overarching empirical detail around securitisation and militarisation of host community spaces. 
5.19 and 5.20. 
7. New, empirically driven ‘Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage’ to support Research Objective 4 
ambition to re-distribute Games benefits and support emancipatory resistance.  
4.5 and then 
discussed in 
5.16. 
8. Drawing together multiple layers of stakeholder perspective from small firms on the front line to the most 
senior of governmental and project actors - rarely exists across the event impacts literature.  
Findings and 
Discussions 
chapters. 
 
Table 31: ‘Thesis Contributions to Knowledge’ 
5.4 Olympic Opportunities, Challenges, Rhetoric and Realities 
For small firms, being in the ‘eye’ of the Olympic storm, whether inside hosting communities and event 
zones or across the host city, brings significant challenges to business environments, firm operations and 
predicted commercial opportunities. This study identifies a series of significant dichotomies that emerged 
during the planning and delivery of the London 2012 project. An analysis of over thirty national and regional 
policy documents released by the UK Government and respective host borough councils, including the 
Royal Borough of Greenwich, established, both implicitly and explicitly, host communities and small firms 
as some of the key beneficiaries of hosting the Games. Particularly those across ‘Olympic host boroughs’, 
HEZs, and Last Mile spaces. Policy documents, alongside official narratives and high profile media outlets, 
projected a series of would-be tourism and trade bounties and commercial opportunities associated with 
the coming of London 2012. For the purpose of this research, as established earlier, the thesis coins these 
faux projections as: ‘opportunity rhetoric’.  
The impact of such opportunity rhetoric was certainly reflected in the positive, pre-Games hopes, 
expectations and perceptions, as retrospectively considered by the majority of the thirty-some small firms 
interviewed. This was a community pumped to prosper and, as frequently referred to by several small firms, 
a stakeholder group promised a ‘bonanza’. As established from the review, several authors acknowledge 
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that events can offer small firms the opportunity to capitalise on tourism and trade13. This is, and may 
sound, self-evident given the influx of visitor crowds, as suggested by media reports before the Games 
claiming that ‘business communities should be looking forward to London 2012’ (e.g. BBC, 2011b). 
However, whilst such conventional wisdoms may still exist, this chapter analyses and theorises why 
optimistic outlooks quickly transformed into narratives of disappointment, anger, frustrations and feelings 
of being ‘lied to’ - and ‘deceived’. These feelings characterised the majority of small firms (and respondents 
across other SGs), who felt locked-out of the party across Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’. A critical 
examination reveals the what, how and why small firms emerged excluded, serving to indicate why the 
bequeathed small firm challenges dominate the headlines of this study. 
This chapter highlights that although mega-events present a series of ‘leveragable opportunities’ for host 
communities and small firms (e.g. Weed, 2008, Chalip, 2004, Preuss, 2006; 2007) these were missed. This 
is despite frequent arguments that small firms often play a major role in the success of events and are often 
a ‘critical much overlooked foundation for a successful Games’ (Osmond, 2002: 237). Whilst small firm 
support in the early stages of bidding and/or event planning emerges a major factor in seeking legitimisation 
of policy objectives (e.g. Foley et al, 2011), literature and empirical evidence collected here supports the 
critical view that pre-Games opportunity rhetoric and the overarching rationale for hosting mega-events 
projected by political economic elites provided little more than ‘legitimisation rhetoric’ (see Chalip, 2006; 
Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016).  
The study reveals that project ambitions were aided through ‘boosterist’ and ‘hyping’ mechanisms14 of 
national and regional policy, and media production was often centred around the promise of a positive 
‘Olympic legacy’ – a range of overstated benefits - that helped to justify intervention and somewhat 
entertain and keep the populace happy and docile15. The logical syllogism, secondary research and empirical 
evidence collected in this study therefore argue that Games rhetoric emerged as a tool to distract small 
firms, who emerged as a ‘potential risk’ to the project delivery of London 2012 in variety of ways16. Smaller 
stakeholders offer limited capacity to effectively contribute to the economic vitality of the project, and 
perhaps the city, thus requiring ‘effective management’. Stakeholders were often kept in line with 
opportunity rhetoric, and thus serving as a political tool to supress dissent (e.g. Cashman, 2002) and any 
negative press that might have either undermined or derailed the project, its funders and, more importantly, 
powerful stakeholder groups.  
As Raco and Tunney (2010) note, small businesses became a bureaucratic fait accompli – to be overcome as 
quickly, quietly and efficiently as possible. Whilst toying with metaphor, one may argue that such Olympic 
mega-projects can be conceptualised as a juggernaut: squashing, silencing, suppressing – scorching people 
and spaces with its intense energy, mustered through international and national political and economic will. 
                                                          
13 For example, Sola, 1998; Preuss, 2006, 2007; Weed, 2008; Chalip, 2004; Cashman and Hughes, 1999; Smith, 2012 
14 From media reports and newspapers, to ‘official’ preparation documents and letters from regional authorities urging preparation for a wave of 
opportunities and challenges (e.g. staffing, delivery issues) from the Games. 
15 Such arguments contribute to latter theorisations around mega-events as shocks. 
16 Risk to Olympic supply chains, risk of upsetting sponsors, risk of visitors consuming locally instead of in official event sites et cetera 
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This mimics Raco and Tunney’s (2010) description17 of the Games as a “tidal wave crashing over local 
businesses” (…) “their low visibility has [in the context of London 2012] made them relatively easy targets 
for ‘decisive action’” (2010: 2082). The populace thus becomes docile, perhaps shocked, blinded and forced 
into submission by a project that offers utopian legacy visions (later on referred to as ‘fetishes’), silencing 
alternative voices, and projecting the inevitable and naturalised neoliberal project ideologies on to spaces 
of capital accumulation.  
Whilst appearing to be centralised in governance, the evidence suggests that delivering a mega-event often 
involves a decentralised nature and, as one House of Lords (2013) report describes in the context of London 
2012, a ‘veritable babble of potentially conflicting voices, the resulting cacophony conflicts with the need 
for clarity of voice and purpose’ (House of Lords, 2013: 23). Multiple narratives attempting to ‘have their 
say’ and ‘get their way’; the Games acting as a filter to determine whose voices are really listened to. This 
was reflected earlier by Vigor et al (2004), stating: ‘business, government (local, regional or national), 
community groups, residents, environmental organisations and the Olympic Movement itself all have a 
view, and many are actively telling their story about what a London Games in 2012 could mean for them. 
All of these potentially entail long lasting legacies, but each has a different impact on the ground’ (2004: 8). 
This thesis, and critical commentators argue, that in this complex amalgam of voices it is those with low 
influence and power that are crowded out – namely host communities and their small firms. As such, given 
the interpretivist nature of this research, this thesis attempts to amplify and give voice to a group of 
vulnerable stakeholders caught in the eye of the storm but simultaneously emerging powerless against the 
stridency of neoliberal-Olympic ideology. 
It can be argued that, through the decentralised nature of it all, project silences and the relative ‘inactivity’ 
of key stakeholders in terms of effectively ‘intervening’ and supporting host communities and their small 
business, conditions are optimised for the juggernaut to freely drive into spaces governed by laws of capital. 
Spaces encroached on by the zeitgeist of capitalism. Evidence suggests that this highlights how subjective 
spaces (e.g. Central Greenwich) can be subjected to ‘objectification’18, effectively ignoring plural, subjective, 
alternative and socially constructed meaning and thus undermining democratic living. It further illustrates 
how Olympic power can be exerted not as a unified will but as a plethora of inaction (and specifically 
tailored actions), illustrating what Maylor et al (2006) refer to as ‘projectification’ in the context of society and 
of projects (also see Flyvbjerg and Bruzelius, 2002) Projectification in this sense aims to ‘capture the 
colonisation of many quarters of life by project related principles, rules, techniques and procedures, aspiring 
to form a new ‘iron cage of project rationality’’ (2006: 2 - also see Hodgson and Cicmil, 2003). This is clear, 
from the evidence of this study and therefore the author claims this thesis emerges as a cautionary tale, 
scrutinising small firm impacts and legacies arising from mega-event delivery, and specifically London 2012.  
                                                          
17 In the context of SME displacement to make way for the Olympic part and the business competitiveness challenges faced throughout these 
periods. 
18 For example, something which is turned from subject to ‘object’ in order to be managed, perhaps instrumentalised and marketised. 
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5.5 The ‘Anti-Perfect Tourism Storm’? 
Tourism and event trade, of course, were to be where small firms based across Central Greenwich’s high 
street believed they could best make a quick buck through an additional boost to predicted strong trading 
periods during the high-peak summer months of Central Greenwich tourism. There was no reason why 
small firms would think otherwise. Predictions postulated19 by Powell (2004) suggested over ‘six million’ 
visitors were to be expected over the three-month period, predominantly during the Games, a figure 
frequently amplified by the national press (e.g. Independent, 2012), with over 6.6 million tickets sold (see 
BBC, 2012e), and tens of thousands bound for Central Greenwich. This was also predicted by key Central 
Greenwich stakeholders20. Even policy makers at the highest levels suggested that business in the 
‘immediate’ and ‘surrounding Olympic sites’ would benefit, putting local businesses on the ‘world stage’.  
As such, small firms had ‘high expectations’ and were ‘expecting a killing’, as clearly identified in the 
findings.  
However, whilst international exposure offers an unrivalled opportunity and promotional platform, 
evidence suggests that by this very ‘spectacular’ nature the ‘local’ can often be transcended in favour of the 
‘global’ through by-passing context-specific cultural offerings (e.g. O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007; Horne 
and Manzenreiter, 2006). Global events are often in favour of creating and maintaining sterilised Olympic-
event experiences21. The problem identified was that small firms, business support organisations, and 
apparently local authorities themselves, hoped-for hordes of jubilant event visitors en-route to official 
venues, navigating through the ‘Last Mile’ inner sanctum of the town centre with their hedonist hats on, 
potentially ready to engage in modes of ‘event shopping behaviour’ (Godbey and Graefe, 1991; Irwin and 
Sandler, 1998) and ‘impulse spending’ (O’Brien, 2006) across the small business community. The potential 
for the Games to encourage consumer spending was referred to by Patrick Foley, Chief Economist at the 
Lloyds Banking Group, in a Telegraph (2012c) article as the ‘happiness effect’ – an often recognised 
hedonist behavioural trait of event tourists in the context of mega-events (also see Grundmann, 2005). This 
was also claimed by a Games-related BBC reports (see all - 2011, 2012), and clearly hoped-for by all parties. 
This is of particular importance as small firms commented on how their business performance often relies 
upon passing trade (also see Chalip and Leyns, 2002; O’Brien, 2006)). The findings suggested that this was 
even more so in the context of the Olympics, 1) because of the widely predicted tourism and trade bounties 
and small firms investing heavily in light of the predicted trade “bonanza”, and 2) because the Games were 
occurring during a key period of high peak summer tourism for this well-known destination. Predicted 
benefits of mass event visitor footfall on the way to and from venues, and the thought of tourists staying 
in the local area after live events, were thought of as lucrative opportunities to capitalise. This was the view 
purveyed by policy, media, local authorities and small firms themselves, as evidenced in the empirical 
findings. Such findings were unsurprising as mega-events are considered to be important means of ‘touristic 
                                                          
19 Also including the Greenwich Senior Business Engagement Officer interviewee, claiming over 60,000 visitors a day would visit Greenwich. 
20 RBOG, 2012a; 2012b; Interviewee #19 (SG2) and landlord Greenwich Hospital Trust discussed this (see BBC, 2012g). 
21 Later on the thesis considers the role of ‘slow tourism’ as a conceptual idea for combatting this problem and promoting stronger local visitor 
engagement. 
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consumerism’ (see Miles, 2010) underpinned by a series of opportunities to consume, especially for those 
involved in active visitation to HEZs, Last Miles and event venues. 
In light of such opportunity rhetoric, it was believed that small firms were ‘encouraged’ to engage in what 
this study found to be ‘doomed to fail’ strategic leverage attempts22 - advice purveyed by local authorities 
in order to optimise performance. Leverage attempts saw firms, i) buying in new stock, ii) paying extra for longer 
market space in the evenings, iii) innovating products, including new menus, and iv) new service development, for example 
putting tables and chairs outside. Evidence suggests that these efforts came to no avail despite Bracker and 
Pearson (1986) and Mazzarol and Ramasehan’s (1996) belief that small business who do engage with 
strategic planning and promotional leverage are often more successful. The question of whether small firms 
have the ‘free will’ to effectively leverage, or whether they were determined by the striating forces of Games 
planning through the TDR cycle emerges a concern raised for this study. 
The FSB (2013) supported this view but, for those interviewed, these small firm tactics cost time and 
money, and served to compound financial challenges faced by small firms, as noted in the tail-end of the 
findings chapter. In light of this, several respondents retrospectively referred to such advice as yet another 
part of the project attempting to ‘save face’ and ‘pacify’ before the inevitabilities of the regulatory and spatial 
challenges to be bestowed upon the Last Mile of Central Greenwich. This was also reflected in other key 
Olympic HEZs.  
A critical projects perspective provided by Flyvbjerg et al (2003) indicates that ‘dishonesty’ is a common 
feature of mega-projects, manifesting as interventions that ‘may often consistently, systematically and self-
servingly mislead governments and the public in order to get projects approved’ (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003:  11-
21). The theme of London 2012 ‘saving face’ reflected, specifically across SG1 and SG3 perspectives, a series 
of project lies and dishonesties enshrouding several aspects of Olympic planning and delivery. This also 
forms one of many features of London 2012 that underpin the emergent ‘rhetoric’ vs. ‘reality’ dichotomy. 
These critical concerns reflect Horne and Manzenreiter’s (2006) view that mega-event project teams tend 
to overpromise, and propose unrealistic, overly ambitious plans that, as indicated in the review: produce a 
‘fantasy world, underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, underestimated environmental impacts, and 
over-valued economic development effects’ (2006: 10). The idea of host communities as fantasy worlds is 
rather apt in light of later criticisms that Central Greenwich and beyond manifested as ‘spectacles’, ‘shocks’ 
and perhaps playgrounds of what Bryman (2004) refers to as ‘Disneyization’. The transformation of host 
spaces into rationalised, controlled, manufactured theme park-esque ‘managed experiences’, ‘prescribed 
paths’ and ‘fast-track lines’ further reflects Ritzer’s (2008) notion of ‘McDonaldization’ governed by 
principles of i) efficiency, ii) calculability, iii) predictability and, above all, iv) control (also see Horne and 
Manzenreiter, 2006). These naturalised principles permeate, implicitly and explicitly, across the findings of 
this thesis. 
                                                          
22 See Chalip and Leyns (2002) for a more detailed discussion around the concept of ‘strategic event leveraging’. 
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The emergence of a ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’ for host community small firms, specifically before and during 
the Games, systematically supported with primary and secondary evidence, emerges as a dominant theme 
and conceptualised developed by the author. The ‘storm’ metaphor alludes to the accumulation of negative 
tourism factors identified throughout the empirical and secondary data collected, leading to the ‘absence’ 
of Olympic trade. Systematic evidence revealed a multitude of systematic and systemic culminations of 
negative tourism, trade, and visitation challenges23. This is rather apt in light of criticisms that tourism 
benefits are often ‘inflated’ (e.g. Preuss, 2004, Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011, Pappalepore and Duignan, 
2016, ETOA, 2010) and based on ‘hopes and illusions’ (e.g. ETOA, 2005), and that a positive ‘tourism 
legacy’ is still often used as a primary justification for staging mega-events, despite limited evidence (Smith 
and Stevenson, 2009). In light of these tourism challenges, it is unsurprising that Pappalepore and Duignan 
(2016) argue that image enhancements obtained by a host region should be used as a measure of tourism 
legacy, rather than the actual number of tourists during the event. These challenges are both empirically 
driven and synthesise concerns identified through policy, media and literature analyses – see Table 32 below 
for full outline of what factors constitute the anti-tourism perfect storm.  
At the time of writing this thesis, the storm thesis, is currently the only systematic analysis of these factors 
to be presented in such detail, underpinned by significant empirical analysis. It is important to note that 
Table 32 below forms a prelude to the overarching SmallBizImpacts mapping framework, presented shortly 
after. The bullet points in normal casing are factors established prior to this thesis, whilst the points in 
italics have been identified by the findings of this study, thus extending the mapping previously developed 
by Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) and our wider understanding of host community tourism, trade and 
commercial impacts. The analysis contributes to the literature because i) Olympic tourism impacts on host 
communities and small firms are fragmented and requires a refresh of the dynamics at play here (especially 
in the context of ‘Last Mile’ zones), ii) of the criticisms, vulnerabilities of small firms and the lack of prior 
attention given to such analysis, and iii) it provides a useful heuristic and analytical lens for future scholars 
to assess tourism impacts across host city and its host communities. Whilst an overview of these tourism 
effects is holistically presented here, this serves as a snapshot overview of matters reflected on in detail 
throughout this Discussions chapter. 
The anti-perfect tourism storm (before and during the Games) 
 Reduced footfall across central spaces of host city24 and ‘substitution’ effects at national, city and regional level25 
 Loss of major local attractions (e.g. Greenwich Park, Observatory, difficult to access Cutty Sark) and thus loss of key footfall small 
firms rely on 
 Closure of/partial service in key transport hubs reducing capacity to access host communities (e.g. Maze Hill, Greenwich DLR) 
                                                          
23 Vlachos (2012) small business report also noted significant challenges for small firms during similar time periods in the context of Greenwich.  
24 French and Disher, 1997; House of Lords, 2012. 
25 ETOA, 2005, 2010; Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011; Work Foundation, 2010; Preuss, 2006; House of Lords, 2013; Deliotte, 2004; ONS, 
2012; FSB, 2012. 
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 Poor trade and challenging tourism environment brought about by the Olympics during high-peak of summer 
tourism weeks26 
 Venue regulations prohibit entrance with food and drink, over 100ml of liquids etc., thus stunting early morning pre-event trade 
opportunities 
 Venue regulations prohibit exit during live Games – stunting day and lunch time trade opportunities for event visitors and small 
firms to capitalise 
 Event seizure, appropriation27 and militarisation of host Olympic spaces28  
 Wasted capital investments in response to faux projections of opportunity rhetoric 
 Beautification costs prior to hosting the Games 
 Barricading of ‘Last Mile’ stunting visitor consumption across small firm producers 
 Continued presence of control barricades even between Olympics and Paralympics  
 Fear tactics and rhetoric of chaos resulting in regular residents avoiding hosting areas (local aversion markets)29 
frightened to drive in ORNs, enter militarised host spaces or to park in fear of fines  
 Event tourists not prone to going ‘off the beaten track’ and fearful of ‘unsafe host areas’  
 
Table 32: ‘Anti-Perfect Tourism Storm’ (Developed by author) 
5.6 ‘SmallBizImpacts’ Mapping 
Tourism and the immediate commercial advantages predicted in light of the Games were not the only ways 
in which small firms were potentially able to leverage. This research reveals a series of other opportunities 
too, including i) access to Olympic supply chain and procurement, ii) improved business skills (formally referred to as 
‘Fitness to Supply’),  iii) stronger position and ability to bid for future contracts (event and non-event related), iv) 
improved business to business (B2B) relationships and networks, v) enhanced internal business operations (e.g. strategic 
thinking, marketing prowess, customer relations and management et cetera), and vi) enhanced image of place 
and regional investment for positive tourism impacts and direct economic stimulation30. The aforementioned hoped-for 
business opportunities illustrate the growing desire to embed ‘business leveraging programmes’ into mega-event 
delivery. This may positively illustrate paradigmatic shifts from key project actors and organisations to place 
an ‘eye for longer-term, sustainable business outcomes, rather than the traditional visitation-related impacts 
(…) the refocus creates opportunity to make events more viable; by enhancing sustainability of their 
                                                          
26 French and Disher, 1997, House of Lords, 2012, 2013; Telegraph, 2012; DCMS, 2007; Financial Times, 2012; FSB, 2013; Independent, 2012; 
Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Osmond, 2002. 
27 Rojek, 2014. 
28 McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Smith, 2013. 
29 Spilling, 1996; Putsis, 1998; ETOA, 2005; 2010. 
30 DCMS, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2012a, 2012b; House of Lords, 2013; FSB, 2013; London Assembly, 2006, Mayor of London, 2007; RBOG, 
2012a, 2012b. 
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benefits; thus justifying organisers’ claim for support’ (Chalip and Leyns, 2002). Qualitative evidence, 
however, shows that these ‘official’ hoped-for business legacy projections became somewhat inaccessible 
for small firms in what emerged to be an issue not just for Central Greenwich but for small firm exclusion 
across the city. Small firms were clearly seen as a ‘risk’ to delivering the quality and quantity demanded of 
event venues. This was epitomised by one Senior Civil Servant laughing, ‘well you wouldn’t want salmonella 
on a global stage would you…’ – see section 4.3.8. 
The challenge identified here is that small firms may not possess the necessary capital resources to access 
elitist supply chains. Small firms therefore emerged as excluded throughout a procurement exercise clearly 
only available to proven, big business. This will be discussed in detail later on in the chapter but here serves 
to illustrate one of several ways small firms were directly excluded from Games-related opportunities. 
Towards the end of the study, given the emancipatory objectives of this thesis, recommendations will be 
provided about how future events can include such stakeholders and re-distribute benefits. The question 
of social inclusion is a vital question which Lowes (2002) believes is often ignored. 
As a key contribution to knowledge and the field of ‘event impacts’, this thesis constructs ‘SmallBizImpacts’ 
mapping (see Table 33 below), centred on both established and emergent impacts and the legacies small 
firms may face in light of hosting mega-events. Although emphasis is placed on small firms intensely 
impacted across host communities, the analysis raises critical issues for small firms situated across the host 
city too.  
The mapping and the anti-perfect tourism storm thesis provide a unique overview of such factors in the 
context of small firms. It was seen as particularly vital to synthesise such in-depth and complex impacts and 
legacies because Hiller (1998) claims that current analysis is often ‘piecemeal’ and ‘fragmentary’ (1998:48), 
and due to Roche’s (1992) criticism that pre-event projections are seldom tested against post-event 
outcomes. Such analysis also emerges as vital in light of Cashman’s (2006) criticism that event organisers 
tend to overly focus on  ‘planned, positive, and tangible’ effects (2006: 15) despite major concerns that 
mega-events frequently exhibit significant negative challenges, both generally and in tourism (e.g. Getz, 
2008, Hall, 1997, Andersson et al, 1991, Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016, Richie, 2000). The mapping 
provides an opportunity to unpack the opportunities and challenges across the TDR cycle framed by two 
key time phases: the ‘short-term’ (before, during and ‘immediately after’ – as the event usually takes some 
months to ‘de-territorialise’) and the ‘long-term’ (the start of the following year after the Games has taken 
place – once the ‘re-territorialisation’ and ‘legacy’ phase begins). The thesis helps amplify subjective 
experiences, perceived impacts and reflections on legacies from the perspectives of those stakeholders 
invited to provide their opinions. It is thus important to note that, due to the subjectivist position of this 
research, the analytical frameworks developed in this chapter - despite being aided by prior literature - are 
exploratory in nature and grounded in the empirical perceptions found in the primary data collection of 
this research. To avoid ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ tensions, the findings and analysis are purely 
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based on individual perspectives [‘verhesten’], as opposed to singularity of truth (see Hiller, 1998)31. This is 
reflected in Lash’s (1990) argument that there is no such thing as ‘reality’, only ‘representations’ of reality. 
Everyone is actively telling their story; the question is merely whose story is being told, what is the primary 
critique of this thesis, and who, in fact, is listening? This thesis amplifies the stories of specific SGs.  
The mapping’s superstructure draws upon several existing theoretical frameworks32. These include and 
build on: i) Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) mapping (see table 4), ii) established key arguments33 in the 
field of event analysis, and iii) the detailed empirically driven findings of this thesis. As such, the model 
benefits from empirically driven robust internal validity, whilst wider connectivity to policy, media and 
literature helps build on the wider external validity of findings. This helps to achieve three main sub-
contributions. Firstly, to collate and deconstruct what is a somewhat fragmented and incomplete literature 
of ‘event impacts’ in an easy, accessible analytical heuristic for future scholars and practitioners. Secondly, 
empirical analysis helps to (internally and externally) validate existing knowledge around host community 
event impacts. Thirdly, theoretical perspectives are placed in the context of qualitatively rich small firm 
experiences, specifically those caught in the hosting eye of the Olympic storm.  
Small firms often form a sub-stakeholder group of host communities and, as such, their narratives often 
fail to fully emerge from mega-event impact analysis. Richards and Palmer (2010) claim that this results 
from governments rarely monitoring the impacts of such events on local organisations. The research 
responds to this, and Hiller’s (1998) call for more systematic analysis at the local level. This is particularly 
important as it is argued that micro and small firms often play a key economic and social role in gluing 
communities together (NEF, 2010), as well as representing a major business demographic that contributes 
to the UK’s domestic economy. As such, the mapping further serves to explain why narratives of anger, 
disappointment and frustration emerged so stridently and negatively, often indicating devastating financial 
performance and major losses to the top and bottom lines during the high peak of the tourism season, and 
overarching feelings of being marginalised. 
The mapping matrix is split into ‘positive vs. negative’ and ‘longer-term legacies vs. short-term impacts’. 
The bullet points in normal casing are factors established prior to this thesis, whilst the points in italics have 
been identified by findings of this study, thus extending the mapping previously developed by Pappalepore 
and Duignan (2016).   
 
 
                                                          
31 A full discussion around the validity and credibility of qualitative research is deconstructed in detail in the methodology 
32 Including: Vlachos’s (2012, 2015) small business analysis, Preuss’s (2006) ‘Legacy Categorisation’ and his (2007) ‘Legacy Cube’; Hiller’s (1998) 
‘Linkage Model’, and the IOC’s (2013), Chappalet (2002), and Cashman (2002) definitions of positive vs. negative impacts and legacies. 
33 Mapping incorporates postulations from Cashman (2002), Mangan (2008), Smith (2008), Smith (2012; 2013) Chalip and Leyns (2002), O’Brien 
(2006), MacRury and Poynter (2009), Gold and Gold (2008), Raco and Tunney (2010), OECD LEED (2010), House of Lords (2013). 
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 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
LONGER-
TERM 
LEGACIES 
(From the start of 
the following year 
after the Games) 
 Increased business confidence34 and 
expanding business horizons35 
 Increased real-estate prices for business who 
own their own commercial property36 
 Enhanced business contacts and B2B 
networks37 
 Enhanced ‘Fitness to Supply’38 and 
easier access to public sector supply chains 
facilitated through ‘CompeteFor’39 
 Improved internal skills and 
competencies40 
 Increased expenditure by international 
tourists after the event due to 
Olympic-related place marketing41 
 Development of niche (e.g. Olympic-
focused) forms of tourism42 
 Increased commercial rents and gentrification for those 
who do not own their property43 
 Risks of the corporatisation of high street firms and the Clone Town 
effect44 
 Business failure and ‘final-straw effect’ as a direct result of short-
term tourism and trade challenges during the Games, may result in 
unsustainable top and bottom line projections (see below) 
 New tenancy agreements split off commercial and residential 
components. Residential components key to subsidising low margins. 
SHORTER-
TERM 
IMPACTS 
(Before, during 
and immediately 
after, aka 
‘immediate 
 Visitor numbers increase across 
official HEZs during the Games45 
 Small firms along Last Mile route in path of 
event visitors, close of event site, with the 
right products to capture passing trade46 
 Displacement of local businesses to make way for 
Olympic related infrastructure56 
 Diversion of public funding towards mega-event project 
(e.g. from the arts to fund mega-event infrastructure)57 
 Reduced footfall across central spaces of host city58and 
‘substitution’ effects at national, city and regional levels59  
                                                          
34 Dwyer et al., 2000. 
35 Various DCMS (e.g. 2008) and ODA, 2007. 
36 McKay and Plumb, 2001; Kavetsos, 2012. 
37 Dwyer et al., 2000; O’Brien, 2006. 
38 (Various DCMS (e.g. 2008). 
39 (Various DCMS (e.g. 2008). 
40 Osmond, 2002. 
41 DCMS, 2007b. 
42 Stevenson, 2012. 
43 McKay & Plumb, 2001; Kavetsos, 2012. 
44 NEF, 2010; Wilbert and Duignan, 2015; Duignan and Wilbert, 2016; Duignan, 2015a, 2015b. 
45 García, 2008; Preuss, 2006; O’Brien, 2006; Chalip and Leyns, 2002. 
46 Spilling, 1996, Chalip and Leyns, 2002, RBOG, 2012a. 
56 Raco & Tunney, 2010; Smith, 2008; Smith, 2012; Gold and Gold, 2008. 
57 Kenyon and Palmer, 2008. 
58 French and Disher, 1997; House of Lords, 2012. 
59 ETOA, 2005, 2010; Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011; Work Foundation, 2010; Preuss, 2006; House of Lords, 2013; Deliotte, 2004; ONS, 
2012; FSB, 2013, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006. 
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leverage’ (Chalip, 
2004) 
 New spaces of entrepreneurial opportunity 
(e.g. pop-ups) along re-commercialised Last 
Mile and HEZ 
 Emergence of alternative procurement 
movement (East London Business Place 
(ELBP)) to open additional regional 
contracts in East London in light of 
CompeteFor elitism 
 Encouragement of first-time 
relationships between small firms and 
local authorities47 
 Increased visibility and international 
exposure of host city and Olympic 
host communities48 
 New viewing sites stimulating regional/local 
footfall in host communities and across city 
 Cultural Olympiad events stimulated 
throughout 4 years prior to the Games drive 
footfall in and around nation, city and future 
Olympic boroughs  
 Trade opportunities directly related to 
the event, such as providing food and 
beverage, construction, music, 
performances, lighting or sound49 
 City and regional workshops spearheaded by 
project and local authorities to upskill, B2B 
network50, help with contract bidding, inform 
of disruptions/plans 
 Loss of major local attractions (e.g. Greenwich Park, Observatory, 
difficult to access Cutty Sark) and thus loss of key footfall small 
firms rely on 
 Closure of/partial service at key transport hubs, reducing capacity to 
access host communities (e.g. Maze Hill, Greenwich DLR) 
 Poor trade and challenging tourism environment brought 
by the Olympics during high-peak of summer tourism 
weeks60 
 Venue regulations prohibit entrance with food and drink, over 
100ml of liquids etc., thus stunting early morning pre-event trade 
opportunities 
 Venue regulations prohibit exit during live Games – stunting day 
and lunch time trade opportunities for event visitors and small firms 
to capitalise on 
 Event seizure and militarisation of host Olympic spaces61  
 Barricading of ‘Last Mile’ stunting visitor consumption across small 
firm producers 
 Continued presence of control barricades even between Olympic and 
Paralympics  
 Wasted capital investments in response to ‘faux’ opportunity rhetoric 
 Beautification costs prior to hosting the Games  
 Operational disruptions to day-to-day running of business (e.g. 
deliveries, staffing, congestion etc.) before, during and after 
 Fear tactics and rhetoric of chaos resulting in regular 
residents avoiding hosting areas (local aversion markets)62 
frightened to drive in ORNs, enter militarised host spaces or park in 
fear of fines  
                                                          
47 O’Brien, 2006; Osmond, 2002 – for example, seen in the context of Sydney 2000 the Sydney Business Club’ and the ‘Olympic Commerce 
Centre’. 
48 Paiola, 2008; Low and Hall, 2011. 
49 Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Low and Hall, 2011; Hiller, 2006. 
50 O’Brien, 2006. 
60 French and Disher, 1997, House of Lords (2012, 2013); Telegraph, 2012; DCMS, 2007; Financial Times, 2012; FSB, 2012; Independent, 2012; 
Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Osmond, 2002; Vlachos, 2012, 2015. 
61 McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Smith, 2013. 
62 Spilling, 1996; ETOA, 2005; 2010; FSB, 2013. 
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 Opportunities to network and develop 
B2B relationships at city level51  
 Opportunities to network and develop 
B2B relationships at the local level52 
 Opportunities to supply to the 
Games53 
 Business development54  
 Increased national civic and business 
pride; may have motivational and 
social cohesion value (esp. during 
periods of economic uncertainty)55 
 IOC-HCC and London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic 
Games Act 2006 - advertising and trading regulations 
preclude marketing and strategic leveraging efforts 
[‘eventrepreneurship’]63  
 Usual street trader and popups locked out with licence revoked 
during the Games64 
 Strategically located Olympic/project endorsed pop-ups situated at 
beginning and end of Last Mile servicing event crowds, reducing 
demand for products/services from existing businesses 
 Event tourists not prone to going ‘off the beaten track’ and fearful of 
unsafe host areas  
 Small firm exclusions in Olympic supply chain, red tape (lack of 
human and financial capital), limited cascading of higher tiered 
contracts, and little to no opportunity to supply to local venues65 
 Limited community consultation and two-way dialogue 
between project and context territory, and incorporation 
of small business needs66 
 Small firms, particularly F&B, seen as a risk to both quality and 
quantity (i.e. ability to cater for large crowds) in local and mega-
event procurement  
 
Table 33: ‘SmallBizImpacts Mapping’ (developed by author) 
What the ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping tells us is that small firms operating in the host city, and specifically 
in HEZ ‘Last Miles’, can be impacted in complex intended and unintended ways (e.g. Hiller, 1998). This is 
particularly the case when we consider Chalip’s (2004) ‘Event Leverage Model’. Despite Hiller’s (2006), 
Chalip’s (2004), Chalip and Leyns’s (2002), and Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) belief that events can 
help to intensify local leisure consumption and provide trade opportunities for local retail, cultural, leisure 
and hospitality industries, the overarching concern of this thesis is that opportunities to stimulate optimum 
economic benefit were missed. Host community small firms were 1) unable to effectively capitalise on 
                                                          
51 O’Brien, 2006; Osmond, 2002. 
52 RBOG, 2012b. 
53 O’Brien, 2006; Osmond, 2002; DCMS, 2008; London Assembly, 2006; FSB, 2013. 
54 Dwyer et al, 2000. 
55 Gold and Gold, 2008; Smith, 2012. 
63 Chalip and Leyns, 2002; O’Brien, 2006; Hall, 2006; Gold and Gold, 2008. 
64 UK Government, 2013. 
65 DCMS, 2012a. 
66 Cashman, 2002; Raco and Tunney, 2010; Cashman, 2006, Smith, 2012. 
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passing trade, 2) failed to entice optimal visitor spend, 3) unable to retain event expenditures as well as they 
could, and 4) were unable to encourage significant numbers of tourists to stay for longer.  
The table below strategically overlaps Chalip’s (2004) opportunity for ‘immediate leverage’ with the 
SmallBizImpacts mapping to explain why optimal leverage appeared to be stunted in the context of the 
‘Last Mile’. By showcasing missed opportunities for optimal leverage, the results of this study justify why 
greater integration of local small firms across host communities should be more deeply embedded into 
visitor and tourist experiences during all phases of Games delivery.  
Chalip’s (2004) four key 
factors for ‘immediate 
leverage’ and ‘optimising 
total trade and revenue’  
Empirical and literature evidence about why optimal leverage was prevented. 
Linkage to ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping provided.  
(1) Enticing local spend * Venue restrictions stunt pre and during event morning and afternoon spend 
* Barriers and marshalling prevent visitor dispersion in to local business communities 
* Aversion markets form due to fear and chaos 
* Natural effects of wider Olympic ‘tourism substitution’ 
* Preclusions to entrepreneurial small business leveraging (e.g. advertising, trading, 
spatial regulation) 
(2) Lengthen visitor stay * Pre and post-event marshalling across Last Mile stunted ability of visitors to stay  
* Natural behavioural tendency for visitors to follow the crowd and stick to ‘known/safe 
areas’ (‘institutionalised tourists’ - see Cohen, date) 
* Long days at event venues fatigue tourists, resulting in them going back to hotel rooms 
(3) Retain event expenditures (e.g. 
leakage if event expenditure and local 
economy can be optimised by sourcing 
local products from local supply chain 
and labour) 
* Little to no success accessing opportunities to supply to local venues 
* New commercial pop-ups and entrepreneurial activity stunt local consumption across 
re-commercialised routes 
(4) Enhance business relationships 
(e.g. networking helped by platforms 
for local and visiting business people 
attending, and those who are 
associated with event procurement) 
* Limited to no success for small firms developing business to business relationships 
 
Table 34: ‘Immediate leverage’ vs. ‘SmallBizImpacts mapping’ 
Through constructing the ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping, this thesis argues that focusing on the short and 
long-term term opportunities can provide practical guidance and empowerment for small firms and those 
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with a vested interest in the promoting the welfare of such stakeholders67. Whilst simultaneously critically 
assessing the short and longer-term challenges, vested stakeholders can consider future ways to effectively 
negate or dampen negative effects. These will be presented in the Conclusions and Recommendations 
chapter. As outlined in the Methodology chapter, it is through the social and politically committed position 
of critical theory, a focus on emancipatory research objectives, and a vow to engage in policy and 
practitioner networks, that this thesis finds both its axiological and pragmatic standpoint in the era of the 
Research Excellence Framework ‘Research Impact’. The Contributions to Knowledge table, and section 
6.6.1 illustrate further the wider impact and engagement of this research on practice.  
5.7 Conflicting Interests, Demands and Ideology – ‘Project’ Territory vs. ‘Context’ Territory  
Creating clear, transparent mapping is additionally important in light of the contrasting and conflicting 
stakeholder perceptions around how host small firms were – ‘believed to be’ vs. ‘in reality’ – impacted by the 
Games. For example, some authorities and bodies believed the Games to be a major opportunity, whilst 
others, including one of the co-authors of the London 2012 bid, knew of the inevitable challenges as 
identified in the findings of this research. The concerns over mismatched perceptions and poor 
communications between these stakeholders were matched by limited consultation between project actors 
responsible for planning and delivering key aspects of the Olympics, and their respective host communities. 
This emerged as a dominant criticism by this study, underpinned by a number of critical concerns. Several 
stakeholder groups, including small businesses and support organisations (e.g. FSB, London Assembly etc.), 
highlighted the difficulty of forging effective two-way dialogues between small firms, local authorities and 
wider London 2012 delivery organisations. Conceptually speaking, spatial, political and economic tensions 
between ‘context’ territory’ and ‘project territory’ thus formed, resulting in a clear disconnect between 
community needs and project demands, which the community felt ‘just took charge!’  Small firms 
subsequently felt kept in the dark and part of a project which was ‘messing us [small firms] up’, claiming 
they had to ‘fight’ against the Games ‘machine’ and ‘satellite’.  The resulting effect catalysed community 
‘resistance’. Acts of ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘lines of flight’ emerged as embattled local narratives fought 
for plurality and to ‘open up the space’ against the ‘striated spaces’ created by the Olympics. Detailed 
reasons why this occurred, tactics employed by small firms to emancipate, and an evaluation of their efficacy 
were identified in the findings, and will be discussed in depth across section 5.16. 
Although opportunities to express concern at local-public forums existed, small firms (and several other 
stakeholder groups) felt they had limited ‘real’ say on how the project was delivered, being ‘uncared’ for as 
small firms are ‘not their agenda’.  This highlights Booth and Tatz’s (1994) criticism that mega-events only 
superficially seek representation; the strategy of incorporating key gatekeepers68 and minority views who 
may oppose plans, to co-opt and silence potential voices of dissent. The evidence suggests that, for the 
                                                          
67 Inclusive of national organisations like FSB, CBI, London Chamber of Commerce equivalents in the UK, and regional authorities, local 
chambers of commerce and business support agencies like Business in The Community (BITC) et cetera. 
68 Interestingly this does mimic the evidence of this study as the key gatekeeper interviewed for Central Greenwich provided the most detail in 
terms of Games planning and acted as a booster for the entire community prior to the Games only to become a critic afterwards when the reality 
hit home. 
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most part, elements of Games delivery were presented as ‘non-negotiable’ (e.g. Vigor et al, 2004). Zizek 
(2008) notes, that whilst this scenario at first glance appears to promote an egalitarian state and more equal 
distributions of power, such structures merely conceal decisions that are still ‘top-down’, even if, on the 
face of it, the ‘organisation’ does not follow the classic capitalist model of the triangular hierarchy (but 
rather a London 2012 ‘matrix team’ or ‘projects’ focus…). We can see here that in such perceived 
‘collaborative’ and ‘participatory’ forms of social organisation, host communities, whilst involved in 
decision making, never have the final say. Zizek (2008) argues that this illustrates the fundamental difference 
between ‘permissions’ and ‘rights’. Whilst permission to speak is granted, such permissions can be revoked 
(ignored or even silenced) by those who have the right to do so, for example those with power and 
influence. As such, whilst elements of society appear more egalitarian, one must question the extent to 
which there has been any real restructuring of allocated power, both generally and in the context of mega-
event planning and delivery. This thesis therefore questions the actual rights of host communities, as 
opposed to superficial forms of passive participation that this, and prior research, suggests occurs when 
considering issues of ‘event consultation’.   
In light of these findings, it is therefore unsurprising that respondents repeatedly referred to scenes from 
science fiction, totalitarian regimes, and war-time and militarised shocks when describing the Games, and 
its project practices. This qualitative, detailed analysis served to illuminate small firm narratives of anger 
and suppression throughout key phases of Games delivery, whereby even senior policy makers invited 
criticism here by simply claiming: ‘there should have been a space for more local engagement’.  However, 
on a pragmatic and appreciative note, there was a recognition by others that ‘local stakeholders are much 
less visible in such [mega] projects – this is a core problem with big projects – you cannot always consult 
with everyone’ and that it is ‘very difficult for a small business to get its point across to government (…) 
there is no way you can consult with businesses along that route [Last Mile]’.  Whilst one must be sensitive 
to the pressures that mega-events and their project managers face, concern over limited consultation is on-
going, and stands in stark contrast to earlier rhetoric promoting the Games as inclusive, an agenda reflective 
diverse range of people, and strong community consultation. As emphasised earlier in the review, in light 
of the evidence of this thesis it is of no surprise to find that Flyvbjerg and Bruzelius (2002) claim there is 
little evidence that suggests local actors, particularly small enterprises, have ever significantly influenced the 
objectives of high-profile mega-event projects (also see Flyvbjerg et al, 2003). The question of manufactured 
concern, omitting any real form of community consultation, and typify how linear dialogues between 
‘project’ and ‘context’ are enacted through legislatively inscribed (the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic 
Games Act 2006 (UK Government, 2006)) IOC and HCC demands. In other words, the plans of the 
Olympic machine are already set in motion - with and certainly without - local support and input, often 
‘failing to be responsive to wider interests and longer-term community needs’ (Mean et al, 2004: 130-131). 
This was reflected in the overarching community narrative - in the words of one small firm, the business 
community felt ‘shat on from a height’ and ‘sold a short straw’.  Whilst these retrospective reflections were 
often said ‘tongue in cheek’, it is through amalgamating the multitude of narratives gathered across the  
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qualitative findings of this thesis that one can gather a sense of charged and hyper-negative attitudes towards 
Olympic experiences. It is through amplification of similes and metaphor throughout both the findings and 
discussions chapter that these narratives can find their voice in such projects. The author argues that the 
illumination of such plight, and the amplification of subjugated stakeholders and suppressed narratives is 
in itself a contribution to knowledge. 
In light of these non-negotiables, the concept of project ‘timing’ strongly emerged as another way in which 
London’s mega-event project enacted a form of power. Although such projects often claim to be ‘user 
driven’69, as evidenced by the findings of this research, they typically exclude users until most of the major 
decisions have already been made so that their impact is considerably lessened. This is particularly so in 
Olympic agendas. Tight deadlines and strict schedules are sharply focused on the immediate goal of 
producing a successful event, with pre-existing visions that are relatively fixed and created for external 
audiences (e.g. IOC), often ignoring local and ‘extra-local’ objectives (see Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2074). 
Such projects can thus limit the scope of policy and planning negotiation and flatten out the politics of 
contestation. Pre-Games displacement specifically highlights selective timing in its most expressed form, 
with pre-arranged compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) ready to be operationalised once the bid had been 
won in July 2005. As found in Raco and Tunney (2010), and reflected upon across this study, direct 
displacement for local communities, specifically small firms, crystallises as a ‘necessary effect’ of hosting in 
densely populated soon-to-be Olympic areas, as ‘you have to look at the balance here, there is going to be 
impact on some people, whereas other people will gain significantly’, as reflected upon in the findings. 
Similar instances of small firm displacement were also seen in the Seoul 1988 Games, where over 200,000 
street stalls were relocated prior to the Olympics (see House of Lords, 2012). Central Greenwich also found 
many street vendor licenses revoked, in order to ‘ensure the free flow of spectators’ according to LOCOG 
(see UK Government, 2006), and, as evidenced by this study, periods of local trade were temporarily 
displaced to make way for Olympic-focused consumption.  Here emerges the concern that a significant 
range of mega-event actions, from bidding through to legacy, manifest as being protected by ‘conventional 
wisdoms’, ‘obvious solutions’ and ultimately naturalised ideologies that strongly reflect the free-market 
principles of neoliberal doctrine. This will be reflected on in final detail in the conclusions of this thesis. 
However, as illustrated earlier, Harvey (1989) argues that such assumptions are often guided by capitalist 
bourgeois control and the misconception that free-market neoliberal principles offer the optimum ‘growth’ 
and ‘dynamism’ economies wish for, thus providing little reason ‘to abandon such political thought’ (1989: 
53).  
5.8 Structural Internal and External Business Disruptions and Challenges 
Alongside displacement, intense ‘business disruptions’ emerged as a dominant theme of this research, 
indicated in the variety of ways small firm operations and trade and tourism opportunities could be severely 
impacted, particularly before and during Games-time. Unpacked by this study, these include: i) Olympic traffic 
                                                          
69 Consultative and inclusive of host communities, especially in the case of London 2012 rhetoric (can I reference Chris I’s book here?) 
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and congestion, ii) introduction of new road systems and the ORNs, iii) noise and construction pollution from infrastructural 
developments, iv) deliveries only allowed in unsociable hours in the late evening to reduce daytime traffic (e.g. one firm 
claimed they had to take deliveries at 03:00am, as the council prohibited deliveries before 01:00am – which 
required further liaising with staff to help with loading and unloading), v) incorrect parking permits issued and 
stronger parking restrictions across host communities and cities, de-incentivising visits and longer stays, vi) challenges remained 
not only before and during the Games but afterwards between the Olympics and Paralympics, and for the Paralympics 
themselves, vii) advertising restrictions intense across HEZs, viii) trading practices transformed for the Games (e.g. chairs, 
and billboards not allowed in ‘public’ footpaths for health and safety reasons, ix) waste disposal regulations 
required small firms to submit waste delivery plans, and x) closure of alternative transport hubs (e.g. Maze Hill and Cutty 
Sark DLR). These issues supplement and serve to illustrate alongside the holistic analysis in the 
SmallBizImpacts mapping the varying challenges small firms face when hosting. Systematically analysing 
these factors is of particular importance in light of the established dichotomies between ‘rhetoric’ and 
‘reality’ indicated by this research. Specifically, the various ways the Olympics can impact, disrupt and create 
uncertain commercial conditions across host cities and host community business environments, 
predominantly before and during the Games but afterwards too, as found in this study (see Work 
Foundation, 2010; Raco and Tunney, 2010; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). Issues here pertaining to 
small firm economic and social ‘legacies’ will be further unpacked later on in the chapter.  
Empirical and policy evidence highlights an on-going concern that the types of business environments the 
Olympics creates potentially threatens business survival. This is particularly true for small firms reluctant 
about or incapable of delivering the necessary strategic and operational adjustments to the way they operate 
and effectively leverage opportunity rhetoric (also see Kondra and Hining, 1998; Miles and Snow, 1978). 
Echoing Chalip and Leyns’ (2002) sentiments, this thesis suggests that small firms lack the strategic and 
operational skills, capabilities, capital, resources and entrepreneurial mind-set to effectively thrive and 
survive (also see Malone and Jenster, 1991). This was also echoed by London’s policy makers prior to the 
Games noting that small firms do not necessarily have the ‘necessary expertise, experience or structures in 
place to compete effectively’ (London Assembly, 2006: 9 – also see LCOC, 2005), and the need for ‘capacity 
that small and micro businesses often do not have’ (2013: 78). The head of Deloitte’s Business Continuity 
team further suggested in a BBC (2011) report that awareness of key business operational areas to prepare 
for prior to the Games ‘remained low’.  This was frequently echoed throughout the media, with another 
BBC (2011c) report claiming that ‘what strikes me is that there are thousands of businesses out there that 
haven’t even considered the impact the Olympics will have on them. Reaching them could be tough’.  In 
addition, as reflected upon by Kitching et al (2013), the types of strident regulations that mega-events are 
known to invoke have the capacity to constrain small business performance which, coupled with their 
potential skill and competency deficiencies, makes small firms susceptible to regulatory non-compliance in 
comparison to medium and larger firms (Blackburn et al, 2005). The idea that limited economic and social 
capital clearly underpins the vulnerable position of small firms in such (neoliberal) mega-event projects 
serves to illustrate one of the major contradictions of capitalism, whereby Brenner and Theodore (2002) 
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note the ‘blatant disjuncture’s’ between the ideology of neoliberalism and its everyday political operations 
and societal effects’ (2002: 352). They go on to examine how, whilst utopian ideals of free markets epitomise 
liberating principles born out of the Enlightenment, they also intensify coercive and disciplinary forms of 
state intervention imposing market rule up on all aspects of social life, subjecting the population to market 
forces whilst preserving social protection for the strong (Gill, 1995: 407). The marketization and 
privatisation of public projects in this sense starkly opposes the fundamental remit of ‘public sector’ 
ownership, whose aim is to provide ‘protection, help, restraint, education, recreation, and care outside of 
‘market relationships’’ (Flynn, 2007:5). The idea that free markets provide protection for the socio-
economic elite invokes what Harvey (1989)70 critically refers to as the process of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. This thesis therefore argues that event-induced opportunity rhetoric exists but for only the 
types of businesses that can afford, access and/or seize them71. Whilst Milton Friedman (1980), in ‘Free to 
Choose’, suggests that free market economics provide an optimum driver for economic growth, and that 
all individuals have the capacity to succeed in the capitalist system, this position can be critiqued. Everyone 
simply has a different starting point with respect to the ownership of capital, including host community 
small firms, as previously alluded to.  
Whilst this study shows limited efficacy for small firms accessing opportunities around workshops, 
networking, contracts et cetera one must be mindful of the qualifying and variable factors here. Specifically, 
the extent to which limited efficacy may simply reflect aforementioned concerns over the lack of skills, 
capabilities and competencies of small firms to successfully access Olympic-related opportunities. This is 
certainly one of the tensions of this research, identified in both the review and the findings, and thus 
requiring further investigation and debate. The question is whether Olympic-related opportunities manifest 
as only available to elite, bigger business, whereby councils simply offer limited support to transform 
opportunities to favour small firms vs. the internal operational and strategic inabilities and entrepreneurial 
struggles of small firms to respond effectively to changing business environments. For example, Osmond 
(2002) notes that in the context of the Sydney 2000 Games, businesses that planned thoroughly for the 
Games met their Olympic period performance expectations. Perhaps the same can be said for Central 
Greenwich firms which, despite believing they were marginalised, may have failed to (pro) actively engage 
in the series of workshops and consultations that were available at the local and regional levels. At a 
University of Westminster (2014) workshop entitled ‘Life After the Olympics’, lead for the Creative Arts 
for the LLDC illustrated that ‘social capital’ and ‘social confidence’ play a major role in determining whether 
local communities engage with event-related opportunities or not. They claimed that such communities 
around the Olympic Park are simply not engaging with cultural initiatives, despite attempts by the LLDC 
to engage. This tension permeated the analysis of this study too. Is it a case of social capital? Or is this a 
case of elite forms of cultural exclusion by virtue of its (somewhat highbrow, gentrified) character? Does it 
                                                          
70 Believe this may be in Neoliberalism and the city (2010) and a Brief History of Neoliberalism (2007)  
71 For example, those with enough human and/or financial resources, internal know how and operational capabilities, ability to construct bids, 
marketing prowess, et cetera, right through to political and/or economic access to networks. 
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not all just come down to limited capital, whether financial and economic capital or social capital, governing 
community confidence? Whilst this debate is briefly raised as a finding of this thesis, further evidence is 
required from future mega-event contexts to unpack this further. 
5.9 Shifting Priorities   
Empirical evidence from this study confirms that whilst small firms were heralded as key beneficiaries in 
initial phases of London 2012 planning, as the event deadline drew close their interests appeared to become 
deprioritised. This is particularly important as such local stakeholders often play an integral role in 
facilitating and ‘gluing’ the close-knit socio-economic networks that underpin local communities (NEF, 
2010). This poses the question of how far small firm interests are ever realistically incorporated into big 
projects. More specifically, whether these stakeholders were simply deprioritised, or ever realistically part 
of the government’s vision for the London 2012 Games in the first place. Whilst Mitchell et al’s (1997) 
theory of ‘stakeholder salience’ suggests that small firm interests and demands for a strong ‘legitimacy of 
claim’72 over economic and social legacy was acknowledged in the early phases of Games planning, these 
quickly dissipate when the project starts to become ‘real’ due to project pressures such as, for example, cost, 
time et cetera. Such concerns have been previously reflected upon by Gilmore (2014) and Smith (2012). 
Taking Raco and Tunney’s (2010) argument, it can be argued that due to their lack of presence, power and 
perceived economic contribution to the vitality of the modern-day city, regional and local economies73, and 
the prominent position of small firms can quickly become de-politicised, de-prioritised and forgotten, as 
postulated by several respondents of this study. This can perhaps be explained by echoing Thomas and 
Imrie’s (1995) concern that local business communities often reside in unappealing, low-cost 
neighbourhoods and are discarded as firms in inevitable economic decline, seen as uncompetitive and old-
fashioned. As such, the author believes (also see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016) that these actors may not 
have either the ‘authority’ (legitimacy and power) or ‘salience’ (legitimacy, power and urgency) to spearhead 
the outcomes they desire (e.g. to capitalise on opportunity rhetoric) and carry out their will in the face of 
resistance (Weber, 1947). This may serve as one plausible argument as to why i) the dichotomy between 
rhetoric and reality occurred, ii) the bequeathed challenges dominate the headlines of this study, and iii) 
serve as evidence to support the emergence of established debate and the production of small firm 
narratives of anger, of being lied to and deceived. This reflects earlier comments from senior London 2012 
and urban planner Ward’s (2013) view that ‘realism was more important than selling’ in the context of 
London 2012, further claiming: ‘there are terrible claims in the bid, you can say anything! The IOC doesn’t 
cast an eye’.  However, as demonstrated by the evidence gathered in this and prior studies, in this sliding 
scale of democracy, as the project gets bigger, riskier and more national in focus, as delivery teams move 
closer to ‘Year 0’, autocratic centralism trumps democracy when projects get big. The idea is that utopian 
promises legitimise intervention to amass the populace, only to waver at the last hurdle as event deadlines 
                                                          
72 Due to their prominent role in host communities, particularly Central Greenwich and in the wider UK economy, subject to potential Games-
related disruptions 
73 See Raco and Tunney, 2010, and implicitly recognised by DCMS’ policy focus on stimulating the ‘creative industries’ for economic and wealth 
creation as opposed to specific mentions of smaller high street and town centre firms. 
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draw nearer – indicating how big projects become less democratic and locally focused, and more fixated on 
politicised national and global demands to deliver a successful ‘end’ delivery (e.g. Smith, 2012, Garcia, 2004, 
Inglis, 2008, Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). Whether such shifting focus is a product of intended 
consequences, where the mega-event provides the smoke and mirrors for unequal developmental effects 
and favouring corporate and capital (a nod to neoliberal doctrine) or just a pragmatic concern of big projects 
- is argued here. Also, whether or not this was a direct or indirect tactic and attempt to seamlessly phase 
community interests out, or merely the offspring of intentional and/or unintentional project and local 
authority ‘inactions’ allowing opportunity rhetoric to wither and die is also an interesting question – and is 
arguably also the case in the context of ‘innovation projects’ (Alderman et al, 2014).  
5.10 Local Autonomy Lost 
Further analysis revealed that, despite being responsible for their local constituents and [as one LOGOC 
respondent put it] accountable for ‘localising legacy’, local authorities also believed they had little to no 
influence over the planning of London’s mega-project. Several small firms agreed with this position, 
explicitly claiming that the council was ‘fooled’, with the LOCOG being perceived as the ‘nasties’,  a ‘beast’ 
and puppet master dictating policies ‘from the top’ using local authorities as a ‘marionette’ to enact Olympic 
regulation. This was supported by empirical evidence suggesting that Greenwich Council were ‘hand-tied’ 
and ‘restricted to serving notices’,  despite often being thought of as playing a key role in ‘stitching’ 
conflicting project and context territories and their demands together to afford seamless integration of the 
event into its new temporary spaces of delivery. Such analysis links closely with Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
critique around ‘voluntarism’ (agency) and ‘determinism’ (structure) debates, specifically their metaphors of 
‘the master’ and ‘the marionette’. Age-old philosophical debates considering the extent to which man has 
‘free will’ or whether choices are determined by power and hegemonic relationships link well here when 
examining host and local topologies in the context of mega-event impact. Critically, similar scenarios were 
found in Cashman’s (2002) analysis of the Sydney 2000 Games, claiming that ‘local authorities have been 
largely locked out of the decision making process receiving very little information on key issues like 
anticipated transport flows’ (Cashman and Hughes, 1999: 32). Such concerns raise the pertinent question 
of the extent to which key local actors, like local authorities, have the autonomy and power to influence 
and dictate host community Games delivery – and the practices, and legacies that spawn from such 
intervention. This may perhaps reflect what Leitner (1990) reflects on as the ‘de-municipalisation’ (and re-
commodification) of social life under ‘entrepreneurial’ governance. Qualitative evidence suggested that local 
authorities expected such conditions to be case for such ‘top down’ projects (e.g. World Cups, Olympics…), 
unlike local-regional events, which can be considered much more democratic with scope for including the 
interests of local communities. As such, it can be argued that mega-events happen on and to people as 
opposed to alongside and with people, despite pledges by DCMS and the LDA to involve the community 
throughout all aspects of planning.  
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Limited local and contextual understanding of impact and legacy was also reflected in the rather ‘passive’ 
responses from senior policy stakeholders responsible for delivering the Games (e.g. Interviewees #2, 4 
and 10 (SG4)). Stakeholders appeared to know very little about the real effects and challenges of the Games 
on the very communities under scrutiny in this study, for the most part ‘toeing the official line’, ‘becoming 
one with the discourse and rhetoric’, omitting any critical reflection on any of the negative effects identified 
in this study. Perhaps indoctrinated into the official Games ‘spiel’. Yet again, this may indicate the continued 
mode of ‘saving face’ during what was still a politicised project or perhaps, even more worryingly, may 
genuinely reflect the limited understanding major stakeholders have of the likely local impact and legacy 
issues at the host community level. This thesis argues that both factors play key contributing roles for the 
findings of this study. The overly ‘top-level’ view of host community impacts was also purveyed across the 
UK Government and DCMS, right through to regional authority documents (e.g. RBOG, 2012a, 2012b). 
Documents often reflected abstract promises and unspecific stakeholder promises that could be seen as a 
tactic for avoiding any specific responsibly towards any particular stakeholder. As argued by Pappalepore 
and Duignan (2016), the use of generic, ambiguous and vague language to construct Olympic rhetoric and 
promises around impacts and legacies, viewed by the Head of Olympic Legacy as a ‘catch-all’, reflect a form 
of ‘planarization’ and ‘cultural imperialism’. Such de-particularised concepts aimed to confuse and appeal 
to everyone, without having any true intrinsic meaning and responsibility towards the very communities 
intended to benefit from the Games – as illustrated as a key point across both the review and the findings 
of this thesis. 
From the ODA and LDA to the LLDC and LOCOG, respondents, particularly those responsible for 
regional economic policies and/or the welfare of small firms, frequently reflected on the complexity of the 
London 2012 Olympic regulatory constellation. As such, several stakeholders identified that it was very 
difficult to understand how and when particular organisations had jurisdiction over the complex delivery 
components of the Games’ project. This was discussed throughout the interviews and was reflected in a 
major House of Lords (2013) governmental legacy report claiming that the multiplicity of stakeholders 
involved had essentially created a ‘veritable babble of potentially conflicting voices, the resulting cacophony 
conflicting with the need for clarity of voice and purpose’ (House of Lords, 2013: 23). It emerged that, due 
to the lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities, and concerns that the council was absent without leave 
and ‘hid (…) sipping champagne (…) avoiding the people who pay for the taxes’ during Games-time, small 
firms were unable to quickly and effectively amplify and find solutions to the local problems identified in 
this thesis. This bred clear resentment amongst several small firms. Interestingly, these findings directly 
mimic that of Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), who also found feelings of small firm creative organisation 
exclusion and thus community ‘antagonism’ (2016: 353). The need for simple communicative mechanisms 
between small businesses and managers of events, alongside the need to foster ‘realistic’ expectations and 
true Games impacts, is noted by Osmond (2002: 239). It is in light of this concern that this thesis calls for 
more transparency with respect to likely impacts to be bestowed upon host communities of small firms. 
With small firms feeling like they had very little local support structure in place, qualitative evidence 
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identified that, through regulatory and spatial shock, the Games appeared to run on auto-pilot, invoking 
Olympic omnipotence over host communities and their public resources. Alongside the limited presence 
and power (see Raco and Tunney, 2010; Raco, 2014; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016) this research 
continues to build the argument that small firms are subject to extreme modes of vulnerability across 
territorialised spaces of chaos, fear, control and power struggles. This echo’s Flyvbjerg’s (2003) critique that 
‘power play, instead of commitment to deliberative ideals is often what characterises mega-project 
development’ (2003: 55). The following section provides a more detailed analysis of these issues. 
5.11 Small Firm Narratives of Powerlessness, Vulnerability and Marginalisation  
Small firms situated in and around Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ emerged as powerless, vulnerable, 
excluded and disconnected from most aspects of Games’ delivery and as beneficiaries. Host communities 
and their small firms not only appeared to be relatively powerless stakeholders but were barely recognised 
as stakeholders at all. Small business ‘invisibilities’ were also recognised in Raco and Tunney’s (2010) 
analysis of London 2012. The thesis captures i) in-depth examination of these feelings of powerlessness 
within large projects and the personal consequences for those involved, ii) how this played out and 
manifested at the local level, and iii) provides explanatory theories for why these significant challenging 
shorter-term impacts and future legacies occurred. The thesis argues that, in light of the comprehensive 
evidence collected, these are both 1) factual and 2) interpretive conclusions - both driven by empirical, 
policy, media and literature analysis.  
Qualitative evidence illuminated local narratives, specifically for small firms but also supported by 
authorities who felt caught in an un-democratic, top-down project which transcended the usual democratic 
socio-economic practices of daily life. The project effectively side-lined them. As identified in the review, 
the exclusion of local involvement and voice emerges as a key feature of East London’s urban planning 
regime since the 1960s (Raco and Tunney, 2010; Cochrane, 2007). This mimics perspectives raised in this 
study, indicating that the London 2012 project emerged as a joint venture initiated by – and through 
mobilising - the city’s elected and unelected political and economic elite. Privileged regional, national and 
supranational stakeholders leveraged cultural and material resources where they saw fit, as opposed to a 
democratic grassroots participatory exercise (also see Hiller, 1998). Under the guise of ‘in the city and 
nation’s interest’, earlier evidence suggests that London 2012 was shielded by ‘legitimisation rhetoric’74 used 
to amass support, dupe the populace and legitimise intervention in East London. The council’s apparent 
inability to do anything other than manufacture consent or to act as a vehicle for locals to express their 
angst on behalf of more powerful political masters serves to indicate that the local populace were deemed 
a risk. A risk to be managed, particularly in light of the justifying discourse around the broader, more macro, 
vision of the project and its hoped-for effects – identified through both the policy document analysis and 
several interviewee responses. The view that mega-events can be seen to produce top-down, dominant 
                                                          
74 The presentation of the East London socio-economic deprivation problematic proved but just one of the mechanisms used to intervene, 
alongside supporting pictorial evidence of shopping trolleys, brownfield land, misplaced pylons et cetera.  
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project actions and practices that unify (private) disparate groups, interests and consumption is given. This 
aligns with the critical concerns of several prominent authors in the field (e.g. Hall, 2006) and amplifies 
Gotham’s (2010) concern that mega-events simultaneously silence, co-opt and/or neutralise voices of 
dissent, justified through the perceived idea that event-led policy plays a major role in the business and 
economic vitality of regional spaces and the national economy.  
This thesis, however, argues that through such policy, mega-events can be criticised for capturing host 
space and transforming it under the regime of the Games at the expense of small firms, which lack the 
power to resist the inevitable disrupted and challenging environments such events create. This echo’s Raco 
and Tunney’s (2010) concern that, in such contexts, small firms have relatively low power, influence and 
‘political clout’ to find their voice and make themselves more ‘visible’ (2010: 2051). Baeten (2009) 
characterises this form of politics as a ‘post-political condition’ where dominant consensus is used to stifle 
effective opposition striving for wider, incontestable political and economic good. As such, mega-events 
reflect modes of power imbalance and Olympic hegemony; traits of neoliberal doctrine, where those 
without social and economic capital (e.g. financial, human, networks, confidence, know-how etc.) are unable 
to capitalise on the new project territories created as part of disrupted and (creatively) destructive Olympic 
landscapes.  
5.12 New Spaces of Olympic Entrepreneurialism  
Empirical evidence alluded to the ways host community and public spaces were commoditised, re-
commercialised and opened up to new entrepreneurial activities from official sponsors and partners and/or 
commercial enterprise. These spaces included: i) the official event venues themselves (e.g. Greenwich Park), 
ii) either end of the ‘Last Mile’, and iii) various pop-ups littered across the ‘Last Mile’ (e.g. market stalls 
situated within the barrier itself and directly in front of barricaded small firms). Local consumption was 
displaced in preference for more lucrative forms of Olympic consumption. Small firms interviewed as part 
of this research clearly described feelings of being ‘left out’ and superseded by Games-corporate interests, 
given that this was an opportunity that only corporations could afford to be a part of. They felt detached 
from the Games, and frustrated that they were not given the option to pitch their wares within the official 
event venue spaces and by the overt corporate takeover. This was reflected across the empirical including 
the concern that: ‘the council did not help us at all. They were not for us, they were all for big corporates – 
we were completely pushed aside and the council made that obvious [during the Games] as well (…) they 
[the council] are not very good [at supporting small firms] I am afraid – not with local businesses anyway – 
they prefer the big companies, they are pushing the big companies in here (…) they do not support you at 
all, we don’t get an inch of help at all’. Epitomising intense feelings of being marginalised, host communities 
and their small firms were not even given free tickets to the event, one small firm claiming: ‘I have lived 
here for 10-15 years, I couldn’t get a ticket to any other events, nothing! You are totally excluded’.  These 
sentiments were not just confined to small firms but raised across other SGs too. Several senior policy 
makers reflected on what was believed to be the intentional control of visitor footfall – bound for the 
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Olympic Park - through the ‘marketplace of Westfield’.  Several felt this strategy was an overt tactic to 
divert consumption toward corporations. One senior representative of the London Chamber of Commerce 
echoed this concern, stating that, despite small businesses being in the area for ‘years and years’ and  
‘expecting to do well (…) to see all the visitors being funnelled through Westfield, Stratford straight into 
the park and then straight back out again. I guess, it’s difficult to swallow’.   
These aforementioned concerns, and the barricading of spaces in and around host spaces in Newham were 
seen as the key causes of poor small firm performance during the Games. Whilst captured spaces provided 
units for new forms of entrepreneurial innovation, such re-engineering of the commercial dynamics and 
consumption at play appeared to divert hoped-for consumption at the expense of, and away from, existing 
small firms into a new mode of Olympic-induced consumption at the local level.  This further emphasises 
the way in which new Olympic spaces of exclusivity can ‘mark’ who is included and who is not – believed 
to be aided by the necessary controls and guise of ‘health, safety and security’. Such conditions closely relate 
to political-theorist Carl Schmitt’s concept of a ‘state of exceptions’ in late 19th century ‘legal theory’, closely 
linked to the popular notion of a ‘state of emergency’, whereby national sovereignty transcends the ‘rule of law’ 
in the ‘name of public good’. This concept is credited to the contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s 
(2005) book ‘State of Exception’, recently applied in the context of mega-events leading to what Marrero-
Guillamón’s (2013) postulates as the ‘Olympic state of exception’, arguing that these concepts play a vital role 
in bringing about what Klauser (2007) refers to as the ‘commercialisation of security issues’. This thesis illustrates 
that this phenomenon was expressed in its fullest form in the context of London 2012 and the case study 
findings; a project that outright protected corporate, sponsor and affiliated political and economic interests 
at the expense of hosting and smaller firms.  
In light of projected opportunity rhetoric the rhetoric vs. reality concerns outlined throughout the findings 
of this thesis further symbolise and materialise as ‘smoke and mirrors’, a ‘carnival mask’ (Garcia, 2004) and 
a ‘placebo’ effect (Rojek, 2014). Such an intervention could arguably conceal parochial interests 
(McGillivray and Frew, 2015) and the Games more broadly as a project that promotes local inclusion and 
community participation but rather ironically favours a narrow sub-section of society that directly and 
indirectly influences event proposals and planning (Hall, 1992) that emphasise ‘class politics’ (Getz, 2008). 
Gruneau (2002: 9-10) argues that often the interests of the middle classes, developers and property owners 
are considered ‘synonymous with the well-being of the city’, resulting in ‘sectional interests’ often being 
treated as the interests of the wider populace. The concern that corporations play a vital role in influencing 
the way [mega]events are programmed is dominant, indicated by McGuigan’s (2005) notion of paradigmatic 
shifts from ‘associative’ to ‘deep’ sponsorship75 - this was highlighted as a key point in the review. However, 
the way in which this notion manifests at the local level requires further attention, coupled with 
aforementioned challenges explored in the SmallBizImpacts mapping.  
                                                          
75 Also see McGuigan (2003, 2005, 2013) and McGuigan and Gilmore (2002); Whitson (1998) and Law et al (2002) 
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In light of the evidence, the thesis argues that the ‘deeper’ embedding of private interests reflects an 
emblematic product of neoliberal policy and its offspring, the public-private partnership, which forms ‘the 
actual constitution of the cultural object itself in pursuit of corporate goals’ (2005: 235). This was also 
identified in Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) study. The idea that corporates may not just dominate the 
sponsorship (visual) and scheduling of events but elements of decision making too76 may serve to highlight 
how such event projects may give rise to publicly subsidised schemes (e.g. the Olympics) that benefit 
corporations (e.g. Smith, 2012; McGuigan, 2005). Prior study from McGuigan (2003) serves as a very useful 
backdrop for suggesting that corporate interests appear to influence public culture and projects. This also 
links nicely with Hall’s (2006) postulation that mega-events are seen as a vital intervention in the ‘place 
competition’ strategies of global cities and the striving for private-public growth coalitions which may seek 
to coerce and/or co-opt interests in an ‘attempt to control the mega-event agenda’ (Hall, 2006: 64; also see 
Smith and Fox, 2007). Coupled with an infatuation with monumentality and world class status, Harvey 
(1989) claims that, whilst this gives the ‘illusion of consensus’ (1989: 76), these strategies simultaneously 
exclude less powerful and socially mobile stakeholders from having their say. This formed a major concern 
of this research.  
Evidence attained in this study clearly illuminates the way in which engineered host places and spaces were 
commodified, re-commercialised and territorialised by ‘necessary’ security measures that can be seen as a 
mask for concealing commercial and corporate interests. Whilst one may argue that inviting corporates in 
this way could be seen as a merely pragmatic solution to combat spiralling public costs (see Cashman, 2002; 
Smith, 2012), project pressures may stunt and limit the real scope local authorities have in influencing mega-
event planning. In turn, this may leave little scope for incorporating regional and local interests and, as 
Hiller (2002) argues, avoids ‘stakeholder consultation’ which may ‘over-ride’ their hopes, demands and 
concerns (also see Raco and Tunney, 2010 in the context of small businesses and London 2012). Empirical 
findings from this research support the notion that London 2012 exhibited intense commercial favouritism 
to ‘guard’ corporate interests and the capacity to overshadow local, smaller business interests.  It is therefore 
unsurprising that, in light of such trepidations, especially over the last decade, critical commentators have 
illuminated these paradoxical characteristics. The rhetoric and actual realities of this (darker) side of event-
policy are contrasted, illuminating tendencies to mask power struggles whilst symbolising power, social 
control, hegemony and manipulation (e.g. Rojek, 2005; McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Roche, 2000).  
Conceptualisations made for this thesis therefore indicate that, through legitimising rhetoric, promises of a 
utopian future, and a ‘spectacular’ and ‘fleeting nature’ (see Cochrane et al, 1996; McRury and Poynter, 
2009; Raco and Tunney, 2010), mega-events have the capacity to ‘shock’ and ‘blind’ the populace, invoking 
policies that contradict democratic principles and determine who is and is not invited to the party. As 
unpacked later, these are projects that symbolise entrepreneurial governance and economic gambles (see 
Harvey, 1989; Zimblist, 2015). The neoliberal cataclysmic policies that (particularly deindustrialised) cities 
                                                          
76 (e.g. McGuigan, 2005; Hall, 2006; Smith, 2012; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Whitson, 1998; Law et al, 2002 etc.) 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
244 | P a g e  
 
have come to rely upon (e.g. Miles, 2010) have transformed Western society into one big risk-taking 
marketplace, as argued earlier by (Braverman, 1974). Rational, progressive planning in this new urban order 
ceases to exist (see House of Lords, 2013). It was overtly claimed across policy rhetoric that ‘speeding up’ 
development and catalysing urban change was a key hoped-for short-term effect and post-Games legacy, 
as stated in several statements in DCMS and UK Government policy documents. The desire for speed, 
efficiency and growth, and the challenges this mind-set brings for effectively including local stakeholders 
as collaborators and beneficiaries, are reflected upon in the conclusions of this research. Such concerns 
were frequently reflected upon by respondents, as epitomised by one small firm: ‘when does social planning 
go out the f*cking door because this tic arrives, called the IOC – we want this, we want this, we want this 
(…) all those projects have been sitting in a cue waiting to happen, waiting for the impetus to happen, 
waiting for the political winds to change’.   
Empirical evidence clearly illuminates frustrated narratives from Central Greenwich, even several years on 
from the actual event. Whilst Harvey (1989) argues that in such capitalist systems public institutions are 
driven by free market principles, whereby funds are redistributed away from local service provision toward 
more speculative projects, this thesis argues that public attention appeared to shift away from achieving 
‘local’ impact and legacy’ toward simply making the project work, whatever the cost. As the findings suggest, 
there was very little evidence suggesting local authorities and central government paid any attention to local 
issues across the board. In fact, in light of the evidence, one may argue that the government and its local 
authorities simply rolled on their backs, allowing hegemonic and naturalised Games practices to project 
themselves on the very community spaces they should have been protecting and championing.  It is for 
these very reasons that an in-depth, qualitative analysis of Olympic spaces was chosen as the overarching 
methodological approach for this thesis, given the need to amplify silenced narratives and unpack the critical 
idiosyncrasies that occur at the local level and make research subjects more ‘visible’. 
5.13 Local Support Structures and Networking 
With respect to Games support for small firms, although the prior evidence suggests that these stakeholders 
lack skills, expertise and resources to thrive and compete effectively in Olympic environments, small firms 
did, however, mention that local authorities provided local briefing packs and briefing sessions, planned 
ad-hoc networking events, skills development workshops (on e.g. ‘marketing yourself’), and support for 
applying to Olympic supply chains77. This was supported by documentary evidence from the RBOG 
(2012b) report’s claim that they helped over 500 businesses and intensively supported 250, with over 850 
businesses being visited by Greenwich’s engagement team. Also, London 2012 organisers believed they had 
‘consulted small businesses throughout the planning process, offering information and workshops on how to 
make the most out of the Games’ (BBC, 2011b). The problem was that almost every small firm, bar one or 
two, believed these were either poorly advertised, running at inconvenient times during trading hours or 
pointless, with the majority completely unaware that they even existed. This was reflected one by SG3 
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respondent claiming: ‘these [support sessions] were reasonably well attended but they didn’t catch fire, you 
know’.  Secondary research, however, highlighted the importance of alternative online blogs and websites 
(e.g. LondonlovesBusiness, 2012) for creating ‘Olympic checklists’ (referred to by the organisation as an 
‘Olympic care package’) to help London’s businesses prepare for the Games. This provided structure along 
with specific support resources and links to appropriate channels to effectively prepare businesses across 
the city for the opportunities and challenges they were to face. When considering official government and 
local authority support networks, one must also consider the extent to which small firms 1) proactively 
engage with such activities, and 2) individually want to participate in dialogue and planning discussions.  
Both issues are raised in the findings and pose questions around how far generally small firms are involved 
in the economic life and development of an area. What we can identify from the evidence collected is that 
an interesting theme emerged here - the view of many SG1, 2 and 3 interviewees that Games support was 
minimal and limited, versus SG4, Greenwich Council’s, view that adequate support was given. Views often 
differed between small firms and the council. However, it was a surprise in this research to find the extent 
to which the negative views of small firms78 were agreed with and amplified by the views of major business 
organisations and senior policy stakeholders. Such critical views, to the knowledge of the author, have 
seldom risen to the surface in such depth across prior mega-event analyses. This in itself greatly enhances 
the validity of the findings of this study, and serves as a useful contribution to the literature. 
To the detriment of small firms, the study found that the two major support structures for small firms – 
local public forums and support events – were by and large ineffective and of no use to small firms79. 
Inaccessibility to relevant resources is an issue previously raised by several authors (e.g. London Assembly, 
2006; LCOC, 2005). This may explain why small firms claimed i) little to no success with respect to securing 
Olympic contracts, ii) little mention of ‘improving business skills’ and ‘enhanced internal business 
operations’, with iii) only a minority engaging with any sort of networking opportunity, despite these being 
the key hoped-for business legacies as identified through the comprehensive analysis of policy documents 
over ten years of the Games being on the ‘political radar’ (2004 – 2014). The development of B2B networks 
(see O’Brien, 2006; Osmond, 2002; Work Foundation, 2010; DCMS, 2008; also see Pappalepore and 
Duignan, 2016) formed the second major strand of the hoped-for business impact and legacies of the 
Olympics in general, and London 2012 specifically. Based on the success of Sydney’s ‘Business Club 
Australia’ initiative (see O’Brien, 2006), one major ambition of the Games was to enhance access to business 
networks and their resources, and thus help to reduce the aforementioned environmental uncertainties so 
that British business could gain the trust of key actors who ‘hold the keys’ to fertile networks (O’Brien, 
2006). ’Who’ and ‘when’ are key questions, according to Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), when 
determining (and optimising) networking leveraging opportunities, the range of which should ideally be 
facilitated through a variety of clear, strategically programmed and structured events rather than messy, 
                                                          
78 Despite Interviewee #1 (SG4) referring to small firms in the data as operating under a ‘default whinge position’ (p). Also, according to a 
NYTimes article, (2012) ‘moaning is a British sport’ and, according to one resident, ‘if it was an Olympic discipline we’d definitely win’  
79 See discussion later for detailed explanations of why these mechanisms were rather ineffective. 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
246 | P a g e  
 
one-off ‘ad-hoc’ events80. Evidence presented across the Findings explored the detail of such programmes. 
In London 2012, such initiatives were present, for example: i) the ‘British Business Club’, ii) a ‘Global 
Investment Conference’ bringing together business leaders (see DCMS, 2012a for more detail), iii) the 
‘Springboard for Success’ programme developed by UKTI, and iv) ‘Beyond 2012’. All these activities were 
attempts to leverage relationships during the Games, with the ambition of creating more ‘sustainable 
business outcomes’ (O’Brien, 2006). The business networking objectives for London were very clear, 
claiming: ‘London 2012 is the perfect shop window: not just for our sporting talent, going for gold this 
summer, but for another proud Team GB - our businesses (...) with Billions watching on TV, the world's 
media in our capital city, and political and business leaders joining the spectators in London, this is a unique 
opportunity to promote the best of British’ (DCMS, 2012b: 4). Initiatives were also found in Greenwich. 
RGOB (2012b) highlighted the ‘Royal Greenwich Business Club’, established prior to the Games, bringing 
together investors and leaders, developing contacts, contract support, business CVs and 1-1 needs analysis. 
Although Greenwich and London-wide networking opportunities existed, and appeared to benefit medium 
and larger sized firms, as later identified by DCMS, evidence from this study suggests the extent to which 
small firms effectively benefitted appeared limited. The findings highlight the limited networking potential 
for the type of small firms interviewed for this study. Although O’Brien (2006) claims that little is known 
about why and the how strategic alliances, networks and other social structures affect and support 
businesses’ ability to adapt and transform themselves to remain competitive (also see Kraatz, 1998), Baum 
and Oliver (1991) claim that organisations which have stronger relationships display better survival skills 
(and advantages) that are boosted with intense levels of competition. This particularly important in light of 
earlier arguments suggesting that mega-events significantly disrupt small firm business operations and 
environments.  As such, a major way to reduce environmental uncertainties, as identified throughout this 
thesis, is to cultivate B2B networks and access new institutional resources (O’Brien, 2006). Although 
Osmond (2002) claims that such positive business effects can be a potential outcome of hosting, qualitative 
evidence collected across this study suggests limited success stories here.  
Qualitative evidence, however, highlighted that beyond Central Greenwich, in the context of Newham, 
significant attempts were made to market host areas. This included running the ‘Local Tourist’ visiting 
friends and relatives (VFR) programme to divert consumption towards main town centres instead of more 
popular destinations like Lakeside. This became so successful it won the second best tourism initiative at 
the VisitLondon 2012 awards, where Newham was ‘the only local authority to win in the entire awards’ 
(Interviewee #20 (SG2).  Furthermore, attempts to raise the profile of Green Street’s creative scene through 
working with small businesses and promotional organisations helped to boost footfall by approximately 
50%. One small firm also briefly mentioned that, as part of the Cultural Olympiad, Greenwich invited 
dancers into the street, which helped entice people to stop for tea and coffee. Despite the challenging 
                                                          
80 O’Brien (2006) notes this is key to avoid difficulties faced at the Atlanta 1996 Games, a scenario that found international decision makers 
floating, fragmented and unconnected. 
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tourism and trade periods brought by the Games, there are glimmers of positive tourism responses which 
failed to fully emerge in the narratives analysed across Central Greenwich’s Last Mile.  
5.14 The Symbolic and Material Challenges of Olympic Procurement  
As alluded to earlier, issues of exclusion emerged as particularly true in the case of Olympic-related supply 
chains and the practices of ‘CompeteFor’, as widely reflected on across stakeholders interviewed from the 
London Chamber of Commerce, local chambers, the FSB and London Assembly, right through to one of 
the co-creators of ‘CompeteFor’ itself. Although heralded as one of the key hoped-for business legacies of 
London 2012 Games, the procurement service ‘CompeteFor’ was seen - implicitly and explicitly – as an 
elitist mechanism for distributing publicly funded projects to medium, large and multinational corporations 
(also see Raco, 2014). This was a major finding in Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) study, which identified 
that local (art and creative) suppliers were superseded by corporate and multinational organisations, 
highlighting that ‘it’s not even through democratic or public call process, it’s through a privileged network 
process’ (…), with cultural content ‘tied up and handcuffed’ and dictated by official sponsors (Pappalepore 
and Duignan, 2016: 351). Although in theory higher tiered contracts were intended to cascade down 
through subcontracts to smaller firms, empirical analysis suggests little evidence of this happening. This is 
despite DCMS (2008a, 2008b) claiming that contracts would be ‘spread widely as possible’ (…) and that 
they were ‘opening opportunities up to small firms, social enterprises, and businesses with diverse 
ownership, as well as large multinationals’ (2008b: 61), and contracts otherwise ‘out of reach for smaller 
companies’ (Mayor of London, 2007: 11). The issues noted here highlight the challenge of ‘red-tape’ and 
‘bureaucracy’81 alongside the ‘risks’ of bringing smaller businesses in to deliver on such projects. Small firms 
‘lack formal procedure’ and ‘business willingness and capacity to meet the required standards in terms of 
health and safety, workforce development, equal opportunities and employment standard’ (London 
Assembly, 2006: 9), according to evidence submitted by the Trades Union Congress to the assembly. This 
is alongside the pragmatic difficulties associated with dealing with multiple smaller contracts as opposed to 
a few larger multinationals. Challenges identified in this thesis interestingly match post-Games reflections 
from DCMS (2012b) themselves, claiming that: ‘smaller contractors have not enjoyed the same degree of 
success as larger businesses, and do not have the same optimism and confidence about the future’ (DCMS, 
2012b: 17). As argued later, in light of and in resistance to contractual elitisms, a new, alternative contractual 
database emerged, offering solace for small firms during key aspects of the Games. However, the need to 
develop small firm consortiums to enhance ability, resource and power in order to compete for Olympic 
opportunities was highlighted several times as a key future strategy. This will be reflected upon in the 
recommendations. 
The issues identified here show not just overt favouring and escalation of corporate interests but also 
symbolise yet another example of how ‘public projects’ and ‘public assets’ are consumed by the private 
                                                          
81 For example, legal and compliance issues, to the requirement that tendering businesses require x4 times the worth of the contract to apply. 
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sector. Specifically, how the UK Government permits such conditions to flourish82. CompeteFor, for 
example, has now been installed as a permanent feature of UK public procurement; a private enterprise 
opening up public projects to the private sector through competitive tendering processes. This serves to 
illustrate and symbolise the continuing withering of the public sector due to limited state intervention and 
governmental interest in the day-to-day governance of places and spaces,83 and the use of new technologies 
and digital platforms to do so. Even one of the co-creators of ‘CompeteFor’ went so far as to say they were 
‘embarrassed’ by what the system had become, stating ‘it’s got the right intentions but it’s not working the 
way they [procurements] should be’.  Again, this serves to highlight the ongoing shift that Harvey (1989) 
refers to as ‘managerialism’ to ‘entrepreneurialism’. This shift is indicative of what Gamble (1994) refers to 
as the ‘new public management’ between private and public bodies, forming a ‘set of ideas for managing all 
institutions in the public sector and involving devices such as internal markets, contracting out, tendering 
and financial services’ (1994: 135). At this point it is worth stating that neoliberal developments can be seen 
across economic and public policy, particularly in the UK, for example the privatisation of the Royal Mail 
right through to 2016’s liberalisation proposals for the UK education sector, as outlined in Jo Johnston’s 
Tory policy on the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF). This illustrates that entrepreneurial thinking 
permeates both left and right political spectrums, specifically but not exclusively in the US and the UK. As 
argued later, such shifts serve to illustrate how, under the guise of the Olympic ‘shock’, economic policy 
continues to give way to free market dynamics and the withering of state responsibility in favour of 
neoliberal and entrepreneurial forms of urban governance.  
The permeation of vested private interests is legitimised under the naturalised assumption that inviting 
private organisations to execute public projects is a more ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’ way to deliver strong 
economic growth, spread risk and stimulate innovation (e.g. Smith, 2012, McGuigan, 2005).84 Interestingly, 
we can clearly identify in UK policy rhetoric and predominantly conservative85 right-wing narratives that it 
is the constant strive for economic growth, prosperous industries, and upwardly highly mobile human and 
financial capital that underpins the current capitalist regime and ideology. Also, aptly enough, the specific 
regeneration visions projected by London 2012 policy-makers and their documents. The dominant theme 
of ‘corporate interests’ vs. ‘local interests’ is clearly unbalanced. One major problem here is that when the 
delivery of a mega-event - a single economic stimulant to catalyse economic growth – embeds itself into 
the policies and practices of what Harvey (1989) critically refers to as ‘entrepreneurial governance’, it may 
give rise to an all-out fight for capital accumulation. The production of this can be aided by extraordinary 
interventions like the delivery of an Olympic Games, a project complete with utilitarian objectives, and 
justified by the label of utopian futurity and legacies, ‘regardless of the loss of cultural value which may 
occur as a result’ (Foley et al, 2011: 23) as indicated earlier. Whilst one may argue that this mode of 
                                                          
82 Forms one of several arguments for the ‘Tremor principle’ 
83 Forms one of several arguments for the ‘Aftershock principle’ 
84 In comparison to the public sector, which epitomises inefficiency, being unresponsive to delivery demands, and limited innovation (e.g. 
Harvey, 2010) 
85 Although neoliberal discourse permeates across Labour (e.g. the ‘New Labour’ movement) and even facets of Liberal Democrat thought (e.g. 
the agreement on Trident and nuclear mobilisation) 
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governance reflects Machiavelli’s notion of the ‘end justifies the means’, it also highlights Harvey’s (2007)86 
critical position that neoliberalism is best conceived of as a political project to re-establish conditions for 
capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites, thus creating inequality that favours the 
wealthy.  
5.15 Regulatory and Spatial Fear and Shock: the Olympic Occupation and 
Commodification of Central Greenwich 
Qualitative evidence further suggests additional ways in which small firm ability to leverage, across the host 
city and specifically in Central Greenwich, was hampered by ‘HEZ’ and ‘Last Mile’ Olympic ‘regulatory 
shocks’. Split into two main parts, i) Olympic trade and advertising and ii) Olympic spatial control and 
engineering, the findings suggest that both ‘regulatory shocks’ played a significant role in stunting small 
firm entrepreneurial event leveraging and creative efforts - mainly during the live Games delivery but also 
before and after the Games.  
Firstly, inscribed into UK Law through the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 (for 
detailed account see Siddons, 2012), the IOC-HCC prohibitions around Olympic branding and affiliation, 
designed to appease and keep sponsors happy (see Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Hall, 2006; BBC, 2009; O’Brien, 
2006; Gold and Gold, 2008), stunted most attempts to capitalise on Games symbols and excitement. This 
is ironic given earlier calls for small firms to engage in what emerged to be ‘doomed to fail’ strategic leverage 
attempts in light of opportunity rhetoric. The discourses emerging from the findings illuminated that small 
firms felt threatened, fearful of likely penalties and bullied by the controls. The resulting effects i) precluded 
affiliation with the Olympic brand and disempowered small firms from engaging in event-marketing87, ii) 
displaced existing businesses from event venues88, and iii) prevented the use of outside public pathways for, 
e.g., customer seating etc. Epitomising such concerns, a range of speakers from the London Assembly to 
small firms themselves, argued: ‘how do you get some of that magic Olympic dust to rub off on your small 
business? You couldn’t even talk about Olympic kebabs. The Olympics is highly controlled’ and ‘that’s 
[local regulation] crazy, we are all bound, we all have the freedom of speech but we are bound by the five 
[Olympic] rings’.  Several critical media reports, including one from the Guardian (2012),89 claimed that the 
Games turned into ‘what many legal experts consider to be the most stringent restrictions ever put in place 
to protect sponsors’ brands’, with one BBC (2011b) report claiming ‘they [existing small businesses] may 
just have to sit out these Games on the side-lines’. In addition, Pierre Williams, a spokesperson for the 
Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), claimed: ‘LOCOG’s almost absurd over zealousness in protecting 
corporate sponsors from threats that frankly do not exist has further weakened small businesses’ views of 
the Games and the opportunities it would bring’, according to the BBC (2011b) and a range of other BBC 
                                                          
86 Brief history of neoliberalism (2007)  
87 For example, one small firm wanted to create medals but couldn’t, and a jeweller laid their rings out in the formation of the Olympic rings and 
was nearly prosecuted 
88 For example, the ‘Crussh’ smoothie bar in Earls Court had to cede trading rights and temporarily close due to conflicting interests between 
them and other F&B sponsors (see BBC, 2009) 
89 Article: Olympics 2012: branding ‘police’ to protect exclusive rights 
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references. Furthermore, the findings reveal that for those firms lucky enough to access Olympic contracts, 
although this was of positive NET benefit, leveraging ‘kudos’ enhancing effects was stunted through the 
‘no marketing rights protocol’ to ‘protect the interests of main IOC sponsors as well as the sponsors 
attracted by LOCOG’ and avoid ‘upsetting’ official partners. The FSB Manager for External Affairs 
claimed: ‘after the regulated period when only sponsors were involved and branding was restricted, all the 
small businesses who supplied to the Games were allowed to say they had helped deliver the Games. This 
was a major change and boosted all of them (…) and small business pride’ (Personal communication, 2016).  
Whilst qualitative evidence points to potential positives after the Games, in the immediate phases around 
the Games the ‘guarding’ of corporate interests remained dominant. One of the key problems identified 
was that host communities, small businesses and their local populations were not only excluded but deemed 
not ‘official partners’ of the events themselves, their presence seemingly seen as offering nothing to the 
delivery of the Olympic project. This may reflect the mode of political-economic thought that underpins 
the ideology of such projects, perhaps indicating the favouring of big, powerful, global, corporate wealth 
over the health of regional and local diversity and vulnerable communities. It is thus clear that several 
factors, including red-tape, lack of skills and capabilities and restrictions on promoting involvement, all 
have to be taken into account with respect to ‘inclusivity’ for small firms in mega-event supply chain, and 
in the real assessment of small firm ability to leverage successfully. However, the shock of Olympic spatial 
territorialisation (e.g. Dansero and Mela, 2007), control and re-engineering was identified as the major way 
in which small firms were excluded from accessing the opportunity rhetoric around Olympic tourism and 
trade.  
Mega-events can be understood as a series of precisely organised processes with intense interactions 
between spatial and temporal dimensions throughout their project lifecycle, from candidature to the (rather 
enigmatic) legacy phases. Space is thus used as a major symbolic and material resource, and formed a key 
Olympic (cultural) commodity and a major symbolic and material resource moulded to achieve a range of 
London 2012 objectives and ambitions. Spaces became instrumentalised centred on satisfying market-
orientated-based outcomes (see McGillivray and Frew, 2015), whilst the mega-event manifested as a major 
opportunity for corporations to reach out and sell commodities globally to vast audiences (e.g. Hall, 2006). 
Small firms across HEZs, and specifically the ‘Last Mile’ of Central Greenwich, were physically locked-out 
of community spaces, subject to forms of ‘event seizure’. HEZs were efficiently captured and transformed 
into Olympic spaces governed by extraordinary security and commercial regulation. This was particularly 
true for firms stranded on the Central Greenwich Island, referred to by one small firm as being on the ‘dark 
side’ of Greenwich Park.  
Significant evidence identified in this study builds on Rojek’s (2014) concept of ‘event appropriation’, 
identifying that London and Central Greenwich were subject to ‘the seizure by external or contingent 
interests, of the good will and spirit of escapism and transcendence that is attached to global events’ (2014: 
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41). Local spaces usually enjoyed by many as a ‘public asset’90 were removed from general public use (e.g. 
Smith, 2013, Guardian, 2012a, Boycoff, 2012) and transformed into single-use ‘private assets’. These 
included public pathways, streets, roads, the Greenwich Park itself et cetera, which were opened up to 
commoditisation and re-commercialisation processes. Similarly to the waiving of public responsibility for 
procurement, such processes highlight the erosion of public space and the withering of the authorities’ and 
government’s responsibility to protect it, leading to  ‘context territory’ primed for an Olympic regime, ready 
for ‘officially sanctioned’ project and event practices. It is therefore unsurprising that Smith (2013) 
highlights that ‘many commentators suggest that access to public space is threatened by privatisation and 
commercialisation’ (2013: 1). Although early 20th century commercial paradigms were founded upon more 
‘break-even paradigms’ of Games commodification (see Tomlinson, 2006), evidence presented in this study 
suggests that the escalation of corporate interests in mega-event projects has reached new heights. 
Further challenges include the loss of public attractions (e.g. Greenwich Park [closed weeks before the 
Games themselves], the Observatory, the Maritime Museum, access to the Cutty Sark) and peripheral train 
hubs (e.g. Maze Hill, Greenwich DLR). As identified in the review, this is the act of ‘Olympic 
territorialisation’, with topologies subject to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to as ‘striation’. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conceptualizations of space provide a useful theoretical lens for analysing how the planning 
and delivery of mega-events impact and transform the ownership of space throughout the TDR cycle – 
illuminating the project’s interplay between the ‘subject’ (e.g. visitor, tourist, resident, trader) and the role 
of external agents ‘fixing’ and ‘territorialising’ urban space to secure planned objectives during mega-events. 
Their work on space is particularly useful in explaining the dynamic processes of governance that exist in 
such contexts, focused upon two principal spatial arrangements in oppositional force (Stevens and Dovey, 
2004): ‘striated’ vs. ‘smooth’ spaces (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). For this research, the explanatory power 
of these concepts is significant, specifically the role of institutional arrangements in the context of mega-
events, catalysing ‘striation’, promoting ‘order’ and engaging in modes of ‘territorialisation’. With respect to 
‘striation’ (‘project territory’), this refers to the creation of new determined, controlled, commodified, 
utilitarian and state-enforced spaces – from the privatisation of host community assets to sponsored 
protection – before (e.g. displacement) during (e.g. spatial shock) and after (e.g. neoliberal development and 
structural issues of gentrification)9192. The stronger the striation, the more determined relationships are 
within that space. This simultaneously creates the opposing force of ‘smooth’ spaces, where attempts by 
‘external forces’ to ‘fix’ and ‘territorialise’ ironically fuel resistance efforts that attempt to ‘destabilise’ and 
‘disrupt’ the ‘ordering tendencies’ of striated spaces. Smooth spaces ( ‘context territory’) involve the creation 
of rhizomatic activity and alternative narratives that attempt to break through ‘striated spaces’ to emancipate 
through acts of ‘creative resistance’ and ‘deterritorialisation’, where ‘lines of flight’ are played out in an 
attempt to invert power relationships between consumer and producer, opening up new paths for 
                                                          
90 As prescribed by the economic theory of ‘public goods’ 
91 Picture the alien bubble that engulfs Springfield in the Simpson’s Movie (2007) – shocking, regulating, immobilising and restricting entry. 
92 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also refer to striation as spaces that promote ‘fixed paths’ in well-defined directions, which restrict speed, regulate 
circulation and relativise movement (1987: 136). 
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expressing protest and dissent. In other words, striation produces ‘misunderstanding, resistance, and flight’ 
(Legg, 2009: 131). The product is the formation of what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to as ‘plateaus’. 
These are theoretical points between opposing demands where resistant actors fighting for plurality meet 
striation, which simultaneously tries to efficiently capture and overcome spaces under its regime (see Nunes, 
1999)93. Spatial conditions akin to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to as ‘determined striated 
topologies’ (also see McGillivray and Frew’s, 2015 analysis of ‘live sites’) epitomise war-zone-like militarised 
states operationalised by an eclectic arrangement of human and non-human project actors. Empirical and 
literature analysis is used to build the case for how and why these determined striated topologies existed 
and appeared to preclude effective small firm leveraging, despite projected opportunity rhetoric. Evidence 
suggests that host communities became subject to an undemocratic assembly of engineered space hidden 
under the guise of safety and security, invoking intense forms of local securitisation of space (securitisation 
theory is discussed later ) to achieve stringent commercial and institutional ends. Spaces were colonised 
through fast-tracked policy regimes, transcending and overtly avoiding democratic forms of community 
consultation that ‘must’ (due to the regulatory stringency of the ‘HCC’) protect the rights and investments 
of corporate sponsors. As argued later, London and Central Greenwich emerged as a contested 
battleground for power, subject to intense forms of community resistance.  
Qualitative evidence suggests that the regulatory and spatial shocks induced on Central Greenwich match 
that of Becker’s (2008) analysis of Beijing’s top-down, regressive approach to event planning (also see 
Meyer, 2008). Even with the panoply of the Games all but complete, evidence illustrates that these local-
host spaces became ‘domesticated’, a form of territorial appropriation and physical control officially 
referred to as ‘reification’ (material control). These processes follow initial phases of ‘nomination’ (symbolic 
control) where host space becomes the pretext for market exploitation and power, whereby classic Olympic 
lexicons (e.g. ‘Olympic Park’, ‘Olympic event venues’) symbolise initial context takeovers, creating, in the 
case of this study, the referentially reflexive name of ‘London 2012’. These temporally bound signifiers 
offer a ‘territorial quality stamp’ to legitimise its new worth and in preparation for ‘reification’. Such 
processes emerged clearly from the findings of this study. These ranged from military signage (warning 
potential visitors/residents to avoid host areas) to strategically parked trucks, overzealous authoritative 
figures (from traffic wardens to subtly disguised Olympic adverting and trading enforcers…), right through 
to the installation of elite Olympic Route Networks (ORNs), a new special parking permit policy, and the 
overarching tactic of invoking fear through policy and media discourse. The aforementioned spatial effects 
constitute the final act of effective ‘territorialisation’; the act of ‘organisation’ (sense control).  
The resulting effects equate to the construction of new milieus where programmes and strategies are applied 
to prepared spaces. For example, in the context of this study: i) Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ and beyond 
in other sites highlighted, and ii) the event venue spaces themselves. The findings illustrated that London 
and its official host spaces manifested as scenarios epitomising ‘states of emergency’. There was tactical use 
                                                          
93 As a mental model, imagine Harry Potter and Voldemort’s wand battle of rouge and ivory lightning shocks to visualise the point of ‘plateau’ 
tension Deleuze and Guattari (1988) refers to. 
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of ‘fear’, a medium for manipulating local, regional and city-wide populace behaviour, which was frequently 
mentioned as having a major impact on the formation of aversion markets – as highlighted in section: 2.3.5. 
Drawing upon media theory, the use of ‘fear appeals’ in advertising messages, although often criticised on 
ethical grounds, continues to be a common part of communicating persuasive messaging - invoking intense 
emotional response as fear enhances ‘recall’ compared to ‘warm’ or ‘upbeat’ ads (LaTor et al, 1996: 1). Fear 
appeals, according to the authors, are often employed when projecting messages of intense seriousness and 
security, particularly scenarios that predict negative consequences. This study identifies that fear appeals 
establishes a ‘risk’ and its potential effects, whilst simultaneously suggesting protective action in order to 
divert behaviour (see De Hoog et al, 2005). Borrowing from psychology, ‘drive theory’ dictates that the 
greater the fear, the greater the compliance with communicative recommendations for action through the 
creation of ‘fear arousal’. Empirical findings suggest this was the case in the context of London, Central 
Greenwich and beyond; messages of fear were found to have a profound impact on visitor and tourism 
behaviours across the city. Evidence clearly suggests that Central Greenwich (and many other Olympic 
areas) were locked-down, with one BBC (2012h)94 report claiming: ‘it was like being in the inner cordon of 
a crime scene’.  Host communities were subject to zero-tolerance policing, legitimised under the realm of 
‘emergency politics’, from covert FBI and CIA operations through to the overt presence of the London 
Met, UK police force and armed forces control. Vice (2012) describes anti-aircraft missiles on apartment 
blocks, shockwave devices with the capacity to immobilise and disable crowds of people, helicopter carriers 
stationed close by on the Thames, with over 49,000 military personnel and 500 FBI agents mingling 
amongst the crowds. Meanwhile, an 11-mile perimeter area around the Olympic Park with the immediate 
potential to be sealed off turned event sites into military zones (see Vice, 2012). These reflections across 
Central Greenwich and beyond serve to illustrate the shared characteristics of mega-events and war zones, 
and help to build conceptualisations of ‘mega-events as shocks’.  
Similar insights have been raised in the context of the Germany 2006 World Cup, cited in BBC (2006), 
where Konrad Freiburg, Head of the German Police Union stated: ‘there would be terrible pictures seen 
all over the world, in which 200 mad neo-Nazis are being protected by a ring of 1000 policemen from a 
counter demonstration. This would be shameful. It’s not the image of Germany we want to present’.  
Security intervention is legitimised through the construction of ‘fear’ and a ‘threat’ with the potential to 
endanger the population but perhaps, also, through business interests and market confidence, built up 
through carefully constructed marketing images of, in the case of London and Germany, ‘an enjoyable, 
colourful, and secure world cup’ (Schauble, 2006). Such features can be conceptualised as ‘securitising 
moves’ aided by subjective safety and terrorism threats socially constructed by powerful ‘securitising actors 
and regimes of governance’95 (Cornellison, 2011: 3222) who have the legal, political and moral means to 
‘construct’ a ‘threat’, allowing elites to break ‘normal procedures’ of democratic planning (Buzan and 
Hansen, 2011). Even The Economist (2008) suggests there is nothing intrinsically democratic about 
                                                          
94 The view of one local trader interviewed in Central Greenwich 
95 As opposed to a democratic opinion of what constitutes security 
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‘successful’ Olympic planning. As such, respondents frequently used a range of sci-fi and political references 
to totalitarian regimes to describe the controls and striation, including: the ‘Gestapo has landed in 
Greenwich’, and ‘Stalinist marshalling’ turning Central Greenwich into a ‘fortress’.  The Games was also 
described as a ‘force field’, ‘alien beast’, ‘alien horde’ and a ‘self-contained satellite’, and more broadly as 
‘shocks’ – with the project and its actors seen as akin to ‘Christopher Columbus and the f*cking 
conquistadors’.  Qualitative evidence presented throughout this thesis helps to explain why these 
communities had to ‘fight’ against the Games ‘machine’;  just a few of the charged words emerging from 
the Central Greenwich narrative. This was a colonised community under attack but also a strident group of 
stakeholders who were clearly not going to roll over so easily. 
Event visitors and tourists were described as ’brainwashed’, ‘bullied’, ‘manhandled’ and ‘treated like cattle’, 
with visitor behaviour akin to a ‘ghost train’, unable to break-free from striated spaces and ‘actively 
discouraged’ from engaging with the locale. Visitors and their everyday experiences perhaps turned from 
‘active participation’ to ‘passive consumerism’ (Debord, 1967). These findings echoed a BBC (2012) report96 
claiming: ‘the stewards pushed everyone home (…) people are behaving like lemmings as if they don’t get 
a train straight away they won’t get home!’ The findings serve to justify arguments around the nature of 
‘institutionalised’ event visitors. The findings illustrate Silk and Amis’ (2006) argument that, due to the 
multiplicity of polarised narratives underpinning host cities and hosting communities, city spaces become 
cordoned off and sites of consumption which: 
‘Protect consumers from the unknown other’ (…) further stating that ‘in this way, the tourist 
bubble can provide a sophisticated dream world that belies the structural inequalities in the 
contemporary cityscape, often becoming manifest in polarised labour markets [and] extreme 
economic disparity’ (2006: 152). 
These extreme uses of security as a pragmatic, logical, legal and morally justified (due to perceived terrorism 
threats) form of control highlight a scenario which Marrero-Guillamon (2013) refers to as the ‘Olympic 
state of exception’, and the process of ‘problematisation’ that often shapes contemporary urban planning 
(Raco and Tunney, 2010). As indicated by Waever (2004), it is through ‘labelling something as a security 
issue, that it becomes one’ (2004: 13), epitomising its ‘self-referential’ nature and conforming to the standard 
view of securitisation theory as advocated by both the Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools (see Waever, 
2004, Buzan et al, 1998). In this case, to label something a security issue, one must: 1) ‘identify existential 
threat(s) [e.g. ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be 
here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 24)], 2) perform emergency 
action, and 3) have a performative effect on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al, 
1998:6). All three were identified in this case study. Although a primary objective in the context of 
Greenwich was to ensure ‘…the safety of large numbers of spectators passing through the area’ (RBOG, 
2012a), findings from this study echo Marrero-Guillamón’s (2013) sentiments that national and regional 
                                                          
96 The view of one local trader interviewed in Central Greenwich 
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security, and ‘discursive legitimisation’ (e.g. McGillivray and Frew, 2015), allowed the circus to be 
performed under the realm of ‘emergency politics’. An undemocratic assembly of engineered space was 
hidden behind the smoke and mirrored guise of safety and security. Exceptional and extraordinary 
circumstances and fast-tracked policy regimes transcended ‘normal politics’, overtly avoiding the ‘usual’ 
progressive form of democratic governance and consultation. Colonised spaces protected not only the 
safety of their visitors but the rights and investments of corporate sponsors who ‘must’ (due to the 
regulatory stringency of the ‘HCC’) be shielded at all costs. This echoes McGillivray and Frew’s (2015) 
findings that ‘city space is zoned and secured to ensure the gaze of spectators is fixed only upon the ‘official’ 
partner offerings’; spaces purged and commodified into temporary spaces of corporate-consumption. This 
highlights McGuigan’s (2005) view that shoppers, spectators and strollers emerge as the sovereign 
customers in neoliberal market ideology, as we continue to see the commercialisation of the experience 
itself.  
Here, mega-events as an agent for spatial disruption, and consumption, reveal their inner ideological 
principles within progressive society. ‘Public goods’ become ‘private goods’ at the expense and under the 
nose of regular taxpayer. One may wonder how ‘public’ spaces can be purchased and territorialised with 
such ease. Well, further evidence indicates that new spatial reconfigurations are permitted and legitimised 
through a ‘new legislative order’: the ceding of national sovereignty (McGillivray and Frew, 2015; 
Cornellison, 2011) under the ‘Olympic and Paralympic Games Act’ (UK Government, 2006). The act of 
moulding and inscribing the IOC-HCC into UK law, paving a ‘democratic’ path to make way for the 
Olympic – metaphorical and, in several cases, quite literal – bulldozer. Territory is efficiently captured, ready 
to succumb to the demands of IOC’s HCC; an off-the-shelf solution and set of standard protocols craftily 
and corporately crafted by the same ruling, elite class who decided to host the Games in the first place. The 
result, as postulated by Foley et al (2011), are that: 
‘Whilst these events may satisfy the lifestyle aspirations of the sought-after tourist audiences, they 
may also exacerbate the exclusionary processes that exist within the urban milieu of post-
industrial cities. Instead of opening up the city and its civic spaces to a wider section of the 
population, corporate culture can colonise, mark space and define who belongs and who does 
not’ (Foley et al, 2011: 23).   
Embattled small firms, their local authorities and usually supportive stakeholders are powerless against the 
purging of public spaces. There is instability, uncertainty, and challenging tourism behaviours and trade 
performance. This ‘unfortunate’ accumulation of challenges, disrupting trade and tourism, restricting the 
oxygen that would usually enliven local trade during the high season for what was an already thriving and 
established tourism destination was the prevailing concern. This was a dominant view across small firms 
but also explicitly discussed across all SGs. Given such contestations among spatio-political relations it is 
therefore unsurprising to find a call for a ‘deeper analysis’ of such concerns with respect to the relationship 
between mega-events and their strategic extensions into host civic spaces that support modern consumer 
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capitalism (Gotham, 2005; McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). These are epic 
spaces of contestation, guerrilla landscapes, messy, complex and thick; the urban jungle where the war over 
local and corporate capital accumulation is played out - or is it already a steamrolled-checkmate for the 
underdog? It is an act of ‘positive aggression’ according to one firm. This highlights Healey’s (2002) critical 
postulation that project striation, and the singular capitalist discourses mega-events project onto 
territorialised spaces, undermine what he refers to as more plural, progressive views of urbanism often 
over-riding the creation of ‘multidimensional conceptions of the city [which] reflect and interrelate the rich 
diversity and complexity of urban life, while generating a discursive public realm which in which people can 
argue about what their city is and should be’ (Healey, 2002: 1779). This builds on Lefebvre’s (2000) criticism 
that such interventions often overlook the quotidian qualitative and inter-dependent invisible relationships 
and networks that exist within local spaces; close-knit communities and their socio-economic practices (also 
see Raco and Tunney, 2010). According to McGillivray and Frew (2015), the dynamics of these new spaces 
have received remarkably little critical attention despite the fact that mega-event research continues to grow 
(Rojek, 2014). Scholars must thus continue to question the ethics and interrogate the evolving nature of 
’who wins’ out of such modes of cataclysmic modes of urban intervention and development – before, 
during and after the carnival has graced host spaces.  
Interestingly, evidence supports the contradictory juxtapositions between Games informality and friendly 
volunteer ‘Games Makers’ waving their foam hands, directing the herd and commanding the direction of 
‘drift’ toward newly commodified, commercial spaces of corporate consumption (the Olympic venues), 
whilst security operations simultaneously provide a ‘safe’ Games. Enough security to settle, but not enough 
to worry. This highlights McGillivray and Frew’s (2015) claim that whilst visitors are encouraged to engage 
in collective experiences and modes of frivolity and joviality that may usually be prohibited97, these 
experiences operate within tightly regulated and fixed processes in the name of safety and security. Evidence 
suggests that a variety of actors played a part in ‘locking out’ small firms and the real socio-cultural and 
economic condition of host communities to hide its ‘messy’ nature, which may form a ‘risk’ to delivery (see 
earlier arguments) as messiness disturbs the ‘peace’.  
Whilst earlier arguments illustrate that in the early phases of policy rhetoric celebrating cultural diversity 
was a major ambition of London 2012, this study and Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) analysis across 
East London indicate that the very corporate culture Foley et al (2011) refer to resulted in a ‘missed 
opportunity, not only for local organisations but also for the tourists themselves’ (2016: 350). The ‘world 
coming to see the world’ (DCMS, 2010) thus becomes a rather ironic objective in light of the evidence 
present, with tourists essentially unable to see behind ‘closed doors’ and embed themselves in more ‘real’, 
‘slower’ forms of  tourism with a deeper sense of place (see Wilbert and Duignan, 2015; Duignan and 
Wilbert, 2016; Duignan, 2015a, 2015b). This may have in turn have enabled local authorities to encourage 
                                                          
97 Consider here Charles Dickens’ sociological explanations around events allowing ‘blood to boil’ for short periods of time, permitting behaviour 
that is usually deemed prohibited in streets (e.g. large hordes and groupings of people, right through to alcohol consumption in public areas (see 
Smith, 2012 for further details)), allowing the populace to ‘let off steam’ so they can be controlled for the remainder of the year (‘Steam valve’ 
theory / ‘ventilsitten’). 
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greater promotion of the local area, and potentially boosted Chalip’s (2004) notion idea of ‘immediate 
leverage’ opportunities. This mimics LCOC’s (2012) call for future large venue-based events in London to 
better encourage visitors to ‘venture out and explore as much of what the capital has to offer as possible, 
so that the economic benefits spread across London’ (LCOC, 2012: 7).  This is an extensive research agenda 
that the author is working on simultaneously with the thesis, through merging theoretical concepts 
associated with ‘slow tourism’ as an antidote to the ‘fast’ and ‘superficial’ visitor engagement often 
characterising mega-event related forms of event tourism.  
The evidence therefore helps develop the argument that spatial and regulatory shock enabled the 
production of sanitised and sinister, contrived, well-articulated and executed controls that cut the blood 
supply to the local economy of Central Greenwich. This was epitomised by one respondent claiming: ‘there 
was that real anticipation that this was going to be a big boost to the local economy, there was going to be 
a high footfall and huge number of tourists coming to those areas [event zones] (…) but I think there was 
a general feeling that during [the Games] it wasn’t what they were expecting, the expectation didn’t quite 
match the reality’.  On one hand it can be argued that the purpose was to deliver a ‘successful’, ‘safe’ and 
‘mess-free’ Games, delimiting risk and appealing to the populace. However, on the other, this could 
symbolise and materialise as the commercialisation of security issues (see Klauser, 2007), with host spaces 
being instrumentalised and used as strategic tool to preserve visitor pennies and maximise spectator gaze 
toward new spaces of commercial-corporate consumption (see McGillivray and Frew, 2015). In turn, this 
restricts the flow of event visitors into local business communities, influencing consumption behaviours 
and stunting their capacity to consume local products and services. This emerged as a concern for Central 
Greenwich, and ideas presented earlier speak to the emergence of re-engineered host spaces prepared for 
new entrepreneurial activity and Olympic-related forms of visitor consumption. Borrowing ideas from the 
mega-projects literature, this thesis asks, to what extent were visitors viewed by the project as a resource ‘to 
be deployed’ to feed large business and corporate objectives? Hence the desire to herd toward corporate 
providers rather than local businesses, to have controlled visitor experiences, with them cajoled into viewing 
and consuming the ‘right’ places to see, experience and buy. Small firms themselves believed their host 
space was blatantly ‘engineered’ to support these goals. Zizek (2008) notes that (neoliberal) ideology is 
hidden here, where consumption patterns demonstrate not only our personal beliefs but also emanate 
outwards – showing people who we are and how we find meaning in our existence.  
In light of these concerns, and the research objectives of this study, we may wish to consider how to re-
distribute benefits more evenly, ‘slow down’, encourage event tourists off the beaten track and into the 
heart of host communities. Although ‘slow tourism’ and ‘Olympic tourism’ (probably the greatest 
expression of ‘fast tourism’) are ideological opposites, and subsequently appear incompatible, it is for these 
very reasons that adopting a ‘slow’ perspective may serve as an antidote to some of the negative symptoms 
associated with the ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’. Wilbert and Duignan (2015) argue that, whilst tourists may 
favour aspects of both differentiated local and standardised experiences, this ideological shift demands of 
policy makers and visitors: 
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‘…a change of leisure life practice, the choice of fast versus slow – and in doing so to engage in 
modes of critical consumption that requires some reflection on the type of tourist and place visitor 
we want to be. Slow tourism is more about living life and experience, as opposed to racing through 
- where the quality of the experience/visitation is purely determined by fast, efficient, quick, 
productive and plentiful quantity of visits’ (2015: 208). 
In this context, the slow movement calls for consumers to consider critically analysing their consumption 
decisions, aptly referred to as the concept of ‘critical consumption’, whereby consumers divert visitor 
consumption toward smaller firms and ‘use their power of choice to modify market relations, in order to 
make them fairer and more conducive to a good life for all’ (Sassatelli and Davolio, 2010: 205). The ideology 
of slow may thus be seen as a solution to achieving optimal ‘immediate leverage’, showcasing regional 
diversity and stimulating stronger local spend in existing community businesses to support both short-term 
advantages and longer-term small business sustainable outcomes. All of these, at some points, formed the 
overarching justification for hosting the event in the first place. This echoes Boukas et al’s (2012) and 
Williams and Elkhasab’s (2012) desire for stakeholders across tourism, events and sports domains to work 
harmoniously on a single agenda to achieve a seamless sport, tourism and event experience for their 
respective markets. 
This thesis identifies that Olympic spaces project singular discourses of control, permitted by new 
government legislation and the ‘extraordinary’ security measures required to deliver a safe Olympics. This 
shares Essex and Chalkley’s (1998) and Hall’s (2006) sentiments that the regulation of event crowds is key 
to ensuring safety, a common assumption and key requirement of hosting mega-events – as illustrated in 
their references to the Commonwealth Games, the Olympics and the America’s Cup. Whilst one could 
argue against the need to ensure visitor safety across spaces subject to heightened threats of terrorism, 
particularly catalysed by the ‘war on terror’ and the London bomb attacks of 7 July 2005 (the day after 
London 2012’s bid success was announced), this thesis argues that, whilst this holds merit, we must critique 
the extent to which security issues are used to control spaces under the guise of capitalist agendas and the 
commercial desires of the right sorts of business. These are corporate sponsors, affiliates and 
entrepreneurial pop-up ventures who have the financial resource to pay for re-commercialised spaces of 
consumption across the Last Mile, at the expense of tax-paying (and contributors to Greenwich’s 
‘beautification’ costs as demanded by the local council in preparation for the Games) existing businesses, 
whose interests must be protected at all times, as explicitly demanded by the IOC-HCC (date). In light of 
these challenges, this thesis agrees with Miles’s (2010) and Kellner’s (2003) concern that the continued 
commodification and commercialisation of events may give rise to a greater ‘cultural orthodoxy’ toward 
spectacles and societal desires to consume and ‘have’ as opposed to ‘live’.  
Wider stakeholder perspectives gathered across London’s host boroughs and city identified that this was 
not just the case in Central Greenwich. Spaces around the Olympic Park funnelled footfall through the 
commercial zone of Westfield Shopping Centre, perhaps as a direct ploy to boost spending in corporate 
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enterprises, with limited opportunity for visitors to move against the tide and direct their spending to the 
nearby market and small firms. This highlights Smith’s (2013) argument that host cities and their 
communities turn into ‘temporary brandscapes’. It further indicates that commercial interests continue to 
match the exponential growth of the Games itself (see Hall, 2006), alongside the parallel rise of neoliberal 
economics from the 1970s onwards. As identified in the findings, traders, similarly to Central Greenwich, 
felt furious and disappointed – see section 4.4. Although potential wider host city substitution effects were 
expected, the localised challenges, for example, of staggering trade deficits of ‘20-75%’ and potentially even 
‘95-100%’ in some cases as illustrated in the findings emerging from this study were not. This was reflected 
in one Guardian poll of small business in the early phases of these Games, in which 84% suggested they 
had not had any more business since the Games, with one small firm claiming: ‘all businesses reported 
being 60-70% down on takings during the first three days because no-one could access local businesses’ 
(The Guardian, 2012a). One small firm even claimed they had ‘7 people in all fortnight of the Games’, with 
another exclaiming: ‘50,000 people were managed into the venue and out again without having any ripple 
on the local area’. The descriptive analysis presented in section 4.6 served to illuminate not only examples 
of financial damage caused by the Games but also the extent to which almost all interviewed firms felt 
negatively affected. It is through such subjectivist, qualitative reporting that we can narrate these rich in-
depth host experience stories and cautionary tales.  
The findings of this study further indicate the critical point of geographical proximity to ‘event zones’. 
Echoing evidence collected in this research, Chalip and Leyns (2002) note that economic distribution of 
benefits and small firm performance is often determined by how close small firms are to the event 
action/zones98.  Both studies found that the major risk for peripheral small business communities was the 
lack of integration between event visitors and host communities, the former consuming event site 
products/services as opposed to shopping in local shops and restaurants. Osmond’s (2002) analysis from 
Sydney 2000 serves to support these assertions, claiming that retailers located in major tourist areas with 
access to event visitors reported an ‘increase of sales of up to 66%’, whilst retailers in the ‘wrong areas’ 
without access to immediate event visitors reported a ‘downturn of 53-75%’ (Osmond, 2002: 53). The 
disparities between business performance based on location and type of product sold was first noted by 
Spilling (1996), followed up by a study by Putsis (1998) into the 1995 ‘Special Olympics’ which identified 
that ‘certain industries (e.g. construction and business services) benefitted from the Games, compared to 
downtown business districts [with limited access to event visitors] that were actually worse off’ (1998: 72). 
As alluded to earlier, whilst trade opportunities for retail, leisure and hospitality industries are believed to 
intensify during mega-events (e.g. Chalip and Leyns, 2002; Hiller, 2006), little evidence suggests that this is 
the case (Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). In fact, French and Disher’s (1997) study mimics the findings 
of this study, suggesting that the very industries hoping to make a quick buck experienced slower than 
normal business during the Games. As such, and in the context of this study, empirical evidence serves to 
                                                          
98 Referred to as ‘precinct areas’ in the context of Chalip and Leyns (2002) 
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illustrate why there was an overarching community narrative of ‘helplessness, disappointment and 
‘heartbreak’ that clearly excluded and frustrated. London 2012 was a missed opportunity was a prevailing 
narrative in this study. Several senior policy maker responses reflected on these challenges, and believed 
‘more could have been done to support the small businesses – pre, during and after (…) to support 
businesses that have been most affected by the lack of footfall for the Games’.  The need to offer more 
localised support, consult closer with these stakeholders, and re-distribute equitably across host 
communities emerged as a major theme reflected upon across all SGs and a key feed-forward point for 
future event delivery (also see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016: 353). The aforementioned arguments serve 
to amplify Smith’s (2013) concern that the territorialising and securitising tendencies of mega-events to 
‘appropriate’ public space have a significant effect on tourism behaviour and local consumption. This was 
reflected by Martin Crookson, a senior urban planner claiming it is simply ‘difficult for potential areas 
outside of the ‘commercial areas’ [event venues] to benefit’ (Crookson, 2013). 
Evidence further suggests that, in addition to stunting local consumption, new re-commercialised spaces 
of commercial exploitation and exclusivity emerged. New commercial ventures strategically situated at ‘Last 
Mile’ entry points (event venues and transportation hubs), housing pop-ups aimed at capturing and 
servicing event crowds, restricted the likelihood of consumption in existing small firms. ‘Already serviced’ 
event spectators were quick to grab a sandwich and coffee before having to relinquish them before reaching 
official sanctioned zones of the event venues. This tells us something about how out-of-town mobile 
business is able to shape and control to fit LOCOG’s narrative and all-out desire to capture and commodify 
host public space for capital accumulation and to claw back project costs, at the expense of cordoned-off 
fixed commercial units. Again, this symbolises how project power is exerted, and how this manifests at the 
local level in the context of hosting mega-events. The culmination of the arguments presented so far 
highlights McGillivray and Frew’s (2015) concern that host spaces manifest as ‘wider urban environments 
as a site for brand extension (…) canvas willingly given over to territorialising tendencies (…) opened up 
to commoditisation’ (2015: 2). A somewhat ‘corporate restructuring’ (Cornellison, 2011). Essentially, this 
is the mining of cultural assets, mimicking Walter Benjamin’s (1978: 49) sentiments that such events, 
specifically World Fairs, manifest as ‘sites of pilgrimages to the commodity fetish’, expressing emergent 
values of profligacy in the growth of a ‘broad-based consuming public organised around the fetishism of 
commodities’ (Gotham, 2010). These are ‘cathedrals of consumption’ according to Roche (2000) and Ritzer 
(2005). In the context of London, as Sinclair (2012) puts, it is a ‘corporate sports day’ with ‘1000s upon 
1000s of individual lives, that are now forever changed for three weeks of a brand fest’ (Sinclair, 2012). As 
illustrated across the review, similar concerns have been found across other major and mega-event case 
study settings – see section: 2.5.4.  
A major problem found in this thesis was that local businesses were caught in the middle of ‘rational’ 
governance, project practices and actors, and their agenda of low-risk and safe event experiences – 
debatably disguised and mutually re-enforced by each other and protected under the naturalised 
assumptions and auspices of neoliberal doctrine. However undemocratically, local, regional and national 
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sovereignty was superseded by new ‘off the shelf’ solutions that helped legitimise and deliver intensely 
securitised and controlled visitor experiences via the IOC’s HCC inscription in to UK Law via the London 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 (see UK Government, 2006). As such, the ceding of 
national sovereignty emerged as allowing Central Greenwich’s civic spaces to be opened up as blank 
canvases ready to be painted with the desires and agenda of London 2012.  As illuminated in the Findings 
and discussed above, Central Greenwich emerged as the theatre of war for symbolic and material conflict 
and power, and political struggles between ‘projects’ and ‘context’ demands.  
Qualitative analysis further reveals that strident venue regulations also played a significant role in stunting 
local consumption. Not only did venue regulations prevent entry with food and drink but they also 
prohibited event spectators from re-entering the venue once exited99. The resulting effect, according to 
respondents across stakeholder groups, was the stunting of lunchtime and casual trade, which in part 
stripped small firms of any mid-morning – mid-afternoon business. This was echoed in a report by the 
Commission for Sustainable London (2012), which identified that ‘restrictions on bringing food and drink 
in to live sites hindered the capacity for spectators to have an affordable day and contravened the principle 
of it being ‘everybody’s Games’’ (2012: 10). In light of such spatial, advertising, trading and venue-related 
regulatory shocks, ‘ghost town’ spaces emerged during the live events across the Last Mile, often referred 
to as scenes akin to the film  ’28 Days Later’, with visitors as ’zombies’. The theme of ‘abandoned event 
spaces’ became dominant in this study, and was reflected on continuously in the context of Greenwich too. 
As unpacked in the Findings chapter, key reasons for this include: i) aversion markets with regular and local 
visitors staying away, ii) Olympic tourism substitution effects, iii) closure of major local attractions and public spaces (e.g. 
Greenwich Park), iv) controlled and cajoled visitor behaviour, v) intense venue regulations (e.g. no food/drink allowed, 
and no re-entry), vi) fear tactics regarding HEZ and city chaos, ‘scaremongering’ and ‘poisoning’ peoples’ minds to avoid 
Olympic areas (city wide, e.g., Boris announcements), vii) parking restrictions and permits required, along with 
overzealous traffic warden, viii) installation of ORNs, and ix) ‘disaster zone’, ‘state of emergency’ and militarisation effects 
(e.g. locally focused war-esque signage telling people to ‘stay out’). The effect was reported not just in 
Central Greenwich but also across Newham and key Olympic areas, and Central London too. What the 
evidence from this study tells us is the extent to which the Olympics and the control mechanisms used by 
the project could dramatically manipulate behaviour and re-define the uses of host spaces, all with 
catastrophic consequences for the very communities intended to benefit from hosting. The use of fear as a 
form of power for control in this case, and used as, for example, the overarching rhetoric for Games 
intervention in the first place (e.g. fear of economic decline and current socio-economic deprivation 
concerns), is a major theme of this research. These aforementioned factors played a major role in causing 
the ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’ effect, as unpacked in the earlier part of this chapter.  
The research also identified that the propensity of event tourists to engage in local consumption may be 
stunted by two overarching themes: 1) their ‘limited local knowledge and the ‘unknowns’’ of visiting new event spaces, 
                                                          
99 Similar issue was cited in McGillivray and Frew, 2015. 
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2) ‘fatigued’ tourists, 3) lack of local-cultural interest, and 4) ‘crowd mentality’, as indicated in detail in the findings. 
The challenges presented so far can be understood as occurring within three main time phases: i) en-route 
from transport hub to event venue, ii) during the day and events, and iii) en-route from event venue to 
transport hub. These all manifest as ‘dead periods’ for trade. Qualitative evidence demonstrates Cohen’s 
(date) concept of ‘institutionalised’ tourism behaviours, with respondents stressing the inherent (and 
difficult to shift) behavioural characteristics of event tourism as causing systematic challenges in 
encouraging (sports) event tourists to engage in more local-cultural forms of visitor engagement. This was 
reflected on by Miles Quest, a spokesperson for the British Hospitality Association, claiming that: ‘the 
people who came to the Games didn’t really do very much sightseeing, didn’t do very much shopping, 
didn’t do much eating out’, with the report citing restaurants and shops complaints that event tourists ‘did 
not spend as much money on food and shopping as typical summer tourists’ (Associated Press, 2012). Such 
behaviours were also reflected upon by one of the co-authors of London 2012’s bid: ‘it’s [the Olympic 
Games] just a very, very unusual event, and people don’t operate in them as they do in other ways. They’re 
not normal tourists’, about which there was a ‘real lack of understanding’ on the part of local authorities 
with regard to event visitor behaviour. However, it was empirically conclusive from the evidence that, whilst 
tourism behaviours must be taken into account when explaining why event visitors hardly engaged with the 
local business community, respondents across SGs believed that spatial controls were a major contributor 
to preventing local consumption activities. 
5.16 Resistance and Effective Leveraging  
Acts of local resistance against the established challenges small businesses faces formed a dominant theme. 
Empirical findings earlier outlined how small firms reflexively developed coping strategies, direct strategies 
and tactics to contest and challenge Olympic planning and perceived ‘injustices’, specifically before and 
during the Games. The findings reveal not only the ‘factors’ behind why resistance occurred (as explored 
throughout this chapter already) but also the multitude of tactics used (both physical and verbal actions, 
and more passive forms of resistance), right through to the efficacy of such efforts. It is through analysing 
the varying attempts to emancipate, and the tactics and strategies suggested throughout the empirical and 
secondary analysis of this thesis, that the ‘Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage’ across the TDR 
cycle is informed.  
In light of the significant challenges throughout the TDR cycle for small firms across Central Greenwich’s 
Last Mile and beyond, an overt emancipatory objective was added as an emergent outcome of the empirical 
and further literature analysis. This was not only introduced to amplify depoliticised narratives but also to 
provide practical ways small firms can resist striation and effectively leverage throughout the TDR cycle – 
and subsequently make these stakeholders more ‘visible’. The manifesto is to be used in conjunction with 
localised and official Games guidance. It can be understood that, through small firm engagement with these 
proposed activities, the thesis promotes rhizomatic activity in order to open up the ‘third space’ whereby 
small firms identify lines of flight that permit emancipatory outcomes, and escape the ‘comfortable certainty 
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of planning’ (Pavoni, 2010: 11) to open up spaces of doubt and uncertainty where territorialising tendencies 
are less effective. As alluded to across the findings, these can comprise both ‘physical’ embodiment 
materially in host communities (e.g. through breaking open of physical barriers) and ‘digital spaces’ afforded 
by the digital technological turn (also see McGillivray and Frew, 2015), which offers new platforms and 
connections for fostering, and spatial relations to be re-constituted to amplify alternative voices and 
narratives (aka ‘smooth spaces’). 
The control and Olympic power projected onto Central Greenwich formed the primary reason why acts of 
creative resistance and deterritorialisation against determined topologies were found across the Last Mile 
case study (along with little local support during the Games, and illogical and over-the-top security 
mechanisms). Lines of flight permitted rhizomatic activity and hopes of emancipation in order to access 
the opportunity rhetoric promised to vulnerable small firms. Several tactics highlighted evidence that, 
through strategic application, small firms can influence event policy and planning often considered ‘non-
negotiable’, as highlighted in this study. The findings revealed that Olympic controls were met with forceful 
local resistance. Whilst complexity often exists across business relations, whereby the views of business 
actors often reflect mixed logic and rationalities alongside broader social, cultural and political views, it was 
clear that these vulnerable stakeholders stood united. Attempts were made to find their voice, amplify 
entrapped narratives and make a change. Acts of deterritorialisation were sought in several ways. Some 
resolved matters through physical and verbal action directly on the streets, whilst others took to more 
passive approaches to make a change. Tactics used to push back some of the negative effects of Games 
planning included: i) breaking through the barriers (e.g. including handcuffing to and dismantling barriers across 
Central Greenwich), ii) once barriers were broken, small firms attempted to divert tourists into the business community 
(e.g. creating signs saying ‘this way’ and verbally encouraging visitors to come in), iii) lobbying to LOCOG and 
local authority (e.g. to remove barriers, remove new pop-up businesses who were stealing trade, and to tone 
down aforementioned militarised signage), iv) mobilising the media to report on local challenges (e.g. politicised the 
problems to encourage remedial action from council/LOCOG100), v) prior to the Games, written and verbal 
demonstrations against use and closure of public spaces, including Greenwich Park (e.g. ‘shame’, ‘sh*t’ and ‘folly’ written 
on closure of Greenwich Park signs), and vi) small firms vs. Games makers verbal and physical conflict (including 
skirmishes between shops and volunteers attempting to change their behaviour (see p for further detail). 
Interestingly, this example of East London urban resistance is, in fact, just one of a long line of historical 
examples of local activism and contestation arising from London’s approach to cataclysmic regeneration 
programmes (see Raco and Tunney, 2010). In addition to specific community resistance, evidence further 
suggests that, in response to such contractual elitisms, a new resistance and alternative non-Olympic 
opportunities emerged. A localised procurement movement was facilitated by the East London Business 
Place (ELBP) as an antidote to the red tape and bureaucracy of ‘officialdom’; places where realistic contracts 
for smaller businesses in East London could be accessed. These alternative sources of localised support 
                                                          
100 For example, BBC, 2012a; 2012b, 2012f. 
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appeared to be more effective than specific Games’ initiatives. According to the LLDC (2013), a new 
Business Engagement Group (BEG) has also been set up as part of the post-Games legacy, to offer local 
support opportunities and access to Olympic Park procurement opportunities. Such opportunities include 
contractual bidding support, right through to ‘meet the buyer’ events (see LLDC, 2013). In addition, 
evidence collected by McGillivray and Frew (2015) notes that communities used spontaneously organised 
events and local alternatives to officially endorsed pop concerts that did not exclude and territorialise, 
allowing local vendors to sell food and people to bring their own alcohol. Similarly to the findings of this 
study, in Weymouth residents broke through barriers that attempted to demarcate beach and sea front 
space. The populace regained their ‘context territory’, which was mediatised similarly to the Central 
Greenwich controversy evidenced in this study. Such evidence proves that, whilst local communities may 
be somewhat ‘invisible’ in the mainstream melee of urban politics and economics, the highly visible nature 
of the Olympics provides a suitable platform for contestation and emancipation, adhering to the traditional 
utility of Bakhtin’s mask. Media – both the traditional and the digital kinds – can therefore be understood 
as a tool with which constrained communities can fight for plurality and invoke new levels of scrutiny upon 
local planning (see Raco and Tunney, 2010). 
Whilst resistance efforts were successful in places, helping to turn around tourism and trade fortunes for 
some respondents, the problem found for Greenwich was that ‘rear-guard action’ efforts to resist ‘after the 
fact’, although helpful, were believed to be too late as they were already wrong footed. As established earlier, 
timing in projects enacts another form of Olympic power, alongside the aforementioned forms of material 
and symbolic striations visible across Central Greenwich. As such, and as evidenced in prior cases of mega-
event analysis, small firm invisibility, limited political allies, local cohesiveness and limited capacity to form 
more powerful business consortiums make it difficult for these stakeholders to establish an influential, 
alternative politics to effectively change Olympic and event-led urban policy in order to re-distribute 
Games-related benefits. It is therefore unsurprising that Zimblist (2015) claims democratic populations are 
now starting to veto the intervention of mega-events, especially the Olympics, long before official bid 
submissions. This shows that populations are regaining power here, and indicates a growing resistance to 
the Games. Additionally, such findings mimic a small number of other instances in the context of mega-
events whereby small firms have resisted and protested against being ‘locked-out’ of Games related-
opportunities.  
Similarly to this case study, such protests were invoked in the context of the Germany 2006 World Cup, 
largely based on the fact that the German FIFA bid was in-part justified by the supposed economic benefits 
it would bring to Germany and host cities (see Hall, 2006). Such issues directly mimic those found in this 
thesis, the dichotomous relationships between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’. Interestingly, we have seen other 
forms of resistance on the streets of Rio, in light of both the 2014 World Cup and the forthcoming 2016 
Olympic Games. As noted by Zimblist (2015), ‘more than a million Brazilians across the country took to 
the streets to protest against the government spending $15 – $20bn on new stadiums and infrastructure 
(…) strikes by police, teachers, and transport and air workers, erupted in many cities, and street 
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demonstrations, though heavily repressed, accompanied the soccer competition’ (Zimblist, 2015: 3). 
London and Brazil are not alone in seeing resistance against ‘unequal’ and ‘unfair’ outcomes aided and 
abetted by government policy (Zimblist, 2015). Zimblist (2015) notes that people worldwide ‘from the US 
(Occupy Wall Street) to the Middle East (the Arab Spring), Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, Istanbul, South Africa, 
Chile, Bolivia and China have risen up again such elitist policy’. According to Zimblist (2015), the concern 
now for FIFA and the IOC is the growing resistance against mega-events, as the populations and 
communities succumbing to them continue to identify that they ‘may not be such a good deal economically 
and politically’ (2015: 6) – fewer cities are bidding and, for example, the Swedish population took to the 
polls and rejected their city’s potential bid to host 2022 Winter Games. Urban resistance is rising against 
this form of event-policy, indicating the somewhat ideological collapse of capitalist projects; mega-events 
perhaps forming a major pillar of the neoliberal global agenda. There is a collapse of underhand tactics, lies, 
the aforementioned silences and inactions, and the overarching undemocratic nature of such projects, 
which are, in the Bakhtinian sense, being unmasked and revealed. This is particularly important given the 
continued development of neoliberal thought across both Western, and now Eastern, nations, continually 
empowering this agenda to gain ground through redefining the political, social and economic models for 
governing city strategies (see Stuart Hall, 2011). One may argue that this appears to have been aided by the 
growing critical mass of the global populace and academic critique, whereby associated unequal 
development benefits now seem unsurprising. Olympic hegemony and power, now exposed, thus becomes 
less effective. Whilst not fully used as an analytical framework for this thesis, Foucault’s (1975) work on 
‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ provides an exceptional analytical framework with which to view this shift, 
indicating how power is often crystallised in to ‘political institutions’ (e.g. formally by Foucault as ‘local 
centres of power knowledge’101), all of which maintain their own ‘intrinsic logic’ with respect to ‘ways of 
thinking’ that have practical and policy implications but also consequences for the way society is ordered 
and how people run their lives. The Olympics can be considered an institution with access to power and 
control of knowledge over others. According to Foucault, it is through ‘implicit’ and ‘naturalised’ messages 
that such institutions enact power, largely hidden in everyday society, often unthreatening and manifesting 
in plain sight as popular cultural artefacts. In this sense, Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) argue that mega-
events can be seen as contributing to the ‘naturalisation of social inequalities’ (2006: 18). Institutions are 
arguably dominating consciousness, determining action, producing and reproducing society through 
project-particular ideology, as argued in the context of the event spaces in this thesis. However, as project 
practices become exposed and communities resist – like those in this study and currently in Rio for the 
2016 Games – one may argue that Olympic ideology is collapsing as we move further into the 21st century, 
as Foucault notes that ‘power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is only proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ (Foucault, 1991: 72). It is important 
to note at this point that a Foucauldian analysis was not the purpose of this thesis and conducted within its 
                                                          
101 Traditionally prisons and schools et cetera, but could be extended to include transnational organisations like the IOC and the Olympic project 
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remit; however in light of the emergent findings and discussions present here, will consider its use in future 
mega-event analyses. 
In response to these issues, and the concern over timing as a form of power, the development of a 
‘Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage’ across the TDR cycle provides a series of pro-active 
tactics and strategies that host communities, especially small firms, can consider in order to more effectively 
re-distribute Games benefits and invoke more inclusive leveraging strategies at the local level. This is an 
explicit research objective of this thesis, and is important in light of Taylor’s (2007) concern that local 
communities are often reactive to early bid, planning and delivery phases, responding to perceived direct 
threat as opposed to being proactive and nipping it in the bud. 
‘Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage’ across the TDR cycle for small businesses 
Before 
 Utilise and bid for funding associated 
with the Cultural Olympiad to host local 
and regional events to stimulate visitation 
and footfall. 
 Identify relevant similar businesses, create 
consortium and bid as a consolidated unit 
for event contracts (e.g. to supply 
catering services). 
 Lobby policy makers to force, or at least 
actively encourage, higher tier contracts 
to trickle down the tiers and subcontract. 
 Utilise expertise in local authority and at 
national level (e.g. Business Link for UK) 
to upskill in preparation for e.g. contract 
bidding, marketing, operations and 
logistics during this time. 
 If your product and service is exportable, 
network and upskill (see above) via city-
wide and localised networking events if 
available. 
 Be mindful of the uses of newly captured 
civic spaces – resist re-commercialisation 
effects and new spaces of consumption 
During 
 Ensure security measures do not directly 
and indirectly block access to your small 
business 
 If barriers and marshals do stunt trade, 
consider: 
- Lobbying authorities and organising committee  
- Local, regional and national media to politicise 
- Physical action on physical barriers 
- Negotiating with Games makers to tone down 
- Using social media and digital spaces that 
permit rhizomatic activity and help amplify 
narrative 
 Work with community to create leaflets, 
discount books and paraphernalia to 
stimulate longer stays, greater spend in 
local establishments and promotion of 
host community to invoke ‘Slow 
Tourism’ approach. 
 Consider tailoring product and service 
offering to event crowds; and offering - if 
feasible – toilet access and spaces to 
watch the Games. 
After 
 Lobby local and 
regional authorities to 
intervene and use 
planning powers to 
keep rents affordable. 
 Lobby government 
and authorities to 
conduct meaningful 
and qualitative study 
of post-Games 
legacy. 
 Continue the 
momentum to deliver 
locally focused events 
that directly and 
indirectly link in 
some way to the 
Olympics and/or the 
Cultural Olympiad. 
 Between the 
Olympics and 
Paralympics ensure 
that barricades are 
removed and that 
host community can 
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which may impact on regular 
consumption. 
 Consider alternative ways regular 
customers in community can access 
business as usual to avoid aversion.  
 Lobby, if applicable, against parking 
permits, militarised signage and ‘fear’ and 
‘chaos’ rhetoric.  
 Lobby against the partial and/or full 
closure of local attractions which may 
dampen passing trade and regular footfall. 
 Consider putting on locally organised 
events across community to encourage 
tourists to stay for longer. 
 Ensure every business has direct contact 
number for local, regional authorities 
and/or local representative of the 
organising team. 
 Lobby for event venue regulations to be 
relaxed to: 
- Allow for entry with locally purchased 
food and drink 
- Allow for re-entry if exited to allow for 
lunchtime trade opportunity 
return to normal 
business conditions. 
 
 
 
Table 35: ‘A Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage for Small Firms’ (developed by author) 
In light of the aforementioned concerns, this thesis argues that policy makers at the lowest and highest 
echelons of governance must consider more ‘bottom-up’ (see Vigor et al, 2004) inclusive leveraging and 
regeneration strategies in order to effectively re-distribute benefits across these stakeholders (see 
Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; Ziakas, 2014). Also, to dismantle the ‘territorialised’ and ‘determined’ 
striated topologies across host spaces, and inevitable ‘sanitised’ event experiences that blight newly captured 
‘official’ mega-event spaces. Further, use event leverage as a tool to plan positive impacts and legacies 
(including the examples shown in the ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping) and ‘enable positive change, rectify 
power imbalances and decrease inequalities’ (Ziakas, 2014: 9). By constructing the SmallBizImpacts 
mapping, alongside the manifesto, host communities and their small firms will have a better awareness of 
the likely affects mega-events may bring, alongside actionable ways these stakeholders can help better re-
distribute benefits to host spaces and regional communities. In addition, another hoped-for outcome is that 
new rhizomatic activity and alternative narratives might emerge, helping to promote the regional-come-
local community idiosyncrasies that fully reflect the diverse quirks that characterise the ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ 
as opposed to the ‘Disneyfied’ (Bryman, 2004). Interestingly, the objective (part of the ‘five’ promises) of 
showcasing the UK and London as an ‘inclusive’ place to visit and celebrate cultural diversity became rather 
ironic in light of the sterilisation of visitor experiences that quite clearly transcended the ‘local’ in favour of 
the ‘macro’. It is therefore unsurprising that Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) claim that London 2012 
represented a missed opportunity, not only for local businesses but also for the tourists themselves and for 
local authorities unable to take advantage of cultural diversities existing beyond spaces of striation 
(Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016).  
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
268 | P a g e  
 
5.17 Small Firm Legacies 
So far, the thesis has identified major challenges small firms may face before and during the Games; a period 
officially referred to as the ‘territorialisation’ stage of the TDR cycle. Whilst the majority of respondents 
claimed the Games should have been of benefit in these periods, a minority of high-level stakeholders 
believed small firms should have written off their hopes of benefitting before and during the Olympics, 
and focused on the ‘longer-term legacies’. In light of the evidence, and identified in the context of Central 
Greenwich in particular, in hindsight this may have been the wisest mind-set for small firms to have. This 
was reflected in the LOCOG (2012) post-Games report claiming that ‘short-term gains will be outweighed 
by long-term gains102’ (2012: 8). However, strong evidence suggests that major risks exist in the ‘legacy’ 
phase too, despite event policy makers often believing that legacy benefits naturally ‘flow back in to the 
community at the end of the Games’ (Cashman, 2005: 15). The question of Olympic legacy (e.g. De 
Moragas et al, 2002) is the infinite beam that characterises the final stages of the TDR cycle: ‘re-
territorialisation’, as mega-events leave behind social and economic legacies which impact on the host 
community for a far greater period of time than that in which the event took place (Hall, 2006). Whilst we 
have a vague idea of its nature, there is little to no widely accepted conceptualisation and definition of what 
it is, despite several authors’ attempts to dissect it (e.g. Hiller, 1998; Preuss, 2007). As established in the 
review, prior legacy analysis has also suffered from limited contextual and empirical support, thus remaining 
challenged with respect to internal validity.  
Reviewing such legacy effects is pertinent in light of explicit claims that the Games will have failed if the 
event does not leave positive legacies of growth and development in surrounding neighbourhoods (see 
Raco and Tunney, 2010). The challenge here is that that event analyses are often centred on short-term 
immediate impacts rather than longer-term outcomes (e.g. French and Disher, 1997). This poses a particular 
dilemma as Chalip (2002) argues that current analysis just does not go far enough to justify intervention 
and legitimise extensive public spending – and with greater spending comes higher public expectations 
(Waitt, 2003a). Also, Baade and Matheson (2004) and Coates and Humphreys (2002) express concern that 
mega-events have at best neutral but largely negative economic effects for host cities and their hosting 
communities. Evidence analysed from prior mega-event case study analysis, alongside the findings of this 
study, identify that systemic and systematic economic structural challenges exist for host communities 
during the ‘de’ and ‘re’ territorialisation of project territory once the carnival has moved on. Such challenges 
pose serious consequence for the livelihoods of small firms. This was duly noted across all stakeholder 
groups, specifically small firms, as a current and potential problem. The well-established view purveyed by 
McKay & Plumb (2001) and Kavetsos (2012)103 indicates that the staging of mega-events has been 
synonymous with rising residential and commercial rents. This is officially referred to as the ‘Olympic effect’ 
(and the ‘Midas touch’), where the all-knowing, all-powerful mega-event sprinkles its gold dust on willing 
and unwilling communities that require it’s specific form of ‘developmental’ effect. Such economic and 
                                                          
102 E.g. through positive image, more inward investment, and increased visitor numbers 
103 And several others including Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), Smith (2012) et cetera 
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social processes may influence small firm ability to continue trading, often forcing lower income 
communities out (e.g. House of Lords, 2013) and changing the ‘social mix’ of Olympic populations104. This 
echoes the existing and overarching concern that ‘convergence’ may be achieved through gentrification as 
opposed to regenerating and improving outcomes for current residents (House of Lords, 2013). This 
highlights specific London 2012 concerns that the concept of ‘regeneration’ may merely act as a synonym 
for ‘gentrification’ and the widely cited unequal developmental benefits indicated across the analysis of this 
research (e.g. House of Lords, 2013 - also see Vice 2012 for specific accounts from Carpenters Estate). 
This reflects Harvey’s (1989) critique that this mode of urban development ‘diverts and entertains’ away 
from the challenges that remain ‘unseen and uncared for’. Also, whilst earlier interpretations of Bakhtin’s 
‘carnival mask’ reflect on events as a way for communities to rejoice in ‘reincarnation and change’, 
contemporary analysis proposes that the mask manifests as an agent of deception, a façade, and a smoke 
and mirrors effect where problems are hidden. Events may therefore give rise to the purging and sanitisation 
of communities and their urban spaces, ousting less-well-off existing communities in favour of upwardly 
mobile capital and communities.  
The idea of mega-events as a form of ‘social cleansing’ was reflected upon several times throughout the 
analysis of this thesis, indicating that new populations are spawned that perhaps fit more neatly with the 
grand visions projected for East London. In the context of the business demographic, it was conclusive 
that East London’s regeneration ambition was to be largely spearheaded through the stimulation of high 
growth industries (e.g. creative, and service industries for example), as clearly outlined across much of the 
pre-Games rhetoric. As identified in Jacobs (1969), as these industries appear, and always have appeared, 
to be the fuel of UK economic growth, in many respects this may partly justify using mega-events to 
intervene and support this agenda. These industries were also identified as key in several policy reports, for 
example the Work Foundation (2010) report written for DCMS, stating that: ‘London's competitiveness 
needs to be understood in the context of the global shift to increasingly knowledge intensive economies’ 
(2010: 4).  Essentially, the report suggests that, as we come out of recession, the economy will grow in the 
knowledge-based sectors, as previously highlighted (Brinkley, 2010), given that ‘future economic growth is 
likely to come from knowledge intensive industries: advanced manufacturing services; low carbon goods 
and services; creative and culture industries; and high tech and business services’ (Work Foundation, 2010: 
5). Of course, the key critiques of this approach mean that there will be business sectors and London 
communities which may not be target priorities for the 2012 Games. For example, little mention was made 
of ‘community’ and ‘smaller firms’ playing a role in the vibrancy and future of East London.  
This thesis argues that smaller firms and their host communities may not just have been side-lined before 
and during the Games but are also excluded in grander visions of the development of post-Olympic spaces 
and places. The question of mega-events producing winners and losers (referred to as ‘casualties’ by one 
respondent) is a key consideration here. However, in order to inform critical debate, a key issue raised by 
                                                          
104 Reported in the context of the 1992 Barcelona Games as illustrated in the literature review  
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this thesis is the extent to which these futurities are: i) the failure of government and regional authorities to support 
and include small firms in the short-term and longer-term legacy of related Olympic activity, ii) the perceived inability of small 
firms to contribute enough to the economic vitality of the city and thus naturally be de-prioritised, or iii) the failure of small 
firms to effectively respond to changing business environments that typify inevitable regional economic change105. This thesis, 
in the final conclusions, thus reflects on two key questions frequently raised by regional and city wide 
stakeholders interviewed for this study: 
1) ‘What is a realistic ask for such small firms in the context of mega-event delivery – before, during and after?’ 
2) ‘How can future policy makers and those responsible for small firms in such contexts better include these stakeholders in 
the delivery of mega-events – again, before, during and after?’ 
Evidence suggests that, in a variety of ways, the London 2012 project can be conceptualised as an enabler 
and agent of neoliberal change. ‘Project East London’ - a blank canvas, subjected to modes of ‘creative 
destruction’ and a ‘tabula rasa’ (see Raco and Tunney, 2010), as discussed at the highest echelons of 
stakeholders interviewed for this study. A new way of re-engineering the populace, underpinned yet again 
by the naturalised assumption that cataclysmic event policy and its off-spring of regenerative goals form 
the ‘only possible’ mechanism to transform the socio-economics of Olympic and/or post-industrial spaces. 
Zizek (2008), in this sense, would refer to the juxtaposition between East London’s dystopic past and evils 
of socio-economic deprivation, and the promised utopian futures forecast as an output from the Games as 
an ‘ideological fetish’. By fetish, Zizek (2008) simply means an object which been given a greater value 
and/or quality. It is by scapegoating and isolating this factor that Zizek (2008) believes fetishes help cover 
up real conflict, acting as a conduit for individuals and organisations (in this case, London 2012 project 
actors) to vent frustrations whilst diverting attention away from more significant social and economic 
problems: the structural social and economic conditions of the ruling class and the ravaging impact of the 
capitalist system.  The problem identified here is that when the fetish is removed, for example the Olympic 
carnival moves on, the harsh reality of the post-Games so-called legacy it perpetuates is uncovered. It is 
because of the positive aurora that enshrouds the Games that, for example, we need to ‘rid East London 
of the evils of socio-economic deprivation’ or that ‘sport is inherently good for you’ - to the average 
layperson, it is fundamentally impossible to argue against the wider perceived good of hosting an Olympic 
Games. This was shrewdly observed by the Creative Director of the Millennium Dome, exclaiming that: 
‘No sane person could be against the idea of the Olympics. Anything which brings prosperity, 
vitality and activity to London is a good thing. However, that said, if you are fastidious you can 
only be appalled by the brainless detritus which the Olympics creates’ (Vice, 2012)106  
What we can therefore see is that urban regeneration is a normative process. A process whereby policy 
makers project ‘ideal’ visualisations of what space should look like and how it should work. Some 
                                                          
105 And virtually impossible to answer at this stage of the thesis, thus requiring future analysis 
106 Video documentary: Vice (2012) 
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communities are visible, whilst others remain invisible in the spatio-political power struggles that manifest 
across these highly circumscribed political and economic zones of contestation across destined-to-host 
Olympic spaces (see Raco and Tunney, 2010). The resulting effect is the promotion of market-led economic 
and social restructuring; orientating and incorporating the needs of the private sector into specific event-
policies and the wider development of the host city (see Jessop and Sum, 2000). This thesis therefore argues 
that the enhancement of public-private coalitions created in the name of economic interests reflects 
Molotch’s (1976) theorisation of the ‘growth machine’ as discussed earlier in the review. 
In the strive to achieve growth, the mega-event, as evidenced by the empirical findings and literature analysis 
of this thesis, has the power to mark and define who is included and who is excluded as contributors to 
such grand economic visions across ex-Olympic, newly re-territorialised, sanitised and utopian community 
spaces. The arguments so far also indicate how mega-events, governed by the political-economic hegemony 
of neoliberalism, may be subject to periods of ‘revanchism’ (e.g. MacLeod, 2002). Cities are ‘tightly 
disciplined’ – from architectural forms to institutional practices (e.g. Smith (1996) often describes zero-
tolerance policing as the most expressed way of social control) – with ‘revenge’ enacted against minority 
groups (to ensure that the city’s image is not compromised by their visible presence – see Mitchell et al 
(1997) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001)). These groups constitute public enemy number one of the 
bourgeois political-economic elite and their proponents, who attempt to recapture the economic landscape 
of their cities. Furthermore, Ley and Olds (1988) claims that gentrification exacerbates social division rather 
than healing, and MacLeod (2002) and Smith (1996) believe mega-events in general merely supress, control 
and marginalise certain demographics, thus suffering punitive costs. Events, serving as tools allowing ‘blood 
to boil’ and the populace to ‘blow off steam’ (the theory of ‘ventilsitten’), allowing control following the 
intervention (e.g. Smith, 2012). This condition was perfectly reflected in the 2013 film ‘The Purge’. The role 
of security in this film was to protect the interests and livelihoods of the socio-economic elite (who had 
access to modern security systems and gadgets of war for protection) against the ‘less worthy’ insecure, 
vulnerable stakeholder – in the case of this film the proletariat (with basic security protection, loose locks, 
wooden barricades and only a baseball bat for protection). Comparisons can be made in the context of this 
study, illustrating how and why security became a key strategic tool in choreographing the geographical 
contours of host Olympic spaces. Corporates, official sponsors, and the socio-economic elite who wished 
for the Games in the first place, represent the ‘securitised’ elite as portrayed in the film. Meanwhile, small 
firms manifest as the unprepared, unsuspecting, vulnerable actor and leading role in the Olympic carnival. 
The stridency of this agenda was reflected in a personal communication (2014) with a major Games planner 
who described the London 2012 Games as an ‘f*ck you policy’ only designed to ‘make the place look a bit 
better’ in order to complete globally. In this sense, the darker side of events is not new, take for example 
the Roman circuses107. Whilst entrepreneurial governance continues to refuel the profitability of the city, 
                                                          
107 For more studies on the link between capitalist cities, neoliberal agenda, and theories of revanchism – see MacLeod’s (2002) analysis of 
Glasgow, Uitermark and Duyvendak (2008) of Rotterdam, Swanson (2008) of Ecuador’s capital Quito, Whitehead and More (2007) of Mumbai, 
and Atkinson (2003) for urban policies across the UK. 
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its resources and its spaces, speculative endeavours – like mega-events – may sharpen the socio-economic 
inequalities and social exclusion of marginal groups.  Spaces are underpinned by Marx’s notion of 
‘valorisation’ and favour - and are governed by - the laws of ‘capital accumulation’ (see Harvey, 1989). 
Perhaps the project may achieve a positive shift away from the socio-economic deprivation that justified 
regenerative intervention. However, new economically prosperous communities may jeopardise, overlook 
and ignore what Lefebvre (2000) describes as the quotidian qualitative and inter-dependent invisible 
relationships and networks that exist within local spaces and between social actors - close-knit communities 
and their socio-economic practices (also see Raco and Tunney, 2010). The ‘invisible’ lives of individual 
residents, small firms and entire communities are restructured around principles of optimum economic 
efficiency, where urban spaces become instrumentalised apparatus, marketised and commoditised, ready to 
be bought and sold on the free market with little to no government intervention. Historical relationships, 
interconnectedness and dependencies are lost, for example between local restaurants and high street 
butchers, because they are not seen to be the optimum effectors of demand or prosperous enough to 
contribute to the economic vitality of East London’s new vision.  
As reflected on by Raco and Tunney (2010), this is of major concern as small firms are often dependent 
upon the qualitative characteristics (customer, supplier, business relationships, for example) of their site, 
and without such communities local urban economies become less functional and sustainable (see Porter, 
2000). As such, communities become caught up within what Del Cerro (2003) refers to as the ‘increased 
competitive global system’ (2003), the battleground where elite cities and nations fight their way to the top 
of the urban hierarchy. Grand, mega-event projects have undoubtedly been a major strategic tool in UK 
urban and economic policy, as identified in the review, seeking to attract tourists, investors, visitors and 
upwardly mobile capital through visually attractive (see Peck, 2005), newly gentrified work, leisure and 
housing (Christophers, 2008). This is certainly a matter of perspective; a battle between the ideology of 
collective communities and socialism vs. individualism, capitalism and one’s108 desire to accumulate capital. 
Such inter-urban competition also means that the desires of corporations, particularly sponsors, must be 
accommodated into the event agenda (Tomlinson, 2005), resulting in what has been clearly evidenced in 
the case of Central Greenwich as the commodification of the ‘cultural product’ (Pappalepore and Duignan, 
2016). An emblematic product of neoliberal policy has been spearheaded through strategic collaborations 
between the public and private sector, resulting in ‘the actual constitution of the cultural object itself in 
pursuit of corporate goals’ (McGuigan, 2005: 235) as indicated earlier in the review. 
5.18 Clone Town Effect 
Concerns surrounding the ‘Olympic effect’ and the outcomes of the gentrification that often follows mega-
events have been synonymous with another process: the shifting demographic from smaller traders and 
independent businesses to larger MNEs and corporations. This is often referred to as the ‘clone town’ 
effect, as coined by NEF (2010), resulting in the corporatisation of the high-street, specifically across UK 
                                                          
108 Governments, authorities, individuals amongst the populace… 
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towns and cities. This was heavily reflected on by a significant number of respondents across all SGs as a 
major current and future threat to small business survival across East London, and specifically the streets 
of Central Greenwich. The clone town materialises as new inner-city spaces for corporate consumption, 
driving out the local in favour of the ‘global’. Economic pressures are brought on by the ravaging effects 
of free market economics, with rising rents indicated in this study as a serious problem, posing a future risk 
to the survival of our quirky traditional high street independents and the ‘local’ consumption experience 
they provide. The idiosyncrasies that typify communities are lost through the slow but sure transformation 
of these spaces into corporate playgrounds, seizing and standardising consumption. References to this can 
be seen across UK media and television. Our acceptance and the permeation of corporate brands into our 
lives can be seen, for example, in several British films humorously depicting such transformative effects. 
This was notably seen in 2013 film ‘The World’s End’, where a group of five male friends attempted a mile-
long pub crawl only to find every pub formatted and designed in the same way with a small, homogenised 
selection of beers109. These effects have been documented across London in the past, and frequently 
discussed by the author in both academic publications (e.g. NEF, 2010; Wilbert and Duignan, 2015) and 
media discourse (e.g. Duignan, 2015a, 2015b). Popular examples, prior secondary analysis and empirical 
evidence collected in this study identify the extent to which these cloning effects may pose uncertain futures 
for small firms. These concerns are echoed by Raco and Tunney’s (2010) conclusions that: 
‘Local firms have found themselves on the receiving end of the process of remaking this part of 
London and the production of new spaces in which they have no part. It has also demonstrated 
how bureaucratic visualisations shape the production of urban spaces and the routines and 
practices of everyday life (…) even though the area was characterised as a ‘dead space’, it was clear 
that a thriving SME community was present, although relatively invisible’ (2010: 2082). 
Factors associated with the formation of the clone town effect highlight Wilbert and Duignan’s (2015) 
concern that it has become common parlance that, in order to survive and compete for mobile capital, 
national and local governments (e.g. UK, East London and Cambridge) adopt entrepreneurial-neoliberal 
policies and economic strategies that expose capitalist ideology and paradigms. This point, again, reinforces 
Harvey’s (1989) idea of ‘entrepreneurial governance’. Neoliberal desires are for such spaces to appear ‘as 
attractive to footloose international finance as possible, foregoing any social programmes likely to be a 
burden on business by multinational companies who might otherwise invest in the city’ (North and Nurse, 
2014: 8). Such findings indicate that leaders of small city and town municipalities110 feel pressure – certainly 
in light of mega-events – to appear ‘bigger by adopting big city policies or the desire to trade-up in scale as 
part of regional and global competitiveness of neoliberal globalisation’ (Wilbert and Duignan, 2015: 200 – 
also see Jayne, 2006, and Ley and Olds, 1988 specifically in the context of mega-events).  
                                                          
109 Alluding to the chain-effect (i.e. Greene King) taking over freehold pubs…again another manifestation of these standardising, clone effects 
which are having significant impacts upon the welfare and survival of small firms. 
110 The authors discuss this criticism in the context of Cambridge (UK), however this could theoretically extend to large authorities like 
Greenwich, which are of similar size and scope.  
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Evidence may suggest that, although mega-events have the power and inspirational effect to make nations, 
cities and regional authorities ‘think big’, this may in turn paradoxically cause paradigmatic shifts away from 
the socio-economic practices underpinning communities that ultimately reflect the cultural diversity of 
urban places and spaces. Lefebvre (2000) describes this process as a bureaucratisation of policy processes 
whereby urban spaces are re-engineered and significantly transformed toward more politically desirable day-
to-day economics and uses. It is in light of such arguments that this thesis argues it is business and economic 
competitiveness, rather than ‘social justice’ or ‘equitable citizenship’ (see Wilbert and Duignan, 2015: 202; 
Hall, 2006: 63), that form the internalised logic of entrepreneurial governance – paving the way for 
neoliberal commodification of national, regional and local (public) assets, regardless of the loss of cultural 
and social value that occurs (Foley et al, 2011). This mimics Thomas and Imrie’s (1989) earlier concern that, 
given the perceived limited social and economic contribution of small firms to the modern city, there 
emerges the presumption that the spaces in which small firms occupy (e.g. on the high street) can be used 
in ‘favour of more marketable purposes and profitable land uses’ (1989: 19). This may, in turn, serve to 
explain why local authorities, not just in London but around many of the UK’s key cities and towns, are 
keen to adopt such neoliberal policies in favour of big corporate capital. The recycling of space in this way, 
and the increasing polarisation of wealth, illustrates a common trait of the ‘post-modern’ city (Hiller, 2006).  
’The hosting and staging of sports mega-events may help to create bourgeois playgrounds, but the 
long-term benefits are unevenly shared’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). 
This thesis argues that the natural market trajectories of regional economies, helped by the intervention of 
mega-events, often tends to transcend the ‘local’ in favour of the ‘global’, ‘corporate’, ‘spectacular’ and more 
homogenised mode of cultural production and identity indicated throughout the findings and discussions 
of this thesis so far111112. Sociologically speaking, this may reflect Roche’s (2000) earlier thesis that mega-
events help ‘orientate’ and ‘integrate’ single states into one, connected global society, echoing Garcia’s 
(2004a) concern that major events tend to prioritise ‘spectacular’ and ‘flagship’ modes of cultural production 
over ‘locally rooted’ ones. Despite the central role ‘legacy’ plays in Olympic discourse (especially for London 
2012), the evidence collected in this study serves to illustrate the reasons why conceptually it remains 
‘ambiguous’ and subject to the criticism that it is a tool to divert attention away from current problems 
towards an aspirational/utopian future. This reflects Bollas’ (2009: 50) concern that legacy helps to forget 
about the present, as there is often anxiety about the ‘future’ invading the ‘present’. As such, mega-events 
are conceptualised as having intergenerational benefits which allegedly repay the costs borne by present 
citizens by benefitting future generations (Gold and Gold, 2008). Furthermore, this legacy characteristic 
reflects Plato’s ‘theory of forms’. Idealistic abstract promises of futurity were remarked on by Plato in The 
                                                          
111 As with the controlled, bland, magnolia visitor experiences (bland food in venues, bland routes, bland experience – limited real engagement 
with cultural diversities as ‘hoped-for’ in the policy rhetoric, where visitors ship back to central London spots, again to engage in modes of 
corporate Regent/Oxford/Bond Street shopping experiences) 
112 This was picked up by one small firm claiming: ‘all they [visitors] could see was McDonalds with hardly any British products on offer!’  
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Republic as an eternal perfect reality of an idea that, once sensed, becomes imperfect or an incomplete 
‘shadow’ of reality – which we can at best only have limited real knowledge of.  
As argued by Wilbert and Duignan (2015), enhanced engagement with local communities and small firms 
in the economic and event policies of cities can give rise to i) greater re-distribution of economic benefits, 
ii) enhanced social cohesion, and iii) enhanced visitor experiences which may in turn stimulate longer visitor 
stays within the regional economy. This is particularly important in light of the standardisation and 
corporatisation effects seen across UK inner-city ‘clone town’ spaces (see NEF, 2010), which are arguably 
damaging destination competitiveness and the heritage and socio-cultural identity of artisan spaces – like 
those under scrutiny here in the context of Central Greenwich, as reflected on in the findings. In the context 
of bohemian and well-developed heritage East London areas (e.g. Central Greenwich, Spitalfields and 
Shoreditch) and currently developing areas (e.g. Hackney, Waltham Forest and other ex-host Olympic 
boroughs), the hoped-for tourism experience of quirky, backstreet spaces continues to attract tourism (see 
Pappalepore et al, 2014). Small business communities, and the goods and service they provide to the locale, 
are also arguably be essential to the formation of ‘balanced urban economies’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010, also 
see Jacobs, 1968, London Assembly, 2006). In light of this, the thesis argues that such spaces, like Central 
Greenwich, must continue to maintain their artisan and established character, and not submit to potential 
clone town effects, in order to maintain sustainable social and economic legacies, following the key ambition 
of London 2012 to provide ‘a sustainable, mixed use regeneration’ (LDA, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). By 
considering the aforementioned arguments, policy makers may just be able to balance the social and 
economic growth objectives demanded by entrepreneurial-neoliberal governance. 
We must, however, place qualifying factors over the variables that determine the economic trajectory of 
regional development, and of course the (micro and macro-environmental) varying factors impacting on 
the survival of high street small firms. As examined in the findings, one cannot solely use the Games as a 
scapegoat and explanatory critique for structural economic concern, as if it existed as a single economic 
variable in its own vacuum. Other factors are changing governmental structures (e.g. the shift from Labour 
to the Coalition two years before the start of the Games, and Boris Johnston replacing Ken Livingstone as 
Mayor of London), economic crisis (e.g. the recession of 2008 affecting macroeconomic spending but also 
microeconomics), and the impact of technological advancements on retail behaviours (e.g. shift to online 
consumption affecting the competitiveness of small local high street firms). These issues serve to illustrate 
the varying ‘determinants of demand’ at play here, externally influencing the aforementioned structural 
economic concerns. So much so that DCMS (2007b) argues the limited reasoning for even reviewing the 
past experiences of other event cities.  
There were however mixed opinions113 around the direct impact the Olympics - empirical, policy, media 
and literature analysis revealed a wide range of factors that accumulate to explain the post-Games economic 
                                                          
113 Some stakeholders were adamant that these problems have been purely stimulated by the Games themselves, others offer a more balanced 
perspective and believe they were an in-direct and additional challenge alongside other market economic and technological forces, for example. 
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challenges identified for small firms in the legacy phases: i) general rising rents and real estate price trends 
prior to the Games, and natural market forces at play with/without the Olympics – although several 
believed the Games ‘sped up’ the process here, ii) recessionary effects and the credit crunch still impacting 
on the supply of credit for both small firms and consumers - stunting consumption across the high street, 
especially in pricier artisan stores, iii) technological developments shifting spending patterns away from high 
street stores to online providers (e.g. MNEs like Amazon, eBay), iv) wider concerns over the ‘death of the 
high street’ and small firm competitiveness and their limited place in the economy and society, v) the 
development of ‘out of town’ retail parks diverting people away from central high streets, vi) the 
aforementioned lack of skills, knowledge and internal competencies among small firms to effectively 
leverage and/or respond to changing business environments, and vii) the limited capital small firms may 
have to capitalise and use on marketing strategies etc.  
‘The core aim of the Olympics was centred on regeneration and developing neighbourhoods to 
benefit communities (…) this should be honoured’ (Sorenson, 2013). 
Legacy can be seen as a tool to unlock funds, unite the populace, push forward project ambitions, and 
plaster over and divert attention away from short-term challenges, whilst simultaneously masking potential 
unequal developmental effects likely to burden host communities and their small firms in the future (as 
reflected on by House of Lords, 2013). The analysis provided by this thesis suggests that the concept of 
‘legacy’ represents a mask over a project that produced the aforementioned unequal development benefits 
in favour of elite interests. Part of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) refer to as ‘Newspeak’, the 
pejorative characteristics of the legacy concept represent a form of cultural imperialism whereby the realities 
of a particular society at a particular point in time are ‘planetarised’ (also see Pappalepore and Duignan, 
2016). Planetization is, essentially, a ‘reality’ that transcends physical organisms, localism and nationalism 
whose spirit and matter unites in a ‘divine marriage’ bringing about new, greater, creative tomorrows 
(Rudhayar, 1977). Such ideas marry up the departicularised nature of legacy, which is a word with limited 
local application but like other words e.g. ‘employability’ and ‘sustainability’ - ‘seems to have sprung out of 
nowhere, [but] is now on everyone’s lips’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001: 2).  
 
Despite positive legacy being projected as one of the greatest ‘prizes’ in a generation and a ‘chance to turn 
the rhetoric of legacy into fact’ (DCMS, 2008b: 4), this thesis argues that, so far, the legacy of Central 
Greenwich’s small firms is under threat and that the transformation of the rhetoric legacy into fact is yet to 
be seen. The research suggests that mega-events exemplify neoliberal approaches to urban and economic 
development; favouring spectacular and speculative short and long term investments and interventions over 
regional planning (e.g. Harvey, 1989a), with a tendency to privatise profits within publicly invested projects 
whilst socialising losses (Peters, 2008). As argued throughout this thesis, although ‘legacy’ offers cities 
unparalleled rhetoric for packaging a comprehensive – and catalysed – event-led policy vision to push 
forward a variety of urban ambitions , the concept is fraught with criticism and often perceived as one of 
the ‘known unknowns of sports mega-events’ (Horne, 2007). Legacy must therefore be placed under further 
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scrutiny, particularly with respect to its longer-term idiosyncratic effects upon the communities that host 
the Games and form the initial beneficiaries during early bidding/project phases. Legacy is, however, often 
forgotten, as indicated by Mangan’s (2008) claim that ‘nobody has been prepared to commit the research 
resources to carry out scientific study of the net legacy benefits’ (2008: 1871).  
 
Although it is often depicted as being poorly defined and conceptualised (e.g. Preuss, 2007), this thesis 
supports the view that the wider impact and legacy rhetoric merely forms a ‘fig leaf’ for the spiralling costs 
of mega-events and the overly excessive expenditure required to stage them. As reflected on by Pappalepore 
and Duignan (2016) they claim that whilst the vagueness and positive connotations of legacy make it 
particularly suitable for ‘legitimation rhetoric’ the same characteristics make it unsuitable for detailed, in-
depth analysis, thus transcending context and remaining often decontextualized and divorced from reality. 
We must explore, unpack and scrutinise legacy (in both its ‘celebrated’ and ‘demonised’ senses… in its 
unique, specific context(s), exploring its idiosyncratic and nuanced local dynamics – amplifying local 
narratives that seldom rise to the surface of mega-event analyses. This is pertinent in light of Cashman’s 
(2002) calls for an ‘excavation’ beneath the immediacy of the event, to draw up on empirical and 
interdisciplinary approaches to post-Games studies of mega-events. This is of further importance given 
that the concept of legacy, developed over sixty years ago, is argued by Gold and Gold (2008) to be a 
legitimisation tool with the specific purpose of supporting a successful Olympic bid. This reflects Ward’s 
(2013) view that ‘realism was more important than selling’ in the context of London 2012, further claiming: 
‘there are terrible claims in the bid, you can say anything! The IOC doesn’t cast an eye’.  Legacy is, however, 
often forgotten114, in a way indicative of what Harvey’s (1989) refers to as ‘bread and circuses’ metaphor as 
indicated earlier in the review. Coupled with the dissolving of the OGGI study shortly after the Games, the 
House of Lords (2013) has indicated concern that policy makers and the Mayor of London have ‘taken 
their eye off the ball’ with respect to legacy analysis. There also appears to be limited political emphasis 
specifically on ‘business legacies’ by key stakeholder business organisations, including the FSB, CBI and the 
London Chamber of Commerce. In response to the question, ‘are you conducting any more reports post-
Games [into the small business legacy of the Games]?’ the Federation of Small Business (FSB) claimed 
there was little work to be done in the area. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) responded in the 
same way. The London Chamber of Commerce also highlighted the lack of funding and focus as we move 
further into the ‘post-Games’ legacy of the Games, agreeing with the idea that, once the event had vanished 
from our screens, legacy was depoliticized and reduced in political pressure. In light of these concerns, 
academics and practitioners must continue to politicise and amplify legacy narratives to hold longer-term 
economic and social policies induced by mega-events to account. 
                                                          
114 This is further important in light of the Head of the DCMS legacy unit claiming that the unit has been downsized since the Games 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
278 | P a g e  
 
5.19 Mega-Events as ‘Shocks’ 
As alluded to throughout the Findings and Discussions chapters, this section draws on detailed empirical 
findings, policy, and media and literature analysis to compile an evidence base for conceptualising ‘mega-
events as shocks’. This section builds on Klein’s (2007) theory of the ‘shock doctrine’ and ‘disaster 
capitalism’, alongside Smith’s (2013) ideas of mega-events as ‘exogenous shocks’. Mega-events are the 
product of ‘exogeneity’ – outside influences (hence ‘exogenous shocks’) - the term derives from the Greek 
word ‘exo’ meaning ‘outside’, and ‘gignomai’ meaning to ‘produce’. The thesis argues that in the host cities 
and communities under scrutiny in this study, the Games manifests as militarised and securitised 
battlegrounds between macro, governmental and ultimately project desires (‘project territory’) and host 
communities’ interests (‘context territory’) throughout the entire TDR cycle. Determined striated topologies 
impose war-zone like conditions and military-esque precision aided by the reinforcement of ‘securitising 
actors’ using fear tactics and rhetoric of ‘chaos’ to manipulate London’s populace, change behaviour and, 
on the micro-Central Greenwich level manipulate visitor experiences and influence consumption patterns 
across ‘HEZs’ and the ‘Last Mile’.  
The evidence and arguments presented so far show that mega-events provide an exemplary illustration of 
the complex relationships between security politics, economic policy and private business (Horne and 
Manzenreiter, 2006). This is despite, according to Klauser (2007) and Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), 
business objectives often being underplayed in security politics. Public assets are captured, commoditised 
and re-engineered in ways that stunt local consumption and preserve the pennies of spectators for corporate 
activity. These tactics are aided by the aforementioned regulatory shocks and Kellner’s (2013) critical 
conceptualisation that mega-events manifest as ‘spectacles of diversion’ that serve to blind, and render an 
unsuspecting populace and event visitors immune to the somewhat sinister neoliberal and capitalist 
practices that underpin them. Zizek (2008) refers to such ‘crises of capitalism’ as a form of shock therapy that 
‘keeps us dreaming’ reverting us ‘back to basics’ and subsequently reinforcing ideology as opposed to 
critiquing it. One can liken such neoliberal hegemony (see Hall, 2006) to a high-speed train accumulating 
speed by dispossessing the communities it dismantles along the way; whilst subject to overt resistance, it is 
difficult to slow down and stop all together due to its juggernaut-like energy and mass. Such 
conceptualisations build on and provide an extension to Klein’s (2007) notion of ‘disaster capitalism’ and 
Debord’s (1967) notion of the ‘spectacle’ (see Debord, 1967). Such interventions divert attention and 
resources away from fundamental social and economic problems, masking critical issues (Garcia, 2004a), 
producing ‘class politics’ (Getz, 2007) and concealing parochial interests (McGillivray and Frew, 2015). 
Events and their related programming prioritise the ‘spectacular’ over the ‘locally rooted’ elements of 
delivery (Garcia, 2004a) in scenarios in which the city cedes both sovereignty and dignity in favour of 
unadulterated capitalism. This closely aligns with Miles’ (2010) belief that mega-event development that 
precedes and follows the carnival uses the aforementioned ideas of the spectacle to ‘camouflage the 
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consumer from the realities of inequality’115. With respect to these concerns, even the Head of the Olympic 
Legacy Unit in DCMS claimed: ‘this is the kind of society we are living in (…) it is a wider argument around 
capitalism, isn’t it’.  
Host cities and their communities cede their freedom through the social contracts that govern our day-to-
day relationships with the state (‘Social Contract Theory’), trusting elected (and unelected) political 
economic elites to drive forward positive futures for host communities under the protective wing of 
government ambition. The ‘neoliberal’ wing (whatever side that may be) produces a project whereby 
utilitarian and macro-elite economic ambitions for the ‘greater good’ ironically manifest as an opportunity 
for a narrow few, a small segment of our socio-economic and political elite. What if one is opposed to this 
‘national’ project? One is perhaps deemed anti-growth, considered anti-nationalist – ‘persona non-grata’, 
‘with opponents derided as conservative, myopic or ‘event unpatriotic’’ according to Smith (2012). Small 
business respondents in Raco and Tunney’s (2010) study also found visibly opposing the Games a 
‘politically difficult’ position to be in, with one activist stating: ‘The LDA did not want to know, the 
government would not help, the opposition would not help, the media wouldn’t help, because no one 
wanted to be seen to be supporting a group which would be seem to be anti-Olympics, even though we 
weren’t, but that is how they portrayed us’ (2010: 2083). The authors further note that in a BBC Q+A the 
audience was not allowed to raise critical questions in relation to the Games otherwise the broadcast would 
be terminated. The idea of being ‘silenced’ found in their study aligns very closely with the findings and 
discussions of this research. Theoretically speaking, this builds on Foucault’s (1975, 1991) belief that those 
resisting institutional power and its associated ‘implicit coercions’ are often ex-communicated from 
society116. As explained earlier, mega-events are thus arguably a project in the guise of naturalised economic 
assumptions about how early 21st century urban spaces and capitalist national economies ‘should’ work.  
Arguably, in light of scenarios of militarisation, territorialisation, securitising actors and the perceived 
controls imposed upon ‘brainwashed’ tourists (to name but a few of the pejorative terms used) hosting 
mega-event spaces can manifest similar conditions to those produced by ‘war’ and periods of ‘political 
unrest’, as they result in social and economic turbulence and instability, as alluded to in Klein’s117 (2007) 
shock doctrine thesis. On the face of it they are arguably almost polar opposites but the argument is that 
they share similar characteristics and social and economic processes, both of which help to further the 
neoliberal agenda in cities and their Olympic spaces to bring about right-leaning (gargantuan) social and 
economic change through the injection of free-market principles and the projection of capitalist ideologies. 
The thesis has argued so far that mega-events can be seen as another entry point for capitalism into the life 
and soul of society and economies – and, like periods of instability brought abought by war and unrest, 
mega-events also have similar features that make them comparable. Interestingly, this echo’s Gruneau’s 
                                                          
115 This was empirically grounded in the US, Baltimore context highlighted by Miles’ (2010) reflection from Silk and Amis (2006)  
116 Foucault’s (1975) work refers to these power institutions as ‘local centres of power knowledge’, traditionally thought of as schools, family life, 
police, prison et cetera. As such, ex-communication usually manifests as running away from home, resisting treatment, skipping school, for 
example. In the case of the Olympics, however, it could be conceived of as ‘removing oneself from the capitalistic order’. 
117 Pinochet’s and the Chicago Boys’ reign across the Southern Cone of South America, spearheaded by Milton Friedman 
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(1984) statement that ‘mega-events can be best understood as a more fully developed expression of the 
incorporation of sporting practice in to the ever-expanding marketplace of international capitalism’, where 
cities become commodified spaces to be marketed and sold (see Lefebvre, 2000). This has been argued and 
evidenced in the context of Central Greenwich and London’s host areas. 
Evidence presented so far, alongside literature analysis, argues that mega-events provide an opportunity to 
temporarily marketise, commodify, privatise and reconfigure ‘host space’. Such host space can be conceived 
of as a ‘national asset’ and/or a ‘natural resource’. Whilst we traditionally think of natural resources as things 
to be ‘opened up’ and commoditised under a neoliberal regime, afforded by economic and regulatory 
shocks, the same can be said for ‘space’. This highlights Roche’s (2000) critique that ‘spatially, mega-events 
uniquely, if transiently, identify particular urban and national places in the national, international, and global 
spaces of media and tourist markets and the gaze of their consumers’ (2000:7). This thesis argues that 
‘public’ and ‘host Olympic’ spaces also constitute ‘national’ and ‘regional’ resources, used more and more 
in the new (neoliberal) urban order - epitomising our traditional understanding of neoliberal processes. This 
viewpoint agrees with the sentiments of Lefebvre (2000) and Raco and Tunney (2010) that the contested 
and decisive decision-making processes that shape the final outcome of policy rapidly become masked or 
hidden as cities become commodified spaces to be marketed and sold. It can be argued that mega-events 
play a vital role not only in the economic and social fabric of modern day life but also in cultural 
consumption (Anderson and Getz, 2007), and it can be seen that, through the marketization of the cultural 
assets of space, ‘cultural capitalism’ can emerge (e.g. Rifkin, 2000). This is particularly important as Rifkin 
(2000) argues that ‘cultural production is beginning to eclipse physical production in the world of commerce 
and trade’ (2000: 8).  Rojek (2013) uses the term ‘event appropriation’ to identify ‘the seizure, by external 
or contingent interests, of the goodwill and spirit of escapism and transcendence that is attached to Global 
Events’ (2013: 41). This was noted earlier in the chapter. The need to claw back excessive expenditure for 
a political economic project which has financially spiralled out of control over the past half-century means 
that the desires of corporations, particularly sponsors, must be accommodated in the event agenda 
(Tomlinson, 2005). As identified earlier in the thesis, this can lead to the commodification of the cultural 
product, with cultural objectives prepared for mining – in this case, space. The idea that mega-events, 
similarly to eco-tourism, have ‘exploitable market values’ (Smith, 2012, Duffy, 2002) manifests as 
interventions that allow the transformation of ‘cultural phenomena’ into ‘commercial assets’, indicating a 
typical neoliberal shift whereby ‘culture, like nature, can be mined to exhaustion’ (Rifkin, 2000: 247). This 
only serves to mimic Cowen and Tabbarock’s (2000) argument that some of the more recent forms of 
cultural production, like art, media and music is sold as a commodity, illuminating that cultural and sports 
production continues to be bought and sold by private enterprise. It also reflects the critical concerns of 
Braverman (1974) and Pine and Gilmore (1998), all of whom claim that the growth of Western capitalist 
cities is underpinned by their desires to be commoditised, with society transformed into a ‘gigantic 
marketplace’ (Braverman, 1974: 271). This highlights Harvey’s (1989) earlier notion about the shift from 
‘managerialism’ to ‘entrepreneurialism’, mega-events as economic gambles and ‘speculative event projects’ 
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(also see Zimblist, 2015), and Gamble’s (1994) idea of the ‘new public management’, as discussed earlier in 
the chapter. What we can also see is that this mimics Horne and Manzenreiter’s (2006) concern that 
continuing tripartite relationships between industrial-corporate-governmental bodies have transformed 
how modern governance is executed and ‘who wins’ of out what are arguably neoliberal-capitalist projects. 
As such, Harvey (1989 - also see McGuigan, 2003, 2005) states that corporates have extensively intertwined 
themselves with public projects in recent years. This illustrates Banarjee’s (2001) concern that ‘we are 
experiencing a steady withering of the public realm, a trend exacerbated by a world-wide campaign for 
market liberalism and downsizing of governments’ (2001: 9), and perhaps serves to explain why (local) 
legacies are seldom measured, and often forgotten after the Olympics become de-politicised following the 
carnival118.  
5.20 The ‘Tremor Principle’ and ‘Aftershock Principle’ 
The thesis now introduces two new concepts of political economy: the ‘Tremor principle’ and the 
‘Aftershock principle’. Both have been developed in light of evidence presented and arguments raised 
throughout the thesis so far. These contrasting concepts are influenced by the principles of shock, 
neoliberalism and political economic theory to argue that two distinctly different temporal modes of urban 
governance exist ‘before and during’ (the ‘Tremor), and subsequently ‘after’ the Games (the ‘Aftershock’). 
They are both explanatory theories but exploratory in nature. The ‘Tremor principle’ identifies that, before 
and during the Games (territorialisation phases),) mega-events and the state provide optimal conditions for 
capital to flourish and accumulate in favour of private interests and the political economic elite. This is an 
intense form of intervention and regulation in favour of private bodies, who are allowed pervasive 
penetration into the public realm at the expense of host communities, small firms and low-order and lesser 
(poorer) social-economic classes. The ‘Aftershock principle’ identifies that, after the Games (de and re-
territorialisation phases), the necessary ‘tremors’ create new spaces, reconfigured for optimal privatisation 
and corporatisation (especially across host communities), and governed by the less-interventionist, 
traditional views of free-market economics and neoliberal doctrine (e.g. Friedman, 1980). Table 36 below 
synthesises the empirical and theoretical evidence that underpins the creation of both principles. 
Mega-events as ‘shocks’ 
The ‘Tremor principle’ (opposing the traditional view of neoliberalism) The ‘Aftershock’ principle 
(traditional view of neoliberalism) 
 Governments intervene by bidding – and paying for - the mega-event in 
the first place. Strangely in the context of ‘entrepreneurial city’ debates by 
Harvey (1989), collective public funds provide more than ‘heroic 
entrepreneurs’.  
 CompeteFor opens up public 
sector contracts and projects for 
greater permeation of private 
sector involvement. 
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 Use of dystopic images and statistics for legitimisation rhetoric for 
regeneration despite mega-events often being seen as an entrepreneurial 
gamble with limited evidence of ROI and with a track record of masking 
social problems. 
 Cataclysmic modes of urban development as a major plank in legacy 
vision, despite the established structural economic challenges this poses 
for existing communities. 
 Regeneration of toxic brownfield wasteland using majority funded public 
money, to prepare sites for private re-development and investment 
potential (despite industrial capitalists being responsible for poisoning the 
land throughout the industrial period). 
 IOC-HCC inscribed into UK law to permit new Olympic legislation and 
supersede sovereignty (‘regulatory shock’). 
 Limited role supporting businesses on the ground during the Games; 
happy to let local plans run on auto-pilot. Challenge given the emergent 
challenges and the need to rectify planning ASAP. 
 Olympic host spaces conceptualised as ‘war-zones’ shielded by 
extraordinary security measures and regulations that permit spaces to 
become militarised and ‘shocked’ by mega-events. 
 Larger firms and corporations thought of as being key beneficiaries over 
smaller firms, and the overarching exclusion of small firms/host 
communities in many aspects of the planning and delivery of London 
2012. 
 Royal parks historically prohibited from conducting any forms of 
commercial activity, transformed for the London 2012 Olympic Games 
into ‘orgies of consumption’.  
 Shifts from ‘associative’ to ‘deep’ sponsorship – permeation of business 
interests ever more into the life and soul of public projects before and 
during the Games. 
 Host city and host community ‘public assets’ transformed from multiple 
use to single use ‘private assets’ – spaces, including public pathways, roads, 
and parks (e.g. Greenwich Park), commoditised and re-commercialised. 
 New economic policies (e.g. 
increased parking charges, 
commercialisation of public 
Royal parks, shifting tenancy 
agreements…) 
 Drive for private investment119, 
House of Lords (2013) concern 
over lack of public ownership of 
legacy direct and urban 
development. 
 Catalyses rent and real estate 
increases creating market 
failures that gentrify, corporatize 
and slowly displace small firms 
and host communities who 
cannot afford to stay. Greater 
permeation of corporations into 
the high street, aka the clone 
town effect. Project is less 
concerned with ‘wealth 
distribution’ and ‘welfare’ than 
with the ‘enabling’ of economic 
enterprise through flagship 
projects. 
 Limited government funding 
and longitudinal study of the 
livelihoods of ex-Olympic 
communities: legacy 
forgotten.120 
 
                                                          
119 For example, a new international cruise line terminal is planned for Greenwich. 
120 House of Lords (2013) believes that legacy is not being well managed enough. Now the mayor’s responsibility but there is no time or budget 
to manage effectively. Also, the mayor/government have ‘taken their eye off the ball’ 
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 Corporate gaze permeation into host communities. Cajoling and 
manipulation of visitor experiences to maximise expenditure in right sorts 
of businesses, e.g. Greenwich Park into event venues and across new 
entrepreneurial actors in Last Mile. Newham and the Olympic Park 
funnelled visitors through the ‘market place’ of Westfield.  
 (Pre-shock) Displacement and disruption to make way for necessary event 
structures.  
 
Table 36: ‘The Tremor Principle and the Aftershock Principle’ (developed by author) 
  
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
284 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction to the Conclusions and Recommendations 
The following Conclusions and Recommendations section synthesises the key findings and discussions of 
this thesis against the five research objectives of this research study. Conclusion statements and judgements, 
of both theoretical and practical natures, are made based on reasoning, logical syllogism and evidence 
accumulated throughout the thesis. Attride-Stirling’s (2001) ‘TNA’ and Toulmin’s (1968) principles of 
argumentation were key frameworks used for the empirical analysis, theory building and developing of 
coherent links between evidence and ‘truth’ claims, both implicitly and explicitly derived, throughout this 
and the Discussions chapter. The latter half of the chapter i) discusses recommendations and implications 
for policy and practice, ii) addresses the (current and future) impact of the research, and iii) establishes and 
critically examines the limitations and future considerations given the philosophical, methodological and 
practical nature of this research, and closes with proposed areas and direction for future research. 
6.2 Key Conclusions: Theoretical and Practical 
What does this thesis tell us about the nature and character of mega-event projects, and specifically their 
effects upon host communities and small firms? The Games clearly represented a significant opportunity. 
However, through detailed examination, this thesis revealed a series of complex intended and unintended 
consequences and challenges that mega-events can have on host spaces, small firm experiences and 
performance. Such an analysis has not fully emerged from current literature, thus forming the justification 
and basis of the stated research objectives.  
Building on Pappalepore and Duignan’s (2016) analysis, and associated literature more broadly, the 
SmallBizImpacts mapping illustrated the depth and complex short-term vs. long-term, positive vs. negative 
impacts of the Olympics on small businesses – specifically around the ‘opportunity’ rhetoric and hoped-for 
legacies for tourism, trade and commercial promise. The importance of the SmallBizImpacts mapping is 
three-fold: to 1) collate and deconstruct what is a somewhat fragmented and incomplete literature of ‘event 
impacts’ in an easy, accessible analytical heuristic for future scholars and practitioners, 2) provide strong 
empirical analysis to (internally and externally) validate existing knowledge around host community event 
impacts (including pre-existing event impacts models and theory), and 3) build theory from qualitatively 
rich small firm experiences. One key element of the SmallBizImpacts mapping was to explicitly focus on 
tourism impacts, given the importance of footfall and usual trade for small retail and hospitality firms (who 
formed the main focus of this investigation). Secondary and empirical evidence uncovered the cumulative 
and systematic chain of negative effects on city-wide and local tourism and visitor behaviours, illustrating 
the challenges small firms face during the high peak of summer. The tourism and visitation factors 
contributing to the absence of trade opportunities was referred to as the ‘anti-perfect tourism storm’. 
Although Olympic tourism impacts are discussed in the literature, these are fragmented, and it is through 
synthesising these factors in their totality and in the context of small businesses that new knowledge is 
created. Earlier discussions identified that, despite their capacity to intensify local consumption for leisure, 
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hospitality and retail sectors, positive event impacts are subject to variability’s, being often highly 
determined based on strategic and operational business competency, alongside the locations of small 
businesses and the nature of their products and/or service offering. It was also noted that the Olympics 
creates environments that temporarily and permanently disrupt both the internal functioning and 
performance and the external, macro business environments small firms operate within. Inherent 
turbulence, business disruptions and chaotic demands require resource-strapped small firms, and often 
owner-managers, to respond to Olympic waste plan demands and adhere to new regulations. Complex 
regulations, if we are being realistic here, can often only be effectively deciphered - and responded to - by 
commercial institutions with the understanding, time, money and internal know-how to do so. This again 
raises the critical issue that opportunities exist but only for the types of businesses who can realistically 
afford or respond to them. It is a question of ‘capital’ –and if you do not have it, tough luck. That is 
capitalism: economic capital buys and gives you access to opportunity. Whilst Max Weber believes that 
‘hard work’ can propel individuals and organisations into the capitalist system, in the context of mega-
events, and in light of Karl Marx’s positionality, this thesis argues that, for the most part, small firms have 
very little opportunity to access Games-related benefits. Capital is the key that unlocks the treasure chest 
to the Olympic opportunity rhetoric and the aforementioned hoped-for business legacies - you are either 
in or out or, as Zizek (2008) puts it, you are in the camp of ‘the included’ or the camp of ‘the excluded’. 
Social objectives, in essence, lie by the wayside, as an all-out fight for capital accumulation takes place. There 
is erosion of networks, the dismantling of socio-economic qualitative and quantitative dependencies that 
often lie hidden in the shadows of capitalist urbanism, which threatens small firms’ ability to thrive, and 
survive. Despite the perceived known challenges of Olympic tourism and the capacity for visitors to avoid 
host areas and local consumption before, during and after live events, opportunity rhetoric was maintained 
and advice to capitalise was still purveyed. A Games ‘bonanza’ where visitors would flow into the host 
community and consume local wares was frequently promised, however this led to ‘doomed to fail’ strategic 
leveraging attempts and subsequently ‘wasted business investments’. The thesis concludes that the stunting 
of Chalip’s (2004) notion of ‘immediate leverage’ defies logic and manifests simply as bad moral – and 
(local) business/regional development – practice. If it were not for the cajoling and manipulation of visitor 
pennies into ‘official event spaces’, why would mega-event project managers desire to stunt local 
consumption? This thesis calls for ‘immediate leverage’ to be nurtured in future event contexts to i) tackle 
the aforementioned small business problematic, ii) thus re-distribute Games-related visitation benefits 
leading to better sustainable host outcomes, and iii) to showcase local diversity and promote culturally 
diverse event experiences. Instead, security moves and host controls stunted any capacity to engage in what 
this thesis refers to as ‘slow’ tourism (see Wilbert and Duignan, 2015 and Duignan and Wilbert, 2016); the 
visitor exploration of inner sanctums to engage in deeper connectivity between visitor and place. One key 
conclusion of this research is that greater connectivity between ‘event visitor’ and ‘host community’ is vital.  
The overarching militarisation of Central Greenwich’s Last Mile and HEZ served to illustrate how, through 
undemocratic planning, a range of securitising actors played a part in turning host spaces into spaces that 
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epitomised war zones. Celebrating ‘diversity’ was a key part of London’s policy rhetoric but the extent to 
which this was achieved was minimal, appearing to mimic more ‘sanitised’ and ‘sterilised’ event experience, 
as opposed to ‘diverse’ one. This reflects Miles’ (2010) concern that the production and consumption of 
urban space is seen to be driven by homogenised urban experiences. This research identified that host event 
spaces became instrumentalised, marketised and commodified, subject to neoliberal ideology directing 
event visitors towards sites of corporate consumption whilst simultaneously excluding small firms and 
stunting visitor consumption through strategically engineered spatial controls. The thesis illustrates how 
such projects can bully and control visitor experiences and divert their expenditure.  
Event spaces emerged as, and were argued to have been, ‘appropriated’, ‘seized’, ‘McDonaldized’ and 
‘Disneyfied’. The thesis agrees with Klauser’s (2007) and Giulianotti and Klauser’s (2011) critique that 
mega-event security manifests as the ‘commercialisation of security issues’.  In almost all aspects of Games 
planning the project prioritised the visions and demands of more powerful individuals and organisations, 
from corporates to the political-economic elite who decided to host the Games in the first place. One would 
be naïve to think otherwise. However, the extent to which so many aspects of Olympic planning downplay 
small firm interests in favour of ‘big business’ – from contracts and networking, right through to direct 
trade opportunities across event zones – was a surprise, and of serious concern. This aligned with concerns 
regarding the extent to which small firms emerge as a ‘risk’ to be managed. From the challenges associated 
with allowing unworthy small firms into Olympic supply chains, to their capacity to divert visitor spending 
away from ‘Official sponsors’ during the live events, their position emerged as a bureaucratic fait accompli to 
be overcome as quickly, quietly and efficiently as possible. This was a battle between macro, utilitarian goals 
and host interests, and exemplifies Swyngedouw (2007) and Baeten’s (2009) ‘post-political condition’, where 
‘dominant consensus is used to stifle effective opposition (...) in the name of a wider, uncontestable, political 
good’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2087). The London 2012 project’s desires, however, were fortified via the 
legal inscription of the IOC’s HCC (London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006), effectively ceding 
UK national sovereignty and allowing many of the illegitimate project practices to occur. Using ‘security’ 
to mask ‘commercial agendas’ typified why host spaces transformed into battlegrounds of contestation 
subject to community resistance. The examination of how and why host space was impacted during the 
planning and delivery of London 2012, and its ramifications, formed the explicit goal of Research Objective 
2, as also discussed in further detail below.  
The thesis concludes that mega-events stimulate a series of regulatory and ‘economic shocks’. This is down 
to the overtly militarised war-zone-like conditions, allowing extraordinary and undemocratic security moves 
to be permitted. Control emerged aided through ‘fear’ tactics and appeals and the manipulation of visitor 
experiences, to securitise but also to ensure spectator gaze was firmly focused on corporate entities and 
offers to maximise their ‘returns on investment’. The thesis argues that such control is enacted not as a 
unified will but as a plethora of both inactions and tailored action - ‘projectified’ – within the ‘iron cage of 
project rationality’ (2006: 2 - also see Hodgson and Cicmil, 2003). Project inactions lead to the seamless 
phasing out of host community interests, allowing them to wither and die (as with ‘innovation projects’), 
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protected under the guise of intense time and cost implication and deadlines, justifying ‘decisive action’ and 
‘extra-ordinary’ undemocratic planning. As argued, these conditions align closely with the philosophical and 
legal principles Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben attribute to the ‘state of exception’, ceding sovereignty 
to law in the name of the ‘public good’. In the context of mega-events, this is what Marrero-Guillamón 
(2013) refers to as the ‘Olympic state of exception’. The idea that projects become less democratic as they 
reach ‘Year 0’ (the year of the Olympics) and the end point of project delivery is raised here, illustrating the 
sliding scale of democracy as big projects become more ‘real’.  
It was argued that host spaces and small firms turned from ‘subjects’ to ‘objects’ to be controlled or 
deployed in this neoliberal project. Plurality and alternative voices were silenced and/or co-opted to make 
way for the singular capitalist ideology prescribed by the Olympic juggernaut. The ‘juggernaut’, with its 
intense energy, political and economic will, is just one of several pejorative metaphors used to describe the 
critical economic and social effects seen. Raco and Tunney’s (2010) view that the Games acts as a ‘tidal 
wave crashing over local businesses (…) their low visibility has made them relatively easy targets for 
‘decisive action’’ (2010: 2082) epitomises the small firm challenges addressed in this thesis. As such, this 
thesis extends Klein’s (2007) notion of the ‘shock doctrine’ and ‘disaster capitalism’ through comparing 
mega-events with the political instability induced by war and civil unrest. This instability provides optimum 
conditions for neoliberal, private interests to permeate the life, soul and governance of the urban realm, 
aided through divisive decision-making processes that ‘shape the final outcomes of policy’ and ‘rapidly 
become masked or hidden as cities become commodified spaces to be marketed and sold’ (Raco and 
Tunney, 2010: 2086). This illustrates Lefebvre’s (1991) argument that the city is no longer lived, per se, but 
rather seen as an ‘object’ for cultural consumption in favour of spectacular cultural and event experiences. 
To help explain how these factors work in the context of mega-events, this thesis develops two new 
concepts of projects and political economy. The thesis argues that mega-events, as projects, can be subject 
to two polarised modes of urban governance: the ‘Tremor principle’ and the ‘Aftershock principle’. Both 
concepts take a critical projects perspective, serving as an explanatory theory to indicate broadly why host 
community space becomes subject to neoliberal doctrine, a natural commodity to be bought and sold – like 
gas, oil and copper – and governed by the laws of capital accumulation. Olympic project actors, the UK 
government and local authorities play a vital role in allowing such conditions to flourish. This is interesting 
as on the contrary it can be argued that such stakeholders during the re-territorialisation phases play a weak 
role and interest in the development of these spaces, thus permitting free-market policy to pervade the 
legacy phase. Legacy is ‘one of the known unknowns of mega-events’ (Horne, 2007), a period of time 
seldom understood and where limited longer-term nurturing and analysis ceases to exist. This is noted by 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), who state that short, and long-term, examinations of impacts and legacies 
often remain de-particularised (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001), decontextualized and divorced from 
reality,  prescribing that mega-event analysis ‘must consider legacy in the specific contexts under scrutiny 
and explores its idiosyncratic and nuanced local dynamics’ (2016: 353). The idea of ‘planetarisation’, 
attributed to the philosophical works of Rudhayar, (1977), is a useful theoretical lens here, and builds on 
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what Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (2001) refer to as a new vocabulary of cultural imperialism. In essence, 
planetarisation, stemming from radical socio-cultural crisis, is where, at a single point, an ‘act of faith in 
man’ is required. Legacy, in this sense, can be understood as a form of socially constructed reality that 
‘transcends’ physical matter, all localisms and nationalisms, to unite in a ‘Divine Marriage’ in the search for 
new and ‘greater creative tomorrows’ (see Rudhayar, 1977). Although utopian and optimist in nature, critics 
(e.g. Hiller, 1998) demand a more in-depth view of real legacies, as opposed to de-particularised versions of 
longer-term effects, as we have a lamentable scenario whereby current analysis is often ‘piecemeal’ and 
‘fragmentary’ (1998:48). Evidence supporting the development of both the Tremor and Aftershock 
principles is established in Table 36. The ever changing guise of neoliberalism symbolises a chameleon-
esque character, attempting to remain undetected in the shadows, where the efficacy of capitalist hegemony 
musters its strength and invokes ideological power through flagship mega-event policies and practices. This 
thesis is one of several studies that attempt to remove the mask and shed light on such ‘dark policy’. 
Furthermore, the author argues that the Olympic Games represents a political, economic and culturally 
significant moment in London and the UK’s all-out striving for growth and capital accumulation at all costs, 
‘regardless of the loss of cultural and social value that may occur’ (Foley et al, 2011).  
Academics and critical commentators are not alone in the resistance attempt. Lines of flight and acts of 
creative resistance littered the empirical analysis found in this research; communities fighting for plurality 
and their alternative voice. Counter-revolutionary narratives and emancipatory attempts to deterritorialise 
were found across host spaces subject to intense project striation and neoliberal ideology, spaces 
territorialised and taken over by the Games ‘machine’ and ‘satellite’.  References to totalitarian regimes, 
right through to science-fiction served to illustrate how Central Greenwich emerged as a determined striated 
topology; small firms describing the Games project as an ‘alien beast’ and akin to ‘Christopher Columbus 
and the f*cking conquistadors’. Small firms, as echoed across several SGs, felt alienated, excluded and 
distant from the project. Narratives of feeling ‘lied to’ and ‘deceived’ were dominant in this research, both 
in the empirical sense but also building on the theoretical view point that mega-projects often exhibit such 
characteristics. Given the established incongruence between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’, small firms were angry 
and disappointed at being invited to the party (in reference to opportunity rhetoric and the ‘bonanza’ 
promise) but arrived without tickets to enjoy it. This thesis amplifies the contextual ‘thick’ detail of such 
issues, illustrating how mega-event project planning can have such temporally bound catastrophic effects on 
host communities.  
One of the practical outputs of this thesis, guided by the emancipatory objectives of this research, was the 
production of a set of guidance notes for before, during and after the Games. The ‘Manifesto for Resistance 
and Effective Leverage’ provides comprehensive (empirical and secondary data-driven) advice in order to 
empower small firms and open up ‘third spaces’ and ‘rhizomatic activity’. In such spaces the determining 
forces of project striation and ideology are less effective, and small firms may optimise and access Games-
related benefits. The manifesto also implicitly recognises the need for small firm pro-activity in negating 
some of the known challenges, which may have a significant impact on their experience and/or small 
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business performance. It is important to note that whilst the thesis provides a detailed critique and 
cautionary tale surrounding the determining challenges for small firms, the research acknowledges that a 
positive small business experience is also governed by strategic and operational prowess and internal 
capabilities with respect to the ability to effectively respond to opportunity. This thesis thus agrees with 
O’Brien’s (2006) notion that mega-events merely provide a temporally limited set of opportunities - and 
the ‘seed capital’ – thus requiring stronger strategic event leveraging (by both authorities and small firms 
themselves) to nurture positive and sustainable outcomes in both the ‘immediate leverage’ period and the 
longer-term legacy phases. The thesis, however, argues that whilst this may be the case, mega-events still 
serve as disruptors to business environments that threaten the competitiveness and survival of small firms, 
who simply do not have the ‘capital’ to effectively seize the opportunity rhetoric promoted by policy makers, 
media outlets and local authorities as being ‘up for grabs’. The findings serve to explain how and why 
optimistic outlooks quickly transformed into antagonistic narratives of disappointment, anger, frustrations, 
and feelings of being lied to and deceived. Continued analysis of small business experiences and 
performance during key Olympic time periods is thus essential for meta-evaluation of these host community 
impacts. 
The research raised the fundamental question of whether mega-events can realistically incorporate the 
interests of host community small firms before, during and even after the carnival has moved on. Also, 
what can realistically be asked of small businesses in such contexts given their systematic exclusion? Whilst 
event-policy provides an unparalleled opportunity for catalysing urban policy, the study examines whose 
voices are prioritised in the context of mega-event planning, delivery, impact and legacy. The systematic 
exclusion of small firms identified in this thesis serves to compound the view that these vulnerable 
stakeholders, whilst having permissions to share concerns and the ‘illusion of consensus’, appear to be either 
ignored or silenced, emerging as powerless with few to no rights (see Zizek, 2008). This is so despite the 
notion of the Games being an ‘opportunity for everyone (…) legacy plans will reflect this aim by ensuring 
they are open to as diverse range of people and communities as possible (…) where local people, businesses, 
and third sector organisations will have a real input in to the plans at every step’ (DCMS, 2008b: 37). The 
thesis outlines that there have to be ‘casualties’ in this apparently utopian promise, and given the challenges 
identified, there is little surprise that the theme of ‘rhetoric’ vs. ‘reality’ emerges so prevalently - the 
incongruence between both positions permeating across the entire examination and all the arguments raised 
across this thesis. Furthermore, it shows the extent to which host communities and their small firms, once 
major hoped-for beneficiaries and winners of the so-called ‘Olympic legacy’, became deprioritised, 
neglected and left without voice when the realities of Olympic planning kicked-in and final project deadlines 
approached. This indicates a gap between the ‘intended beneficiaries’ and the ‘real beneficiaries’, and is 
exemplary of Zizek’s (2008) notion of ‘the included’ vs. ‘the excluded’. Project timing, in this sense, proved to be 
a strategic tool with which to invoke Olympic power. Although Games planning often claims to be a ‘user 
driven’ project, providing the allure of democratic participation, key strategic and operational decisions are 
already ‘fait accompli’. One of the ironic challenges identified in this thesis was that, whilst local authorities, 
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in this specific case the Royal Borough of Greenwich, are often thought of as key social actors in 
contextualising and stitching national policy and project demands across their ‘context’ territories, limited 
capacity to influence and push back project striation characterised their position. They were ‘hand-tied’ and 
restricted to serving notices – the middle man between the community on the bottom and what small firms 
referred to as the ’nasties’ and ‘beast’ (e.g. LOCOG) on the top - whilst simultaneously providing the allure 
of listening and local consultation and consensus. The result was the formation of ‘determined striated 
topologies’. The new legislative order, ceding existing law and UK sovereignty in the name of economic and 
thus public good through the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006, paved the 
‘democratic’ path for the Olympic – metaphorical, and in several cases quite literal – bulldozer. The context 
(territory) provided the material canvas, whilst new laws symbolise the paint brush. Central Greenwich was 
efficiently captured, territorialised and ready to succumb to the utilitarian ambitions of the Olympics’ newly 
formed project territory. In this sense, this thesis argues that opportunity rhetoric simply emerged as way 
of seeking legitimisation of policy objectives (see Foley et al, 2011), concluding that early Games rationale 
provided little more than ‘legitimisation rhetoric’ (see Chalip, 2006). Coalter (2008) pejoratively refers to 
the Games and its Olympic legacies as having a ‘mythopoeic character’, referring to the process of myth 
making and the construction of fantasies. The conclusive point here is that London 2012 simply failed to 
respond to the interests of the community(ies) under question and their small firms – before, during and 
after the carnival. It can be concluded that, whilst the Olympics afforded the (social) construction of 
dreams, for some these visions have become, and continue to turn into, nightmare realities.  
The projection of ambitions and positive Olympic legacies was aided by boosterist media and policy hype 
that helped to justify intervention and overstate benefits whilst entertaining and keeping the populace happy 
and docile. The ‘bread’ was shared out, whilst the circus prepared for its grand performance. This is a play 
on Harvey’s (1989) critical metaphor of ‘bread and circuses’, offering a dose of ‘charisma’ in an excessively 
rationalistic world (Roche, 2000), and supports the view that events offer an escape from the harshness, 
uniformity and ordinariness of reality and modern life. However, visible spatial, social, economic, political 
and ideological conflicts between ‘context’ territory and ‘project’ territory were noted, attributed to what 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refers to as tension between ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ spaces. It was, in fact, an 
overt objective of this thesis to amplify these voices and unravel local idiosyncrasies. Not just to map the 
inherent complexities faced but to invoke detailed qualitative narrative analyses that serve to illustrate their 
plight. This was aided by sematic analysis, the use of simile and metaphor to describe their position within 
the highly circumscribed politics of contestation that emerged across Central Greenwich’s Last Mile and 
beyond, across other key sites of the London 2012 Games. This thesis further sheds a critical light upon 
the Olympics’ IOC Charter (2013) proposition that the Games advocates ‘respect for universal fundamental 
ethical principles’. Whilst utilitarian in principle, it is hard – as the respondents of this research would agree 
- to claim that the London 2012 Games constituted a ‘moral crusade’. Very ironic given the critique.  
The question of small business legacy was also examined and scrutinised from the perspective of this 
vulnerable stakeholder group. An overview of legacies was broadly unpacked in the SmallBizImpacts 
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mapping. A critical eye was placed on the sustainability of small firms across Central Greenwich and 
beyond, in light of the economic trajectories of gentrification and the associated ‘clone town’ effects. 
Empirical analysis situated the artisan town centre of Greenwich as under threat from corporate invasion; 
small firms progressively ousted from the face and place of what was thought to be a thriving high street 
of independent shops in the retail and hospitality sectors. This was deemed a major threat, and visual 
physical evidence from the case study site indicates that this process is fully underway. Logical syllogism 
derived from prior case study analysis and secondary evidence suggests that such processes are an 
inevitability after mega-event development. In other words: the ‘Midas Touch’. The thesis argues that, 
despite the variabilities at play affecting small firm high street survival, – from technology, shifting 
consumption patterns and e-commerce, to the natural rise of rents (with or without the Games) – mega-
events catalyse these economic pressures and advance the neoliberal agenda. Ironically, this was an explicit 
hoped-for legacy of the Games: an opportunity to catalyse new and existing urban policy striving for 
‘convergence’. In light of the challenges, the concept of achieving positive local legacy must be critiqued, 
particularly as, in the latter stages of the Games delivery, host community stakeholders were encouraged to 
look beyond the short-term challenges and focus on the perceived utopia of ‘legacy benefits’. Although 
legacy continues to be heavily critiqued, the term has become synonymous with Olympic discourse and 
policy rhetoric. It is however important to note, as explained in Preuss’ (2007) analysis of the ‘Legacy Cube’, 
that we should consider that legacy is not fixed and does not have an end point. In other words, the period 
of ‘re-territorialisation’ is infinite. The structures of space and legacy, and their perceived efficacy in host 
communities, are thus bounded by temporality, fused into the life stream of the context territory it has 
graced. Legacy is thus re-appropriated and ‘converted in to an asset, in the sense of endowment, a gift of 
memory for future generations, in to territorial capital’ (OECD, 2001; Zonneveld and Waterhout, 2005). 
The question of semantics and underlying meaning in Olympic legacy discourse emerges as a prominent 
concern in this thesis. Although Games organisers claim the project will have failed if it does not leave a 
positive legacy of growth and the development of Olympic neighbourhoods, who exactly constitutes the 
neighbourhood? Thus, who are really the intended beneficiaries of projected legacy visions and the 
formation of new post-Games ‘territorial capital’. The thesis argues that small firms seem perhaps de-
prioritised in the grand vision of post-Olympic development. Their economic position is disregarded as 
one of inevitable decline, unworthy, uncompetitive and ‘old fashioned’ lifestyle businesses, incompatible 
with East London’s utopian desire for a highly mobile populace and ‘creative class’ (see Florida, 2005), and 
the economic prosperity of the creative, business, financial and service sectors. This was a key theme in this 
research, and reflected on by Miles (2010). In the search for criticality, this thesis has throughout served to 
implicitly question the social, economic, political and somewhat moral question of ‘whose fault’ is all of 
this? This is the philosophical dilemma of right and wrong, and the age old debate between ‘free will’ and 
‘determinism’. This thesis thus urges future researchers to continue such debates, specifically centred on 
the critical questions presented below: 
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Could and should small firms be able to enact free will (free will in the traditional sense of being able to make their own 
decisions and the economic liberal sense around the freedom of markets) to effectively leverage from, and successfully 
respond to, the turbulence and disruption brought about by mega-events across all stages of the TDR cycle? For example, 
several senior stakeholders reflected on the need for small firms to ‘seize’ opportunities, re-think their business offering, and 
engage with the inevitabilities associated with changing market conditions. 
Or: 
Is the problem the failure of event policy makers to fully reflect on the challenges of limited small firm capital (in the senses 
of both economic and social capital), their perceived determined position in light of the challenges examined and revealed in 
the case study context, and their valuable non-economic role in social cohesion, cultural diversity and the sustainability of 
local urban economies? 
 
The above questions, posed as a conclusive musing of this thesis, are not answered within the remit of this 
study but serve as a thought experiment to be reflected on for future consideration. What we can, however, 
consider, is that whilst it is presented a vision for all, there are on-going concerns that London’s vision of 
development with and for existing communities may in fact be morphing into a project of gentrification on 
and sanitisation of existing communities colonised by the socio-economic elite attempting to re-capture 
valuable urban landscapes under the project of revanchist neoliberalism. This is a process of ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ (see Harvey, 1989) catalysed by the ‘economic gamble’ (see Zimblist, 2015) of mega-
events and entrepreneurial forms of governance that underpin urban development in the 21st century. This 
thesis illuminates the regressive nature of cataclysmic event-led policy that ‘undermine more plural and 
progressive views of urbanism’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2086), transcending ‘a discursive public realm 
within which people can argue about what their city is and should be’ (Healey, 2002). The clone town effects 
currently underway across the UK, London Central Greenwich specifically, epitomise this condition, 
indicating Lefebvre’s (2000) ‘bureaucratisation of policy processes’ that constructs new urban spaces with 
‘radically different, but politically desirable, quotidian or day-to-day uses’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2087). 
The problem identified in this thesis is that the shaping of the city in this way homogenises and promotes 
a singular view of urbanism and community living, as corporations are often considered a more reliable 
source of regional incomes, job security and increased employment. This thesis argues that, whilst such 
strategies may optimise short-term economic growth, opening local doors to corporate takeover may 
paradoxically erode destination competitiveness, social cohesion, cultural vibrancy and diversity. And it 
shares Weed and Bull’s (2009) critique that mega-event development can result in traumatic break-up of 
entire communities, identified in both the primary and secondary evidence of this thesis for London – and 
certainly so for the case of Rio 2016. For example, Porter (2000) argues that without local SMEs urban 
economies become less functional and sustainable, as hidden socio-economic networks, relationship, and 
qualitative interdependencies often act as the glue for bonding communities and their social actors together 
(see NEF, 2010). This thesis therefore agrees with Raco and Tunney’s (2010) key conclusion that the 
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planning, delivery and legacy of such events must be more focused on the more invisible elements of society, 
and be repoliticized to encompass plural and alternative vocabularies, voices and imaginations. This stance 
is less asphyxiated by ‘growth’ (‘growth fallacy’), ‘progress’ and ‘futurity’, while and considering ‘current’ 
context and ‘welfare’, intervening where the market is deemed to have ‘failed’, and is required to ‘balance’ 
the types of urban development planned for the future. One of the biggest challenges of such a counter-
culture and political movement is the ease which one, and society, can get caught up in the naturalised 
economic assumptions and wisdoms of neoliberal, free market thought.  
This thesis paints a grim picture of the localised challenges attributed to the planning, delivery and legacy 
of mega-event projects. It is, however, important to note that the findings, discussions and conclusions of 
this research, whilst comprehensive in analysis, derive interpreted conclusions and by no stretch of the 
imagination attempt to seek a definitive ‘truth’. Although the thesis places a critical note on local effects, 
one must be appreciative of the potential positive effects elsewhere. This is important to realise and 
acknowledge in the guise of appreciative inquiry that the Games offered major opportunity for city and 
communities but also systematic challenges that greatly affected small firms in this case study. It is therefore 
no surprise to find the research agree with Calvo’s (2014) sentiments that there are few real benefits for host 
communities to stage Games development and activity. 
The thesis argues that, due to the occurrence of the London 2012 Olympics within the societal norms of 
the 21st century neoliberal agenda, it is merely through its own skewed internalised logic that outcomes are 
understood. In other words, it is not the control of individual and/or institutional puppet master will but 
rather the autonomous agent of free market principles that govern how and why mega-events have the 
discussed effects on host communities. It is the naturalised assumptions and conventional wisdoms many 
of us, including project actors, take for granted and believe to be the optimum method for economic and 
social prosperity, human and cultural progression and growth. This is what Zizek (2008) refers to as the 
‘unknown knowns’ that we take for granted, which form our ideological perspective and sit in the societal 
consciousness, ultimately governing the way we think, act and function. However, it is the agenda of this 
thesis, in light of the empirical challenges addressed, to unpack and unmask the challenges associated with 
mega-event planning in the context of neoliberal development, and to showcase the associated inequalities 
as evidenced across the TDR cycle. The emancipatory objectives and following recommendations written 
in order to restore equality and balance, re-distribute and equalise the perceived benefits the Games are said 
to bring, as pejoratively referred to in this study as opportunity rhetoric. However, one needs to consider 
the potential efficacy of such efforts as we further enter an unbridled neoliberal hegemony (see Hall, 2006) 
that may engulf anyone, or anything, in its path. In essence, the thesis calls for stakeholders to break the 
chains of cultural orthodoxies (see Kellner, 2013) and conventional wisdoms that we hold true, rid ourselves 
of social, economic immaturity, and wake up to the systematic short - and long-term - challenges of 
neoliberal hegemony. However, the thesis self-referentially reflects on this position: it is it not just easier to 
sit back and watch the Rio 2016 Games and the World Cup just round the corner, as humorously – and 
hopefully not seriously – postulated by Michael C. Hall (2006)? Or is it the perfect time for a revolutionary 
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political stance and movement? As noted, mega-events provide an exceptional platform, not just for 
unequal distributional effects but also for host communities on an international scale, and supportive, 
critically orientated scholars can use it as a soap box for amplifying the urban struggles associated with the 
coming, planning, delivery and legacies attributed to flagship event-led projects like the Olympics. As the 
ideological collapse of the Olympics continues, and the mask of hegemony begins to reveal itself, perhaps 
now is the time for strident emancipatory change. Or shall we kick back, relax, open a bottle of beer and 
immerse ourselves in the spectacle of Olympic TV? You decide. 
6.3 Recommendations 
Providing data-driven and practical recommendations forms the emancipatory goal explicitly established in 
Research Objective 4. The recommendation points in the table below complement practical advice 
provided throughout the thesis, and work closely with sections 6.4 and 6.6 to help support and invoke 
change.  
Recommendation  Detail 
Supporting emancipatory 
change and resistance, and 
empowering host (small 
business) communities 
Promote the ‘Manifesto for Resistance and Effective Leverage’ alongside future official Games advice 
in the form of local consultation, work with regional universities, and working with strategic business 
(lobbying and support) organisations to stimulate change and advice where possible. Policy makers, 
project actors, business support organisations and small business communities themselves need to 
better collaborate and organise to strengthen their economic and political positions. The creation of 
business consortiums to better negotiate Olympic planning and delivery practices, to collectively bid, 
for event and venue contracts for example, was a key point. Business consortiums may also empower 
these communities with the necessary capacity and expertise to effectively bid and supply to local 
venues, alongside developing an effective local scene of festivity, joviality and events which may in 
turn encourage ‘longer stays’ and ‘greater local spend’ to optimise ‘immediate leverage’ (Chalip, 2004). 
The use of a ‘slow tourism’ approach, as identified below, may be a potential solution.  
Embedding a slow tourism 
approach 
Integrating ‘slow tourism’ approaches to event visitation to optimise ‘immediate leverage’ 
opportunities to combat identified tourism problem, encourage local spend and celebrate local 
diversity, identity and authenticity whilst simultaneously helping to re-distribute the benefits of event-
visitation across the locale. The use of Wilbert and Duignan’s (2016) Slow Phases framework for 
embedding slow tourism may provide an effective solution. See section 6.6 for an outline of the 
author’s research strategy for this. 
Event policy based on 
social justice/equitable 
citizenship 
Wider call for event policy and project practices to consider ‘social justice’ or ‘equitable citizenship’ 
as opposed to ‘business and/or economic competitiveness’ (see Wilbert and Duignan, 2015). Create 
‘alternative yardsticks’/different measurements (e.g. not solely based on economic inflation) that 
measure effective Olympic development based on a ‘plurality’ of voices and imagining of how urban 
spaces should look and work. This involves ‘re-politicising’ more progressive forms of urban policy 
as opposed to seeing cataclysmic ‘economic growth’ and ‘gentrification’ as the only possible driver 
for ‘successful’ development. This will in turn prioritise socio-economics that create ‘vibrant and 
functioning cities’, shifting perspectives away from ‘spectacular’ elements of the city toward less 
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visible elements of society, among whom thriving socio-economics exist unseen and who are vital 
for urban vibrancy, diversity and sustainability (Raco and Tunney, 2010). We do, however, need to 
be cautious about overly left-wing and socialist thinking. The inclusion of corporations and sponsors 
is perhaps a pragmatic necessity to avoid even more public expenditure, especially in a period when 
event spending continues to spiral out of control. Such events must, however, consider how they re-
distribute and invoke more inclusive leveraging strategies (Ziakas, date) to share wealth across greatly 
impacted host communities. 
Opening up host spaces to 
dispersion of tourism and 
visitor spending 
Building on the idea of embedding slow tourism, the need to de-securitise host spaces: avoiding local 
lock downs and perceived ‘ghost town’ effects to prevent aversion markets and allow event visitors 
to consume locally. In addition, project actors are urged to more carefully assess the local and city 
consequences of ‘fear appeals’/excessive panic and chaos effects on existing residents and Olympics-
induced visitor behaviours on small firm performance. 
Greater analysis of host 
community and 
longitudinal legacy  
 
As established in section 6.6. below, a greater and more comprehensive focus on longer-term legacy 
and contextual longitudinal analysis surrounding the post-Games development of business 
communities, in both academic and practitioner realms, is a key agenda point going forward. This 
may perhaps include the reservation of public funds factored into the Olympics for assessing legacy 
in such quantitative – and – qualitative detail. Given that legacy remains overly de-contextualised and 
divorced from reality, legacy must be scrutinised in its specific context, to allow for a detailed 
examination of idiosyncratic and nuanced local dynamics. This was attempted for this present study 
and Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) - given the subjectivist interpretivist nature - as many 
stakeholders are actively telling their stories, all of which are different on the ground. Too many 
impact analyses transcend the messy complex dynamics that truly reflect local experiences of impact. 
Balancing and examining 
cross-stakeholder 
perspectives from the micro, 
meso to the macro 
governmental level in event 
impacts analysis and for 
invoking real change 
As demonstrated by this study, gathering perspectives across all major stakeholder organisations and 
individuals can support a more balanced approach to qualitative analysis and serve to enhance the 
reliability of findings and encourage seeing ‘both sides of the coin’. This research also demonstrates 
the importance of social media and digital platforms for developing policy and practice stakeholders, 
with both governmental and non-governmental actors gaining access to data, opening up discussion 
outside the realm of academia and achieving a stronger ‘research impact’, as shortly discussed in 
section 6.6. For those who sit within critical management studies and/or critical tourism studies, 
social critique should precede solutions to identified challenges. Those who consider themselves 
‘critical theorists’ and position their research within the ‘sociology of radical change’ must consider 
their critically orientated position as one of socio-political and/or economic commitment. One of 
advancing change and restoring balance in a world of inequalities, imbalance, complexity, chaos and 
flux. This can be helped by providing clarity in methodology and its processes, allowing for greater 
and closer replication (as called for by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory), so that future 
researchers can adopt similar approaches, methods and theoretical positions (e.g. through 
triangulations) to systematically scrutinise host community impacts. The thesis acknowledges that a 
unified and systematic methodological spatio-political analysis of intensely impacted ‘Last Miles’ and 
‘HEZs’ provides spatial proximities and geographical boundaries within which to examine Olympic 
impacts and legacies. Following a transparent approach here will not only continue to build on the 
‘internal validity’ of findings but also contribute to the enhancement of ‘external validity’ and the 
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development of theory. This will, in turn, take a more scientific approach, and help build a stronger 
evidence base to influence policy and practice. Furthermore, as Yin (1994) prescribes, the use of 
quantitative and mixed-method research is ideal for attaining greater ‘external validity’ – following in-
depth qualitative case study examination. As explained in the methodology and in section 6.6, 
collaboration between this research and a wider mixed-method FSB study was a direct tactic used 
here to boost external validity. 
 
Table 37:  Study Recommendations 
6.4 Limitations of Study 
This section is devoted to critiquing the limitations associated with the methodological positions and 
strategies used to construct the primary and secondary data collection and analysis of this thesis. The section 
details limitations concerning: i) ontological and epistemological nature, ii) practical nature, and iii) invoking 
behavioural and policy change, finishing with an analysis of iv) problems attributed to retrospective analysis, 
and v) specific improvements that could have been made.  
Firstly, we must consider the aforementioned debates around ontology and epistemology with respect to 
the nature of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. As discussed, one of the major criticisms of prior impact research is 
the over-use of quantitative measures, serving as one of the key reasons why an anti-positivist approach 
was taken in this research. However, this approach does open the validity of the findings to critique. The 
idea that truth is a social construction, an interpreted and contextual phenomenon, naturally raises the 
question of how far the findings of the study reflect generally, i.e. theoretically reflect ‘real’ life. Also, why 
even conduct research that throws up major contextual factors and variabilities which may/may not be only 
present within the single case study setting of Central Greenwich? There is certainly an argument that results 
are skewed given the significant number of dimensions affecting the validity of the data. The author, 
however, has a series of counter-points. Firstly, it is not the sole objective of this study to find a ‘single 
truth’ or theory which explains the qualitative and nuanced data and conditions found in this study – 
although, through using Toulmin’s (1958) theory of argumentation, the author can provide valid and robust 
arguments given the systematic use of an evidence-based approach to the links between ‘evidence’ and the 
‘truth claims’ of this research. Secondly, developing ‘external validity’ is not the sole purpose, the study can 
boast strong ‘internal validity’ through strong ‘construct validity’ – good practice examples of which are 
outlined throughout the methodology chapter. It is important to note the role that the FSB co-authored 
study plays in exploring the qualitative data results of this thesis by using a more ‘objectivist’ philosophy 
and subsequent research design. As already explained, this PhD qualitative study is thus placed as a pre-
study to future large-scale studies for London and future Olympic cities. To further enhance generalisability, 
the author has explicitly developed a transparent and reproducible methodological design – outlining exactly 
what, where, how, when and why particular decisions were made. Such reproducibility thus provides 
opportunities for meta-evaluative study aided by clarity, transparency and easy replication of methodology. 
The idea is that reproducible methodology provides optimum conditions for encouraging systematic meta-
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analyses which may result in the creation of future similar studies, for which future research results can be 
meta-evaluated to enhance theoretical developments of similar issues. This was a direct strategy invoked by 
the author of this study. 
There are also issues of a practical nature. As outlined by both empirical and secondary evidence, not only 
are ‘impact’ and ‘legacy’ intensely difficult to measure (e.g. Baade and Matheson, 2002) but further 
complications are found with respect to difficulties researchers and policy makers face in measuring the 
relationships between the event and associated policies, and the overarching output of legacy – owing to 
the difficulty of defining, counting and attributing to specific events (OECD LEED, 2008). The findings 
of this research must therefore, given its ontological and epistemological nature, not attempt to directly 
attribute any variables and ‘isolate’ London 2012 as the intervention driving all short and longer-term 
economic challenges seen in the research. As explained throughout the results and findings of this thesis, 
we must see arguments as existing across a series of macro and wider variabilities. This is reflected in the 
phrasing of ‘truth claims’ made across the thesis.   
These factors are also complicated by the nominalist ontological nature of ‘legacy’ and ‘impact’. The idea is 
that both are rooted in context (e.g. small firms who own their premises are overjoyed by the rising 
commercial rentals of the Olympics, whilst those renting are not) but also simultaneously affected by their 
socially constructed nature. These are interpreted phenomena that result in ‘everyone telling their story’, a 
position of ‘verhesten’, as addressed earlier in the study. Furthermore, if we think about the construction 
of primary research data collection, human actors involved in a study may interpret semi-structured 
questioning differently from others, so we may ‘talk past’ each other as we all share different ‘conceptual 
schemes’ (e.g. language, episodic memories etc.). In an attempt to mitigate this risk, the concepts used are 
well-defined to avoid confusion – both across this thesis and during conversation with non-academic 
stakeholders.  
It is unsurprising, given such complications, that efforts to measure mega-event effects are guided by the 
impossibility of the task at hand in that legacy research, e.g. the ‘Legacy Cube’ and ‘Linkage Model’, tends 
to be looking at decontextualized positivist phenomena with limited empiricism to evidence assertions. 
Measuring legacy is like catching a cloud in a net: there are just too many internal and external factors that 
influence its complexity. For example, going back to issues of temporality, Preuss (2007) claims that ‘legacy’ 
is a structure which changes over time, and empirical and secondary evidence claims that legacy evolves 
and manifests as a 10-30-year project. Only time will tell us what the legacy will be for London and its East 
End but, as presented in the discussions, we must not pass too much judgement over legacy in the early 
phases. One must also consider the temporal contingencies of the research. This study, taking place between 
2012 and 2016, must be understood within the context of this time period, and with the proviso that impacts 
and legacies may have developed for better or worse since data collection. We must therefore critique the 
usefulness of analysing ‘legacy’ over short periods of time. As outlined in the impact section, it is however 
pertinent to note that through the execution of the joint FSB study the author intended to explore the 
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emergent legacies using a more longitudinal design. This will hopefully negate such issues.   In this sense, it 
is for these reasons that this study finds its justification for analysing impact and legacy. The need to see 
legacy through the eyes of its beholder – to amplify narratives deeply affected by the occurrence of the 
Games and tell ‘their truths’. Changing contextual dynamics, as established earlier in the review, mean that 
local impact analysis is required across a series of case study approaches (meta-evaluation), often with ‘small 
scale’ samples driven by ‘human interest’ in the subject area (e.g. links to my subjectivist and ethical stance) 
and needing to see the ‘totality’ of situation (holism) – see Easterby-Smith et al (1991). The author calls for 
researchers to embrace such complexity, and to review their methodological and philosophical decisions 
for future scholarly works. 
One major concern with respect to the research’s applied and policy-orientated goals is the potential 
influence, and/or perceived barriers qualitative research can realistically have on changing policy behaviour. 
In reference to Creswell’s (1994) earlier argument around the ‘audience for the study’ – one notable 
limitation of this single case study and subjectivist qualitative study is the idea that, although qualitative 
findings may be of interest and supported by qualitative academics in the respective fields, there may be a 
risk of policy makers/mega-event practitioners rejecting this design due to ‘high degree of error’, ‘validity’ 
and ‘credibility’ issues. Thus the key risk is the limited ‘impact’ this study may have on practice; an overt 
objective of this research. We must also consider ‘social desirability’ effects placed upon respondents, and 
particularly those in higher echelons of government, who were still in politically pressured positions during 
the data collection. One must consider the influence of these effects upon responses. However, the 
researcher was very clear that confidentiality and anonymity were sought, and opted for public yet secluded 
areas of premises to prevent aspects of social desirability affecting the data. 
Retrospective analysis of impacts gives rise to a number of a critiques. Behavioural psychologist and Nobel 
Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, 2012), in his seminal book ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’, claims we 
recall information differently after the event in comparison to during or just after. He distinguishes between 
two positions: the ‘experiencing self’ (how we feel in the moment) and the ‘remembering self’ (how we feel about 
an experience as a whole). The experiencing self, as expected, provides a more accurate version of events, 
whilst the remembering self is less accurate because it registers memories after the event has finished – a 
mode that dominates our memory banks. Kahneman (2012) claims the risk here, specifically in the context 
of this research study, is that retrospective versions and ‘faulty memories’ of events suffer from a) ‘duration 
neglect’ and b) the ‘peak-end rule’. Firstly, duration neglect refers to ignorance of the ‘total duration’ of the 
event in favour of a particular memory of it – for example, the potential length of spatial barricading directly 
causing negative trading effects found in my study. Secondly, the peak-end rule indicates that people tend 
to overemphasize what occurs at the end of an event – for example, the resulting effects of poor trading 
periods - without a more holistic analysis of the overall Games opportunity. One must also be aware of 
‘positivity effects’: as memory distorts, positive ‘rose-tinted’ spectacles emerge which may give rise to 
forgetting negative experiences and images. 
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There are several ways the methodology could have been improved, including larger sample sizes across all 
SGs, although all potential SG1 small firms within the remit of this case study were invited to provide their 
views for this study.  Furthermore, comparative analyses across host borough ‘Last Miles’ may have 
strengthened the study by offering greater general validity to empirical analysis and theoretical development. 
Instead, only one in-depth analysis of the specific experiences of small businesses in Last Mile areas, and 
broader perspectives as showcased across all SGs, were provided. Although this is a limiting factor in the 
enhancement of ‘external validity’, the researcher is confident that very in-depth and thick descriptions were 
unearthed and greatly contribute to the ‘internal validity’ of findings. The use of the joint FSB and researcher 
study, as illustrated already, attempts to enhance external validity. Continuing longitudinal study, alongside 
more comprehensive analysis of ‘Last Mile’ HEZs, are future considerations for boosting both internal and 
external validity.  
On a final note, if the study had been initiated prior to the delivery of London 2012, an ethnographic and/or 
live observation approach could have been invoked. This would have aided validity, reduced the degree of 
error created through retrospective study, and provided the researcher with a stronger empirical focus for 
the research. Although it was impossible to conduct ethnographic study as the PhD commenced in October 
2012, the research could have benefitted from data being collected in late-2012, taking a more grounded 
approach to the collection of data to reduce the aforementioned problems of duration neglect and reduce 
the risk of mortality and unavailability among key Olympic stakeholders. Fortunately, this research managed 
to track down major stakeholders to share their perspectives. As outlined in section 6.6, these issues will be 
avoided in the case of the author’s future research for Rio 2016 as on the ground empirical investigation 
during the real-time and immediate impacts of the event will be observed, analysed, and written up to 
complement the retrospective approach for this study. 
6.5 Current and Future Research Impact: Research and Teaching 
The thesis has attempted to go above and beyond the production of this document in order to drive change, 
alter minds and attempt to achieve what the refers to as ‘Research Impact’. This is a key strategic ambition 
of UK funding councils, since the Research Assessment Exercise of 2008 (see Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) (2016) for further details). This section is split into two parts. Firstly, how the research 
has attempted to drive change through ‘research’, and secondly how it has attempted this through ‘teaching’ 
and ‘pedagogy’.   
6.5.1 Driving Change through Research and External Engagement 
Over the past two to three years the author has engaged with and spoken at high-profile public engagement 
events, for example the University of Cambridge ‘Festival of Ideas’ (University of Cambridge, 2013) and 
the ‘EAT Cambridge’ 2015 festival, as well as interacting with the media (BBC, ITV, regional and local 
radio and newspapers) and with major business organisations (e.g. LCOC, FSB). This has been in both the 
field of mega-events and slow tourism. See images below, from top left to bottom right: a) Michael speaking 
for ITV on the effects of the Tour de France barricades on local businesses, b) London Chamber of 
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Commerce media article publicising the London 2012 study, c) Michael speaking on ITV on the economic 
effects of the Tour de France for the local economy, d)/e)/f) a series of drawings made at the University 
of Cambridge ‘Festival of Ideas’ talk on the local effects of London 2012 on host communities, and g) 
Michael and Dr Sally Everett’s key-note talk on the impact of food festivals on small businesses and the 
role of slow tourism. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: ‘Various Images from Media, Policy and Public Engagement’ 
In addition to external engagement, the author has also led internal initiatives and events to offer platforms 
to share research ideas, expertise etc. (e.g. Researcher Exchange), and even incepted, developed and 
designed the first Lord Ashcroft International Business School (LAIBS) Annual Research Conference on 
the theme of ‘Impact, Media, and Digital Scholarship’. This invited scholars from the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE), Taylor and Francis (T&F) and The Open University (OU), along 
with a series of internal professors (including our VC, PVC and Dean), to discuss approaches and 
methodologies for optimising ‘Research Impact’ and the usage of ‘Digital Technologies’ in light of new 
‘Research Excellence Framework’ (REF, 2016) demands (www.anglia.ac.uk/laibs/conference) – see image 
below. His passion for delivering such an event was directly driven by the study’s critical stance and desire 
to make ‘real-world’ change, as opposed to shouting from the ivory tower (and his general interest in the 
‘digital turn’ and its consequences for the academy and the changing research landscape per se). Ideas and 
findings from the conference have and will continue to influence the author’s approach to ‘impact’; hence 
the strong emphasis on emancipation, practical recommendations, close working with key policy makers 
for this research and business support organisations to influence change.  
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Figure 25: Lord Ashcroft International Business School, 2015 Research Conference Poster (developed by 
author and university graphic design team) 
In order to share ideas, discuss research findings and share resources, the author set up a research blog: 
‘Olympic Researcher’ (www.olympicresearcher.wordpress.com) – see image below. Since its inception in 
January 2013 the blog has reached over 4500 hits and a professional Twitter alias, ‘@michaelbduignan’, for 
the purposes of gaining access to empirical data, creating networks and amplifying his own and others’ 
research. A key point the author learnt along his journey (and after speaking with university ‘REF and Policy 
Manager, Dr Tim Brooks) is that although digital technologies are often a ‘window’ for finding and looking 
into research works, they do not necessarily drive ‘impactful’ changes in real behaviour. It was thus a core 
objective of this research to form strategic collaborations and relationships with interviewees and major 
stakeholder organisations who do have the necessary decision making and influential capacity to stimulate 
and drive change. This is due to the overlap between those who actively voiced their opinions for the 
empirical findings of this research and actor networks established purely in light of the research and with 
interest in its final results. Furthermore, the author has also set up a ‘Research Gate’ profile to publish all 
the key outputs of his research to date. Throughout the PhD process the author also joined the peer 
communities ‘Crossing Spaces’ (a network initiated by UEL post-Games) and attended over 10 events, 
including the UEL Conference on the ‘Legacies of Mega-Events’, September 2013, and UCL and joint 
UEL/LLDC workshops across 2013, 2014 and 2015. All of these events have, without doubt, provided an 
exceptional insight in to the field of event impact and legacy studies. 
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Figure 26: ‘Mike’s Research and Teaching Blog [www.OlympicResearcher.wordpress.com]’ (developed by 
author) 
To expand the author’s research, theoretical and empirical knowledge and experience, in addition to the 
PhD research he has been working with Anglia Ruskin University colleagues Dr Chris Wilbert, Dr Sally 
Everett (Deputy Dean) and various other colleagues (including at the University of Bergamo, Santander, 
Girona, Lubeck, Sofia etc.) across European institutions throughout the EU network ‘Centrality of 
Territories’. The purpose of the network is to conceptualise further the ideas associated with ‘Slow 
Tourism’, and consider how this ‘critical’ agenda can be developed and managed in the context of European 
historic cities in light of economic pressures on local communities and small firms. These issues overlap 
with the concerns and focus of this thesis, and this is why the author reflects upon it now as dialogue 
facilitated by conversations with internal colleagues and the European network of colleagues at the 
International Conference in Bergamo (March, 2014) helped to influence ideas presented in this thesis. 
Through engagement in this network, a special interest book on the topic has appeared, including a chapter 
from the author and colleague Dr Chris Wilbert (Wilbert and Duignan, 2015)), with recent re quests by 
Hartford University, Connecticut to contribute to a Routledge book chapter on these very topics (Duignan 
and Wilbert, 2016 – forthcoming). Furthermore, the slow tourism research has received notable attention 
at national UK level, where the author led the business school’s winning entry for the ‘Leadership in the 
Visitor Economy’ award presented by the Association for Tourism in Higher Education (ATHE), 
sponsored by VisitEngland. The debates explored in this project inform elements of the discussions, as 
focused on in the latter part of the discussions chapter. See images below from left to bottom right: a) 
European Tourism Research Group, b) Michael presenting at the University of Bergamo, Italy, c) Michael 
talk and acceptance of ATHE/VisitEngland Slow Tourism Award at the University of Oxford (December, 
2015). 
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Figure 27: Various Images from European Research Group and ATHE Awards 2015 
Further related to this PhD thesis are contributions arising from recent co-authorship with Westminster 
University colleague (and now 2nd external supervisor) Dr Ilaria Pappalepore (Pappalepore and Duignan, 
2016). In addition to (Wilbert and Duignan 2015), the construction of Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) 
significantly helped with the construction of this PhD thesis. Ilaria’s mentorship and guidance throughout 
the development of this 4* Tourism Management paper exposed the author to the holistic creation of a 
professional research argument. Although well-read prior to co-authorship, writing the paper afforded the 
author to see the need to construct considerable intellectual coherence between objectives, literature, 
methodology, findings, discussions and conclusions. It was such learning that subsequently helped the 
author with the construction of the thesis, and it was a vital platform for testing ideas and arguments 
established throughout this thesis to gain successful peer-review at 4* journal standard. As identified in 
section 6.6. this thesis is the start of series of academic outputs dedicated to theoretically and empirically 
examine the key ideas, findings, discussions and conclusions of this study. 
6.5.2 Driving Change through Teaching, Pedagogy and Student Engagement 
Over the past three years the author has also strived to influence his teaching output to balance and reflect 
critical positions across the field of tourism and economics, in reflection of his role in the ‘epistemic 
institution’ and more broadly in ‘epistemic community’ and my moral duty to my field and students. This 
‘mission’ started initially with a cover lecture and seminar series by the author for Dr Ilaria Pappalepore on 
the theme of ‘strategic uses of mega-events’ (e.g. Smith, 2012) and the theory of ‘Event Leverage’ (e.g. 
Chalip, 2004; Weed, 2008). The focus was on unravelling the messy tourism and wider urban opportunities 
and local challenges of hosting mega-events in March 2013. The content was directly lifted from the 
literature, empirical and theoretical analysis of this research. Following on from this, various opportunities 
to guest lecture and lead workshops arose (e.g. across ‘Heritage Tourism’ modules (year 3), ‘Events and 
Conference Management’ (year 3) etc.), providing further platforms for critical analysis and incorporating 
empirical analysis into the author’s research-informed teaching style. Semesters 1 and 2 of the following 
year (2014-2015), through co-leading year 2 ‘Current and Critical Issues in Tourism’ module (SEM1) and 
sole module leadership of year 2 ‘Tourism Marketing’, also provided exceptional opportunities to integrate 
critical perspectives. By integrating real-life data and empirical evidence from the author’s research against 
critical theory he found that students significantly engaged with the content – so much so that a selection 
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of students joined and shadowed the latter phases of data collection (Phase 3) to further help them connect 
theory with practice (see images below). Incorporating critical perspectives and through research informed 
was cited as one of the key reasons why the author won, alongside 12 other teaching colleagues across the 
university, the annual teaching award ‘Made a Difference’. The author owes gratitude for this to engagement 
with the PhD process. See images below from left to right: a)/b) research field trip, c) Made a Difference 
Award 2015. 
 
 
Figure 28: Various Images from Research Field Trip and Made a Difference 2015 Teaching Awards 
6.6 Areas for Future Research and the Author’s Research Agenda: 2016 to 2020  
The exploratory, and thus diversely themed and critical nature of this thesis, opens up several pertinent 
areas for future academic and policy generally, and for the author himself. Broadly speaking this includes 
on-going theoretical and empirical developments spawned by the production of this thesis, and more 
specifically embraces an agenda that supports the greater redistribution of event-related and induced 
benefits for host communities and their small businesses. The potential and on-going areas of future 
research include: i) greater in-depth qualitative examination of complex host (small business) event impacts 
and idiosyncrasies, ii) stronger comprehensive and more longitudinal legacy analysis at the local host level, 
iii) better structured advice to effectively leverage and support host (small business) community resistance 
and emancipation, and iv) greater integration of the slow tourism approach to disperse the benefits of mega-
event tourism and trade. The need to engage with policy makers, project actors and business support 
organisations, and to amplify the challenges mega-events pose as established throughout findings and 
discussions of this thesis, is key. This includes effective utilisation of both academic and non-academic 
communicative mechanisms as illustrated below, not only to enhance the legacy and outputs of this thesis 
but also to inform the on-going actions of the author. 
The challenges posed by the Games before, during and in the enigmatic legacy phases, illustrate the need 
for intervention. From the perspective of the author, future research needs to focus on the deeper, 
descriptive and qualitative richness and idiosyncrasies of host community impact, as also called for by 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016). Otherwise, evaluative studies will remain overly top-level and somewhat 
superficial in their examinations. Without doubt, this is a common feature of impact analysis which needs 
to change. Through greater understanding of local issues, project actors and/or those who can influence 
Games planning and delivery can intervene where required to re-distribute the benefits initially hoped for 
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by host communities. This is in part driven by the thesis’ call for mega-event policy to be guided by ethical 
principles of ‘equitable citizenship’ as opposed to capitalist neoliberal hegemonic practices that arguably 
underpin the delivery of late 20th and early 21st century Olympic policies, project planning, practices and 
outcomes. The desire to include host (small business) communities in mega-event planning and delivery, to 
embed and empower as opposed to excluding and marginalising, and thus re-distribute Games-related 
benefits, forms the driving narrative fostered across the thesis. However, it also continues to form a 
fundamental part of the author’s moral crusade and critically orientated approach to scholarship in this field 
of study – above and beyond the scope of this thesis.  
One of the overarching barriers to a positive small business experience, and potentially long-lasting legacy, 
was the inaccessibility of trade and tourism benefits. Considering slow tourism approaches, through for 
example the ‘Slow Phases’ framework (Duignan and Wilbert, 2016), as recommended earlier in this section, 
is just one of many perspectives that could be taken to help re-distribute trade and tourism related benefits 
for small businesses across HEZs and Last Mile spaces. The importance of embedding a ‘slow’ approach 
to combat ‘fast’ mega-event tourism effects found across this thesis forms a major plank in the author’s 
REF2020 publishing pipeline over the coming years. The strategic focus on embedding slow tourism here 
is a direct response to the comprehensive evidence found across this thesis, and thus will hopefully play a 
major part in invoking change in favour of a better Games experience and more sustainable immediate 
short-term impact and regional development legacy. 
A focus on longer-term legacy analysis will be employed by the author over the coming years. This is of 
critical importance in light of the structural economic concerns established in the review and reflected upon 
in this study. The author also calls for greater longitudinal legacy analysis at the host community level by 
project actor and policy makers, to comprehensively examine the challenging actualities that follow mega-
event intervention and developments. The concern that London has taken its eyes off the ball in neglecting 
the analysis of legacy since the Games compounds the criticisms surrounding the enigmatic character of 
legacy and the neoliberal ‘Aftershock principle(s)’ developed by the author. In the case of London’s ex-host 
Olympic boroughs, a joint legacy study between the author and the FSB is currently underway, and data 
has already been collected – as identified earlier in the methodology. The author will be analysing this data 
with the hope of publishing an empirically driven legacy journal piece, which will then be complemented 
by a national level policy report presented to the UK Government and House of Lords by 2018. The 
question of continued gentrification processes and shifting business demographics leading to potential 
clone town effects will form the critical focus of examination – a major issue highlighted in the findings 
and discussions. 
It is also important to note that the author’s REF2020 pipeline also includes two key critically descriptive 
examinations around the synthesised conceptualisations forming both i) the ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping, and 
ii) the ‘anti-tourism perfect storm’ metaphor. For both papers, the author has secured two key co-authors to co-
write and theoretically develop these ideas into what will hopefully be highly impactful and rigorous 
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academic journal articles. The dissemination of practical advice, for example the ‘Manifesto for Effective 
Leverage and Resistance’, although now too late for Rio’s 2016 mega-event, forms part of the author’s 
REF2020 pipeline and will attempt to engage with project actors, policy makers and business support 
organisations for later major and/or mega-events to support the re-distribution of event-related and 
induced benefits, and empowerment of small business communities inside and outside HEZs and Last Mile 
spaces (or their equivalents). A future paper attempting to make sense of the territorialisation of London’s 
and Rio’s HEZs, Last Miles and host public spaces is currently underway in light of empirical material to 
be gathered from a fully-funded Rio 2016 research study – see final paragraph for more details. 
The author notes that due to changes in technology toward the use of social media (e.g. Vlogging, Twitter), 
and shifting scholarly and communicative mediums for academic production of ideas (e.g. ‘The 
Conversation’ [www.theconversation.com]), there are a variety of ways to amplify the stories we want to 
tell as academics that can complement more traditional routes like media production and public engagement 
events. In this sense, and in light of the externally facing ways the author has attempted to achieve ‘impact’ 
or ‘change’ in some way (see section: 6.5), we as academics can contribute to broader knowledge in many 
different ways in today’s era of interconnectedness and interdisciplinary demands. The production of the 
PhD must therefore be seen not as existing in a vacuum but as very much embedded within the 
everydayness of academe, policy and practice, answerable to the very stakeholder perspectives that underpin 
empiricism – wherever an empirical method is used. The UK REF and HEFCE demand this, and as a 
critical scholar this digital and cultural shift affords a unique opportunity for invoking change. Alongside 
the empirically driven nature, theoretical and scholarly contributions hoped for, the author argues that the 
outputs of the study have gone – and will continue to go – beyond the framing, narrative and production 
of this document. These are all principles the author continues to share as a scholarly approach to the 
construction of research stories, and he calls on doctoral students in particular to consider ‘impact’ and 
‘wider engagement’ from the beginning and holistically conceptualise the notion of contribution during the 
PhD.  
Along with the continual development, application and publishing of key contributions established in this 
thesis, the author is pleased to note that the life and findings of this PhD study continue to flourish thanks 
to internal funding provided by Anglia Ruskin University and the Lord Ashcroft International Business 
School. This includes: i) a £70k three year fully-funded PhD scholarship (October 2016 – 2019) to be 
supervised by the author across similar theoretical and empirical focuses, and ii) a £2900 travel and research 
grant for the author to conduct empirical observation at the Rio 2016 Games between 31 July and 9 August. 
The empirical focus directly focuses on similar issues found across this research to provide an opportunity 
for cross-comparative analysis, and help provide a contemporary refreshing of examinations focused on in 
this thesis. Continuing support has led to several related tourism publications (e.g. Pappalepore and 
Duignan, 2016; Duignan and Wilbert, 2016; Wilbert and Duignan, 2015; Duignan, Walsh, Everett and Cade, 
2016 – under review), over ten international conference presentations, the development of a REF2020 case 
study, and a strong pipeline of REF2020 journal submissions and academic collaborations with key authors 
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in the field cited across this research, scheduled from 2016 – 2020, to build on the theoretical and empirically 
driven findings of both slow tourism and mega-events research.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Overview of Key ‘Organising’ and ‘Basic’ Themes 
As prescribed by the Attride-Stirling (2001) TNA focus for the qualitative analysis of this thesis, find below 
a series of organising and basic themes driven from the NVIVO coding of this thesis which helped to 
construct the findings. 
Organising themes Basic themes 
Opportunity rhetoric  -Tourism and trade potential [‘opportunity rhetoric’] 
-Access to supply chains 
-Potential to develop skills/knowledge [‘Fitness to -
Supply’] 
-Networking and workshops 
-Policy-project opportunity hype 
-Media opportunity hype 
-Local council opportunity hype  
-Conflicting policy perspective – Games as opportunity 
vs. Games as challenge for small firms 
Challenging realities -Small firms symbolically and materially locked-out 
-Limited tourism and trade footfall 
-Tourists unable to access in to host community 
-Little to no supply chain success 
-Operational disruption [e.g. deliveries, staffing, 
congestion, ORNs etc] 
-Advertising and trade regulations 
-Superseded by ‘new’ short-term commercial solutions  
-Visitors warned to ‘stay out’ 
-Limited efficacy of strategic leveraging tactics 
Host spaces -Control of consumption patterns and visitor 
experiences 
-Sanitised experiences  
-Overzealous traffic wardens and parking permits -
Securitisation and militarisation - ‘Last Mile lock-down’ 
-Marshalling and barricading 
-Abandoned event spaces; 28 days later effect 
-Exogenous shock 
-Commodified and re-commercialised civic space 
-Fear 
-Pragmatic security, but Last Mile too controlled  
-Human and non-human securitising actors 
-Zero-tolerance policing [e.g. tow trucks] 
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-Aversion markets 
-Loss of local attractions [e.g. Observatory] 
-Loss of civic space [e.g. Greenwich Park] 
Community exclusion – limited consultation and 
poor perceptions 
-High Games expectations vs. disappointing reality 
- Anger, disappointment and resentment towards 
London 2012 
-Powerless small firms. Little to no real say in practice, 
unnegotiable practices and autocratic planning 
-Resistance 
-Manufactured consent 
-Critical sci-fi and political references to local Games 
engagement [e.g. Gestapo, Conquistadors, Stalinist 
control, Alien beast, Satellite et cetera] 
-Lied to, deceit and deception 
-Poor community between project and community 
-Council hand-tied  
Small firm legacies -Gentrification [rising rents and property prices]  
-Corporatisation of Central Greenwich and ‘Clone 
Town’ effects 
- Winners and losers in Olympic economic game 
- Games as mode of creative destruction marking space 
and determining inclusion and exclusion 
- Forgotten legacy 
- Decontextualized legacy 
- Tremor – Aftershock principles 
Vulnerabilities of small firms -Heavy reliance up on footfall 
-Lacks skills,  expertise and resources to leverage  
-Low profit margins, unable to absorb rising rents 
-Difficulty to respond to regulation 
-Unresponsive to environmental change 
-Project risk management; small firms a risk to supply, 
risk for legacy… 
-Limited contribution toward East London growth and 
economic invisibility 
 
Appendix 2: Overview of Key Findings 
Subject Key finding 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
310 | P a g e  
 
Tourism, trade 
and 
commercial 
impacts 
 
 Major dichotomy between ‘Opportunity rhetoric’ and local ‘reality’ of host community trade, footfall 
and tourism bounties. This supports critical view that rationale for hosting mega-events, projected by 
political economic elites provide no more than legitimisation rhetoric (e.g. Chalip, 2006); projected by 
multiple ‘hyping’ mechanisms, including policy, and media rhetoric, local support documents et cetera. 
 Conflicting stakeholder perspectives: some believed the Games was an opportunity to be capitalised 
on, whilst others deemed the Olympics as an inevitable ‘blip’ in the life for small firms of whom 
should look to the ‘legacy’ phases to deliver Games-related benefits. Highlights poor communication 
between people in the ‘know’ vs. those who were an aware of the local challenges. 
 Analysis unpacks the complex tourism and trade challenges, identifying messy, nuanced picture of 
how host communities can be systematically excluded from accessing such opportunities (perfect 
storm) – the Games identified as a major inconvenience throughout territorialisation phases. 
 Small firms advised to engage in [‘doomed to fail’] strategic event leverage tactics, in light of 
Opportunity rhetoric, but seen by most of these small firms as project [and council] lies and 
dishonesties attempting to ‘save face’ [and avoid riot, local pressure perhaps?] from inevitable spatial 
controls and trade, tourism challenges. 
 Opportunities to showcase the ‘real’ Greenwich, the community, artisan spaces and shops were missed 
– limiting Olympic visitors with sanitised and controlled event experiences. Highlights prioritisation 
of policy makers of (broadly defined) social and economic objectives, regardless of the loss of cultural 
value which may occur as a result (see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; Foley et al, 2011). 
 Amplified narratives of small firm anger, disappointment and frustration at actual realities, indicating 
devastated financial performance, major annual losses during high peak time of tourist season. ALL 
firms, and the majority of other respondents recognise these disappointing impacts. 
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Marginalisation 
and exclusion 
of small firms 
 
 Unpacking of trade and tourism challenges illuminates how small firms were and felt excluded and 
marginalised as key beneficiaries of aforementioned Opportunity rhetoric. Small firms, and key local 
stakeholders overarching anguish and in some places hatred for what the Games did to the local 
communities, before, but mainly during and after the Games. Discourse structures analysed in detail 
across the chapter to reflect and amplify their strong opinions against aspects of Games-delivery. 
 Through a series of other commercial potentialities – host small firms were locked out of supply 
chains and Olympic contracts, elite networking, exporting opportunities, internal operational 
developments (e.g. ‘Fitness to Supply’). Although the idea that higher tiered opportunities to capitalise 
on subcontracts was purveyed, not one business and any other respondent (including Chamber of 
Commerces’, small firm support managers at the London Assembly et cetera) claimed this ‘trickling 
down’ effect provided tangible benefits for small firms. And as such these rhetorical opportunities 
can be understood as ‘phantom benefits’ – believed to be there, but out of touch. 
 Narratives of direct lies, deceit and dishonesty – versus – belief that through project and council 
‘inactions’ initial consultation Opportunity rhetoric and trade bonanza was allowed to wither and die. 
 Small firms at all stages of Olympic territorialisation TDR cycle were excluded and emerged as limited 
beneficiaries of the Games projects – from pre-Games disruptions, and during Games trade and 
tourism challenges, to their questionable contributions to Greenwich and East End’s legacy ambition, 
especially in light of concerns over structural economic post-Games challenges. 
 Opportunities to attend networking events, skills workshops, contractual support, alongside public 
forums and meetings to provide information around opportunities and challenges were there, 
however the majority of small firms claimed they either unaware of them, or found them pointless 
and unsuitable (e.g. contract opportunities through CompeteFor, whilst there, appeared to be out of 
reach due to red-tape issues – and mainly geared around big business and investor heavy weights). 
Findings also point out to the on-going debate as to whether engagement problematic is a symptom 
of ‘poor project communication’ – versus – ‘limited individual small firm engagement’. 
 Limited ‘real’ say and consultation on project delivery, small firms and host community as powerless 
stakeholders whereby project transcends usual democratic practices of daily life – side-lining small 
firms under the guise of ‘in the city and nation’s interest’ despite rhetoric of hoped local inclusion and 
locals’ being key beneficiaries. Although heralded as key beneficiaries in initial phases, one must beg 
the question how far small firm interests are ever realistically incorporated in to big projects, and 
whether these stakeholders were just de-prioritised or ever realistically part of the governments vision 
for the Games (see Mitchell et al’s (1997) theory of ‘stakeholder salience’ in discussions). As 
highlighted in the review, emergent criticisms from London 2012, mimic established systematic 
challenges concerning the exclusionary tendencies for mega-events to marginalise host communities, 
including small firms. However, findings reveals that the council, due to strident Olympic practices 
also found that aspects of Games’ planning was non-negotiable to them. 
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Strategic 
abilities, 
capabilities and 
vulnerabilities 
of small firms 
 
 Small firms seen as a major ‘risk’ to delivery - 1) risk of failing to adequately supply and procure, 2) 
risk to effectively contribute toward London’s/East End economic vitality and ambitious economic 
and social legacy plan, 3) risk of upsetting sponsors and official partners et cetera [to add to], 4) risk 
on the success of the project that needed the mitigated 
 Systemic barriers for small firm leverage exist – 1) their inability to respond to turbulent environments, 
2) overt reliance up on footfall, 3) limited power and influence, 4) potentially limited strategic and 
operational capability, experience, and internal (e.g. protocols, policies, know-how…) and external 
structures (e.g. networks) to fully capitalise on event-related opportunities, 5)  
 Strategic leveraging firms more successful, vs. non-strategic leveraging firms who were less 
successful.  
 Limited efficacy of strategic event leveraging due to advertising and trade restrictions preventing 
affiliation with the Games, including firms unable to promote / market involvement in Games supply. 
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Host spaces 
and event 
seizures 
 
 Host community spaces subject to ‘war zone’ ‘militarised’ conditions, Olympic territorialisation and 
project striation invoking controlled environments operationalised by eclectic series of human and 
non-human actors locking out host community who form a ‘risk’ to delivery as messiness disturbs. 
Local business caught in the middle of the sanitised project, corporates and project actor’s bed fellows 
as big organisations [clear policy document and link in empirical work how closely align corporate 
interests are] help negate risk to the big project – aided through the inactions of the council [limited 
presence on the ground during live Games, backseat role in planning, limited autonomy and ability to 
resist, little eye over legacy effects after and aftershock effect…]. Rational actors and their agenda of 
low-risk and safe event experiences, all of which are mutually re-inforcing each other, protected under 
naturalised assumptions and auspices of neoliberal forms of urban life and how the project should 
ideally run. These standard ‘off the shelf’ solutions for delivering such experiences, delivered through 
the IOC’s HCC subsequently legally inscribed in to UK Law via the London 2012 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games Act 2006. 
 Contrived, sinister and engineering of social and event spaces; directing drift, controlling event 
experiences, stunting local consumption, whilst preserving pennies and maximising spectator gaze and 
space toward new spaces of commercial-corporate consumption – thus contributing to 
aforementioned trade and tourism destruction. Analysed controls formed major barriers for small 
firms accessing opportunities, and caused inability to leverage effectively. 
 Symbolic and material conflict and power struggles between ‘project’ territory demands vs. ‘context’ 
local territory demands – ‘Last Mile’ the final spaces of battlegrounds of contestation and ownership 
of space, alluding to the power and politics at play. 
 Acts of creative resistance and deterritorialisation against determined topologies seen across case study 
Last Mile, lines of flight permitting rhizomatic activity, hopes of emancipation, in order to access 
Opportunity rhetoric promised to vulnerable small firms. Several tactics highlighted provide evidence 
that through strategic application, small firms can influence (e.g. through physical action on barricades, 
verbal resistance, media engagement et cetera). Problem found is for Greenwich, lobbying after the 
fact rear-guard action – they were already wrong footed – timing in projects is another act of power, 
projects that claim to be user driven actually and typically exclude users until most of the major 
decisions have already been made so their impact is considerably lessened.  
 ‘Fear’ [of ‘chaos’] key tactics used for ‘Olympic control’ to manipulate visitor behaviours across host 
city, and specifically in the case of Greenwich – thus having major effect up on aforementioned 
tourism and trade. 
 Public spaces, and the withering of the ‘public realm’ and erosion of public space – turned in to private 
ventures – civic spaces undemocratically removed from use to the general public and tax paying 
business, including loss of key attractions (e.g. Greenwich Park, Observatory..). 
 Emergent spaces of exclusivity – captured, commodified and re-commercialised Last Mile spaces 
opened up for new commercial exploitation across HEZ and ‘Last Mile’, aided by security and 
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Olympic control (‘commercialisation of security issues’, and the ‘Olympic state of exception’) at the 
expense of host small firms [due to financial pressures, but they are tax paying businesses anyway – 
why should they pay for more space?]. Illustrates how the Olympic Games can ‘mark’ space, define 
who is included and excluded, and forms yet another way big business capital accumulation permeates 
in to urban realm. 
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Small firm 
legacy 
 
 Olympics conceptualised as the ‘final straw’ due to poor financial performance during the Games, 
thus appearing to fail in leaving a positive lasting legacy for such small firms.  
 Host Olympic spaces currently subject to gentrification and rising rents, shifting demographics toward 
corporate ownership of the high street leading to potential ‘Clone Town’ effect. Although likely 
trajectory of London development, thesis argues mega-events catalyse neoliberal forms of urban 
development – spaces that clean out deadwood businesses and renew through a mode of creative 
destructive which is indicate of how communities grow, flourish, wither and die – a cycle. 
 Serious questions are to be asked about the totalitarian regimes that emerge under the guise of the 
departicularised and planetarised nature of the concept of ‘legacy’ itself. One of the key conclusions 
to be derived here is that legacy serves only to provide legitimisation rhetoric for Games intervention, 
one that remains overly decontextualized and divorced from reality. As recommended in Pappalepore 
and Duignan (2016), policy makers and academic inquiry must consider legacy in its specific contexts 
[city, region, locale…] under its influence, and explore this vague concept against the idiosyncratic and 
nuanced local dynamics it will inevitably interact with – as attempted by this study, inclusive of a 
systematic analysis of the shorter term small firm impacts too. 
 Structural economic developments post-Games alludes to London 2012 as a sanitation project, 
removal of deadwood business of whom do not fully contribute [or optimally contribute – as opposed 
to the ‘services’] to East London’s utopian legacy vision. Reflects modes of ‘social injustice’. 
 Disneyfication of Central Greenwich tourism. 
 Potential erosion [following corportisation effects] of Central Greenwich’s artisan and heritage 
cultural identity; will once upon a time unique spaces, of which clearly form a major driver of tourism 
and visitor demand (see Kotler et al, 2010) reduce longer-term destination competitiveness, impacting 
on future economic demand for emergent clone spaces, whilst simultaneously destroying social 
cohesion and dismantling qualitative interdependent networks that underpin the survival of small 
business communities. Although the Games presents quick-win; short-term economic boosts to host 
city, inevitable touch of Midas may in fact not only displace and sanitise small business communities, 
but also jeopardise the competitiveness of melancholic clone town spaces.  
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
316 | P a g e  
 
Misc. 
 
 Drawing from ‘shock theory’ and ‘neoliberal’ ideas -- two major modes of governance and political 
economy emerged – the pre-Games intense form of regulation and control via public and government 
intervention (the ‘Tremor Principle’ vs. the dissipation of public and government interest due to de-
politicised project presence (the ‘Aftershock Principle’). The Olympics to be conceptualised as an 
‘exogenous shock’, permitting controls and neoliberal forms of urban-economic development. 
 In order to fully analyse the complexity of small firm HEZ and Last Mile experiences, continued 
qualitative approaches are required to understand the in-depth consequences of Olympic planning.  
 Vague, wish washy responses [passive language, negative effects omitted, lack of honesty] from senior 
government, and policy – very little understanding of true localism – disconnect from realities of 
impacts and legacies here at the local-host community level. 
 Missed opportunities to use the Games to celebrate the cultural diversity [‘We hoped for people 
walking through the market and talking some time to browse and maybe shop – finding locally sourced 
good and ‘Made in the UK’ items’ (Interviewee #43 (SG1))] often reflected across UK high streets; 
and legacy potential to re-brand and support more vulnerable small firms to reflect Central 
Greenwich’s heritage. 
 Smaller, bottom-up events more inclusive and of benefit for local small businesses than top-down 
mega-events. 
 
Appendix 3: Contributions to Knowledge Table 
Contribution? What? How and why does this contribute? 
‘SmallBizImpacts’ 
mapping 
Empirical and literature analysis unpacks wide-
reaching, short, long, and negative, positive economic 
and social impacts on small business, specific to case 
and more broadly.  
i) Limited analysis in small business impacts, ii) important 
in light of criticisms, vulnerabilities of small firms and lack 
of attention given to such analysis, iii) useful heuristic and 
analytical lens for future scholars and builds on work by 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), iv) in light of democratic 
cities vetoing government use of mega-events for urban 
development (see Zimblist, 2015) mapping can be used as 
evidence of opportunities and challenges for local people 
to avoid ‘information asymmetry’, which may empower 
communities to democratically say ‘NO’ to hosting the 
Games (e.g. Boston 2022; and recently Hamburg 2024). 
Helps to empirically validate Preuss’/ Hiller’s theoretical 
models that currently lack evidence base, opening up 
collaborative opportunities. Empiricism highlights critical 
concerns that form one of the overarching justifications 
for study. In addition, detailed empiricism helps provide 
data to underpin interpretations and theoretical arguments 
throughout. 
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Conceptualising the 
Olympic-tourism perfect 
storm 
Empirical and literature analysis unpacks complex 
tourism, trade and visitation impacts, argues that 
Olympics creates a perfect storm, a systematic chain of 
negative effects for local small firm consumption. 
i) Olympic tourism impacts on host communities and 
small firms are fragmented, and require a 2016 refresh of 
the dynamics at play here [especially in the context of ‘Last 
Mile’ zones], ii) important in light of criticisms, 
vulnerabilities of small firms and lack of attention given to 
such analysis, iii) useful heuristic and analytical lens for 
future scholars. 
Neoliberalism and 
public Olympic spaces 
Like national-natural commodities, public spaces 
projected to host Olympic activity are temporarily 
commodified and recommercialised - bought and sold 
by private capital. Mega-events thus allow public assets 
to be ‘neoliberalised’, corporatised and opened up to 
free market dynamics.  
i) Limited use of neoliberalism as a lens to conceptualise 
uses of spaces in the context of mega-events in this way, 
ii) identified as major barrier for effective small firm 
leveraging, iii) qualitatively maps out all securitising actors 
in rich, thick detail. 
Mega-events as shocks - 
temporal shifts of 
neoliberal governance 
Argues two modes of urban governance exist before 
and during (the ‘Tremor principle’) and ‘after’ (the 
‘Aftershock principle’). Explanatory theory to indicate 
why, before and during, interests of host communities 
are superseded by the desire for ‘capital accumulation’ 
and capitalist regime, and why government allows 
public spaces to become commoditised. Whilst after 
the Games, once the damage has been done, play weak 
role in policy and development, opting for free market, 
private-led approach. 
Argues that during the Games host spaces turn into 
overly militarised and securitised areas, imposing war-
zone like conditions, aided through ‘fear’ tactics, 
controls to manipulate visitor experiences and 
engagement with host spaces. The Olympics seen as a 
necessary shock and blinding spectacle where 
undemocratic extraordinary controls are permitted. 
i) Builds on House of Lords (2013) and literature critique 
of limited post-Games attention to legacy and host 
communities, ii) questions traditional view on 
neoliberalism and opens up new ways for neoliberal 
doctrine to work in the new urban order, iii) critiques overt 
role governments play in allowing undemocratic urban 
events to flourish in favour of ‘capital accumulation’ 
regardless of the loss of cultural and social value that may 
occur (see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016), iv) 
contributes to wider application of Klein’s (2007) shock 
theories, doctrine and ‘disaster capitalism’ and Smith’s 
(2013) notion of mega-events as ‘exogenous shocks’, v) 
whilst creating a whole new theoretical focus around the 
guises of neoliberalism in the 21st century urban order. 
Exposes small firm 
marginalisation, risk 
and exclusion – and 
develops a manifesto for 
small firm resistance and 
effective leverage. 
In-depth examination of exclusion and feelings of 
powerlessness within large projects and the personal 
consequences for those involved. Empirically driven 
series of guidance notes, supported with literature 
where possible, for small firms and those responsible 
for the welfare of small firms in host communities to 
emancipate themselves from determined topologies, 
trade and spatial challenges arising across host 
communities. Includes recommendations for 
capitalising on the potential opportunities for small 
firms as outlined in the ‘SmallBizImpacts’ mapping. 
Develops specific knowledge around how small firms 
can be excluded and marginalised by mega-events, and 
i) Resource never before created for small firms in mega-
event contexts, ii) emancipation required in light of 
challenges identified (to resist and/or avert, not de-rail 
current project practices), iii) useful as a lobbying tool for 
stakeholder organisations and to help re-distribute benefits 
across these stakeholders that use more inclusive 
leveraging strategies (see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016; 
Ziakas, 2014), iv) affords new rhizomatic activity to be 
permitted across what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer 
to as ‘determined striated topologies’. 
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
318 | P a g e  
 
contributes to current wider debates around how host 
communities in general can be side-lined. 
Exposing the gap: 
‘rhetoric’ vs. ‘realities’ 
Builds complex story using significant policy document 
and media analysis and interviews with major 
stakeholders (including DCMS, LOCOG, Olympic 
borough councils, House of Lords121) to juxtapose pre-
Games rhetoric with the challenging realities and 
experiences informed through systematic analysis and 
amplification of  rich qualitative narratives emerging 
from over 50% of Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’ 
small firms. 
i) Prior discussion exists around ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ but 
not to the level of detail exhibited in this thesis or with the 
kinds of stakeholder perspectives gathered.  
ii) Critical to note in light of the theme of ‘doomed to fail’ 
strategic leveraging attempts by small firms down to ‘faux 
opportunity’ which compounded challenges faced. 
Exposes systematic and 
systemic structural 
economic risk to small 
firm legacy and futures 
Argues the Olympics, alongside aforementioned space 
and trade challenges and several other adjoining 
economic variable factors, imposes inevitable and 
evidenced rising rents [‘Olympic effect’], gentrifying 
and stimulates the corporatisation of the high street – 
thus posing challenging futurities for small firms which 
constitute an on-going major shift, as identified by the 
author (Wilbert and Duignan, 2015). Reveals the 
challenging realities for small firms throughout the 
TDR cycle. This is empirically evidenced and 
supported by literature and logic. 
i) Builds on existing knowledge around gentrification of 
host communities, and places this theory in the context of 
small firm experiences and survival in new urban order, ii) 
exposes legacy as greatest expression and form of 
‘newspeak’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001) – a 
‘departicularised’ concept and form of ‘cultural 
imperialism’ (see Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016), a ‘fig 
leaf’ to cover up excessive project expenditure and help 
policy makers to project promising futurity to distract from 
the present challenges. A concept overly decontextualized, 
divorced from reality – requiring studies like this thesis to 
place ‘legacy’ in its idiosyncratic and nuanced local 
dynamics to understand its ‘true’ implications. 
Reproducibility of 
methodology, and the use 
of digital technologies  
Detailed, clearly designed methodology allowing for 
repeatability, and the use of digital technologies (e.g. 
Twitter, blogs, LinkedIn) to inform sampling, gain 
access to difficult to reach policy networks, and 
support data collection efforts. The multi-levelled 
stakeholder sample (SG1-4) alongside rich, qualitative 
analysis provides antidote to the problematic overuse 
of positivistic, statistical and economic measures often 
used in mega-event analyses that often paint over the 
complex, nuanced nature of local impacts – not 
revealing often enough the lost small firm narratives 
that fail to emerge in mega-event contexts. 
i) An explicit characteristic for critically orientated studies 
advocated by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, in 
order to help build theory and external validity of 
knowledge. Aligns with the need to promote systematic 
meta-evaluative qualitative study to build theory and 
evidence base, and provide enough traction to invoke 
practical change and (event-led) policy. 
Calling for wider 
conceptualisations of 
‘contribution’ 
Argues UK doctoral contributions not only need to 
extend knowledge, theory base et cetera but should 
also be centred on dissemination (public/media) and 
policy engagement in preparation for REF ‘Research 
Impact’ agendas, alongside research-informed teaching 
i) Limited discussion on considering new ways of thinking 
about doctoral contribution in the literature, only at the 
post-doctoral and early career level, ii) important to 
critique doctoral outputs in preparation for future 
academic leadership, iii) empower doctoral students to 
                                                          
121 See Methodology chapter for full breakdown of all major stakeholder organisations and perspectives gathered, which forms, in itself, a 
contribution to knowledge. 
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excellence as part of informing critical debates with 
students, who play a vital role in impacting on future 
management practice. 
gain both academic and public peer feedback on the very 
stakeholders under investigation and with vested interest 
in outputs. 
 
Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form (PCF) 
Participant Consent Form 
Name of participant: ……………………………….. 
Title of the project: Exploring the project experiences and potential local business legacies of the London 2012 Olympic 
Games 
Main investigator and contact details:  
Name: Michael Duignan 
Email: Michael.Duignan@anglia.ac.uk 
Work Number: +44 1223 363 271 (ext 5691) 
Mobile Number: +44 784 606 1595 
Members of the research team: Michael Duignan (only) 
1. I agree to take part in the above research.  I have read the Participant Information Sheet which is attached to this form.  
I understand what my role will be in this research, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
2. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any time, for any reason and without prejudice. 
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded. 
4. I am free to ask any questions at any time before and during the study. 
5. I have been provided with a copy of this form and the Participant Information Sheet. 
Data Protection:  I agree to the University processing personal data which I have supplied.  I agree to the processing 
of such data for any purposes connected with the Research Project as outlined to me* 
Name of participant (print)…………………………. 
Signed………………..…. 
Date……………… 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS FORM TO KEEP 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
If you wish to withdraw from the research, complete the form below and return to the investigator 
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Title of Project: 
I WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY 
 
Signed: __________________________________        Date: _________________________________ 
Appendix 5: Ethics Checklist 
Date 23.05.13  
 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Duignan 
  
SID: 
 
0505494/3 
 
 
Title of 
Research 
Project: 
 
 
Understanding Olympic legacy through a local lens; the experiences of small businesses and the 
London 2012 Games 
 
 
Faculty: 
 
 
LAIBS 
  
Supervisor(s): 
Dr Ilaria Pappalepore 
Dr Chris Wilbert 
Prof Chris Ivory 
 
 
Type of research: 
Tick all that apply 
 
 
 Undergraduate      Taught postgraduate      Research degree 
 
 Member of staff      Other 
 
 
                             If you require this checklist or any of the documentation in an alternative format (e.g. Braille, large print, audio or 
electronically) please contact Julie.Scott@anglia.ac.uk 
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You need to consider ethics for all research studies.  Research is defined in the UREC (Research Ethics Sub 
Committee) Policy and Code of Practice for the Conduct of Research with Human Participants on Page 5.  Please 
refer to: 
http://www.anglia.ac.uk/ruskin/en/home/central/rds/services/research_office/research_degrees/ethics.html 
Please complete this mandatory Ethics Review Checklist for all research applications.  This is to ensure that you are 
complying with Anglia Ruskin University Policy and Code of Practice for the Conduct of Research with Human 
Participants.   
All research applications are dealt with in the same way.  There is no distinction between undergraduate, 
taught Masters, research degree students and staff research. 
For research involving animals, please complete the Animal Ethics Review Checklist to determine your course of 
action. 
This checklist should be completed by the Principal Investigator or the student in consultation with his/her supervisor. 
 
If your study requires a Risk Assessment, it must also be kept on file and updated annually. Please see the 
ethics guidance and the Risk Management website for further information 
http://rmd.anglia.ac.uk/form.asp?id=17&sectionid=19      
CHECKLIST 
                          YES     NO 
1. Does your research involve human participants?       
(Including observation only)      
2. Does your research involve accessing personal, sensitive or     
 confidential data?         
3. Does your research involve ‘relevant material’ as defined by the    
Human Tissue Act (2004)?        
4. Does your research involve participants who are 16 years and     
over who lack capacity to consent and therefore fall under the  
Mental Capacity Act (2005)?        
5. Will the study involve NHS patients, staff or premises or Social                 
Services users, staff or premises? 
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If you have answered NO to all the above questions, you do not need formal ethics approval.  You do, however, need 
to submit this checklist signed and dated to the relevant Faculty Research Ethics Panel (FREP) Administrator prior 
to starting your research. 
 
If you have answered YES to either or both Questions 1 and 2, you need to submit an application, including this 
checklist, to your FREP. 
 
If you have answered YES to Question 3, you need either to submit your application to your FREP or an NHS 
Research Ethics Committee (REC), even if the study does not involve the NHS.  Please seek further advice if you are 
unsure about which committee it needs to be submitted to. 
 
If you have answered YES to Question 4, you need to seek approval from an NHS REC, even if your study does not 
involve the NHS. 
 
If you have answered YES to Question 5, you need to obtain approval from: ca. Both an NHS REC and the NHS 
Trust(s) where you are carrying the research out (R&D Management Approval) or b. The Local Research Governance 
Group (Social Services). Please note that you must send a copy of the final approval letter(s) to: Beverley Pascoe, 
RESC Secretary, Research, Development and Commercial Services. 
 
Additional information: 
This project will involve working with human participants throughout the primary data collection processes, and 
will therefore need to access data of a personal, sensitive and confidential nature. 
All involved participants in the research will be informed about the overall purpose of the research, main features 
and will consider issues like ensuring confidentiality, avoidance of harm, reciprocity and feedback of results will 
be also taken into account (Cryer, 2006) – see RD1 Research Proposal for reference. 
 
Appendix 6: Participant Information Sheet (PIS)  
Participant Information Sheet  
This participant information provides a brief summary of key information relating to this research project.  
Section A: The research project  
1. Title of project:  
Exploring the project experiences and potential local business legacies of the London 2012 Olympic Games  
2. Purpose and value of study:  
This exploratory piece of research has two key interests:  
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a) Looking broadly at the opportunities and challenges local high street businesses around London 2012 Olympic 
host ‘event zones’ (Newham and Greenwich) faced during the planning and delivery of the Games  
- Identify how far the Games impacted on local stakeholders over a range of economic and social aspects; 
and whether high street business extracted some form of value from their Games experiences 
 
- Following on post-Games 2-3 years later, conceptualise what the local legacy may potentially look like for 
this specific stakeholder group  
b) Exploring how far interests of such local stakeholders are considered during the complexity of such mega-
sporting event project planning and delivery, and what part did local and national project actors play in supporting 
local stakeholders? 
Value: the key value of the study is to draw on an eclectic range of key stakeholders involved in the project – local 
‘event zone’ businesses; local and national level project actors responsible in some way for the planning and delivery 
of the Games. This will provide a non-bias, holistic and balanced range of perspectives and experiences.  
By analysing opportunities and challenges of mega-event project delivery on local stakeholders, data collected may 
inform future local and national policy decisions in mega-events, and enhance local economic development and 
provide greater value for local stakeholders pre, during and post-event.  
By building a picture of London 2012 local impact and legacy; we can continue to incrementally build on the types 
of effects mega-events can have on their respective host communities. Given the continuing importance of events as 
a strategic tool for economic and social regeneration and development – understanding their local effects is of 
significant importance for study.  
3. Invitation to participate  
We are inviting three key stakeholder groups to share their perspectives and experiences from London 2012 relating 
to one or both of the areas of interest above – these are:  
- Local host ‘event zone’ businesses around key competition venues in Newham and Greenwich  
- Local council/authority project actors with a stake in the interests/welfare for local businesses in their respective 
constituency  
- National level project actors (e.g. ex-LOCOG; Mayor’s Office; GLA; LLDC etc) of whom had an interest/stake in 
the planning and delivery of the London 2012 Olympic Games  
4. Who is organising the research  
Michael Duignan – PhD Researcher and Lecturer within the Institute of International Management Practice (IIMP), 
Lord Ashcroft International Business School, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge. 
You can visit Michael’s academic profile here: 
http://www.anglia.ac.uk/ruskin/en/home/faculties/aibs/staff_profiles/all_staff/michael_duignan.html  
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5. What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results of the study will be analysed on Anglia Ruskin University Cambridge campus, and stored securely under 
a password protected virtual environment. Any data will be published within the PhD research; and in academic 
journals and other sources within the academic domain. At all times, data and everyone who partakes in the study is 
completely anonymous.  
 
6. Source of funding for the research? 
Institute of International Management Practice (IIMP), Lord Ashcroft International Business School, Anglia Ruskin 
University, Cambridge.  
 
7. Contact for further information  
Email: Michael.Duignan@anglia.ac.uk  
Work phone: +44 1223 363 271 (ext 5691)  
 
Section B: Your participation in the research project  
 
1. Why you have been invited to take part?  
You have been invited to take part as you fall under one of those stakeholder groups stated above in the section 
‘Invitation to participate’.  
 
2. Whether you can refuse to take part?  
You can refuse to take part, during any point of the research.  
 
3. Whether you can withdraw at any time, and how? 
You can withdraw, even after being interviewed as part of the study.  
If recorded, the researcher will send the raw audio file for your agreement before any data is analysed.  
If you would like to retract anything you say from the audio, please notify the researcher and this will be taken out 
of the data to be analysed.  
N.B. Before any data is published, the researcher aims to ensure all research participants are comfortable with the 
responses they have provided.  
 
4. What will happen if you agree to take part?  
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
325 | P a g e  
 
You will be provided with a brief description of the procedure of the primary data collection – inc date, time, place 
and agenda. The key details within this form should also answer any more issues.  
If the participant has any questions at all, they can contact me on the contact details provided.  
 
5. Whether there are any risks involved?  
None.  
 
6. Agreement to participate in this research should not compromise your legal rights  
Agreement to take part in this research study does not affect your statutory rights.  
 
7. Whether there are any special precautions you must take before, during or after taking part in the study? 
None.  
 
8. What will happen to any information/data that are collected from you?  
All data/information samples will be kept securely on a password protect server at Anglia Ruskin University 
campus. All participants will remain completely anonymous unless they specifically state they are happy to be 
named.  
 
9. Whether there are any benefits from taking part  
a) For all participants, a full final report with study outcomes and recommendations will be provided.  
b) Opportunity to be part of a unique local legacy study for London 2012; and contribute a valuable perspective in 
relation to the study focus  
 
10. How your participation in the project will be kept confidential  
All details to be kept anonymous; all personal and professional details kept securely – where only the researcher has 
access to research participant information. Any confidential details required i.e. disability and financial information 
shall be kept in accordance to the Data Protection Act 1998. This will apply to ALL research approaches, methods, 
phases and stakeholder groups subject to research.  
If you have any questions relating to anything in this information sheet; please feel free to contact Michael Duignan 
using the contact details provided in this document. 
 
Email: Michael.Duignan@anglia.ac.uk  
Michael B. Duignan  Anglia Ruskin University 
326 | P a g e  
 
Twitter: @michaelbduignan 
Academic profile: http://bit.ly/1sbuZto  
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS TO KEEP, 
TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF YOUR CONSENT FORM ON THE DAY 
Appendix 7: Ethics Application Form 
Name Michael Duignan 
Faculty LAIBS 
Title of Proposed 
Research 
Understanding Olympic legacy through a local lens; the experiences of small businesses and 
the London 2012 Games  
Address 72 Perne Road 
E-mail address Michael.Duignan@anglia.ac.uk 
Type of 
Researcher 
(please tick) 
  Undergraduate student        
Postgraduate student:  
  Masters      Doctorate   Other please state………………….   
  Member of staff                    
Supervisor/Project 
Director 
Dr Ilaria Pappalepore 
Collaborators N/A 
 
Expected date of 
commencement  
01/07/2013 
Approximate duration 18 months 
Externally funded   Yes 
  No 
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The University offers indemnity insurance to researchers who have obtained formal written ethics approval 
for their research.  For details see page 25 of “Ethics Committee Procedures for the Conduct of Research”.  
1. Briefly describe the rationale for and state the value of the research you wish to undertake. 
The research will attempt to explore how specific business clusters around London 2012 core event zones (i.e. the Olympic 
Park / Excel arena etc) have been impacted by the Games so far. With regards to impact and value; by achieving the 
aims/objectives as outlined in 3); this research will further understanding of the key factors that contribute to the Olympic 
legacy of local small businesses; and help inform future local policy decisions and strategic business decisions needed by 
local businesses themselves in order to capitalise and leverage potential opportunities pre, during and post-Games.  
 
2. Suitability/qualifications of researchers to undertake the research  .Please include details of any internal or external 
research ethics training you have participated in. 
1)  Previous research experience carrying out primary research; handling i.e. confidentiality issues with dealing with 
human participants. 
2)  Internal ethics training completed 
3)  Background reading of how similar research has been executed; which will support and guide how I may approach 
my own 
 
3. What are the aims of the research? 
Overarching objective – to enhance our understanding of what Olympic legacy means for local small business clusters 
around core event zones (i.e. Olympic Park; Excel Arena etc), and the role of both local policy and strategic business 
decisions made by businesses themselves in order to leverage potential Olympic opportunities – pre, during and post-Games. 
The study will look at how such local small business clusters / environments change over time post-Games in year 1 and 
year 2. 
The final product - to create a conceptual model; that helps to explain this particular dynamic.  
Individual research objectives / questions 
1) From the perspective of small local business clusters around core event zones - what do they believe to be the key 
elements that contribute towards achieving a positive long-term Olympic Legacy for them?  
 
2) Identify the cause and effect relationship between decisions made throughout the Olympic Games delivery process 
and the competitiveness and performance of local small businesses 
a) Pre, during and post-Games; which local policy decisions worked Vs those that did not in helping local small 
business clusters around core event zones achieve a positive Olympic legacy 
b) During the Games; – can we identify key  initiatives taken by small local businesses themselves, that determined 
successful Vs non-successful business competitiveness and performance 
3) Identify post-Games year 1 and year 2 impact of the Games on local small business clusters / environment around 
the specific core event zones – what’s changed? 
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4) Extrapolate good local policy / business practice AND/OR learn from the lessons of London 2012 Games delivery 
to inform future mega-event delivery 
 
 
 
NOTE: For clearer picture - see attached JPEG Picture ‘PhD Research Objectives – visualised and connected – May 2013 
 
 
4. Briefly describe the overall design of the project 
Overall 
Multi-methodology; phenomenological case-study of London 2012 Games using qualitative and quantitative methods to 
extract primary data. Primary research will be triangulated with three key stakeholder groups of who form the main 
influencers in terms of Games impact on local small business clusters – see below 1-3. This will further complement the 
secondary research triangulation approach (academic literature/writings; comparative case-study analysis; policy/practice 
documentations). 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Group 1 – Small local businesses 
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Stakeholder Group 2 –  Local business associations (i.e. East Greenwich Business Association) 
Stakeholder Group 3 –  Local council officials in representing London boroughs 
Geography 
The research will take place within proximity of the key London 2012 core event zones (i.e Greenwich Park)  
 
5. Briefly describe the methods of data collection and analysis 
 
This ethics application will ONLY need cover- PHASE 1 below.  
Phase 1  (Summer, 2013) – preliminary exploratory study to develop relationships with key stakeholder groups; validate 
the apriori secondary themes of how local businesses are/can be impacted (general business, economic and social impacts) 
by the Games; and to identify any particular aposteriori new and known impacts worth exploring. 
This phase will include 
-  initial semi-structured interviews with local business associations to identify how their respective local small 
business clusters have been impacted by the Games 
- Initial semi-structured interviews with local businesses themselves to identify and achieve Research Objective 1. 
 
The research will also have two further phases to be decided of which will aim to contribute to achieving research objectives 
1,2,3 and 4.  
 
 
6. Describe the participants: give the age range, gender and any particular characteristics pertinent to the research 
project. For experimental studies state the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Primary research triangulated; with three key stakeholder groups of who form the main influencers in terms of Games impact 
on local small business clusters – see below 1-3. This will further complement the secondary research triangulation approach 
(academic literature/writings; comparative case-study analysis; policy/practice documentations). 
Stakeholder Group 1 – Small local businesses 
Random selection of research participants, geographically based within proximities of London 2012 ‘core event zones’  
Stakeholder Group 2 –  Local business associations (i.e. East Greenwich Business Association) 
Targeted primary data collection from key representatives from the respective borough business associations, of whom are 
responsible for collective welfare of their local small businesses 
Stakeholder Group 3 –  Local council officials in representing London boroughs 
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Targeted primary data collection from council officials of whom played key roles in supporting local activities within their 
respective borough pre, during and post-Games 
 
7. If your participants are under 18, please attach a copy of your clearance letter from the Criminal Records Bureau 
(if UK) or equivalent non-UK clearance, or, if not, explain below: 
N/A  
 
8. How will the participants be selected and recruited? 
Random selection of local businesses within a specific proximity of the London 2012 ‘core event zones’. The use of company 
databases like OSIRIS and FAME will be used to identify suitable array of candidates. Social media will also provide a 
gateway in to specific local communities, and I will engage with local business, and local business association via these 
channels to develop preliminary relationships. I will then set-up primary data collections via email, once links have been 
established. For those I do not engage with via social media, I will use the contact details provided on OSIRIS and FAME, 
or via company internet webpages, to make initial email / telephone contact. I may also make a preliminary visit to the key 
geographic areas I wish to study first, in order to scope out the potential small business population.  
 
9. How many participants will be involved? For experimental studies, specify how the sample size was determined. 
In clinical trials, a Power calculation must be included. 
The number of interview participants will be determined, once an analysis of ALL key stakeholders has been identified. 
FREP will be informed about the number of participants and consent obtained before commencement of the fieldwork. 
 
10. What procedures will be carried out on the participants (if applicable)? 
To gather the necessary primary data, three standard techniques will be used for data collection; interviews, questionnaires 
/ surveys and focus groups. A triangulated methodological approach. A similar triangulated stakeholder / participant 
approach will also be adopted. Forming the main influencers in terms of Games impact on local small business clusters, and 
for achieving my research objectives, I will focus on collecting the views and experiences of the three groups 1-3 listed above 
in section 6.   
Interviews will likely form a semi-structure to allow for narrative, discussion and the participant themselves to control an 
exploratory direction of conversation facilitated by the researcher. Given the exploratory nature of this research, this is vital 
to ensure each participant’s experience [of Games impact] is communicated. The location of interviews will be dependant 
up on the stakeholder group involved within this primary data collection. Interviews with local business will likely take place 
in their rented/owned premises, to ensure they feel comfortable, have privacy and confidentiality.  
Questionnaires will run post-interview stage, and will be developed using the Bristol Online Survey (BOS) or Survey 
Monkey and will be disseminated via email. Email addresses will be gathered via the Participant Information Sheet (PIS), 
post-interviews. They will be used to compare and consolidate findings from interviews. 
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Focus groups, if conducted will likely take place at a London University campus (UEL or UCL); and if not feasible, the 
Cambridge campus of Anglia Ruskin University Business School. The likeliness of the need for focus group will be 
determined by the degree the researcher feels the research objectives and whether data saturation has been achieved. 
 
11. What potential risks to the participants do you foresee?  
1)  Anonymity of identity and personal details 
2)  Reflecting their research participant opinion correctly within research and analysis 
3)  Some people may find interviews intimidating 
 
12. How do you propose to ameliorate/deal with potential risks to participants? 
1)  All details to be kept anonymous; all personal and professional details kept securely – where only the 
researcher has access to research participant information. Any confidential details required i.e. disability and 
financial information shall be kept in accordance to the Data Protection Act 1998. This will apply to ALL 
research approaches, methods, phases and stakeholder groups subject to research 
2) In order to ensure that the research reflects the opinions of the research participant/subject – ALL transcripts 
and themes will be sent to them so they can validate the information appropriately  
3) To provide a relaxed environment for the research participant; talk through the structure of the questions and 
the format of the interview. I will also make it clear that participants are free to withdraw at any time (during 
the interview and their responses afterwards) and are by no means obliged to answer questions if they feel 
uncomfortable. 
 
13. What potential risks to the interests of the researchers do you foresee?  
Interviewing face-to-face and one-to-one there may be physical risks. If experiences of local small business owner have been 
traumatic; this may induce upset responses. 
 
14. How will you ameliorate/deal with potential risks to the interests of researchers? 
Public environments; not alone – agreed by both parties. When constructing semi-structured questions; these must be 
emotionally intelligent and not be provocative.  
When asking questions; research must remain neutral and non-biased.  
 
15. Has a risk assessment been completed? (Yes/No) – link to risk assessment website - 
http://web.anglia.ac.uk/anet/rdcs/compliance/index.phtml (please be aware this must be kept on file and updated 
annually)  
N/A 
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16. How will you brief and debrief participants? (Attach copy of information to be given to participants) 
1)  Participants are fully informed from the start of the project, pre-meeting of time, date and place (agreed by both 
parties) 
2)  At time of the meeting, there will be an introduction to the project, its aims and objectives, and the allotted time 
we have to conduct the interview. At this stage to ease the participant, I will provide a list of all semi-structured 
questions prepared for interview 
3)  Participant Information Sheets (PIS) will be distributed – SEE ATTACHED PIS form 
 
17. Will informed consent be sought from participants?  Yes (Please attach a copy of the consent form)  
No   
If no, please explain below: 
 
18. If there are doubts about participants’ abilities to give informed consent, what steps have you taken to ensure that 
they are willing to participate? 
At this current stage respondents will be all above 18 and fully able to give consent. If they cannot give consent (i.e. people 
unable to give consent are children, mentally disabled people or perhaps people in precarious situations like in jail, political 
refugees, etc.) then they will not partake in the research study. 
 
19. If participants are under 18 years of age please describe how you will seek informed consent 
At this current stage respondents will be all above 18. If this changes, I will inform the FREP.   
 
20. How will consent be recorded? 
Consent will be recorded on file, using the ‘Participant Consent Form’ and recorded electronically; using a secure password 
protected server.  
 
21. Will participants be informed of the right to withdraw without penalty? Yes   
No   
If no, please detail the reasons for this: 
 
22. How do you propose to ensure participants’ confidentiality and anonymity? 
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All data/information will be treated without a name and identity; and no data/information will be published that denotes 
that it is from a particular research participant. At all time data is always kept secure, under a password protected University 
system.  
 
23. Please describe which of the following will be involved in your arrangements for storing data: 
 Manual files (e.g. paper documents or X-rays)  
 Home or other personal computer 
 University computer 
 Private company or work-based computer 
 Laptop computer 
 Other (please define) 
Please explain, for each of the above, the arrangements you will make for the security of the data (please note that any data 
stored on computer must have password protection as a minimum requirement): 
ALL research participant data will be kept on audio recordings, which are synced with the laptop of the researcher. This data 
will at all times be kept under a password protected server in a password protected folder to optimise protection. 
ALL transcribing will be placed under exact same protective environment – and will be only accessible by the researcher 
(me).  
 
24. Will payments be made to participants? Yes   
No   
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